Development  of  Tactics 

World  War 


BY 


BALCK 

Lieutenant  General,  Gennadi  Army 


Translated   By 

Harry  Bell 


With     Eighteen     Sketches 


THE  GENERAL  SERVICE  SCHOOLS  PRESS 
Fort  Leavenworth,  Kansas 


1922 


All  Rights  of  Translation  and  Publication  for  North  America 
Secured  by  Book  Department,  General  Service  Schools,  1921 


^v 


:;?■. 


FOREWORD 

Shortly  before  the  outbreak  of  the  World  War,  I  was 
engaged  in  preparing  my  six-volume  "Tactics"  (the  single 
volumes  of  which  had  already  appeared  in  the  4th  Edition) , 
for  a  new  edition.  Extensive  preparations  had  been  made 
therefor  and  valuable  material  had  been  assembled,  gath- 
ered from  my  essays  on  Infantry  Tactics  since  1901  and 
published  in  Loebell's  Annuals.  With  the  first  edition  of 
my  "Tactics,"  I  had  taken  a  stand  for  increased  valuation 
of  Tactics  and  Psychology  in  troop  leading.  The  World  War 
has  confirmed  this  necessity.  My  work  concerning  tactics 
embraced  the  viewpoint  in  tactics  of  all  large  military 
powers  prior  to  the  World  War,  and  it  is  hoped  that  it  will 
always  remain  of  value  in  all  general  questions.  The  World 
War  brought  about  enormous  changes:  It  has  shown  the 
importance  of  the  penetration,  with  the  million  men  armies 
of  modern  times,  as  compared  to  the  envelopment.  I  had 
very  early  advocated  the  unavoidable  necessity  of  the  pene- 
tration, though  I  fully  knew  that,  without  doubt  an  envelop- 
ing battle,  a  "Cannae,"  would  be  easier,  would  have  greater 
success,  and  would  probably  also  be  of  more  decisive  effect. 
1  well  knev;  that  my  opinion  and  the  opinion  of  military 
circles  differed  greatly;  I  have  never  denied  the  advantages 
of  the  enveloping  battle,  but  also  have  always  pointed  out 
the  necessity  of  preparing  for  the  penetration.  The  World 
War  proved  that  I  was  right.  I  attempted  from  the  first 
days  of  the  war  to  make  myself  familiar  with  all  new  writ- 
ings and  events  in  training,  and  to  utilize  the  lessons  shown. 
If  I  now  attempt  to  discuss  the  development  of  tactics  in 
the  World  War,  I  well  know  the  difficulties  thereof,  because 
so  far  little  authentic  material  is  available  for  a  basis. 
Therefore,  in  the  discussion  of  actual  events  in  the  field, 
from  which  I  was  far  removed,  I  have  touched  upon  briefly 
and  have  treated  principally  the  events  on  the  Western 
front  from  the  standpoint  of  the  troop  leader.  The  portrayal 
of  the  development  has  been  selected,  because  it  only  makes 
clear,  how  we  arrived  at  our  present  day  views,  which  are 


FOREWORD 

SO  very  different  from  those  at  the  opening  of  the  World 
War. 

It  is  hoped  that  this  work  will  have  its  share  in  em- 
phasizing the  experiences  of  the  war  that  have  been  pur- 
chased with  so  much  blood,  and  which  experiences  may 
easily  run  the  danger  of  being  lost  in  the  dissolution  of 
our  old,  tried  army.  May  these  pages  call  back  to  mind 
what  our  troops  have  performed,  the  equal  of  which  can- 
not be  found  in  military  history,  by  heavy  work  against 
an  enemy  so  superior  in  numbers  and  equipped  with  all 
possible  auxiliary  means.  But  the  heroic  achievements 
of  our  troops  were  possible  only  because  all  members  of 
the  army  performed  untiring  and  devoted  work  in  time  of 
peace,  in  the  matter  of  training  the  men  to  faithful  per- 
formance of  duty,  willingness  to  assume  responsibility  and 
audacity.  I  have  but  briefly  touched  on  the  end  of  the  army ; 
my  theme  ends  upon  the  battlefield ;  the  awful  dissolution 
process  and  the  failures  at  home,  are  beyond  the  limits  of 
tactics.  Therefore,  I  have  purposely  avoided  touching  on 
the  unfortunate  struggles  in  the  interior  of  our  country. 

This  book  of  mine  is  not  for  the  purpose  of  accusing, 
neither  is  it  for  the  purpose  of  excusing  errors  that  have 
been  committed.  I  have  merely  touched  where  it  was  abso- 
lutely necessary.  My  only  endeavor  has  been  to  show  how 
our  present  day  tactics  had  their  being  and  how  they, 
starting  from  an  excellent  peace  training,  adapted  them- 
selves to  the  continually  more  difficult  demands  of  battle. 
Though  the  war  could  not  end  with  victory  on  the  battle- 
field, that  surely  was  not  the  fault  of  the  army,  nor  of  its 
leaders. 

I  shall  be  very  thankful  for  any  corrections  and  addi- 
tions. 

Aurich  {East  Friesland)  the  day  of  the  50th  Anniver- 
sary of  the  French  Declaration  of  War  in  the  Year  1870. 

Balck, 

Lieutenant  General,  Active  Service  in  the  Field, 
Commanding  the  51st  Reserve  Division. 


iv 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 


Chapter  I  — Training  in  Peace  and  Reality  in  War 1 

Chapter  II — Mobile  Warfare 16 

Training  and  Organization 16 

Tactics  of  Mobile  Warfare 29 

Changes  in  Organization,  Equipment  and  Armament 37 

Training   Regulations   for   Foot  Troops 42 

Chapter  III — Position  Warfare  in  the  West,  1914-1917 47 

Origin  and  Nature  of  Position  Warfare 47 

The  Position  Battles  Up  to  the  First  Attack  on  Verdun 52 

Lessons  of  the  Battle  on  the  Somme  and  the  Battles  in 

Front  of  Verdun  in  the  Late  Fall  of  1916 71 

Utilizing  the  Experiences  Gained 85 

The  Battles  in  1917 88 

Chapter  IV — The  War  in  the  East  and  in  Italy 108 

Russia    108 

Battles  in  Northern  Italy 117 

Mountain   Warfare   122 

Chapter  V      — Technique  in  War  129 

Chapter  VI    — The  Defensive  Battle  in  Position  Warfare 151 

Chapter  VII  — German  Attacks  with  Limited  Objectives 169 

Chapter  VIII — Machine   Guns    176 

Machine  Gun  Equipment  at  the  Outbreak  of  the  World  War__176 

Chapter  IX — The  Infantry  Attack  in  Open  Warfare 189 

Requirements    189 

Procedure  of  Attack 192 

Near   Reconnaissance   194 

Deployment  and   Development  197 

Artillery  of  the  Attack 199 

Working  Up  to  the  Enemy 200 

The   Assault   207 

Influence  of  Fog  213 

Fighting  in  Woods 214 

Village   Fighting   218 

Chapter  X— Cavalry  Prior  to  the  World  War 222 

Views  on  Cavalry  Attacks  223 

Employment  of  Cavalry  in  War 226 

Cavalry   Divisions   230 

Cyclists    231 

French  Views  Concerning  Employment  of  Cavalry 233 

Chapter  XI— The  Artillery 238 

Organization  and  Combat  Principles 238 

Co-operation  of  Infantry  and  Artillery 242 

Co-operation  Between  Artillery  and  Air  Service 246 

The  Decisive  Battle  in  Position  Warfare , 247 

The  Offensive 251 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

Chapter  XII— The  Year  1918 260 

Transition  from  Position  to  Mobile  Warfare 260 

Methods  of  Hostile  Defense  and  German  Offensive 262 

The  Spring  Offensive 270 

Resuming  the  Offensive 281 

The  Last  Defensive  Battle 286 

Conclusion    294 


VI 


I.     Training  in  Peace  and  Reality  in  War 

"Our  long  garrison  life  has  spoiled  us,  and  effeminacy 
and  desire  for  and  love  of  pleasure,  have  weakened  our  mili- 
tary virtues.  The  entire  nation  must  pass  through  the 
School  of  Misfortune,  and  we  shall  either  die  in  the  crisis, 
or  a  better  condition  will  be  created,  after  we  have  suffered 
bitter  misery,  and  after  our  bones  have  decayed."  Thus 
wrote  the  late  Field  Marshal  von  Gneisenau  under  the  im- 
pressions of  the  experiences  of  war  in  the  Year  1806.  Only 
the  bloody  seriousness  of  war  furnishes  a  final  receipt  for 
long  peace  labors.  If  the  training  of  the  troops  is  accord- 
ing to  correct  principles,  so  that  they  can  perform  anything 
and  everything  war  demands  of  them,  they  will  not  have 
to  forget  on  the  battlefield  anything  they  have  learned  in 
time  of  peace  (I.D.R.  477)  ;  also  they  will  not  have  then  to 
learn  anything  new.  Anyone  who  possesses  actual  ex- 
perience in  war  may  more  easily  attain  such  education  than 
another  who  knows  war  only  from  books,  or  whose  remem- 
brances of  war  have  been  dimmed  during  long  peace  time. 
The  Austrians  in  1866  and  the  British  in  the  Boer  War, 
had  materially  larger  experiences  in  war  than  had  their 
opponents,  and  still  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  was  inured 
against  disillusions ;  it  may  be  because  they  arrived  at  erro- 
neous decisions  based  on  prior  experiences,  or  it  may  be 
because  the  conception  of  actual  war  had  been  lost  by  col- 
onial warfare.  "La  petite  guerre  gate  le  militaire."  "The 
Austrians,"  wrote  Marshal  Foch  when  he  was  Director  of 
the  War  Academy — "had  so  far  conducted  war  without  un- 
derstanding war,  the  Prussians  had  studied  war  and  there- 
fore understood  it,  even  without  having  conducted  war." 

Just  as  dangerous  as  effeminacy  is  the  danger  of  let- 
ting habitual  custom  gain  the  preponderance,  as  is  shown 
by  a  senseless  repetition  in  training  of  a  well  known  exer- 
cise or  a  measure  that  has  proven  successful  in  the  face  of 
the  enemy.  The  army  of  1806 — as  von  der  Goltz  calls  it 
"a  very  industrious,  orderly,  willing  army" — had  gone  to 
sleep  on  the  laurels  of  Frederick  the  Great.    Afraid  to  break 


2  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

away  from  the  creations  of  Frederick,  we  had  allowed  them 
to  become  obsolete  by  adhering  to  the  strong  impetus  given 
by  unreliable  foreigners,  and  consequently  also  adhered  to 
the  old  time  line  tactics  and  the  sterotyped  formations.  The 
first  made  the  army  tactically,  the  latter  operatively  clumsy, 
an  enormous  disadvantage  opposed  to  the  French  Army  that 
was  not  bound  down  to  those  tactics.  Not  in  line  tactics  (for 
in  adopting  line  tactics  the  British  army  was  victorious  in 
the  Peninsula  War  over  the  French  column  tactics)  but  in 
the  inaptitude  of  commanders  and  troops  was  to  be  found 
the  cause  of  defeat  on  the  battlefield.  In  the  "echelon  at- 
tack" practiced  in  time  of  peace  at  every  opportunity,  later 
commanders  perceived  the  surest  guarantee  of  victory.  In 
Germany  we  also  trained,  up  to  the  publication  of  the  Regu- 
lations of  1888,  by  battalion,  regiment  and  brigade.  In  addi- 
tion to  the  free  fighting,  frequently  badly  transformed  into 
what  we  called  the  "Turkish"  method  there  was  a  hard  and 
fast  formation,  which  would  hardly  have  been  proper  in 
the  sixties.  The  finger  marks  of  this  formation  was  an  at- 
tack, badly  prepared  by  fire,  carried  out  with  insufficient 
means,  and  the  final  result  of  which  was  retreat,  followed  by 
flight  in  the  face  of  cavalry  and  forming  squares  by  bat- 
talions. Even  the  so-called  "Schlichting's  Seven  Wonders" 
caused  fatal,  normal  formation  tactics,  until  the  new  regu- 
lations swept  these  misconceptions  aside.  But  no  matter 
how  advanced  these  new  regulations  were,  the  habitual  cus- 
tomary training  of  earlier  times  (for  instance  the  prepon- 
derous  importance  of  adhering  to  regular  distance)  kept  up 
its  domination. 

Prior  to  the  World  War  the  German  army  worked  faith- 
fully and  it  was  very  far  from  falling  into  the  errors  Gneis- 
enau  had  condemned  in  1806.  But  it  was  not  free  from  a 
certain  formality,  which,  as  early  as  1892  Major  von  Mala- 
chowski  pointed  out  in  an  efficient  study  as  "Review"  tac- 
tics. By  pointing  out  the  difference  between  peace  engage- 
ments and  actual  engagements  in  war  he  showed  the  "Re- 
view" tactics  as  fatal  for  the  field  training  of  the  troops.  In 
the  words  of  Gneisenau  "The  endeavor  to  lead  the  troops 
well  on  large  parade  and  muster  days  is  very  damaging," 
and  then  continuing,  "the  tactics  which  expects  everything 
from   regulation   uniformity,   artificially  produced   on   the 


PEACE  TRAINING  AND  REALITY  OF  WAR  3 

drill  ground,  or  at  the  green  table,  that  cannot  be  used  in 
war  is  "Review"  tactics.  In  most  cases  it  extends  only  to 
a  play,  or  criticism-proof  battle  exercise.  During  longer 
periods  of  peace  it  is  the  most  dangerous  enemy  to  field  train- 
ing, by  continually  attempting  to  push  the  field  training 
into  the  background  at  all  points."  And  finally  he  adds 
wamingly  "The  mask  of  'Review'  tactics  continually 
changes,  the  inherent  quality  of  the  matter  is  always  the 
same."  Malachowski  then  turned  against  endeavors  in 
the  army  which  had  for  their  object  to  assure  a  smooth 
course  of  exercises.  "No  normal  tactics  can  replace  the 
military  qualities  and  tactical  perception  of  the  leader,"  he 
says,  "it  is  absolutely  fatal  to  field  training,  by  continually 
leading  away  from  the  simplicity  and  the  actuality  of 
things."  There  is  but  one  auxiliary  means  to  meet  such  ab- 
normal growths,  and  that  is  reverting  to  military  historical 
experiences.  The  "Review"  tactics  are  satisfied  with  super- 
ficial (exterior)  forms,  but  forgets  entirely  that  war  is  con- 
ducted by  men  against  men  and  that  in  war  the  moral  in- 
fluences are  principally  of  the  most  decisive  importance. 

It  is  very  probable  that  the  cavalry  especially  suffered 
from  "Review"  tactics,  for  it  rode  charges  in  autumn  man- 
euvers till  shortly  prior  to  the  World  War.  These  charges 
gladdened  every  military  eye,  but  they  could  never  have 
been  executed  in  that  manner  under  actual  fire.  On  the 
other  hand,  we  do  not  desire  to  bring  forth,  as  an  example 
to  be  governed  by,  the  British  cavalry  in  the  Boer  War, 
which  was  nothing  but  mounted  infantry. 

Still  less  did  the  artillery  count  in  our  exercises,  unless 
it  laid  weight  on  appearances,  as  its  firing  capacities  and 
results  could  not  be  portrayed. 

Actual  experiences  in  war,  which  each  one  can  gain 
only  in  a  limited  way,  are  of  inestimable  value;  but  they 
can  produce  fruitful  effect  only  if  they  are  thoroughly  proven 
and  utilized  by  the  study  of  military  history.  And  still,  how 
quickly  do  actual  war  experiences  fade  away!  We  have 
experienced  that  fact  in  our  own  army.  At  the  opening  of 
the  war  in  1864  we  had  lost  what  had  been  gained  in  the 
Wars  of  Liberation  at  so  much  effort  and  so  much  loss  of 
blood.  The  experiences  of  Worth  and  St.  Privat  should  un- 
doubtedly have  been  sufficient  to  teach  our  army  what  we 


4  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

considered  new  experiences  in  the  Russo-Japan  War.  In 
front  of  Verdun,  in  1916,  we  had  for  instance,  experiences 
in  plenty  concerning  how  horse  batteries  could  follow  the 
infantry  across  positions — and  shortly  prior  to  the  Spring 
offensive  in  19]  8,  trials  on  a  large  scale  were  repeated  to 
gain  the  same  old  results. 

It  is  not  at  all  difficult  to  cite  a  military  historical  ex- 
ample for  every  tactical  operation.  "Especially  difficult 
will  be  a  clear  objective  judgment,  when  the  question  is  one 
of  an  unfortunate  experience  in  war  by  our  own  army.  The 
general  adaption  of  military  history  to  such  examples  often 
leads  to  the  most  serious  errors  which,  having  become  ac- 
cepted rules,  spread  like  an  epidemic,  which  will  even  take 
hold  of  thinking  heads,  and  still  will  not  allow  their  meaning 
to  be  perceived."  Thus  we  can  account  for  the  numerous 
erroneous  decisions  drawn  from  events.  The  Austrians 
drew  from  their  experiences  during  the  War  in  Upper  Italy 
in  1859  the  necessity  of  brutal  shock  tactics;  the  British, 
after  the  Boer  War,  were  not  very  far  from  denying  the 
possibility  of  attack;  the  desire,  to  avoid  losses,  took  pre- 
cedence over  the  requirement  to  annihilate  the  enemy.  And 
finally,  the  Russians  in  Eastern  Asia  had  again  to  gather 
the  same  bitter  experiences  they  had  gained  before  at 
Plevna.  Nothing  but  thorough  study  of  military  historical 
events,  omitting  the  special  experiences  we  obtain  ourselves 
on  the  respective  theaters  of  war,  can  prevent  commanders 
from  entering  a  new  war  with  erroneous  views  of  the  in- 
herent qualities  of  present  day  fire  effect  gained  during  long 
periods  of  peace.  Up  to  the  present  day  every  war  has 
brought  surprises,  which  the  troops  could  master,  not 
through  hard  and  fast  rules  and  formations,  but  only  through 
the  training  they  underwent  in  time  of  peace ;  and  this  very 
fact  must  be  reckoned  with  in  peace  time  training.  Only  the 
inflexible  will  to  be  victorious,  without  regard  to  sacrifices 
demanded  by  battle,  will  overcome  all  difficulties.  Only 
thus  may  we  prevent  the  danger  of  immediately  accepting 
every  new  thing  happening  in  a  strange  theater  of  war  as 
our  guide,  and  adopting  it  as  a  cure-all  for  success.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  caution,  that  ought  to  be  con- 
sidered, contained  in  the  words  of  the  British  lieutenant 
general,  Sir  Ian  Hamilton,  based  on  his  impressions  of  the 


PEACE  TRAINING  AND  REALITY  OF  WAR  5 

battles  in  Eastern  Asia : — "What  a  blessing ;  the  larger  and 
the  prouder  an  army  is,  the  more  immobile  is  it  in  its  firmly- 
rooted  power  of  sticking  to  fundamentals  so  that  finally,  as 
a  unit,  it  becomes  inapt  to  absorb  the  experiences  of  other 
armies.  Military  attaches  can  discover  the  most  important 
points  for  training  and  employment  in  a  foreign  army  and 
urgently  recommend  their  adoption.  The  majority  of  their 
comrades  pay  just  as  little  attention  to  them  as  did  Napo- 
leon III  pay  attention  to  the  reports  of  Stoffel  concerning 
the  Prussian  army  prior  to  the  Franco-Prussian  War."  And 
quite  similarly  wrote  the  General  of  Infantry,  von  der  Goltz, 
in  the  second  edition  of  "Rossback  and  Jena;" — "Even  the 
South- African  War  has  created  doubt  if  we  are  still  on  the 
right  road  in  the  execution  of  our  infantry  fighting ;  will  our 
long  and  dense  skirmish  lines,  with  closely  following-up  sup- 
ports, carefully  nested  in  the  terrain,  in  the  face  of  rapid 
fire,  not  go  to  pieces,  as  did  in  other  times,  the  massed 
Prussian  lines,  under  the  fire  of  the  French  skirmishers?" 
Herewith  were  pointed  out  currents  of  "review"  tactics, 
which  threatened  to  limit  the  freedom  left  by  training  regu- 
lations. However,  the  German  infantry  could  with  satis- 
faction look  back  on  the  events  of  the  war  in  Eastern  Asia, 
for  did  not  the  Japanese  infantry,  trained  according  to  Ger- 
man methods,  victoriously  fight  under  very  difficult  condi- 
tions? The  Russo-Japanese  War  had  set  aside  the  uncer- 
tainty caused  by  the  Boer  War  in  the  tactical  views,  and 
primarily  the  doubts  concerning  the  possibility  of  executing 
the  infantry  attack.  It  made  short  and  thorough  work  in 
removing  the  overestimation  of  adherence  to  forms,  and  of 
overestimation  of  the  value  of  the  fire  power  of  the  defense. 
However,  the  superior  German  leadership  in  1870-71  and 
the  passiveness  of  the  Turks  in  1877  did  not  show  these  two 
maxims  as  clearly  as  was  the  case  in  the  engagements  of 
the  British  and  Japanese.  Thus,  these  wars  did  not  teach 
anything  else  than  what  could  be  gleaned  from  the  exper- 
iences of  the  Franco-Prussian  and  Russo-Turkish  ,wars, 
namely :  "Conduct  of  War  means  attack,  attack  means  car- 
rying forward  the  fire." 

Attack  and  defense  are  on  the  same  footing;  any  one 
who  wants  to  be  victorious  and  who  desires  to  gain  an  ad- 
vantage by  physically  overcoming  the  enemy,  must  attack. 


6  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

But  if  we  desire  to  resort  to  the  attack,  we  must  train  our 
troops  accordingly.  The  bayonet  training — almost  preached 
by  Dragomiroff — would  have  been  the  very  thing  in  Eas- 
tern Asia,  if  it  had  been  accompanied  by  thorough  training 
in  fire  fighting.  The  form  is  of  importance  only,  if  it  mater- 
ially increases  the  enemy's  losses.  The  will  to  be  victorious 
may  also  offset  a  discrepancy  in  numbers ;  not  the  stronger, 
but  the  one  that  is  more  energetic,  has  the  best  chances  of 
success.  During  a  long  period  of  peace,  which  easily  causes 
overestimation  of  material  factors,  we  cannot  too  fre- 
quently emphasize  the  fact  that  the  decision  to  attack  is 
based  on  the  task,  not  on  the  relation  of  strength.  This 
notwithstanding  the  fact  we  usually  learn  the  actual 
strength  of  the  enemy  only  after  a  battle,  in  many  cases 
only  after  the  end  of  the  war,  and  that  all  troops  are  in- 
clined to  overestimate  the  strength  of  the  enemy  with  whom 
engaged,  and  also  that  intrepid  attack  weakens  the  enemy 
and  makes  him  dependent  on  our  decision.  Finally,  no  one 
knows  if  the  enemy  is  actually  able  to  make  use  of  his 
forces. 

These  maxims  the  German  army  appropriated  to  its 
own  use.  Its  location  between  the  two  most  important  mili- 
tary Powers  of  Europe,  in  connection  with  an  army  which 
had  delayed  the  opportunity  to  demand  the  utmost  power 
of  its  people  in  the  expectation  of  a  decisive  battle,  forced 
the  German  army  leadership  to  pay  special  attention  to  the 
attack  against  hostile  superiority  in  numbers.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  experiences  in  war  by  ourselves,  our  army  had  to 
draw  on  the  sources  of  military  history  for  guides  in  its 
training,  and  this  was  done  with  success.  Military  history 
offers  the  possibility  to  properly  learn  the  decisions  that 
were  of  decisive  importance,  which,  in  exercises  on  the  map, 
or  on  the  drill  ground  seldom  come  into  account.  For  con- 
duct of  war  we  have  to  learn  from  foreign  experiences,  our 
own  experiences  come  too  dear  and  almost  always  too  late. 
"Military  history  is  no  manual  containing  well-formed 
theories,  is  no  volume  to  pass  the  time  in  reading,  but  is  a 
careful  teacher,  who  enables  us,  if  we  are  attentive,  to  view 
things  and  to  conceive  their  value,  as  w'e  would  never  have 
seen  in  life.  At  any  moment  we  may  face  in  the  same,  or 
an  entirely  changed  form,  questions  demanding  responsi- 


PEACE  TRAINING  AND  REALITY  OF  WAR  7 

ble,  decisive  and  nevertheless  immediate  action.  Of  course, 
military  history  offers  us  in  outline  only  the  events.  But 
it  also  offers  what  the  very  best  theory  can  never  offer,  the 
picture  of  frictions  in  war,  the  picture  of  the  influences  of 
the  doubts,  of  the  urgency,  of  the  incalculable  chances,  of 
the  surprises,  of  the  obstacles;  it  recounts  the  road  which 
the  commander  and  practical  military  knowledge  have  to 
take  to  overcome  these  difficulties;  it  prepares  the  normal 
counter-poise  for  the  moment  of  action;  it  should  prepare 
us  also  for  the  unexpected.  Military  history  should  take 
the  place  of  actual  experiences  in  war.  Our  life  is  not  long 
enough  to  gather  these  experiences  up  to  the  moment  of 
action."  It  does  not  suffice  to  merely  follow  up  the  regu- 
lations laid  down;  these  are  only  the  basis  of  experiences 
during  a  definite,  and  passed,  interval  of  time,  which  por- 
tray themselves  in  a  far  different  manner  in  the  brain  of 
the  victor  than  in  the  conception  of  the  vanquished.  Regu- 
lations must  never  descend  to  the  plane  of  a  code  laid  down 
for  punishments;  their  details  must  not  be  allowed  to  in- 
terfere with  freedom  of  action.  Regulations  are  for  the 
purpose  of  creating  independent  thought,  but  they  have 
to  be  studied  in  conjunction  with  military  history,  and 
only  what  the  commander  inserts  into  them  in  the  matter 
of  his  personal  will  and  skill,  makes  them  the  guide  for 
the  conduct  of  battle.  The  new  arms  with  which  the  armies 
were  equipped  in  the  beginning  of  the  sixties,  favored,  in 
France,  the  creation  of  position  tactics,  caused  von  Moltke 
to  consider  the  combination  of  the  operative  offensive  with 
the  tactical  defensive,  while  the  Austrians,  having  a  one- 
sided, and  in  addition  an  entirely  false  estimation  of  the 
French  offensive  conduct,  in  vain  endeavored  to  have  vic- 
tory perch  on  the  Imperial  standards  by  means  of  brutal 
shock  tactics.  Of  course,  those  shock  tactics  were  suc- 
cessful at  Custozza  over  a  badly  armed  and  morally  in- 
ferior army.  Tactical  theories  turn  into  fatal  brain  illu- 
sions if  they  influence  the  commander  in  his  decision  beyond 
the  situation. 

Mahan,  in  his  "Influence  of  Naval  Power  on  History," 
writes  as  follows:  "We  will  make  the  observation  that 
changes  in  tactics  will  occur  not  after  the  introduction  of 
new  arms  as  is  necessary,  but  also  that  the  period  of  time 


8  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

between  the  two  changes  is  relatively  very  long;  this,  un- 
doubtedly, is  caused  by  the  fact  that  the  improvement  ot 
arms  has  its  origin  in  the  skill  of  one  or  two  individuals, 
while  for  the  change  in  tactics  the  inclination  to  stick  to 
customs  on  the  part  of  an  entire  class  has  to  be  overcome, 
which  class  endeavors  to  adhere  to  what  exists  now.  This 
is  a  grave  misfortune.  It  can  be  overcome  only  by  ac- 
knowledging each  change  willingly  and  voluntarily."  The 
history  of  tactics  in  the  19th  Century  shows  this  "incli- 
nation to  stick  to  established  customs,"  from  the  disputes 
between  field  and  review  tactics,  and  we  could  cite  more 
than  one  case  thereof. 

The  reason  that,  no  matter  how  farseeing  any  regu- 
lations are  constructed  in  their  inception,  they  become 
obsolete  after  a  time,  may  be  found  in  the  very  spirit  of 
the  training  regulations.  Emperor  Napoleon  measured  that 
time  to  be  ten  years.  In  any  case,  frequent  changes  are  a 
mistake,  if  we  do  not  want  to  interfere  with  the  tranquility 
of  tactical  development  and  if  we  want  to  avoid  friction  in 
the  composition  of  our  mobile  army  consisting  of  the  reg- 
ular levies,  reservists  and  landwehr.  On  the  other  hand, 
regulations  must  follow  suit,  if  the  conditions  on  which 
they  are  based  have  changed.  In  his  military  phantasies, 
the  Prince  de  Linge  wrote  in  1783: — "A  paragraph  that 
ought  to  be  incorporated  in  all  regulations,  and  that  we 
omit,  I  do  not  know  for  what  reason,  is  that  we  should  occa- 
sionally act  contrary  to  regulations.  We  must  teach  action 
contrary  to  regulations  just  as  well  as  we  must  teach  dis- 
order among  troops,  for  it  will  happen  in  battle." 

To  be  out  of  touch  with  present  day  requirements  is 
always  dangerous.  Troops  will  have  to  pay  later  on  with 
streams  of  blood  for  knowledge  gained  under  the  fire  of 
the  enemy.  Of  what  use  was  it  to  the  Austrians  in  1866 
that  they  charged  in  utter  disregard  of  death,  imbued  by 
the  firm  will  to  be  victorious,  but  did  so  in  tactical  forma- 
tions which  were  then  obsolete  and  in  the  face  of  the  newest 
improved  arms?  The  willingness  to  sacrifice  themselves 
on  the  part  of  the  troops  and  strictest  discipline,  encoun- 
tered an  impassable  obstacle  in  the  rapid  fire  of  an  unshaken 
infantry.    The  experiences  in  war  on  the  part  of  our  regi- 


PEACE  TRAINING  AND  REALITY  OF  WAR  9 

merits  show  that  bullets  quickly  write  a  new  tactics,  that 
bullets  make  short  work  of  obsolete  formations  and  create 
new  ones.  But  at  what  cost !  In  the  Franco-Prussian  War 
superior  leadership  and  a  better  artillery  permitted  us  to 
pay  the  price. 

At  the  outbreak  of  war  the  usual  custom  is  to  prepare 
troops,  that  have  been  trained  under  obsolete  regulations, 
for  fighting  on  a  strange  theater  of  war  by  certain  "Field 
Service  Regulations."  After  the  battle  of  Montebello  in 
1859  Napoleon  III  made  his  troops  quickly  acquainted  with 
the  peculiarity  of  the  terrain  and  the  method  of  fighting 
on  the  part  of  his  opponents,  and  the  Austrians  neglected 
to  do  this.  In  18^6  Benedek  was  forced  to  change  the  tac- 
tics that  he  had  recommended  in  his  field  service  regula- 
tions, before  his  excellent  views  could  be  of  any  general 
benefit  to  the  army.  The  tactical  instructions  of  Kuro- 
patkin  were  without  any  effect  whatever  in  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War  and  individual  experiences  were  disregarded. 
It  is  very  desirable  that  the  first  experiences  in  battle  be- 
come the  general  property  of  all  concerned  as  rapidly  as 
possible. 

In  1870  we  did  not  do  this,  and  all  units  had  to  gather 
their  own  experiences.  As  late  as  August  18,  1870,  the 
85th  Fusilier  Battalion  advanced  in  columns  toward  the 
center,  though  the  campaign  in  Bohemia  had  shown  that 
that  formation  was  completely  obsolete.  In  the  World  War, 
the  experiences  gained  at  some  one  point  were  printed  and 
thus  quickly  became  the  general  property  of  all.  The  im- 
pulse to  gain  and  spread  experiences  worked  especially  well 
on  tranquil  fronts.  Extraordinarily  much  was  accomplished 
by  establishing  schools  in  order  to  make  officers  of  all  ranks, 
under  officers  of  the  special  arms,  familiar  with  the  latest 
experiences.  But  this  method  sufficed  only  when  the  troops, 
by  the  method  of  their  training  in  peace,  had  gained  the 
necessary  ability  to  adapt  themselves  thereto.  Training 
regulations  should  not  emphasize  the  matter  of  formation, 
they  should  induce  every  one  to  practical  co-operation. 

Troops  that  are  thus  trained  and  trained  theoretically, 
and  who  are  not  afraid  of  losses,  will  soon  evolve  new  tac- 
tics.   What  a  difference  there  was  between  the  method  of 


10  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

attack  of  the  Guard  at  St.  Privat  and  at  Le  Bourget,  and  the 
charge  of  the  Royal  Grenadiers  on  Chateau  Geisberg  and 
of  the  Baden  Body  Grenadiers  on  the  railroad  embankment 
at  Nuits!  The  Russian  experiences  at  Plevna  were  similar 
to  ours  in  August,  1870,  except  that  with  the  Russians  the 
fear  of  losses  gained  the  upper  hand;  they  considered  the 
fire  effect  of  the  Turks  as  a  certain  unchangeable  factor,  de- 
clined the  freedom  of  operations,  and  sought  only  means  to 
lessen  their  losses.  In  no  instance  must  the  troops  at  the 
first  sudden  impression  of  the  hostile  fire  effect  accept  that 
fire  effect  as  a  stated  factor  and  passively  submit  to  it  with 
the  thought  that  it  cannot  be  helped,  and  that  the  main 
consideration  is  to  lessen  the  losses.  In  that  case  we  forget 
that  the  impressions  are  the  same  with  the  enemy.  The 
effect  of  these  impressions  is  naturally  larger  if  we  have,  be- 
fore the  war,  underestimated  our  opponent.  The  Russians 
sought  to  draw  lessons  for  mechanical  conduct  in  battle,  as 
they  also  did  subsequently  in  Eastern  Asia ;  but  entirely  dif- 
ferent factors  co-operated  decisively.  The  application  of  the 
best  lessons  as  to  utilization  of  our  own  fire  power,  as  to 
formations  and  conduct  against  the  influence  of  moral  fac- 
tors, is  impossible.  We  must  never  lay  down  the  law,  or 
accept  as  a  maxim  for  our  action,  that  procedure  which 
proved  itself  in  war,  or  in  battles,  as  immediately  the  best, 
or  which  brought  about  the  victory.  Conditions,  under 
which  that  procedure  was  correct,  play  too  large  a  role,  and 
among  these  numerous  and  different  conditions  the  moral 
status  of  the  troops  and  of  the  commander  play  the  leading 
role.  What  one  may  permit  himself  to  do  and  what,  be- 
cause he  permits  himself  to  do  it,  leads  to  success,  is  for 
another  who  adopts  it,  the  very  cause  of  defeat.  Studying 
wars  and  battles  does  not  furnish  recipes  for  victory.  It 
increases  the  knowledge  of  the  commander  of  troops  only 
when  it  causes  him  to  perceive  the  connection  between 
cause  and  effect.  It  is  not  difficult  to  perceive  the  effect, 
that  lies  open  to  the  view,  but  to  correctly  cull  the  causes, 
requires  not  only  a  clear  view  and  study,  but  thought  and 
knowledge  of  the  characteristics  of  war.  It  is  important 
also  to  know  that  chance  plays  a  great  role  in  all  military 
actions,  and  that  chance  favors  permanently  him  only,  who 


PEACE  TRAINING  AND  REALITY  OF  WAR  11 

deserves  it.  It  is  therefore  wrong  to  condemn  any  action 
because  without  "luck"  success  could  not  have  been  possible. 
Such  an  event  teaches  merely  that  we  must  have  the  mental 
conception  that  luck  easily  passes  one  by,  and  that  we  must 
have  manhood  enough  to  grasp  it  in  passing. 

Superior  in  rifles  and  guns,  trained  in  fighting  the 
mountain  inhabitants  of  the  Indian  frontier,  and  in  defense 
against  numerous  swarms  of  the  false  Mahdi,  the  British 
entered  the  campaign  against  the  Boers  with  full  confidence. 
No  one  doubted  a  glorious  victory ;  but,  in  the  dark  December 
days  of  1899  ill-success  succeeded  ill-success,  not  only  in  the 
matter  of  defeated  attacks,  but — what  the  heart  of  a  soldier 
had  to  feel  most  poignantly — even  capitulations  in  the  open 
field.  Up  to  then  it  had  been  unheard  of  in  British  military 
history,  that  in  the  first  six  months  182  officers  and  4984 
men  capitulated,  while  only  168  officers  and  2124  men  were 
killed  or  wounded.  It  is  said  that  the  tactics  pursued  by  the 
British  had  their  origin  on  German  ground.  But,  German 
troops  defeated,  with  German  tactics,  in  South-Africa,  an 
enemy  equally  as  good  as  the  Boers ;  our  troops  there  in  any 
case  understood  how  to  quickly  adapt  themselves  to  new  con- 
ditions. Colonial  wars  and  inapt  training  in  the  home  coun- 
try had  led  the  education  of  British  commanders  into  wrong 
channels.  Absence  of  the  firm  will  to  insert  even  the  very 
last  man  for  victory,  dearth  of  willingness  to  assume  re- 
sponsibility on  the  part  of  the  higher  commanders,  absence 
of  independence  on  the  part  of  the  subordinate  commanders 
and  the  inability  to  execute  attacks  by  combined  units  sup- 
ported by  artillery,  are  the  real  causes  of  the  British  dis- 
asters. As  the  British  had,  at  the  start,  underestimated 
the  Boers,  the  weight  of  the  impressions  gained  was  the 
heavier.  Underestimation  is  followed  as  a  matter  of  course 
by  overestimation.  In  England,  they  went  even  so  far  as  to 
question  the  possibility  of  any  attack,  and  only  gradually 
the  spirits  rose  again.  We  must  bear  witness  to  the  fact 
that  the  British  in  the  World  War  attacked  especially  well. 
Through  the  misconception  of  inherent  things  in  the  Boer 
War,  we  attempted  in  Germany  to  follow  the  forms  of  the 
Boer  attacks  for  a  time  (as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  Boers  never 
attacked),  until  we  again  thought  of  our  own  experiences 


12  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

and  employed  only  the  most  valuable  of  the  experiences 
gained  in  the  South  African  War. 

A  similar  thing  happened  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War. 
The  tactical  causes  of  defeat  were  the  same  as  in  the  Boer 
War,  and  thereto  were  added  faults  to  be  found  in  the  char- 
acter of  the  Russian  peoples.  Bitterly  did  they  pay  for 
their  underestimation  of  the  enemy.  And  this  very  fault  is 
hard  to  avoid,  as  leaders  and  troops  take  their  own  achieve- 
ments as  a  model.  Only  sharp  criticism  of  our  own  action 
can  save  us  from  underestimating  the  enemy. 

On  the  Japanese  side  also,  the  first  successes  had  been 
bought  with  relatively  small  losses  and  just  as  in  the  Franco- 
Prussian  War,  a  change  of  the  procedure  of  attack  took 
place,  as  we  can  see  from  following  up  the  battles  of  the 
First  Army.  As  with  us  in  the  year  1870  the  endeavor  was 
to  arrange  a  looser  formation.  "But  the  course  of  war,  with- 
out definite  rules,  caused  all  tactical  formations  prescribed 
by  regulations  to  be  forgotten.  As  was  the  case  with  the 
Germans  in  1870,  the  Japanese  battle  action  gradually  lost 
its  uniform  character  and  adapted  itself  again  and  again  to 
the  changing  situation.  In  larger  as  well  as  in  smaller  units, 
down  to  the  battle  unit,  the  same  applied.  Thus,  the  Japan- 
ese tactics  became  more  and  more  clearly  acting  according  to 
circumstances,  without  regulation  formations,  and  without 
oflficial  basis,  all  depending  on  the  peculiarity  of  the  leaders." 

Knowledge  of  the  inherent  peculiarities  of  a  people,  of 
their  military  establishment  and  tactical  views  is  therefore 
absolutely  required  of  every  leader.  Thus,  the  tactics  of 
the  French  1st  Corps  at  Worth  ought  not  to  have  contained 
anything  surprising  to  us,  as  those  tactics  had  been  min- 
utely discussed  in  German  military  literature  prior  to  the 
war,  and  the  fire  effect  of  the  chassepot  rifle,  which  we  be- 
littled (probably  for  reasons  of  training),  ought  not  to  have 
been  unknown  to  the  troops.  The  annihilating  effect  of  hos- 
tile arms  must  not  be  allowed  to  offer  something  new  to  our 
troops.  Proper  target  practice  must  make  known  the  effect 
of  arms  to  the  troops  and  get  them  accustomed  to  have  the 
artillery  and  other  arms  fire  over  their  heads.  As  far  as 
possible,  the  primary  battle  impressions  must  not  be  for- 
eign to  the  troops.     Dragomiroff's  method  of  training,  to 


PEACE  TRAINING  AND  REALITY  OF  WAR  13 

strengthen  the  will  and  the  heart,  was  correct,  though  it 
had  been  completely  misunderstood  in  Russia.  The  leader 
must  be  able  to  see  his  troops  bleeding,  but  he  must  also 
know  how  to  save  them  from  unexpected  high  losses.  The 
more  individual  the  training  has  been  in  time  of  peace,  the 
more  the  will  to  gain  victory  has  been  fostered,  the  more 
the  readiness  to  assume  responsibility  has  been  developed, 
the  better  will  the  troops  behave  under  the  first  impressions 
in  battle.  The  individual  will  perform  more,  the  more  he 
is  trained  in  the  use  of  his  arm,  and  the  more  he  is  imbued 
with  the  feeling  that  he  is  superior  to  the  enemy  in  its  use. 
In  prior  wars  the  British,  the  French,  and  the  Russian 
boasted  of  their  superiority  to  all  other  armies,  in  the  use 
of  the  bayonet.  This  conviction  in  a  way  hurt  them,  as  it 
merely  fostered  the  desire  to  seek  the  decision  in  hand  to 
hand  fighting.  Similarly,  in  the  World  War  the  conviction 
of  the  superiority  of  the  German  infantry  in  close  range 
fighting  which  was  proven  in  the  very  first  battles,  and  there- 
after spread  throughout  the  army,  played  a  great  role  in  the 
stubbornness  of  defense  and  in  the  relentless  attack.  Under 
the  surprising  impression  of  the  effect  of  hostile  fire  we 
quickly  discount  the  effect  of  our  own  fire,  when  it  becomes 
the  "safety  valve  of  our  own  nervousness,"  as  when  the  skir- 
misher fires  only  to  deaden  his  hearing,  or  to  be  doing  some- 
thing. Here  the  influence  of  the  subordinate  commanders 
and  of  quieter  and  better  educated  men  must  make  itself 
felt,  to  attain  a  slow,  well-aimed  fire.  The  moral  value  of 
the  individual  is  the  decisive  factor. 

We  must  not  forget  the  importance  of  drill.  It  may  be 
possible  that  other  peoples  do  not  feel  its  beneficial  influ- 
ence. But  we  require  drill  by  all  means.  We  should  never 
forget  that  it  was  nothing  but  the  drill  which  helped  the 
Guard  at  St.  Privat  gain  the  victory  with  the  employment  of 
obsolete  formations  and  in  spite  of  enormous  losses.  When 
imminent  danger  of  death  overpoweringly  awakens  the 
striving  for  salvation,  when  the  frightful  impressions  of  the 
battle  cloud  the  clear  understanding,  then  the  often-heard 
word  of  command  must  electrify  the  soldier  and  make  him 
capable  to  perform  his  duty.  Therefore  we  cannot  go  too 
far  in  demanding  the  utmost  endeavors  in  time  of  peace ;  but 


14  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

not  in  the  forms  of  a  senseless  marching  around  the  parade 
or  drill  ground,  but  in  the  forms  used  in  battle.  We  foster 
the  drill,  not  for  inspections,  but  for  war. 

However,  the  army  has  no  community  life  for  itself 
alone.  Prior  to  the  World  War,  the  army  was  the  school 
through  which  a  very  material  portion  of  the  people  went. 
Army  and  people  are,  and  must  be,  one.  Education  of  the 
entire  people  for  efficiency  in  war  and  willingness  to  sacri- 
fice is  a  political  and  national  necessity,  and  at  the  same  time 
the  main  basis  for  the  successful  training  of  an  army  equal 
to  all  conditions. 

We  were  not  saved  from  surprises  in  the  World  War, 
as  will  be  shown  later  on.  But  we  did  not  treat  them  merely 
passively,  we  became  master  of  them  and  utilized  them. 
That  was  possible  only  through  the  manner  of  our  peace 
training,  through  rapid  dissemination  of  all  experiences, 
and  through  never  slacking  up  in  our  work  during  the  rest 
pauses  between  the  battles.  "It  has  always  been  moral 
factors  which  have  decided  a  war,  even  before  it  began,  and 
it  will  always  be  moral  factors  that  will  do  so.  In  compari- 
son with  them  everything  else,  organization,  numbers,  arma- 
ment, and  even  leadership,  are  but  secondary  considera- 
tions. And  that  is  even  true  of  leadership,  as  has  just 
been  said,  because  in  an  army  in  which  every  individual  is 
trained  to  perform  his  highest  duty,  the  leadership  cannot 
be  bad.  And  even  if  leadership  sometimes  commits  an  error, 
which  is  but  human,  what  are  those  errors  as  compared  with 
the  efficiency  that  overtops  everything,  and  the  moral 
strength  ? 

"But  let  us  not  believe  that  at  any  time  any  technical 
inventions,  even  if  they  are  ever  so  enormous,  will  be  able 
to  change  even  the  very  least  bit  of  the  nature  of  war.  It 
is  true  that  they  may  change  the  forms,  but  they  will  never 
touch  war's  inner  core.  The  capability  to  be  victorious  is 
not  naturally  inherent  to  any  people.  It  cannot  be  bor- 
rowed from  nature  for  eternity.  No,  the  capability  for 
victory  must  be  educated  into  the  people  and  into  the  army 
and  must  be  maintained  by  strict  performance  of  duty. 
Maintenance  is  frequently  more  difficult  than  acquisition. 
Two  races,  two  nations,  may  be  physically  equal  and  have 


PEACE  TRAINING  AND  REALITY  OF  WAR  15 

the  same  intelligence,  but  if  in  case  of  one  of  them  the  capa- 
bility of  greater  sacrifices  by  the  individual,  and  thus  by  the 
entire  people,  is  less  than  is  the  case  with  the  other,  it  is 
as  certain  as  the  sun  rises  in  the  morning  and  sets  at  night, 
that  war  will  pass  its  hard  judgment  on  the  lesser  sacri- 
fice." 


II.     Mobile  Warfare 

TRAINING  AND  ORGANIZATION 

The  German  leadership  sought  the  annihilating  battle 
as  quickly  as  possible ;  and  in  order  to  be  able  to  conduct  it 
at  the  decisive  point,  satisfied  itself  with  defensive  proce- 
dure on  minor  fronts,  or  with  giving  ground,  prior  to  the 
decisive  battle.  The  training  of  the  infantry  in  time  of 
peace  was  in  full  conformity  with  those  intentions.  Train- 
ing in  peace  was  based  on  the  excellent  drill  regulations  of 
May  5,  1906,  which  of  course  had  their  origin  in  1888,  but 
which  had  been  revised  several  times.  Special  preference 
to  training  in  mobile  warfare  sought  to  foster  the  spirit  of 
attack  on  the  part  of  the  infantry  in  every  possible  manner. 
The  leaders  saw  the  basis  of  all  military  success  in  indepen- 
dence, properly  checked  by  tactical  training  and  education, 
in  increased  firing  ability  and  marching  capacities,  as  well 
as  in  drill  intelligently  carried  out.  We  cannot  blame  the 
troops  for  their  inclination  to  a  so-called  "attack-agitation" 
in  carrying  out  the  attack.  This  however  prevented  the 
co-operation  between  infantry  and  artillery  which  would 
have  produced  the  fullest  effect.  Insufficient  time  was  given 
to  battle  reconnaissance,  to  the  establishment  of  means  of 
communication,  and  it  cannot  be  denied  that  there  was  a 
great  preference  for  dense  skirmish  lines.  But  this  peace 
training  had  such  a  permanent  effect  that  the  regular  soldier 
and  the  reservist  could  not  be  distinguished  in  their  capa- 
bilities within  a  few  days.  The  officers  of  the  furlough  class 
were  prominent  by  their  knowledge  and  faithfulness  to 
duty.  The  effect  of  the  training  course,  held  before  the 
war  on  the  drill  grounds,  could  be  plainly  felt.  Only  the 
aims  should  have  been  set  higher.  It  must  be  attributed  to 
the  youth  and  incomplete  training  of  many  officers  who  had 
been  promoted  on  the  battlefield,  that  they  not  always  found 
the  proper  "tone"  in  their  relation  with  the  older  soldiers 
whom  they  had  been  with  but  shortly  before  in  ranks,  and 
to  whom  they  were  now  superiors.  The  difficulty  in  pre- 
serving the  status  as  superiors,  placed  the  new  officers  in 

16 


MOBILE   WARFARE  17 

a  difficult  position  often  erroneously  considered  as  super- 
cilious ;  it  probably  might  have  been  better  to  transfer  these 
officers,  on  commission,  to  other  units.  It  was  far  from  those 
officers  to  be  cold  to  their  subordinates,  though  they  were 
blamed  for  that.  Many  of  the  newly  appointed  officers 
failed.  Instead  of  setting  an  example  to  their  men,  they 
thought  more  of  their  ease  and  pleasure,  which  could  be 
procured  behind  the  front  by  any  one  with  sufficient  means. 
The  subordinate  had  sharper  eyes  than  the  superior.  The 
danger  to  consider  single  instances  as  the  general  rule,  lay 
near.  It  cannot  be  denied  that  in  selecting  the  provisional 
applicants  for  commissions  we  did  not  always  exercise  suffi- 
cient care,  and  on  the  other  hand,  we  were  frequently  too 
slow  in  promoting  acting  officers.  How  frequently,  however, 
have  we  seen  that  in  battle  the  men  preferred  to  follow  the 
youngest  lieutenant  than  the  older  well-tried  noncommis- 
sioned officer. 

The  necessity  to  carefully  husband  our  material  for 
commissioned  officers  which  compelled  us  to  cut  out  a 
"leader  reserve"  before  battle,  encountered  small  compre- 
hension ;  the  great  loss  in  officers  show  that  very  plainly. 

In  the  course  of  the  World  War  the  conditions  of  re- 
plenishment became  worse.  Younger  levies  at  home  had 
grown  up  uninfluenced  by  the  older  men  in  the  field.  The 
irresponsibility  of  youth  in  Germany  increased  and  the  short 
time  for  training  at  home  by  officers  that  were  not  of  the 
best  grade  offered  no  counterweight.  To  this  were  added 
difficulties  in  the  matter  of  subsistence.  Increases  in  wages 
made  the  relations  more  acute  between  employers  and  em- 
ployees and  between  superiors  and  subordinates.  Through 
this  new  levy,  and  through  the  influence  of  men  of  the  field 
army,  home  on  furlough,  mistrust  was  sowed  between  the 
recruits  and  the  officers,  which  was  not  fully  perceived  in 
the  first  two  years  of  the  war.  It  was  strange,  but  in  the 
officers,  people  saw  only  "Prolongers  of  the  War,"  who  were 
believed  to  expect  higher  rank  from  the  longer  duration  of 
the  war,  while  as  a  matter  of  fact,  a  major  general,  for  in- 
stance, remained  a  full  year  longer  in  that  grade  than  he 
would  have  in  time  of  peace,  before  being  promoted  to  lieu- 
tenant general.    The  talk  that  officers  procured  at  the  cost 


18  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

of  the  men,  advantages  which  were  denied  the  men,  was 
easily  believed.  We  do  not  want  to  deny,  by  any  means, 
that  irregularities  happened,  that  through  the  method  of 
appointing  officers  much  was  made  easier  for  them.  But  in 
general  the  officers  can  be  proud  of  the  fact  that  they  took 
good  care  of  their  men.  Mistrust  existed,  factory  workers 
believed  that  preference  in  the  matter  of  granting  furloughs 
was  given  to  agricultural  workers,  while  the  latter  objected 
to  the  numerous  claims  of  well  paid  factory  workers  for  ex- 
emption from  service.  All  this  ill  feeUng  was  increased  by 
the  advanced  cost  of  all  necessities  at  home ;  and  many  men 
returned  to  the  field  army  disgusted  with  conditions  at 
home. 

As  was  the  case  during  the  Franco-Prussian  War,  the 
losses  in  officers  were  extremely  high  in  the  first  battles,  so 
that  young  officers  quickly  became  company  and  even  battal- 
ion commanders.  It  was  soon  perceived,  that  it  would  have 
been  wise  to  train  every  officer  in  time  of  peace  for  the  du- 
ties of  the  next  higher  grade.  Intense  desire  to  attack  on 
the  part  of  the  troops  and  bravery  of  the  officers,  never  fear- 
ing bodily  harm,  helped  the  troops  to  overcome  many  diffi- 
cult situations.  "All  hail  to  that  army  where  untimely 
bravery  is  frequently  shown ;  it  may  be  a  rank  growth,  but 
it  is  a  sure  indication  of  fruitful  ground." 

The  German  defense  held  to  a  single  line,  fortified  in 
depth  as  much  as  possible — and  generally  strongly  occu- 
pied— sought  the  decision  by  the  attack  of  its  main  reserve. 
Advanced  positions,  which  had  been  occupied  under  the  ex- 
periences of  the  fortress  warfare  (Regulations  for  fortress 
warfare,  August  13,  1910,  p.  123)  assumed  a  doubtful  im- 
portance and  the  question  arose,  due  to  increasing  develop- 
ment of  aerial  reconnaissance,  of  advanced  positions  being 
replaced  by  false  v/orks.  Under  the  conviction  that  infan- 
try that  can  attack  well,  can  also  defend  itself  well,  we  had 
not  paid  as  much  attention  to  the  technique  of  the  defensive 
battle  as  should  have  been  done.  Leaders  and  troops  paid 
little  attention  to  the  defense.  The  soldier  does  not  love  the 
spade.  Troops  that  had  participated  in  fortress  maneuvers 
however  were  better  trained  for  the  close  range  battle  in  the 
use  of  hand  grenades  and  minenwerfers. 


MOBILE   WARFARE  19 

The  infantry  was  armed  with  the  rifle  model  '98  (mag- 
azine under  the  barrel  and  pointed  bullet) .  The  complement 
of  machine  guns  was  not  sufficient.  There  were  onlj^  6 
guns  to  the  regiment.  The  fire  effect  was  excellent,  but 
the  sled  mount  was  too  heavy;  protective  shields  intended 
to  offer  protection  to  the  men  in  the  fire  fight  and  during 
fire  pauses,  betrayed  their  location  by  their  size. 

The  intrenching  equipment  had  been  augmented  shortly 
before  the  war  by  the  addition  of  an  intrenching  tool  wagon 
for  each  regiment  (field  train)  containing  230  long  handled 
spades.  With  the  small  intrenching  equipment,  suitable 
only  for  digging  trenches  of  little  depth,  1  company  could 
construct  a  trench  of  150  meters.  The  supply  of  wire  cut- 
ters and  wood  working  tools  was  inadequate. 

Hand  grenades,  introduced  by  the  Russian  infantry, 
were  used  only  by  pioneers. 

The  "protective  coloring"  of  the  field  equipment  was 
not  correctly  done.  The  various  arms  betrayed  themselves 
by  different  colored  insignia.  Officers  fell  because  of  their 
equipment,  order  clasps,  belts,  sashes,  and  especially  the 
officers'   long   side-arms. 

To  each  infantry  regiment  were  attached  6  telephone 
squads  with  18  kilometers  of  light  wire  (not  field  wire  as 
in  case  of  telephone  battalions),  and  there  were  an  addi- 
tional 12  kilometers  of  light  wire  on  the  infantry  ammu- 
nition wagon.  Of  special  importance  for  mobile  warfare 
was  the  equipment  of  mobile  field  kitchens.  The  Russians 
had  these  rolling  kitchens  but  not  the  French  nor  British. 

The  Jager  battalions,  composed  of  picked  men,  and 
intended  for  the  support  of  the  army  cavalry,  had  been 
reinforced  by  1  cyclist  and  1  machine  gun  company  each. 
They  performed  excellent  services  due  to  their  increased 
fire,  their  training  and  the  excellent  material  of  which  they 
were  composed. 

The  German  cavalry  had  excellent  well  trained  animals, 
though  a  little  sensitive  against  extremes  of  temperature. 
The  troopers,  trained  by  3  years'  service,  were  armed  with 
the  carbine  and  tubular  steel  lance  as  principal  weapons; 
the  "thrusting"  saber,  fastened  to  the  saddle  was  little 
suited  to  the  German  cavalry  for  their  "strike  and  cutting 


20  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

method."  Our  cavalry  could  meet  the  French  and  British 
cavalry  with  full  confidence.  France  believed  that  the  Ger- 
man cavalry  had  a  great  love  for  fighting  dismounted.  The 
regulations  of  March  4,  1909,  rightly  warned  against  fight- 
ing on  foot  in  only  a  half-hearted  manner.  These  drill 
regulations  also  mentioned  the  possibility  of  carrying  on  at- 
tacks on  a  larger  scale  dismounted  (C.D.R.  456)  but  laid  par- 
ticular emphasis  on  the  general  rule,  that  the  cavalry  fight 
should  in  general  be  mounted  (C.D.R.  389)  ;  also  that  cavalry 
must  always  try  to  solve  its  task  mounted.  "Only  where 
the  lance  is  out  of  place,  the  cavalry  resorts  to  the  carbine. 

In  an  engagement  of  all  arms,  small  cavalry  units 

may  achieve  local  success  by  vigorous  action  at  the  right 
moment.  Decisive  participation  in  the  course  of  a  battle, 
either  in  the  beating  off  of  a  hostile  attack  or  in  the  support 
of  our  attack,  is  possible  only  by  insertion  of  large  masses 
of  cavalry.  The  enemy  is  very  vulnerable  to  a  cavalry  at- 
tack on  his  flank  or  rear.  Merely  threatening  an  attack  in 
such  a  direction  has  a  serious  effect  on  the  hostile  troops. 
But  the  cavalry  must  not  be  satisfied  with  mere  threaten- 
ing. Operations  against  the  lines  of  communications  of  the 
enemy  to  the  rear  can  have  valuable  results ;  but  these  opera- 
tions should  never  divert  the  cavalry  from  its  battle  task. 
If  a  battle  ensues,  then  the  watchword  for  each  large  and 
small  cavalry  unit  must  be  "participation  in  the  victory." 
(C.D.R.  393-395.)  Success  against  unshaken  infantry  is  con- 
sidered possible  "if  the  cavalry  has  come  up  close  and  can 
attack  by  surprise"  (C.D.R.  441).  An  attack  against  shaken 
infantry  will  always  be  successful.  Attack  direction  and 
attack  formation  are  of  less  importance  in  this  case.  (C.D.R. 
443.)  Where  possible,  charges  against  infantry  from  sev- 
eral sides  may  be  executed  with  depth  formation,  in  which 
the  leading  waves  are  deployed.  In  attacks  against  artil- 
lery the  advice  was  given  to  attack  the  flanks  rather  than 
the  rear.  Artillery  under  cover  can  be  charged  in  front  also, 
under  certain  conditions,  without  material  loss  (C.D.R.  444), 
and  heavy  artillery  was  pointed  out  as  an  especially  vulner- 
able target  (C.D.R.  448).  In  the  service  of  reconnaissance 
the  attack  was  especially  emphasized,  the  impression  created 
on  an  enemy  by  the  offensive  action  of  patrols  and  recon- 


MOBILE   WARFARE  21 

noitering  detachments  was  valued  especially  high.  It  was 
believed  that  no  valuable  information  could  be  gained  by 
making  detours.  The  enemy  undoubtedly  would  endeavor 
to  hide  important  measures  from  our  view,  which  could  only 
be  overcome  by  force  of  arms.  To  foster  the  offensive  spirit, 
stress  was  laid  on  the  fact  that  our  mounted  messengers 
could  find  their  way  back  only  after  the  hostile  reconnoi- 
tering  detachments  had  been  driven  from  the  field. 

The  composition  of  the  larger  units  (army  cavalry) 
was  consistent  with  the  demands  of  reconnaissance  and 
battle ;  higher  cavalry  commanders  were  instructed  to  cause 
the  consolidation  of  several  cavalry  divisions  on  the  battle- 
field into  1  cavalry  corps  (C.D.R.  523),  in  so  far  as  this  had 
not  been  done  during  the  course  of  the  operations  (C.D.R. 
229).  The  cavalry  division  consisted  of  3  cavalry  brigades, 
each  of  2  regiments,  1  machine  gun  battalion,  1  pioneer  de- 
tachment, and  1  information  detachment.  Some  cyclist 
troops  and  a  Jager  battalion  were  attached. 

During  the  year  prior  to  the  war,  the  German  artil- 
lery had  been  increased  so  that  each  infantry  division  had 
the  disposition  of  2  regiments,  of  6  batteries  and  2  light 
ammunition  columns  each;  1  battalion  thereof  being  equip- 
ped with  light  field  howitzers.  Corps  had  the  disposition  of 
a  heavy  howitzer  battalion  of  4  batteries.  We  could  count 
on  the  attachment  of  mortars  (21-cm.)  and  heavy  guns  in 
battle.  At  the  beginning  of  the  World  War  the  field  bat- 
teries had  6  guns  and  caissons ;  horse  batteries,  4  guns  and 
caissons,  heavy  field  howitzer  batteries,  4  howitzers  with 
8  caissons,  and  mortar  batteries,  4  mortars  and  caissons. 
During  the  course  of  the  war  all  field  batteries  were  limited 
to  4  guns,  without  any  disadvantages  accruing  thereby,  as 
far  as  military  literature  shows.  In  the  6-gun  battery 
there  were  136  rounds  per  piece  available,  in  the  French 
4-gun  battery  312  rounds  for  each  piece.  The  field  gun, 
model  '96,  with  its  very  effective  shrapnel,  was  considered 
the  main  fighting  weapon,  and  less  importance  was  attached 
to  the  shell,  as  shown  by  the  supply  thereof  carried  by  the 
battery.  The  light  field  howitzer  with  high  explosive  shell 
was  to  be  employed  principally  against  artillery  targets  be- 
hind cover,  villages,  and  troops  in  dense  forests.    "It  is  able 


22  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

to  pierce  most  of  the  cover  found  in  the  field,  and  to  fire  on 
captive  balloons  and  airplanes  at  high  altitude."  (F.A.D.R., 
356.)  The  heavy  field  howitzers,  drawn  by  heavy  draft 
horses,  broken  to  fire,  was  considered  an  especially  effective 
gun  to  fire  on  artillery  under  cover  and  on  strongly  fortified 
positions.  Only  when  the  crisis  of  battle  demanded  it  were 
the  heavy  field  howitzers  advanced  at  the  trot.  The  princi- 
pal projectile  was  the  percussion  shell  (instantaneous  and 
delayed  fuse).  The  employment  of  the  mortar  battery  was 
made  more  difficult  by  the  parts  of  the  gun  being  carried 
separately  on  the  march — barrel,  cradle  and  trail.  It  re- 
quired about  five  minutes  to  assemble  the  piece.  Equipped 
with  a  mobile  and  efficient  heavy  artillery  the  German  Army 
was  presumed  to  have  a  material  superiority  over  its  oppo- 
nents. It  could,  "delay  by  its  long  range  pieces  the  advance 
of  the  enemy ;  could  force  him  to  make  detours ;  could  block 
or  keep  open  defiles."  "It  also  can  take  up  the  battle  against 
heavy  hostile  artillery  and  thereby  facilitate  going  into  posi- 
tion of  light  batteries  at  effective  range."  (F.A.D.R.  388.) 
As  the  battery  that  is  in  the  open  can  be  rapidly  destroyed, 
the  development  of  the  telephone  and  the  indirect  laying 
method,  caused  the  field  artillery  to  generally  be  found  fir- 
ing from  covered  positions.  Causing  the  officers  of  the  fur- 
lough class  to  attend  courses  of  instruction  in  field  artillery 
schools  of  fire,  had  disseminated  knowledge  of  indirect  lay- 
ing and  the  new  firing  procedure  to  a  very  great  extent. 
Regulations  demanded  that  the  field  artillery  should  at 
times  disregard  the  advantages  of  covered  positions,  and 
should  fire  from  the  open  to  bring  about  the  decision  in  the 
infantry  battle.  (F.A.D.R.,  367.)  In  such  emergency  even 
the  hottest  infantry  fire  was  not  to  be  feared.  Emphasis 
was  laid  on  the  fact  that  the  battle  activity  of  infantry  and 
artillery  must  be  of  the  closest  and  that  the  main  task  of 
the  latter  is  to  support  the  infantry  (I.D.R.  44,  446,  F.A.D.R. 
366).  Co-operation  of  these  two  arms  was  demanded,  but 
it  was  left  to  the  training  in  peace  time  to  find  the  suitable 
means  therefor.  (I.D.R.  447,  F.A.D.R.  368.)  That  require- 
ment left  much  to  be  desired.  We  intended  to  force  the  de- 
fender to  leave  his  position  and  show  his  troops  by  having 
our  infantry  advance  and  attack  (F.A.D.R.  494,  H.A.D.R. 


MOBILE   WARFARE  23 

454) .  Then  the  task  was  left  to  the  artillery  to  annihilate  the 
enemy  with  its  sheaf  of  projectiles.  Contrary  to  this  method, 
the  French  Regulations  contemplated  but  a  portion  of  the 
artillery  firing  on  the  attacking  infantry,  while  the  mass  of 
the  guns  were  to  engage  the  hostile  artillery.  Conduct  of 
the  artillery  battle  was  left  to  the  commander  of  the  artil- 
lery. Employment  by  regiment  and  by  battalion  was  the 
rule,  without  however  prohibiting  the  employment  of  sin- 
gle batteries  and  platoons.  It  was  recommended  that  in- 
stead of  dispersion,  employment  by  groups  be  resorted  to, 
for  the  better  utilization  of  the  terrain  for  facilitating  fire 
control  (F.A.D.R.  366).  Hostile  artillery  was  to  be  engaged 
by  field  fire  and  heavy  artillery  combined,  though  we  did  not 
deceive  ourselves  in  thinking  that  locating  batteries  under 
cover  would  be  easy.  If  we  did  not  succeed  in  locating  the 
hostile  batteries,  firing  on  observation  posts  that  were  visi- 
ble might  promise  success.  (F.A.D.R.  438.)  In  any  case  the 
infantry  had  to  become  used  to  the  belief  that  the  attack 
must  be  made  even  when  the  artillery  did  not  succeed  in 
gaining  fire  superiority. 

The  infantry  division  formed  the  battle  unit;  2  to  6 
infantry  divisions  were  formed  into  an  army  corps  or  group, 
which  could  be  reinforced  in  artillery  according  to  the  sit- 
uation. All  fighting  arms  were  combined  in  the  infantry 
division,  while  corps  headquarters  reserved  to  itself  the  dis- 
position of  the  heavy  artillery,  information  detachments, 
columns  and  trains.  Dividing  the  infantry  division  into 
2  infantry  brigades  of  2  regiments  and  1  artillery  brigade, 
also  of  2  regiments  (a  corresponding  number  of  infantry 
and  artillery  regiments)  undoubtedly  assisted  in  the  proper 
co-ordination  of  these  arms.  This  co-ordination  was  inter- 
fered with  by  the  assignment  of  a  light  field  howitzer  bat- 
talion. The  organization  of  the  infantry  into  2  brigades 
was  disadvantageous  in  so  far  as  the  brigade  unit  became 
disrupted  in  deploying  for  battle  from  the  march  column. 
One  brigade  commander  became  superfluous.  A  better  so- 
lution, and  one  corresponding  to  the  battle  object,  was  at- 
tained by  decreasing  the  units  into  3  infantry  regiments 
and  3  artillery  battalions  (1  of  the  latter  a  light  field  how- 
itzer battalion) .    Experience  soon  showed  this  organization 


24  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

corresponded  best  with  the  demands  of  battle,  even  if  the 
overhead,  in  comparison  with  numbers  of  troops,  became 
larger.  Many  instances  happened  where  field  guns  and 
light  field  howitzers  were  found  in  the  same  battalions. 

It  was  a  grave  error  to  send  the  22d  and  27th  Reserve 
Corps  in  October,  1914,  to  Flanders  and  Poland,  after  a  short 
period  of  training,  without  attaching  strong  artillery  to 
them.  Only  a  few  commanders,  with  war  experience,  could 
be  assigned  to  them  by  transfer,  at  the  last  hour  and  the 
number  of  seasoned  soldiers  in  those  corps  was  very  small. 
Intense  enthusiasm  could  not  offset  training  and  equipment. 
These  corps  went  to  pieces  in  Flanders  under  heavy  losses. 
This  was  the  more  serious,  as  in  these  corps  the  men  were 
from  the  well  educated  classes  and  we  lost  considerable  ma- 
terial that  could  have  been  used  later  on  for  commissioned 
officers.  We  thus  gained  the  same  experiences  as  we  did  in 
the  Wars  of  Liberation,  in  forming  volunteer  corps.  Events 
of  war  proved  that  new  organizations  of  young  troops,  Land- 
wehr  and  Landstrum,  require  a  more  liberal  supply  of  ar- 
tillery, to  give  them  the  same  fighting  power,  as  active  and 
reserve  organizations.  No  one  can  foretell  in  arranging  war 
organizations  when  units  will  be  compelled  to  fight  at  a  de- 
cisive point. 

The  divisional  cavalry  originally  organized  into  3  squad- 
rons, still  possessed  a  certain  fighting  strength.  This 
strength  proved  itself  unnecessary  the  more  the  cavalry 
confined  itself  to  message  service  and  near  reconnaissance. 

In  the  matter  of  technical  troops,  only  1  pioneer  com- 
pany with  division  bridge  train  was  attached;  this  sufficed 
for  mobile  warfare,  but  was  not  sufllicient  as  the  change 
was  made  into  position  warfare.  There  were  no  division  in- 
formation detachments,  and  only  1  sanitary  company. 

Ersatz  units,  at  mobilization  received  an  insufficient 
instructor  personnel.  When  the  loss  in  officers  became  so 
great  these  units  very  soon  lost  their  active  officers  by 
transfer.  This  loss  was  very  bad  for  the  training  of  the 
Ersatz  troops.  The  retired  officers  detailed  as  instructors, 
did  not  comprehend  the  requirements  of  modern  war.  This 
increased  the  difficulties  in  training  at  home,  so  that  units 
in  the  field  were  satisfied  to  have  only  primary  drill  and 


MOBILE    WARFARE  25 

training  take  place  at  home,  while  the  actual  training  for 
work  in  the  field  was  undertaken  by  divisions  independently, 
in  field  recruit  depots  gradually  established.  In  any  case 
these  replacements  could  be  furnished  quicker  from  divi- 
sion depots  than  to  be  brought  from  home.  For  this 
the  army  authorities  should  have  made  arrangements  in 
time  of  peace.  All  experiences  gained  in  war  proved  that 
field  recruit  depots  were  necessary  in  the  theater  of  war. 
The  training  in  the  field  recruit  depots  was  enhanced  by 
the  military  atmosphere;  by  the  immediate  use  of  cam- 
paign experiences  and  lessons ;  and  by  life  within  the  midst 
of  hostile  peoples.  According  to  the  progress  of  their  train- 
ing the  men  were  formed  into  companies.  Strict  orders  had 
to  be  issued  that  the  men  subsequently  were  sent  to  join 
their  former  organizations  or  in  case  or  recruits,  to  whose 
home  district  they  belonged.  This  was  especially  important 
in  consideration  of  furthering  esprit  de  corps.  In  the  battles 
on  the  Hochberg  near  Rheims  in  1917  one  battalion  of  my 
division  was  almost  annihilated.  Within  three  days  it  had 
been  filled  up  again  from  our  field  recruit  depot,  and  by 
transfer  of  officers,  and  was  again  ready  for  employment. 
We  generally  allowed  eight  weeks  for  training  in  the  Er- 
satz battalion,  four  of  which  was  for  company  training.  In 
that  short  a  time  nothing  thorough  could,  of  course,  be  ac- 
complished. The  greatest  difficulties  encountered  were  to 
make  good  the  losses  in  officers.  The  Ersatz  battalions  com- 
menced very  early  to  train  younger  acting  officers  and  of- 
ficer aspirants.  As  compared  with  the  old  noncommis- 
sioned officers,  who  in  most  cases  were  far  more  advanced 
in  years,  they  lacked  experience  in  military  service  and  in 
the  field.  It  might  probably  have  been  better  to  promote 
efficient  first  sergeants  and  sergeants  major  to  commis- 
sioned rank,  as  rapid  promotion  of  young  men  causes  bad 
blood  very  quickly.  In  the  field  mental  education  alone  is 
without  value.  If  the  young  officers  were  assigned  to  a 
unit  of  well  trained  troops,  their  value  in  the  field  grew 
gradually.  It  was  no  illusion  whatever  that  such  a  short 
time  of  training  could  not  suffice  to  create  a  unit  of  war- 
trained  troops.  A  superficial  training,  deceiving  the  lay- 
man, can  be  attained,  but  we  can  never  create  the  cohesion 


26  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

and  the  morale,  which  assures  the  primary  battle  value  of 
troops.  Campaigns  clearly  showed  the  importance  of  a  well 
trained  peace  army.  Even  the  training  of  Kitchener's 
armies  does  not  justify  a  militia  system.  Training  was  had 
under  the  pressure  of  military  events.  There  was  a  nucleus 
of  units  that  had  been  trained  in  peace,  furthered  by  the 
sporting  sense  of  the  entire  nation.  The  primary  training 
was  not  for  the  difficult  mobile  war,  but  for  mere  position 
warfare,  in  which  the  troops  were  supported  by  superior 
artillery.  The  war  situation  permitted  the  high  command 
to  designate  the  time  for  recruits  to  be  sent  to  the  front 
according  to  the  status  of  their  training.  Complaints  that 
the  army,  with  its  young  officers,  was  not  able  to  cope  with 
the  difficult  situations,  were  frequently  heard.  Sporting 
rifle  clubs  and  military  training  in  the  schools  and  colleges 
of  the  nation  are  absolutely  necessary  for  an  army  that  has 
but  short  period  of  service  in  peace  time.  Athletic  and 
similar  training  are  not  only  for  bodily  training,  they  are, 
for  the  mind  also,  of  great  value.  They  not  only  further 
the  will  power  but  demand  within  a  stated  time  the  great- 
est exertion  of  all  mental  and  physical  powers.  Thus  they 
directly  increase  the  value  of  our  youth  for  service  in  the 
field. 

Labor  Battalions  modeled  after  those  of  Japan,  were 
organized  by  us  early  in  the  war.  These  units  relieved  the 
fighting  troops  from  detaching  large  numbers  of  men  and 
preserved  their  fighting  strength.  The  Russians  learned 
this  lesson  to  their  sorrow  through  the  difficulties  they  en- 
countered in  bringing  up  recruits  in  Eastern  Asia.  Men, 
who  were  unsuited  for  active  service  in  the  field  under  arms, 
were  enrolled  in  the  labor  battalions,  and  under  efficient 
officers,  performed  excellent  services. 

The  infantry,  as  a  matter  of  course,  had  to  bear  the 
heaviest  burden.  In  active  officers  of  infantry,  the  7th 
Army  Corps  lost  70%,  60%  of  officers  of  the  furlough  class, 
and  40 9(  of  the  men.  The  corresponding  numbers  in  field 
artillery  were  45%,,  35%  and  7%. 

The  tactical  views  of  the  Austrian  Infantry,  after  they 
had  been  purged  of  false  ideas  of  the  lessons  of  the  Boer 
War,  were  in  general  in  accordance  with  the  tactical  views 


MOBILE    WARFARE  27 

of  the  German  leadership.  The  Austrians  did  not  fully  un- 
derstand the  method  of  German  training,  in  which  prime  im- 
portance was  laid  on  good  training  in  firing  and  marching. 
However  a  portion  of  the  Austrian  Infantry  was  well  trained 
for  mountain  warfare.  In  time  of  peace  each  regiment  had 
2,  in  war  3  machine  guns  with  tripod  and  collapsible  shields 
carried  on  pack  animals.  It  was  believed  machine  guns 
could  replace  artillery  at  short  range  and  their  employment 
in  defense  as  a  fire  reserve  in  widely  separated  positions 
was  recommended.  Regulations  of  1911  laid  emphasis  on 
the  value  of  training  in  close  formation  in  order  to  increase 
discipline.  This  however  without  limiting  the  front  to  be 
covered  in  the  various  exercises.  The  Regulations  desig- 
nated "the  inflexible  will"  as  the  power  that  would  mainly 
decide  the  battle: — "In  case  the  attacker  does  not  succeed 
in  gaining  fire  superiority,  even  after  inserting  all  his 
rifles,  the  commander  must  always  remember  that  even  in 
apparently  hopeless  situations  success  will  come  to  the  side 
which  is  the  more  stubborn.  Tenaciously  persisting  is  far 
better,  and  causes  less  losses,  than  retreat When  dur- 
ing a  costly,  stubborn  infantry  engagement  the  enervating 
influences  of  the  battlefield  have  caused  the  utmost  exhaus- 
tion on  both  sides,  that  side  will  gain  the  victory  whose  iron 
discipline  and  stronger  will  power  enables  him  to  better 
withstand  that  exhaustion,  and  who  continues  the  fight 
with  unshakeable  persistence,  until  he  has  forced  the  enemy 
to  desist Upon  the  sure,  firm  will  of  the  comman- 
der reflects  all  actions  of  the  troops.  If  he  vacillates  in  his 
decision,  his  uncertainty  is  transmitted  to  his  subordinates. 
He  must  let  his  will  permeate  to  his  subordinates,  and  must 
always  take  care  that  his  will  turns  into  action."  The  im- 
portance of  independence  was  especially  emphasized.  In 
the  excellent  words  of  our  field  regulations,  par.  38,  "Inac- 
tivity is  criminal."  It  was  pointed  out  that  the  decision 
being  made  and  knowing  its  objective,  the  energetic  exe- 
cution of  the  decision  makes  high  demands  on  character. 
That  often  after  success  these  demands  must  be  increased. 
"After  every  battle  the  vital  point  is  for  the  comman- 
der, and  for  the  troops  as  well,  to  force  themselves  to  over- 
come the  mental,  physical  and  moral  tension,  which,  after 


28  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

fatigue  and  danger,  may  easily  lead  to  being  satisfied  with 
a  half-success.  Only  a  forceful,  inflexible  will  can  overcome 
this  weakness.  In  most  cases  the  commander  must  demand, 
after  the  success,  a  further  extreme  effort  by  all  forces  to 
complete  the  victory  and  annihilate  the  enemy.  Only  thus 
can  he  avoid  renewed  heavy  sacrifices  in  subsequent  bat- 
tles." 

The  regulations  of  1903,  written  under  the  fresh  im- 
pressions of  the  Boer  War,  placed  too  high  a  value  on  fire 
effect,  and  credited  fire  as  the  only  decisive  element.  The 
regulations  of  1911  took  into  account  the  fact  that  the  oppo- 
nent would  display  tenacity  and  persistence,  which  all  lead- 
ers demand.  "Infantry,  imbued  with  the  will  to  attack, 
physically  and  morally  well  trained  and  well  led,  can  fight 
successfully  under  the  most  difficult  conditions.  The  infan- 
try batters  down  the  enemy  with  its  fire,  then  with  the  bay- 
onet breaks  down  his  last  resistance."  Good  infantry  must 
always  look  to  the  bayonet  fight  as  the  last  resort,  it  is  fre- 
quently indispensable  to  gain  the  decision.  The  final  appeal 
to  the  bayonet,  omitted  in  prior  regulations,  is  found  again 
in  the  new  regulations.  In  its  preparation  for  war  the  army 
suffered  much  from  the  small  appropriations.  A  portion  of 
the  infantry  (Landwehr)  consisted  mainly  only  of  skeleton 
organizations  so  that  the  excellent  plans  for  training  of  the 
drill  regulations  were  of  little  use,  the  more  so  as  the  re- 
plenishment of  officers  had  not  been  sufficiently  prepared. 
The  number  of  guns  and  machine  guns  of  units  did  not  cor- 
respond to  the  requirements  of  modern  times.  Still  less 
than  in  Germany  was  the  population,  fit  to  carry  arms,  made 
available  for  service  in  the  army. 

The  Austrian  Cavalry  was  excellently  trained  as  such. 
Its  regulations  corresponded  to  those  of  the  German  cav- 
alry. The  artillery  had  been  for  years  the  elite  arm.  Theo- 
retically well  trained,  it  suffered  from  having  a  small  num- 
ber of  guns.  In  an  army  corps  there  were  only  8  gun  bat- 
teries, 2  light  and  2  heavy  field  howitzer  batteries,  a  total 
of  84  guns  against  160  in  the  German  army.  Austria's  ar- 
tillery had  not  been  sufficiently  trained  for  the  tasks  of  fire 
control  in  large  scale  battles. 


MOBILE    WARFARE  29 

At  the  opening  of  the  war  the  Imperial  Austrian  army 
was  not  a  valuable  instrument  for  war.  The  value  of  the 
army  was  decreased  by  the  composition  of  the  States  from 
which  men,  with  different  racial  qualities,  and  different  poli- 
tical aims  were  drawn.  German  and  Hungarian  troops  were 
decidedly  superior  to  Slavic  troops.  High  losses  in  the  first 
battles,  for  the  replenishment  of  which  little  preparations 
had  been  made,  the  absence  of  an  old,  well-tried  corps  of 
noncommissioned  officers,  the  mixture  of  non-German  with 
German  troops,  with  no  common  language,  the  unreliability 
of  the  Slavic  troops,  an  indisputable  effeminacy  on  the  part 
of  the  officers,  decreased  the  value  of  the  army  still  fur- 
ther. "In  the  instruction  of  officers  training  in  will  power 
was  neglected,  knowledge  and  education  were  rated  higher. 
More  dutiful  subordinates,  than  independent,  forceful  sup- 
eriors were  trained;  we  systematically  accustomed  the  offi- 
cer to  be  dependent  and  to  await  leadership.  In  the  general 
staff,  knowledge  was  the  prime  requisite;  the  general  staff 
dominated  the  forms  of  troop  leading  and  the  issue  of  or- 
ders, but  was  insufficiently  acquainted  with  the  instrument 
with  whose  help  it  intended  to  utilize  its  knowledge."  In 
1916  an  exchange  was  tried  with  German  officers ;  it  was 
hoped  to  give  the  Austrian  army  a  greater  degree  of  power 
of  resistance  through  the  increased  influence  of  German  offi- 
cers in  its  training,  and  through  the  insertion  of  German 
troop  units  into  the  Imperial  Austrian  units  of  the  army. 
But  it  was  too  late  for  that.  The  army  lacked  strict  disci- 
pline, lacked  the  enormous  driving  power,  and  lacked  the 
sense  of  duty,  of  the  German  troop  units  which  never  failed 
in  the  first  four  years. 

TACTICS  OF  MOBILE  WARFARE 

The  rapid  advance  of  the  German  Armies  in  the  West 
made  a  material  change  in  the  method  of  fighting  impossi- 
ble; the  troops  attacked  as  they  had  been  taught  in  peace; 
after  the  first  experiences  the  skirmish  lines  were  kept  thin- 
ner. Troop  leadership  sought  to  give  plenty  of  time  for  the 
absolutely  necessary  battle  reconnaissance,  and  for  a  better 
co-operation  with  the  artillery.  Proper  utilization  of  the 
terrain  progressed  under  the  stimulus  of  the  hostile  fire. 


30  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

On  the  eastern  front  the  training  of  the  German  infantry, 
was  so  superior  to  its  opponent  that  here  also  a  change  in 
the  method  of  fighting  was  not  considered  necessary.  It 
must  be  said  that  the  Russians  had  many  excellent  quali- 
ties. Its  infantry  especially  showed  the  benefit  of  the  ex- 
periences gained  in  the  Russo-Japanese  War  in  its  use  of 
the  hand  grenade  and  field  fortifications.  While  demanding 
the  strictest  discipline,  our  regulations  had  educated  the 
troops  in  initative  and  the  will  to  attack.  It  had  given  them 
the  means  to  adapt  themselves  to  the  changing  forms  of 
battle.  Where  high  losses  occurred,  the  reason  could  in- 
variably be  traced  to  non-observance  of  the  maxims  laid 
down  in  regulations. 

A  material  difference  in  the  conception  of  the  infantry 
attack  in  Germany  and  in  France  existed  prior  to  the  World 
War  in  the  value  laid  on  utilizing  infantry  fire.  Regula- 
tions for  the  training  of  the  French  infantry  published  im- 
mediately prior  to  the  World  War  did  not  mention  the  neces- 
sity of  gaining  the  infantry  fire  superiority,  the  artillery 
rather  was  to  hold  down  the  hostile  guns,  and  then  to  facili- 
tate the  advance  of  the  infantry  by  heavy  fire  on  the  de- 
fender's infantry.  "Infantry  is  the  main  arm;  it  fights 
through  fire  and  on  the  move.  Only  the  forward  movement, 
leading  to  hand-to-hand  fighting,  is  decisively  irresistible, 
and  usually  an  effective  and  strong  fire  has  to  open  the  road 

to  pierce  the  enemy Artillery  fire,  which  has  only  a 

very  slight  effect  on  an  enemy  under  cover,  can  never  by 
itself  drive  the  defender  out  of  his  position.  The  advance 
of  the  infantry  must  compel  the  opponent  to  show  himself 
and  to  offer  targets.  The  artillery  supports  the  advance  of 
the  infantry,  by  annihilating  everything  that  might  hold  up 
that  advance."  Infantry  must  resort  to  its  protecting  arm 
if  the  hostile  fire  prevents  a  continuation  of  the  forward 
movement,  which,  as  soon  as  possible,  should  be  resumed. 

Our  German  regulations  considered  "the  most  excellent 
means  for  working  up,  (prerequisite  to  going  forward)  to 
be  gaining  fire  superiority"  (170),  "which  will  be  perceived 
by  the  decreasing  hostile  fire,  or  by  the  enemy  firing  too 
high"  (336).  In  this,  errors  were  possible,  as  fire  pauses, 
ordered  by  hostile  commanders,  due  to  firing  with  incorrect 


MOBILE    WARFARE  31 

sight  elevations,  might  only  too  easily  be  mistaken  as  due 
to  the  results  of  our  fire.  The  demands  of  the  Infantry  Drill 
Regulations  (374),  to  not  make  the  execution  of  the  infan- 
try attack  mainly  dependent  on  first  gaining  artillery  fire 
superiority,  seldom  furnished  a  basis  in  field  exercises  to 
execute  an  attack  with  our  own  infantry  weapons.  We 
waited  until  our  attacking  artillery  had  gained  fire  super- 
iority. During  the  Russo-Japanese  War  it  was  reported  of 
Japanese  attacks  that  they  had  been  executed  without  the 
Japanese  artillery  having  gained  fire  superiority.  Reports 
from  the  Balkan  war  made  us  study  the  statements  accord- 
ing to  which  Bulgarian  and  Serbian  infantry  had  worked 
their  way  up  to  within  200  to  300  meters  of  the  enemy  with- 
out firing  a  shot.  By  deploying  into  small  detachments  and 
under  efficient  support  by  the  attacking  artillery,  a  well 
trained  unit  might  get  close  to  the  enemy  and  take  up  the 
fire  fight  only  at  close  range.  This  was  successfully  achieved 
by  the  43d  Infantry  Brigade  (General  v.  Hiilsen)  on  Sep- 
tember 9,  1914,  at  Gerdauen. 

French  reports  available  at  this  time  praise  the  rapid 
advance  of  our  infantry  and  their  excellent  utilization  of 
the  terrain,  without  waiting  for  the  artillery  preparation. 
They  state  that  the  fire  effect  of  the  infantry  was  annihil- 
ating and  that  the  machine  guns  were  used  effectively  at 
every  opportunity  and  with  surprising  skill.  The  effects 
of  the  field  artillery  were  considered  less  favorable.  The 
reports  further  say  that  the  superiority  of  the  German 
tactics  was  especially  noticeable  in  the  open  terrain  during 
the  battle  of  Saarburg.  The  hostile  divisions  were  anni- 
hilated in  a  frightful  frontal  attack,  though  the  French  in- 
fantry utilized  the  terrain  most  excellently  and  could  barely 
be  distinguished.  The  Alpine  Chasseurs  and  the  colonial 
troops  fought  very  well.  The  skill  of  the  French  in  defend- 
ing a  village  was  especially  noticeable,  while  at  the  start 
the  fire  of  the  French  infantry  and  machine  guns  did  not 
come  up  to  our  expectations.  That  may  have  been  because 
we  valued  the  artillery  effect  too  highly  and  believed  that 
it  could  overcome  every  halt  that  was  forced  on  us.  Though 
the  fire  was  good  by  itself,  the  French  sought  every  oppor- 
tunity to  attempt  a  flanking  movement,  and  was  seen  to  be 


32  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

especially  adept  in  finding  good  firing  positions,  unperceived 
by  the  enemy,  in  houses,  bams,  sheds,  etc. 

The  French  positions  also  had  a  great  depth,  the  lead- 
ing line  consisting  of  single  rifle  trenches,  connected  by 
false  works,  and  the  foreground  excellently  arranged.  Farm- 
ing implements  that  had  been  left  in  the  fields,  scarecrows, 
and  trees  were  utilized  to  designate  the  range. 

In  the  British  Infantry  were  found  many  excellent 
marksmen,  who  acted  independently.  Much  attention  was 
given  to  flanking  fire;  loopholes  and  embrasures  in  the 
trenches,  arranged  so  as  to  allow  firing  obliquely  to  the  line 
of  retreat  had  the  preference ;  trenches  were  generally  well 
hidden,  were  constructed  in  sawtooth  shape  or  wave-like, 
so  that  the  attacker  could  be  taken  under  oblique  fire,  while 
the  enemy's  fire,  straight  from  the  front  against  the  loop- 
holes had  no  effect.  The  trenches  usually  lay  300  to  500 
meters  below  the  crest  or  behind  hedges.  The  troops  made 
much  use  of  night  firing. 

Subsequent  to  the  first  battles  much  was  heard  in  Ger- 
many of  the  insidious  conduct  of  the  French  and  Belgians ; 
it  was  said  that  each  soldier  (?)  had  a  suit  of  civilian  cloth- 
ing in  his  knapsack,  to  evade  difficult  situations  or  to  carry 
on  the  war  as  a  bushwhacker.  Long  range  ricochets  caused 
the  suspicion  that  inhabitants  had  fired  from  houses,  and 
it  was  also  assumed  that  the  entire  population  took  part  in 
the  information  service.  Cases  of  that  kind  certainly  did 
happen,  but  should  not  be  taken  as  the  general  rule.  There 
is  no  doubt  that  the  Germans  were  much  inferior  to  their 
opponents  in  the  employment  of  permitted  and  forbidden 
war  ruses  and  tricks,  and  our  men  did  not  consider  it  fair 
that  the  enemy  should  resort  to  placing  sharpshooters  in 
trees,  and  neither  did  they  consider  the  conduct  of  the 
British  sharpshooters  posted  in  cabbage  fields  as  permissible. 
At  the  start  our  men  were  not  suspicious  enough  and  they 
trusted  the  inhabitants  too  much.  Subsequently  they  saw 
in  each  inhabitant  a  traitor. 

The  German  rifle  fire  had  an  enormous  effect,  probably 
being  the  result  of  carefully  firing  each  round  in  the  manner 
taught  in  peace  in  connection  with  the  training  in  the  con- 
tinuous rifle  fire,  increasing  and  decreasing  according  to 


MOBILE    WARFARE  33 

the  situation.  The  main  fire  fight  was  carried  on  at  about 
800  meters  range,  then  the  lines  advanced  in  long,  broad 
rushes,  to  close  with  the  enemy  quickly  without  awaiting 
for  our  artillery  to  gain  fire  superiority  in  each  instance. 

Under  the  impression  created  by  this  advance,  hostile 
fire  effect  soon  diminished,  and  in  most  cases  the  French 
did  not  await  the  contact  but  retreated  when  the  attacker 
came  to  within  500  meters,  thus  offering  excellent  targets 
to  the  artillery.  Our  troops  felt  superior  to  the  enemy  in 
short  range  fighting.  The  example  set  by  the  officers  and 
by  a  few  courageous  men,  who  in  time  of  peace  had  not 
been  numbered  amongst  the  best  subordinates,  was  of  de- 
cisive influence.  In  battle  everyone  went  straight  ahead  and 
everyone  fired  straight  to  the  front.  In  the  very  first  bat- 
tles the  importance  of  independence  could  be  seen. 

Fire  control,  developed  in  peace  time  to  perfection  with 
its  precise  words  of  command,  was  practiced  only  in  the 
most  favorable  instances  at  the  opening  of  fire.  The  noise 
of  battle  is  generally  such  that  we  cannot  hear  our  own  com- 
mands. Targets — almost  exclusively  a  strip  of  the  terrain 
from  where  the  noise  of  firing  seems  to  come — and  eleva- 
tion, will  be  designated  by  the  platoon  commander  as  long 
as  practicable,  but  very  soon  the  fire  control  will  slip  out  of 
his  hands,  and  his  place  is  taken  by  the  squad  leader  and 
finally  by  the  individual  skirmisher.  This  is  of  no  very  great 
importance,  provided  the  individual  correctly  observes  the 
effect,  husbands  his  ammunition,  increases  the  fire  rapidity 
when  the  target  becomes  more  favorable,  and  decreases  it 
when  the  target  fades,  and  ceases  fire  at  once  when  the 
target  disappears.  The  command  "fire  slower,  fire  quicker" 
merely  indicates  inattention  or  insufficient  training. 

In  carrying  the  fire  forward  to  the  enemy,  in  gaining 
the  fire  superiority  by  infantry,  supported  by  the  fire  of 
the  artillery,  the  Infantry  Drill  Regulations  saw  the  surest 
means  of  success,  and  demanded  that  infantry  open  fire 
only  at  mid  range  even  in  a  terrain  devoid  of  cover.  In  bat- 
tle the  conviction  gained  ground  more  and  more,  that  to 
bring  the  defender  into  a  condition  where  he  could  be 
charged,  was  the  principal  task  of  the  artillery  and  that, 
considering  that  the  infantry  could  rapidly  entrench,  fire 


M  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

preparation  by  infantry  was  a  minor  matter.  Besides  the 
terrain,  the  possibility  of  our  own  and  of  the  enemy's  fire 
effect  controlled  the  manner  in  which  infantry  worked  it- 
self up  to  charging  distance.  But  even  under  the  most 
favorable  conditions  artillery  will  not  be  able  to  open  a 
road  for  the  infantry  to  victory,  even  if  reliable  connection 
is  maintained  during  the  entire  attack  between  the  two 
arms. 

Insufficient  support  of  artillery  forced  the  infantry  to 
resort  to  the  spade  to  hold  the  ground  it  had  gained.  The 
infantry  soon  perceived  that  incautious  conduct  on  the  part 
of  the  staffs  and  troops  soon  drew  the  hostile  artillery  fire, 
and  that  fire  was  then  directed  also  on  points  where  in  the 
opinion  of  the  enemy  commanders,  German  troops  were 
moving  and  where  they  might  be  halting.  The  fire  was 
then  in  the  shape  of  a  sweeping  fire  up  to  the  longest  ranges. 
This  occasionally  caused  material  losses  to  an  incautious 
unit,  but  a  cautious  unit  could  avoid  it,  as  the  method  of 
fire  was  distinguished  by  regular  uniformity.  The  French 
artillery  designated  buildings,  woods,  and  rows  of  trees  as 
"artillery  traps."  Frequently  the  fire  commenced  with  a 
well  prepared  fire-surprise  and  the  effect  then  might  be 
very  great.  The  artillery  took  pleasure — being  covered  in 
front  against  the  German  artillery — in  firing  into  neighbor- 
ing sectors. 

Reconnaissance  and  scouting  that  attracted  no  atten- 
tion was  now  of  importance,  in  order  to  cross  the  long  and 
mid-ranges  by  smaller  units  vdth  irregularly  formed  skir- 
mish lines,  to  gain  a  firing  position  at  about  400  to  500  paces 
from  the  enemy.  The  skirmish  lines  were  made  denser  by 
supports  rushing  forward  from  cover  to  cover.  It  was  also 
found  to  be  well  to  bring  the  reserves  up  in  skirmish  waves. 
Massing  the  reserves  at  points  that  could  be  seen  from  afar, 
proved  to  be  an  error.  The  success  of  the  attack  was  based 
on  the  efficiency  of  the  lowest  commanders;  battalion  and 
regimental  commanders  had  their  hands  full  in  inserting 
the  troops  and  keeping  up  connection  with  the  artillery,  as 
well  as  with  efficiently  bringing  up  the  reserves,  and  could 
not  therefore  supervise  all  the  minor  details  of  troop  lead- 
ing. 


MOBILE    WARFARE  35 

Night  engagements  very  soon  assumed  increased  im- 
portance; their  success  frequently  became  questionable  by 
reason  of  insufficient  preparation  and  by  the  fact  that  no 
attention  was  being  paid  to  the  lessons  of  war  that  had  been 
compiled  during  peace.  Dense  skirmish  lines,  with  scouts 
far  to  the  front,  were  found  to  be  of  advantage,  or  any  for- 
mation in  close  order  with  narrow  front  extension.  It  was 
found  best  to  execute  the  advance  with  pieces  unloaded. 
All  distances  were  shortened.  The  decision  was  sought  in 
the  charge  with  cold  steel  and  without  shouting.  If  the 
enemy  was  encountered,  an  immediate  charge  was  always 
of  advantage.  As  the  enemy  undoubtedly  was  prepared  to 
fire,  it  was  well  to  draw  his  fire  by  false  movements  and  to 
conduct  the  charge  in  another  direction,  but  in  any  case  to 
clear  the  roads.  Charges  that  were  to  pierce  deep  into  the 
enemy,  required  formation  in  depth.  Conduct  in  case  of 
artificial  illumination  (agreed-on  signals  or  signs  for  our 
own  illumination  or  our  own  information)  and  co-operation 
with  searchlights  (light  signals,  flank  protection)  required 
special  training.  In  the  defense,  fire  must  be  opened  only 
if  the  enemy  is  recognized  beyond  doubt.  The  practice,  re- 
commended by  Regulations,  of  laying  guns  and  rifles  during 
daylight  for  firing  at  night,  was  hardly  ever  resorted  to; 
night  fire  was  as  a  rule  executed  by  machine  guns,  not  by 
riflemen.  Frequently  it  was  found  better  not  to  occupy  the 
skirmish  trenches,  because  the  defender,  standing  lower  was 
of  a  disadvantage  against  the  attacker  standing  higher;  it 
was  found  to  be  best  during  the  night  to  have  the  unoccu- 
pied trenches  as  an  obstacle  in  front  of  the  line. 

The  newly  organized  reserve  corps  employed  in  Flan- 
ders in  October,  1914,  did  of  course  utilize  the  experiences 
of  the  Western  front,  but  suffered  from  the  difficulties  in- 
herent to  all  new  organizations,  when  they  have  been  insuffi- 
ciently trained  and  fcicompletely  equipped.  The  first  battles 
caused  heavy  losses  among  the  young,  inexperienced  troops, 
but  by  early  summer  of  1915  they  had  been  trained  in  the 
following  attack  method.  Approach  to  within  about  800 
meters  of  the  enemy  with  patrols,  which  reconnoiter  and 
find  out  everything  necessary  for  the  battle  activity.  Ad- 
vance by  the  company  on  a  narrow  front  in  skirmish  waves, 


36  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

companies  200  meters  in  rear  of  each  other.  Intrenching  in 
the  first  firing  position,  reinforcing  with  machine  guns,  and 
men  making  the  firing  line  denser  to  an  interval  of  two 
paces  between  skirmishers.  Working  forward  by  squads 
up  to  the  next  firing  position,  which  again  will  be  entrenched. 
From  the  firing  position  close  to  the  enemy  the  charge  starts 
under  all  available  fire  protection,  the  captured  position  be- 
ing immediately  arranged  for  defense  against  a  counter- 
attack that  is  sure  to  come. 

The  French  First  Army  (Dubail,  November  27,  1914) 
demanded  that  troops,  as  the  result  of  the  first  lessons 
gained  in  the  war,  abandon,  the  march  column  10  to  12  kilo- 
meters from  the  enemy  and  continue  the  further  advance 
deployed;  that  the  infantry,  in  open  terrain,  should  not 
show  any  unit  in  close  order  at  10  kilometers  range  from  the 
hostile  infantry,  but  work  up  to  500  meters  in  the  smallest 
units  and  these  intrench  when  they  could  no  longer  advance. 
In  covered,  close  terrain  and  in  hazy  weather,  each  battalion 
in  the  first  line  was  to  send  ahead  1  company,  followed  by  2 
companies  echeloned  to  the  flanks,  and  followed  in  turn  in 
their  center  by  the  reserve  company.  For  fighting  in  woods 
it  was  laid  down  that  the  companies  in  the  second  line  should 
at  once  turn  against  the  enemy.  It  was  recommended  that 
in  night  fighting  an  advance  be  made  by  half  platoons  in 
column  of  fours. 

A  German  report  concerning  the  French  method  of  at- 
tack supplements  these  Regulations.  "Frequently  individ- 
uals rushed  forward,  assembling  again  in  squads  at  the 
nearest  cover.  Stretches  of  open  terrain  were  crossed  in 
this  manner  in  very  thin  lines,  echeloned,  and  offering  a 
very  poor  target.  The  supports  and  even  the  reserves  fol- 
lowing the  skirmishers  separated  into  small  groups,  never 
more  than  a  platoon,  with  large  intervals.  The  endeavor 
seemed  to  be  to  reach  the  mid  ranges  without  material  losses 
and  there  to  form  skirmish  lines  that  could  take  up  the  bat- 
tle in  force.  The  fire  of  these  skirmish  lines  usually  was 
very  strong,  but  was  of  little  effect  as  soon  as  it  met  our  in- 
fantry fire." 

The  French  infantry  was  excellently  supported  by  its 
artillery,  which  utilized  its  long  range  guns  to  the  utmost. 


MOBILE   WARFARE  37 

Its  skill  was  very  great  in  finding  and  taking  up  covered 
positions,  in  frequently  changing  positions  and  in  observa- 
tion. Batteries,  platoons  and  single  guns  took  position  with 
very  irregular,  different  intervals  and  in  echelon.  It  appears 
that  the  French  entirely  abandoned  the  normal  position 
with  regular  intervals.  Detaching  of  platoons  or  pieces  for 
the  direct  support  of  the  infantry  or  for  the  purpose  of 
flanking  the  leading  lines  was  frequently  observed.  The 
French  laid  the  greatest  value  on  flanking  fire.  The  en- 
deavor was  very  plain  on  the  part  of  the  French  artillery, 
to  cover  itself  frontally  against  German  artillery  firing 
straight  to  the  front  by  this  method  of  taking  position,  either 
using  the  terrain  (ridges,  villages,  buildings)  or  by  the  use 
of  masks  (strips  of  wood,  rows  of  trees,  hedges).  Each 
French  gun  carried  a  saw  in  its  limber,  by  the  use  of  which 
it  procured  for  itself  a  line  of  sight  through  these  masks 
and,  covered  frontally,  fired  obliquely,  and  mostly  into  the 
firing  sector  of  its  neighbor,  and  thus  effectively  flanked 
the  neighbor's  attack  target.  Therefore  the  French  bat- 
teries were  hard  to  locate  by  the  German  batteries,  and  could 
but  seldom  be  perceived  by  our  infantry  in  the  front  line, 
causing  it  frequently  to  assume  that  it  was  being  fired  on  by 
its  own  artillery. 

CHANGES  IN  ORGANIZATION,  EQUIPMENT 
AND  ARMAMENT 

Based  on  the  experiences  of  the  war,  changes  in  or- 
ganization and  armament  had  been  made  in  the  summer  of 
1916,  which  were  to  make  their  influence  felt  on  the  method 
of  fighting.  The  divisions  were  organized  into  3  regiments 
of  infantry,  1  regiment  of  artillery  of  9  batteries  (3  of 
them  light  field  howitzers)  and  2  pioneer  companies;  the 
strength  of  the  divisional  cavalry  had  been  reduced  to  1 
squadron,  but  the  information  troops  had  been  permanently 
increased.  Heavy  artillery  was  assigned  to  the  division 
from  time  to  time  according  to  need,  so  that  in  tranquil  posi- 
tion warfare  each  division  generally  had  3  heavy  field  how- 
itzer batteries,  1  mortar  battery  and  2  heavy  gun  batteries. 
The  number  of  machine  guns  had  been  materially  increased, 
each  battalion  receiving  1  machine  gun  company  of  6  guns. 


38  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

By  changing  the  construction  of  the  gun  carriage  (wagon) 
the  guns  per  company  could  subsequently  be  doubled.  The 
introduction  of  automatic  rifles  whose  importance  the  Ger- 
man infantry  had  found  during  the  fighting  on  the  Somme, 
took  place  in  the  Summer  of  1917 ;  the  introduction  of  "fir- 
ing cups"  for  throwing  grenades  from  the  rifle,  took  place 
in  the  Spring  of  1918,  after  specially  constructed  grenades 
had  proved  to  be  too  heavy  for  mobile  warfare. 

Each  man  was  protected  by  a  steel  helmet,  in  addition 
received  a  gas  mask  and  in  many  cases  a  long-handled  spade, 
which  was  valued  also  as  a  means  of  hand-to-hand  fighting. 
Every  man  was  equipped  with  hand-grenades ;  the  originally 
adopted  ball  or  disc  grenades  were  not  good,  and  they  were 
replaced  by  grenades  more  easily  handled,  and  the  lighter 
egg  grenades,  which  were  carried  in  the  attack  in  sandbags 
slung  across  the  shoulder.  There  is  no  doubt  that  both  sides 
overestimated  the  effect  of  the  hand  grenade  and  attached 
more  value  to  it  than  to  the  rifle.  An  automatic  pistol — 
"long  pistol" — (16  per  company)  was  supplied  for  trench 
warfare.  For  connection  with  the  artillery  colored  light 
rockets  served,  and  for  connection  with  airplanes  colored 
lights  and  large  cloths  (panels)  were  used.  Shocktroops, 
minenwerfers  and  flame  throwers  taken  from  the  position 
war,  could  also  be  employed  in  the  mobile  war.  The  artil- 
lery had  made  great  progress  in  flash  and  sound  ranging 
methods.  Much  more  use  was  made  of  the  shell,  than  had 
been  expected  before  the  war.  In  gas  shells  artillery  pos- 
sessed a  fighting  means,  independent  of  the  direction  of 
the  wind,  to  neutralize  hostile  batteries  and  to  gas  stretches 
of  the  terrain.  Airplanes  increased  in  importance  through 
armament,  equipment  with  cameras  and  wireless  apparatus. 
The  means  of  communication  were  materially  improved.  In 
addition  to  the  telephone  there  came  into  use  intermittent 
lights,  ground  and  wireless  telegraph,  light  and  sound  sig- 
nals, information  projectiles,  carrier  dogs  and  pigeons.  In 
February,  1918,  the  divisions  received  wireless  battalions 
(also  for  ground  telegraphy),  and  the  personnel  with  the 
troops  was  organized  into  troop  message  detachments  as 
follows :  each  infantry  regiment,  had  1  regimental  informa- 
tion platoon,  consisting  of  1  officer,  and  13  men;  each  in- 


MOBILE   WARFARE  39 

fantry  battalion  had  1  battalion  information  platoon,  consist- 
ing of  1  officer  and  21  men ;  each  independent  battalion  (cav- 
alry rifle  regiment)  1  battalion  information  platoon  of  1 
officer  and  30  men.  Employment,  traffic  and  co-operation 
was  in  charge  of  the  information  officer  under  the  direction 
of  the  regimental  (battalion)  commander. 

As  early  as  1915  the  French  commenced  to  organize 
their  battalions  into  3  infantry  and  1  machine  gun  com- 
pany of  8  guns,  and  to  attach  automatic  rifles — up  to  16 — 
to  the  companies.  By  the  law  of  September  27,  1916,  the 
company  organization  was  fixed.  Each  company,  not  count- 
ing officers,  had  a  subsistence  strength  of  194,  the  fighting 
company  proper  having  a  strength  of  168  men.  This  num- 
ber did  not  include  4  older  noncommissioned  officers  and  22 
men,  used  for  runners,  signal  men  and  infantry  pioneers. 
The  men  throwing  hand  and  rifle  grenades  were  designated 
"grenadiers,"  the  gunners  of  the  automatic  machine  guns 
were  designated  "fusiliers,"  and  the  rest  as  "voltigeurs." 

The  fighting  company  was  divided  into  4  platoons  of  2 
half-platoons  (sections)  each.  Of  the  half-platoons,  the 
first  always  contained  rifle  grenadiers,  hand  grenade  throw- 
ers and  fusiliers,  the  second  contained  the  voltigeurs,  4 
rifle  grenadiers  and  2  cartridge  carriers  (pourvoyers) .  All 
men  were  trained  as  hand  grenade  throwers.  The  fighting 
company  numbered  32  hand  grenade  throwers,  16  rifle  gren- 
adiers and  8  (12-16)  gunners  for  automatic  machine  guns. 

The  rifle  grenade  {Vivien  Bessieres)  fired  from  a  firing 
cup,  was  very  effective.  With  16  rifles  arranged  with  the 
appliance  a  barrage  could  be  thrown  with  150  rounds  per 
minute  at  from  80  to  150  meters.  In  village  fighting  they 
replaced  absent  artillery,  cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  enemy, 
prevented  supports  coming  up,  and  defeated  counter-at- 
tacks. Fire  unity  was  sought.  The  possibility  of  fire  by  the 
automatic  rifle  on  the  move  forced  the  enemy  under  cover 
in  the  final  phases  of  the  charge.  Of  course,  the  machine 
gun  could  not  be  entirely  replaced,  but  the  automatic  rifle 
was  especially  useful  in  accompanying  the  infantry,  to  se- 
cure terrain  that  had  been  taken,  to  stop  counter-shocks, 
and  enable  the  bringing  up  of  machine  guns  without  undue 
haste. 


40  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

The  37-mm.  gun  attached  to  the  battalion  was  so  mobile 
that  it  could  follow  the  infantry  in  all  battle  situations ;  its 
fire  was  exact,  easy  to  regulate,  had  a  range  up  to  1500  me- 
ters, and  could  be  fired  from  a  covered  position.  The  pro- 
jectile had  the  effect  of  a  shell,  as  solid  shot  pierced  three 
sandbags,  or  steel  plates.  It  was  especially  suited  for  anni- 
hilating invisible  machine  guns.  In  the  attack  waves  the 
gun  was  not  to  be  used,  as  there  it  would  be  easily  seen  and 
destroyed. 

In  order  to  gain  the  highest  efficiency  of  the  company 
after  its  first  organization,  all  war  implements  must  act  in 
co-operation,  the  supply  of  ammunition  must  be  assured 
and  the  complement  well  trained.  In  the  training  the  ma- 
chine guns  and  the  37-cm.  gun  directed  their  fire  on  targets 
above  ground,  the  hand  and  rifle  grenades  against  skirmish- 
ers or  targets  under  cover. 

In  the  deployed  line  the  interval  between  files  was  4 
to  5  paces.  The  platoon  had  an  extension  of  60  to  75  me- 
ters. In  depth  it  was  formed  in  two  waves  following  each 
other  at  10  to  15  meters  distance,  the  grenadiers  and  fusil- 
iers in  the  first  wave,  the  grenade  carriers  and  voltigeurs 
in  the  second.  They  were  followed  by  the  nettoyeurs 
(trench  moppers-up)  at  10  to  20  meters  distance,  and  the 
latter,  at  a  distance  of  40  to  50  meters,  by  the  company 
reserves.  The  fighting  front  of  one  compan|y  was  300 
meters. 

By  the  law  of  September  10,  1917,  the  peculiar  organi- 
zation of  the  platoon  was  even  extended  to  the  half -platoon 
"as  after  the  filling  up  of  the  first  line  the  battle  is  con- 
ducted by  half -platoons ;  therefore  these  should  not  only 
in  case  of  need,  but  at  the  very  start,  combine  all  infantry 
auxiliary  and  fighting  means  and  have  the  auxiliary  weap- 
ons within  themselves  be  able  to  take  formation  in  depth." 
Each  half-platoon  had  1  sergeant  and  14  to  18  men,  with 
one  automatic  rifle  attached.  After  the  automatic  rifles 
had  been  distributed  to  the  half-platoons,  the  8  guns  re- 
maining comprised  the  materiel  reserve — 4  to  the  company, 
4  at  the  disposition  of  the  division.  There  was  no  differ- 
ence made  in  half-platoons  between  grenadier  (hand  gren- 
ade throwers)  and  voltigeurs.     The  half-platoon  consisted 


MOBILE    WARFARE 


41 


French  Battalion  in  Attack  Formation 
Extension — 400  to  500  meters 


iBt  Wav< 
2d  Wav( 


1st  Company  2d    Company 

2d  Platoon        '            1st  Platoon  2d   Platoon         '           ist  Platoon 

>  I                    I 

Section           I                 S^tion  S^tion             |               Section 


/rrst 


/f(Si 


J((S) 


3d   Wave 


S  S, 


k  -.- 


4th  Platoon 


I      A 

3d  ipiatoon 


I 
GO*  .  I      . 


J  J-| 


^    $    G^M    G    S^H     S   G  \  Jf    G    d 


4th   Hatoon 


,  3d  Platoon 


M    S    C^ Jf    G    S  \Ji    S    G'Jf    G    S 


H     M  ^*  J/     Jt     \     //    M 


/f   Jf 


T 


Jt     Jt 


4th    Ware 

J{    //     \     /f    Jf     '      M    /f 

5th  Wave^^^^    |^/ J-; /T/i/ 1       ^''J';    W&/     tflSl^S*    /ffS)     \jf(St  ATU  \       X{S)    ^Jftt/  JK/St 


6th  Wave 


^«>•> 


>¥^ 


/Trrr 


I 


r 


Lexjend  : 


^    3-4  Hand  Grenade 
•  Throwers 

S     1  Cpl  &  3  pvts 
■to        ( automatic 
rifles) 


/f      3-4  Rifle  Grenade 
^"  throwers 

rLu/'F\ajae  thrower 
^    Company  Comdr 
™        with    telephone 

operators  &  lighl 
signal    equip- 
ment 

4     Platoon    Comdr    with 
tel.   operator 

4     Sergeant  &  Section 
comdr 

-^  ,  ,  L/itter  bearers 

^  „ ,  Minenwerfers 
Cleaners-up 


Bn.   Comdr  with   Tel  &   It.   Signal   Equipment 


.h/faJCp    J    M.    G.    Co. 

nil 


2iPIatoon    200m  p     Ist.PlatooiL 


3d  Platoon^ 


4tk  PlatoM 

Section 


Section. 


1^1^  1^1^   i^i^  i^i^ 


J   M, 


^^05^any|/  |y  f  |j 

iiil 


3d  Company 


lJ7»r/»»37-mm.  gun 


) 


42  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

of  a  complement  (1  corporal,  3  men,  fusiliers),  of  auto- 
matic rifles,  of  grenadiers  V.  B.   (grenade  gun)  with  2  to 

3  firing  cups  divided  between  the  two  squads.  It  was 
directed  that  an  elite  company  be  formed  in  each  regiment. 
In  the  attack  the  half -platoon  was  formed  into  2  waves  with 
10  to  15  meters  distance,  in  the  first  wave  the  riflemen 
and  the  automatic  machine  gun  squad,  in  the  second  wave 
the  rifle  grenade  throwers  and  skirmishers.  In  the  attack 
the  platoon  inserted  its  half-platoon  either  alongside  or 
behind  each  other;  in  the  latter  case  the  first  half -platoon 
was  the  vague  d' assault  (attacking  wave),  the  second  the 
vague  de  r^enfort  (support),  distance  60  to  100  meters,  ex- 
tension (half-platoons  in  rear  of  each  other)  40  to  45 
meters.  The  nettoyeurs  (trench  moppers-up)  were  fur- 
nished by  other  than  the  attacking  unit,  which  after  the 
completion  of  their  task  formed  the  security  detachment 
of  the  trenches. 

In  England  the  same  mixing  of  men  took  place.  Each 
tactically  independent  platoon  (28  to  44  men)  consisted  of 

4  squads;  riflemen,  hand  grenade  throwers,  light  machine 
gun  (Lewis  gun)  and  rifle  grenade  throwers.  Half  of 
the  men,  were  trained  in  the  use  of  the  machine  gun,  the 
other  half  in  the  use  of  the  rifle  grenade. 

TRAINING  REGULATIONS  FOR  FOOT  TROOPS 

At  the  close  of  the  battles  of  the  Somme  in  the  Au- 
tumn of  1916  the  lessons  of  the  mobile  and  position  war- 
fare that  had  been  gathered  were  thoroughly  examined. 
These  were  published  to  the  troops  in  January,  1917,  in  the 
shape  of  an  outline  of  "Training  Regulations  for  Troops 
in  the  Field."  The  mobile  war  has  proven  the  correctness 
of  the  general  rules  of  our  previous  training  and  field 
exercises,  and  thus  it  was  only  a  question  of  minor  changes 
of  our  Field  Service  Regulations.  The  few  directions  how- 
ever contained  in  our  F.  S.  R.  concerning  position  warfare, 
required  material  revision  and  extension.  The  impor- 
tance of  drill,  as  means  to  an  end,  to  teach  the  individual 
the  absolute  necessity  of  the  strictest  obedience  to  his 
superior,  had  come  to  the  front  everywhere,  especially  in 
difficult  battle  situations.       Troops,  trained  and  educated 


MOBILE    WARFARE  43 

in  a  strict  school,  fought  well.  This  fact  had  to  be  ad- 
hered to  in  the  new  Regulations,  but  on  the  other  hand, 
the  fact  was  not  to  be  lost  sight  of  that  thoughtless  drill, 
carried  to  excess  on  the  drill  ground,  had  a  damaging  effect. 
The  increase  in  auxiliary  arms  and  the  necessity  of  making 
the  "shock-troop  procedure"  the  very  life  of  the  troops,  led 
to  the  publication  of  a  second  outline  edition  in  January, 
1918. 

The  Regulations  treated  of  training,  not  leadership. 
Rigid  adherence  was  held  to  careful,  strict  individual  train- 
ing as  a  basis  for  the  schooling  of  the  unit,  and  all  was  left 
out  which  was  not  absolutely  required  in  war.  The  train- 
ing of  the  individual  was  to  be  furthered  at  every  oppor- 
tunity, either  while  at  rest,  or  in  the  trenches.  Special 
attention  was  paid  to  rigidity,  exactness  and  order,  in  all 
close  order  drill.  Double  time  in  cadence,  present  arms, 
the  manual  of  arms  for  the  charge,  and  the  use  of  signal 
flags  was  omitted. 

In  extended  order  the  formation  in  platoon  columns 
was  omitted,  the  line  was  the  principal  formation  for  the 
company.  Drill  ground  formations  were  no  more  to  be 
expected  of  the  company,  than  skirmish  fire  in  close  order. 
Volley  fire  and  the  charge,  gaining  direction  on  guides  sent 
to  the  front,  the  transition  from  line  into  column  of  squads 
while  on  the  move,  as  well  as  different  kinds  of  deployment 
for  firing  were  done  away  with.  A  new  designation  was 
given  to  the  single  column  (column  of  files)  and  also  col- 
umn of  twos,  as  column  and  double  column. 

The  most  important  formation  in  close  order  was  the 
company  column,  in  which  the  platoons  are  in  column  of 
squads,  in  double  column,  or  single  file  with  1^  pace  inter- 
val, which  can  be  increased  according  to  need  (see  plate). 

The  company  must  be  able  to  take  up,  in  addition  to 
the  regulation  formations,  a  formation  adapted  to  the  ter- 
rain and  the  available  space.  The  formation  of  the  pla- 
toons need  not  be  the  same  in  that  case.  The  main  point 
is  that  the  company  must  be  ready  for  employment  in  any 
direction  according  to  existing  conditions.  By  attaching 
the  automatic  rifles,  the  company  received  a  materially 
changed  appearance.     Training  Regulations  (first  edition) 


44  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

COMPANY  COLUMN 


20' 


^        SOcmr      ^^ 

BEZZIZI  *        ^!</W^A 
rrrr-i  tcnx) 


■HTTTI 
W  I.I  I  I 


I'm  I  I  I 

rrrn 

ti  I  I  I  I 

s    ■ 


strength   of  the  Company 
5  officers 
22  NCO 
160  men 


9' 


6eo(t)e6 

©OOQ 

■  III! 
SdOO© 

axD 

^32123 


1  machine  grun  wagon 


l-CH 

i 


Company  Commander 


3  Lieutenant 

!— '  1st   Sergeant 

S  File-closer 

•3  Squad  leader 

•  Machine  gun   commander 

^       (ako   right   guide) 

B  Left   guide 

BB  Sanitary    NCO 

^  Armorer 


0  Front  rank   file 
DRear  rank  file 
D  Runner,   telephone  operator 
+  Litter  bearers 

•■  Musician 

^  Machine   gunner 

<Pm.   G.    Captain 

•  M.  G.  complement,  5  to  8 

•  Assistant  Armorer 

•  Driver 


MOBILE    WARFARE  45 

provided  for  the  formation  of  a  4th  platoon,  in  which  the 
charging  troops,  the  hand  grenade  throwers,  the  sharp- 
shooters, and  the  automatic  riflemen  were  consoHdated,  "so 
that  the  fighting  power  of  the  company  would  be  kept  at 
the  highest  degree."  This  plan  permitted  at  the  opening 
of  decisive  battle,  selected  leaders  and  men  to  be  a  special 
platoon  at  the  disposition  of  the  company  commander.  But 
more  correctly.  Training  Regulation  Number  2  objected  to 
composing  the  platoons  of  rifle  carriers  and  specialists  as  in 
England  and  France.  Every  man  v/as  trained  in  the  use 
of  hand  grenades  and  rifle ;  the  squad  was  trained  for  skir- 
mish fighting  as  well  as  for  shock-troop  fighting.  The  au- 
tomatic rifles  were  inserted  on  the  right  wing  or  at  the 
head  of  the  platoons  and  half -platoons. 

The  machine  gun  complement  had  to  be  selected  on  the 
basis  of  the  reliability  and  independence  of  the  individuals. 
For  each  machine  gun  at  least  1  complement  and  2  er- 
satz complements  should  be  trained.  The  men  were  armed 
with  pistols,  the  ersatz  men  with  rifle  or  carbine.  The 
complement  (Numbers  1  to  4)  and  the  best  ersatz  comple- 
ment formed  a  machine  gun  squad  under  a  machine  gun 
squad  commander.  On  the  march  the  machine  guns  were 
loaded  on  the  machine  gun  wagon  of  the  company.  All 
officers  and  noncommissioned  officers  of  each  company  were 
trained  in  the  service  of  machine  guns.  Special  importance 
was  laid  on  timely  opening  of  fire,  so  the  machine  guns 
were  inserted  on  the  right  wing  or  at  the  head  of  their 
platoons  or  half-platoons. 

The  battalion  consisted  of  four  companies,  one  auto- 
matic rifle  platoon,  one  information  platoon,  and  machine 
gun  company.  The  battalion  assembled  in  companies 
alongside  or  in  rear  of  each  other,  the  companies  in  march 
column,  in  line  or  in  company  column.  The  machine  gun 
company  consisted  of  three  platoons  of  two  half-platoons 
each,  the  two  guns  of  the  half-platoon  carried  on  one  gun 
wagon.  The  following  formations  were  designated  for  the 
machine  gun  company:  the  line,  single  file,  and  march  col- 
umn. Drill  was  never  to  be  in  the  line  formation.  It  was 
proper  to  have  the  platoons  march  in  line  in  rear  of  each 
other  or  in  single  file  column  abreast  of  each  other.     When 


46  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  guns  were  taken  off  the  wagon  in  each  instance  it  was 
ordered  whether  the  gunners  were  to  carry  the  protective 
shields,  the  water,  or  cartridge  chests.  To  decrease  the 
weight  of  the  heavy  machine  guns,  the  sled  was  replaced 
by  an  auxiliary  mount  or  even  by  a  sandbag.  Loading  and 
unloading  at  night  with  gas-mask  was  practiced.  Move- 
ments of  heavy  machine  guns,  after  having  been  unloaded 
from  their  wagons,  was  generally  executed  with  the  gun 
assembled,  but  in  all  cases  without  cartridges  in  chambers 
differing  from  the  automatic  rifle,  in  which  movements 
with  loaded  guns  was  permissible. 

All  movements  were  at  the  walk.  Trotting  was  con- 
fined to  exceptional  cases.  By  order  of  the  company  com- 
mander, when  the  battle  situation  demanded  haste  in  en- 
tering the  action,  portions  of  the  complement  rode  on  the 
machine  gun  wagons  (for  instance  noncommissioned  offi- 
cers and  gunners  Nos.  1  to  3  of  one  platoon  distributed  on 
the  6  wagons).  Employment  of  machine  guns  in  battle, 
will  be  discussed  later  on. 


111.     Position  Warfare  in  the  West,  1914-1917 

ORIGIN  AND  NATURE  OF  POSITION  WARFARE 

The  prime  importance  of  the  initial  success  upon  the 
entire  course  of  a  campaign,  as  illustrated  by  the  wars  of 
the  19th  Century,  which  generally  ran  a  rapid  course,  led 
Germany  to  rapidly  assume  positions  in  readiness  at  the 
outbreak  of  war  and  to  simultaneously  insert  all  available 
forces.  Strategic  reserves  were  discarded.  They  con- 
sisted of  troops  (new  organizations)  condemned  to  a  slow 
mobilization,  or  of  allies  who  entered  the  war  later  on.  If 
neither  of  the  opponents  has  sufficient  forces  to  break  the 
other's  resistance,  position  warfare  results.  It  lies  in  the 
very  nature  of  the  offensive  war  that,  after  relentlessly 
gathering  the  fruits  of  the  initial  success,  the  heavy  ex- 
penditure of  strength  forces  the  victor  to  a  halt,  also,  in 
order  to  protect  what  he  has  gained. 

Such  a  culmination  of  victory  is  shown  in  the  World 
War  by  the  first  battle  on  the  Marne  with  the  resulting  re- 
treat and  defense,  which  was  fought  against  a  strong  su- 
periority of  the  Entente.  In  the  subsequent  course  of  the 
World  War,  which  developed  for  the  Central  Powers  into 
the  most  magnificent  operation  of  all  times  on  interior  lines, 
the  situation  forced  them  upon  the  defensive  on  one  front 
in  order  to  beat  the  enemy  by  an  offensive  on  another. 
The  length  of  the  lines  was  so  extensive  that  the  disad- 
vantages of  a  central  location  were  of  no  importance.  A 
favorable  railroad  net  made  it  possible  to  shift  the  forces 
from  one  to  the  other  theater  of  war.  Thus  position  war- 
fare had  its  origin  in  the  East  and  in  the  West. 

Military  history  shows  that  only  by  inserting  fresh 
forces,  or  by  voluntarily  abandoning  a  large  part  of  the 
position  followed  by  an  offensive  against  the  pursuing  ene- 
my, is  the  inertia  of  position  warfare  overcome  and  mobile 
warfare  resumed.  The  effect  on  the  morale  of  the  enemy 
and  our  own  troops  and  the  difficulties  of  overcoming  rapid- 
ly constructed  field  fortifications,  requires  serious  consider- 

47 


48  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

ation  prior  to  voluntarily  abandoning  a  portion  of  our  posi- 
tion and  starting  a  counter-attack  against  the  enemy  who 
may  have  taken  our  position. 

The  extension  of  battle  fronts  of  today  seldom  permits 
any  envelopment,  and  leads  naturally  to  a  penetration  of 
the  position,  the  execution  of  which  makes  great  demands 
upon  leadership  and  troops.  The  commander  requires 
strong  forces  to  gather  the  fruits  of  a  penetration  after 
the  first  battle  success. 

No  commander  will  voluntarily  choose  position  war- 
fare, and  will  hardly  consider  blocking  off  in  time  of  peace 
a  certain  portion  of  the  terrain  after  the  method  of  the 
Roman  Lines  or  by  means  of  a  Chinese  Wall.  The  decision 
lies  in  the  attack.  The  fortified  lines  of  the  18th  Century 
did  not  meet  expectations.  They  held  confined  extraor- 
dinarily large  numbers  of  troops  and  these  never  did  make 
a  good  stand.  Today  aerial  reconnaissance  can  furnish 
the  basis  for  the  attack  of  fortifications.  Another  point 
must  not  be  left  out  of  consideration  and  that  is  that  the 
sphere  of  action  of  the  enemy  into  the  home  terrain  by 
means  of  airships  and  long  range  guns  has  increased  im- 
measurably, whereas  in  the  18th  Century  the  effective 
range  of  hostile  guns  reached  only  some  few  hundred  me- 
ters within  our  position.  By  such  procedure  (choosing 
position  warfare)  we  abandon  every  possible  war  objective, 
delay  the  decision  into  the  distant  future  and  increase  the 
economic  pressure  on  our  own  people.  Sufficient  protection 
of  valuable  economic  terrain  can  be  secured  only  by  carry- 
ing the  war  in  the  enemy's  country. 

Brief  examination  of  the  military  events  in  the  past 
forty  years  may  cause  us  to  assume  that  position  warfare 
became  the  rule;  mobile  warfare,  the  exception.  But  we 
must  in  each  case  carefully  ascertain  whether  the  position 
warfare  was  selected  on  account  of  inferiority  of  numbers, 
in  order  to  delay  defeat  until  other  States  could  participate 
(expected  British  participation  in  the  Russo-Turkish  War, 
1877-78),  or  until  the  arrival  of  reinforcements  (Russo- 
Japanese  War,  1904-05),  or  whether  the  position  warfare 
was  forced  by  special  conditions.  Position  warfare  length- 
ens the  war  and  thereby  increases  the  suffering  and,  in 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  49 

spite  of  the  smaller  losses  in  separate  engagements,  the 
aggregate  losses  total  far  more  than  results  from  a  battle 
in  the  open.  Only  overestimation  of  our  auxiliary  means 
and  underestimation  of  the  moral  influences,  could  lead 
to  the  conclusion  that  in  the  future  position  warfare  will  be 
the  rule.  Only  an  attack  (not  considering  the  influences 
of  an  economic  war)  is  able  to  break  the  will  of  the  enemy. 
For  any  commander  seeking  a  decision,  position  warfare  is 
but  an  auxiliary  means  used  to  let  the  enemy  wear  himself 
out  and  to  gain  time.  The  earlier  the  attack  is  undertaken 
and  the  greater  the  forces  employed,  the  less  time  will  the 
defender  gain.  Most  time  will  be  gained  by  the  defender  if 
the  attack  is  made  with  insufficient  means  (Plevna,  1877). 
The  commander  must  be  thoroughly  prepared  for  position 
warfare  but  must  strive  with  all  means  at  his  command  for 
mobile  war  and  carry  that  through. 

Field  Marshal  von  Moltke,  as  is  known,  had  advised  as 
early  as  1865  a  strategic  offensive  in  connection  with  a  tac- 
tical defensive,  and  in  1874  had  again  insisted  on  that  pro- 
cedure; but  in  war,  not  counting  the  battles  on  the  Loire 
(Coulmieres,  Beaune  la  Rolande,  Loigny)  the  Field  Mar- 
shal had  been  unable  to  transmute  his  ideas  and  recommen- 
dations into  action,  under  the  pressure  of  events.  But 
Moltke  surely  had  in  mind  a  procedure  that  was  to  be  vol- 
untarily adopted,  even  before  the  climax  of  the  victory  was 
attained.  After  the  September  battles  on  the  Marne  in 
1914,  and  in  the  summer  of  1918  we  were  forced  (in  France) 
to  choose  the  defensive  after  a  successful  offensive.  We 
by  no  means  appreciated  the  advantages  of  that  situation. 
In  1914  the  frontal  attacks  of  the  enemy  were  defeated  on 
the  Aisne,  and  then  commenced  a  race  "to  the  sea"  each  op- 
ponent with  the  intention  of  gaining  the  flank  of  the  other. 
The  Entente  had  gained  freedom  of  action  by  stopping  our 
forward  movement,  and  they  were  able  to  recuperate  from 
the  heavy  fighting  of  the  Summer  of  1914.  In  England  an 
army  had  been  created  from  nothing  and  their  divisions  at 
the  front  had  been  equipped  with  heavy  guns  and  modern 
battle  means. 

In  position  warfare  attacker  and  defender  are  opposed 
to  each  other  at  close  range  and  both  of  them  are  forced 


50  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

to  the  same  construction  of  positions.  While  the  attacker 
has  to  take  the  terrain  as  he  finds  it,  the  defender  seeks  to 
increase  his  fighting  strength  by  choice  of  a  favorable  ter- 
rain, fortified  by  artificial  means  and  he  certainly  will  not 
give  up  that  position  without  good  reasons.  Therefore  pos- 
session of  the  terrain  gains  increased  importance  in  position 
warfare.  As  the  attacker  desires  to  avoid  the  frontal  at- 
tack, he  seeks  to  lead  the  attack  against  a  flank  or,  as  was 
the  case  in  the  18th  Century  with  smaller  armies,  to  maneu- 
ver the  enemy  out  of  his  position  and  to  attack  him  in  the 
open.  The  defender  is  thus  oifered  the  opportunity  of 
counter-attacking  with  strong  forces,  holding  the  position 
with  weak  forces  merely  as  a  shield.  However,  the  impor- 
tance of  possession  of  the  terrain  held  good  only  as  long  as 
the  defensive  means  of  the  defense  proved  themselves  sup- 
erior. All  battles  show  that  the  attacker  is  successful,  and 
even  with  far  less  losses,  in  gaining  the  first  penetration. 
The  defender  has  to  decide  whether  to  hold  to  the  terrain 
under  great  loss  or  to  avoid  a  decision,  abandoning  his  labors 
and  the  terrain — but  which  have  forced  the  enemy  to  time- 
consuming  expenditure  of  material  and  personnel — and  to 
resume  the  battle  at  some  other  place. 

It  cannot  be  stated  whether  modern  weapons  favor  the 
attacker  or  the  defender,  but  the  attacker  has  the  advan- 
tage of  being  able  to  choose  the  place  and  time  for  the 
attack  and  to  bring  the  assaulting  troops  into  the  effective 
fire  zone  of  the  defender  only  a  short  time  before  the  hour 
of  the  assault.  On  the  other  hand  the  defender  must  keep 
his  troops  in  readiness  at  all  times  awaiting  the  attack. 
For  that  reason,  surprise  on  a  large  or  small  scale  increases 
in  importance.  Attack  preparations  that  have  not  been  ob- 
served avoid  counter-measures.  A  surprise  in  the  commence- 
ment of  the  assault  delays  the  hostile  barrage  fire  and  pre- 
vents timely  occupation  of  the  hostile  fire  trenches.  But  we 
cannot  reckon  on  surprise  as  a  certainty.  It  is  difficult  to  hide 
from  aerial  observation  the  placing  in  readiness  of  person- 
nel and  materiel  employed  in  an  attack,  on  a  large  scale, 
even  if  we  can  succeed  with  our  surprise  at  other  points. 
The  statements  of  a  single  deserter  may  easily  nullify  all 
preparations.     Thus  we  cannot  plan  an  attack  on  surprise 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  51 

alone.  Surprise  is  merely  a  material  auxiliary  means  for 
success.  In  attacks  on  a  very  large  scale  the  statements  of 
a  deserter  immediately  prior  to  the  attack  still  may  have 
no  materially  bad  consequences.  Transmission  of  messages 
requires  much  time,  as  well  as  the  transition  from  decision 
to  execution.  Our  military  channels  seldom  have  anything 
important  to  report.  Even  "reliable  reports,"  meaning  such 
as  confirm  a  pre-arrived  at  opinion,  cause  little  attention  to 
be  paid  to  other  reports  that  are  not  in  conformity  there- 
with. 

A  certain  monotony  is  combined  with  position  warfare, 
which  can  easily  lead  to  indifference  and  apathy  and  finally 
to  acceptance  of  a  "Peace  within  the  precincts  of  a  castle" 
or  "leave  me  alone  and  I  surely  will  do  nothing  to  you" 
policy.  Such  a  conception  which  is  as  far  as  heaven  is 
from  the  earth  from  the  conception  of  actual  war,  must  be 
combatted  with  all  possible  means.  The  most  extensive 
damage  must  be  done  to  the  enemy.  In  the  foreground, 
up  to  the  hostile  obstacle,  no  patrols  must  be  permitted. 
Fortification  labor  in  the  open  and  movements  in  the  open 
by  detachments  or  vehicles  must  be  made  impossible  by 
fire.  If  that  is  not  done  we  will  finally  see  an  agreement 
between  the  pickets  and  thus  "trench  friendships"  will 
be  created  which  in  all  cases  are  of  the  gravest  danger  to 
loyal  troops.  In  the  French  divisions  the  maxim  was  gen- 
erally adhered  to  that  troops,  once  relieved,  should  never 
again  be  placed  in  the  line  at  the  same  point,  thereby  in- 
creasing the  difficulties  of  fraternizing.  Monotony  will 
be  prevented  by  firing  as  a  general  rule  on  all  visible  targets, 
laying  a  sweeping  fire  by  day  and  night  upon  the  hostile 
rear  areas  and  frequently  executing  operations  of  some 
kind.  In  position  warfare,  as  we  have  learned,  discipline, 
capacity  for  marching  and  desire  for  operations  suffer 
under  the  hard  work  of  throwing  up  fortifications  and 
officers  of  all  and  every  grade  have  to  do  their  very  best  to 
prevent  a  "tiredness  for  war."  The  value  of  cover  is  easily 
overestimated.  As  numerous  complete  reports  indicate 
the  troops  accustomed  to  the  cover  of  a  position  system  in 
many  instances  can  no  longer  accommodate  themselves  to 
the  uncertain  conditions  of  mobile  warfare. 


52  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

THE  POSITION  BATTLES  UP  TO  THE  FIRST 
ATTACK  ON  VERDUN 

When,  after  the  battle  of  the  Mame  in  the  Autumn  of 
1914,  the  German  troops  resorted  to  the  spade,  they  had 
sufficient  high-trajectory  artillery.  It  therefore  was  suffi- 
cient, as  the  enemy  lacked  minenwerfers,  to  arrange  for 
protection  in  the  trenches  against  small  arms  and  shrapnel 
fire.  The  importance  of  aerial  reconnaissance  was  insuffi- 
ciently appreciated  at  that  time. 

The  first  positions  in  which  infantry  and  artillery 
worked  in  many  cases  without  proper  connection,  showed, 
with  a  long  range  field  of  fire,  a  line  according  to  the  profile 
of  the  reinforced  rifle  trench,  constructed  in  most  cases  by 
far  separated  groups.  Differing  from  the  French  and  the 
Russians,  we  rejected  any  formation  in  depth.  The  center 
of  gravity  lay  in  the  most  advanced  trenches,  beyond  which 
a  few  shallow  trenches  for  sentries  were  located.  The  de- 
mand, to  defend  only  one  line,  was  based  on  the  proposed 
conduct  of  the  defense  which  anticipated  that  the  attacker 
would  be  held  up  by  the  fire  fight  of  the  defender,  and  the 
decision  sought  by  the  counter-attack  by  the  reserves.  There 
was  no  time  for  false  works.  There  were  but  very  few 
routes  of  approach  and  covered  trenches.  Shelters  were 
to  provide  security  at  the  most  against  straight  hits  of 
field  artillery,  otherwise  only  against  shrapnel  fire.  The  im- 
portance of  flanking  from  open  trenches  was  not  generally 
appreciated.  Fortification  by  squads  or  groups  led  to  the 
reestablishment  of  the  supporting  points  (which  had  been 
omitted  in  the  "Field  Pioneer  Service  Regulations  for  all 
Arms")  which,  constructed  in  the  shape  of  "kraals,"  allowed 
deployment  of  the  firing  line  up  to  400  meters,  but  resulted 
in  violating  of  the  general  rule  of  the  line  being  defended 
only  by  weak  forces.  Obstacles  were  to  be  placed  so  far 
from  the  trenches,  that  they  could  just  be  watched  from  the 
latter  (about  50  meters).  "If  they  are  located  close  to  a 
position,  they  will  be  within  the  effective  zone  of  dispersion 
of  the  hostile  artillery  fire  laid  on  the  position ;  and  in  addi- 
tion they  will  not  provide  sufficient  cover  for  the  garrison 
against  hostile  hand  grenades"  (Field  Pioneer  Regulations, 
348). 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  53 

The  applied  forms  of  fortification  were  in  absolute  con- 
sonance with  the  Regulations  of  the  Field  Pioneer  Service, 
in  the  preparation  of  which  we  might  have  reckoned  with 
the  possibility  that  the  enemy  would  quickly  bring  to  the 
front  heavy  batteries  employing  high-angle  fire,  and  that 
we  would  also  have  to  encounter  heavy  guns  of  large  cali- 
ber using  flat-trajectory  fire.  In  any  case  the  15-cm.  cali- 
bers were  soon  outclassed  by  heavier  ones.  Also  new  weap- 
ons, hand  grenades  in  the  hands  of  the  infantry,  minenwer- 
fers,  gas  shells  and  gas  projectors,  made  their  importance 
felt  which  caused  a  complete  change  in  the  forms  of  the 
fortifications. 

It  was  very  soon  seen  that  the  attacking  artillery,  if 
in  sufficient  strength  and  liberally  supplied  with  ammuni- 
tion, would  be  capable  with  increased  volume  of  fire  (drum 
fire)  to  annihilate  any  position  that  it  could  observe;  that 
thereby  narrow,  deep  skirmish  trenches  would  be  trans- 
formed into  flat  depressions  in  which  the  artificial  works 
disappeared  beyond  recognition,  and  that  shelters  and  cov- 
ered trenches  with  insufficiently  strong  roofs  were  in  danger 
of  being  filled  up.  A  remedy  therefor  was  had  by  increas- 
ing the  strength  of  cover  first,  then  by  constructing  more 
covered  and  connecting  trenches,  whereby  it  became  possi- 
ble to  construct  numerous  shelters,  distributed  in  breadth 
and  depth,  so  that  in  the  rear  of  the  front  trenches  several 
lines  were  created,  to  which  the  garrison  that  was  being 
heavily  fired  on  could  go  for  shelter.  Where  the  ground 
was  firm,  very  narrow  and  deep  trenches  were  preferred. 
Such  were  not  fit  for  defense  at  all  points  without  additional 
preparation.  They  required  special  arrangements  for  fir- 
ing and  for  drainage ;  could  not  be  used  indefinitely  without 
proper  wall  supports;  and  finally,  the  rescue  of  the  men 
who  had  been  covered  up  by  trenches  caving  in,  was  made 
more  difficult.  We  rightly  asked  ourselves  if  the  extensive 
labor  connected  with  the  construction  of  such  trenches  was 
justified  by  the  protection  which  they  could  offer  the  garri- 
son after  a  continued  **drum"  fire.  If  we  assume  that  any 
position  within  reach  of  the  hostile  artillery  can  be  anni- 
hilated by  the  enemy,  then  second  and  third  positions, 
against  which  the  hostile  artillery  would  have  to  deploy 


54  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

again,  gained  special  importance;  thus  we  discarded  the 
view:  "as  a  general  rule  only  one  defensive  position  will 
be  selected  and  fortified  with  all  available  means."  (Pio- 
neer Regulations,  216.) 

Very  properly  all  regulations  pointed  out  the  necessity 
of  making  the  parapet  as  low  as  was  possible  from  the 
nature  of  the  terrain,  the  character  of  growth  covering  the 
ground,  and  condition  of  the  ground.  But  following  the 
directions  of  regulations  alone  did  not  suffice  as  soon  as  hos- 
tile artillery  could  observe  the  trenches,  which  could  not 
be  hidden  from  aerial  observation,  and  which  betrayed  them- 
selves by  the  obstacles.  False  works  offered  only  a  minor 
remedy.  Thus  in  the  first  months  of  1915  we  took  a  step 
farther  and  abandoned  the  long  range  field  of  fire  by  draw- 
ing back  the  firing  line  from  the  forward  slope  of  the  pla- 
teau, in  many  cases  even  to  the  rear  edge  of  the  plateau, 
and  merely  observing  the  forward  slope  of  the  plateau  by 
sentries,  who  frequently  were  posted  in  false  positions.  The 
advantage  of  being  able  to  defend  positions  having  a  good 
field  of  fire  with  only  a  small  number  of  skirmishers  became 
of  small  consideration  as  a  powerful  hostile  artillery  would 
prevent  skirmishers  from  using  their  rifles.  It  is  certain, 
however,  we  mainly  secured  protection  against  hostile  ar- 
tillery fire  by  this  method,  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  we  lim- 
ited the  co-operation  of  our  own  artillery  and  gave  the  enemy 
increased  facilities  for  finding  the  range.  In  a  short  time 
the  hostile  artillery  could  bring  its  observers  to  the  aban- 
doned, or  only  weakly  held  heights ;  and  then,  from  a  cov- 
ered position  and  unhindered,  could  without  difficulty  smash 
our  infantry  by  its  fire. 

It  is  true  that  the  observation  stations  of  our  artillery 
could  be  placed  for  temporary  purposes  beyond  our  own 
position,  but  for  the  decisive  battle  they  had  to  be  located 
within  the  position.  On  account  of  the  immense  dust  and 
smoke  clouds  caused  by  the  drum  fire,  observation  from 
flank  positions  and  from  positions  in  rear  gained  in  impor- 
tance. It  became  more  and  more  evident  that  the  location 
of  the  observation  was  of  the  utmost  importance  in  the 
selection  of  the  fighting  line. 

The  non-successful  battles  of  the  Entente — in  Flanders 
and  in  the  Champagne  starting  with  the  16th  of  February, 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  55 

1915 — differed  from  the  prior  attacks  only  by  the  stronger 
artillery  preparation  that  had  been  increased  to  "drum" 
fire.  This  preparation  was  to  enable  the  attacking  infantry, 
advancing  in  dense  skirmish  lines  and  followed  at  100  meters 
distance  by  companies  and  battalions  in  columns,  to  take 
possession  of  the  battered  position  without  fighting.  It  is 
said  that  in  the  Champagne  18  to  20  rounds  were  thrown 
on  each  lineal  meter  of  positions,  but  the  success  did  not 
accord  with  the  expenditure  of  ammunition  because,  ac- 
cording to  the  views  of  the  leaders,  the  assaulting  mass  was 
not  broad  and  deep  enough  and  there  were  no  reserves. 

"Experiences  in  war  concerning  field  fortifications"  de- 
manded that  a  portion  of  the  infantry  should  be  trained  in 
throwing  and  manufacturing  suitable  hand  grenades.  The 
ball  (time-fuse)  hand  grenade,  the  disk  (percussion-fuse) 
and  the  steel  handled  grenades  (time  and  percussion  fuses) 
were  all  employed.  Only  the  steel  handled  grenades  (time- 
fuse) were  found  to  be  serviceable  and  also  a  lighter  egg- 
shaped  hand  grenade  with  throwing  ranges  of  30  and  40 
meters.  It  was  recommended  that  in  stubborn  defense,  at 
least  two  positions,  one  in  rear  of  the  other,  be  taken  up, 
each  consisting  of  several  lines  (50  to  100  meters  distance), 
with  organization  in  depth  to  prevent  a  rolling  up  after  the 
enemy  had  broken  in.  Not  much  emphasis  was  laid  on  the 
value  of  a  large  field  of  fire,  but  it  was  recommended  that 
machine  guns  and  light  field  pieces  be  placed  in  the  forward 
trenches  and  thoroughly  covered  at  the  most  important 
points ;  that  the  trenches  be  arranged  for  defense  toward  the 
rear  as  well  as  toward  the  front  ("closed  rifle  trench,"  sep- 
arating the  two  trenches  by  50  meters)  ;  and  that  they  be 
surrounded  by  obstacles.  Construction  of  loopholes  was 
left  to  the  discretion  of  the  defender.  Smaller  shelters  were 
provided  in  the  front  trench;  larger  ones  holding  as  much 
as  one  platoon  in  the  rear  trench.  Head-cover  was  not  re- 
quired in  rifle  trenches,  except  in  observation  stations,  be- 
cause it  interfered  with  the  use  of  the  rifle  and  bayonet.  If, 
in  exceptional  cases,  head-cover  was  desired,  one  with  a 
continuous  horizontal  loophole  was  considered  best.  Closed 
works  were  of  no  use ;  straight  lines  rather  were  preferred, 
as  it  was  not  possible  to  depend  on  securing  flank  fire.    When 


56  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

Fortifications  Prior  to  the  Autumn 

Dugouts  (fox-holes,  for  about  4  men  sitting) 


^ 


-rf  "^ 


Trenches 


:>^ 


f^ 


Hnr 


^ 


Front  Trench 


Communication  Trench 


•  0  iO 


l,e  e 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917 
Battle  in  the  Champagne 

P     Trench 


57 


8    maters 


Side   track,   for   firing  to 
the   right 


Riflemen's  niches 

a 

Splinter-proof    shelters 

Shelters   on  larger   scale    (warming   places, 
C      Command  stations,  rest  stations,  dressing 
stations ) 

J  Route   of   approach 


^aso 


O  60  .    . 

Reinforced   trench    as   infantry   position.     To   be   constructed   in 
one   night  in   favorable  ground 


Loopholes,  reinforced  with  lumber    (profile) 

_  .   _  .  .  ^y»  ■VyM!/////:r:7r>^  Sod  or  sand-bags 


1  Concrete  head   cover  with    1    meter  thickness   offer   protection 

against   shells  fired  from   mortars 

2  Trenches    in    the    shape    of    reinforced    trenchee.        Approach 

trenches  2i  meters  from  floor  to  ceiling 


68  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  flanks  of  a  position  have  to  be  drawn  back,  it  should  be 
done  by  echeloning  the  rifle  trenches.  Machine  guns  had 
better  be  posted  on  the  flanks  and,  if  possible,  under  cover. 
They  should  not  expose  themselves  prematurely  in  order  to 
avoid  early  destruction  by  artillery  fire.  In  many  cases  the 
front  trench  was  designated  the  fighting  trench,  the  rear 
trench  (12  meters  distance),  the  communication  trench. 
The  strength  of  cover  against  light  field  howitzer  projec- 
tiles was  given  as  2  meters  (using  alternate  layers  of  stones, 
logs,  etc.,  of  1.5  meter).  Using  concrete  the  cover  was  0.5 
to  1  meter  thick.  The  necessity  of  having  two  exits  from 
shelters  was  not  suflSciently  emphasized.  Obstacles  were  to 
be  constructed  not  farther  than  from  20  to  30  meters  in  front 
of  the  trenches,  and  to  be  in  2  to  3  bands,  each  6  to  10  meters 
wide.  They  were  to  protect  against  sudden  attack  and  to 
force  the  attacker  into  the  spaces  swept  by  our  fire.  Sev- 
eral bands  of  obstacles  proved  themselves  just  as  good  as 
obstacles  placed  in  depth.  High  obstacles  betrayed  them- 
selves clearly  on  aerial  photos.  Close  co-operation  between 
infantry  and  artillery  was  absolutely  necessary. 

Posting  the  artillery  at  a  designated  time  and  place  was 
absolutely  required  for  attack  as  well  as  for  defense.  To- 
day infantry  cannot  fight  unless  the  artillery  has  fully  pre- 
pared the  way.  But  the  artillery  effort  is  in  vain,  if  it  is 
not  utilized  by  the  infantry  at  the  correct  time.  The  effect 
of  the  artillery  fire  supplements  that  of  the  infantry  and 
vice  versa,  and  both  must  work  in  close  conjunction. 

The  French  positions,  exclusive  of  those  in  unimpor- 
tant sectors,  as  a  general  rule  consisted  of  three  lines  of 
which  the  first  line — strongly  constructed  but  weakly  held, 
— was  designed  for  security.  The  second  line,  150  to  200 
meters  distant,  was  the  main  line  of  resistance,  in  rear  of 
which  were  located  a  series  of  supporting  points  prepared 
for  all  around  defense.  400  to  500  meters  in  rear  of  the  line 
of  main  resistance,  the  reserves  were  held  in  secure  shel- 
ters for  use  in  the  counter-attack.  Special  consideration 
was  given  to  carefully  planned  flanking  works  for  all  lines. 
Sector  reserves,  labor  and  park  battalions,  were  employed 
in  constructing  a  second  position. 

French  generals  ascribed  the  cause  of  the  success  of 
the  German  attacks  to  the  fact  that  the  front  lines  of  the 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  59 

positions  were  always  too  strongly  occupied,  though  Joffre 
as  early  as  January  5,  1915,  had  cautioned  (to  reduce  the 
loss)  against  crowding  defenders  into  the  front  line.  The 
men  in  the  front  line  were  merely  to  report  the  assault  and 
delay  it;  the  decision  was  to  be  sought  in  the  counter-at- 
tack by  the  reserves.  This  created  the  need  of  a  position 
system,  with  carefully  planned  formation  in  depth  in  which 
strong  obstacles  and  a  powerful  flank  defense  played  an  es- 
pecial role.  The  difficulty  in  gathering  together  the  widely 
distributed  garrison  of  the  front  line  for  attack  purposes, 
led  to  the  construction  of  covered  assembly  places.  Num- 
erous captured  documents  show  that  the  French  were  slow 
to  accept  the  very  correct  views  of  Joffre.  Similar  views, 
as  we  will  show  later,  encountered  stubborn  resistance  in 
the  German  Army. 

The  British,  not  caring  much  for  a  long  range  field  of 
fire,  tried  to  hide  the  fortifications  from  the  view  of  the 
enemy.  In  many  instances  they  were  constructed  on  re- 
verse slopes  and  in  the  cover  of  hedges.  Their  position  con- 
sisted of  three  lines,  connected  by  approach  trenches.  The 
front  rifle  trench  was  as  narrow  as  possible  (45-cm.)  and 
90-cm.  (or  more)  deep,  with  shelters  and  breastworks.  15 
yards  in  rear  was  the  communicating  trench,  45  to  60  meters 
long  and  1.8  to  2.1  meters  deep.  25  yards  in  rear  of  the 
communicating  trench  was  the  cover  trench  with  a  breadth 
of  60  cm.  and  with  a  depth  as  great  as  practicable,  under 
special  conditions,  4.8  meters.  The  earth  dug  out  was  scat- 
tered and  smoothed  off  or  used  for  the  construction  of  false 
works.  For  protection  against  explosive  shells,  a  parados 
was  required.  Simple  arrangements  were  provided  for 
fixing  the  rifles  with  proper  sight  elevations,  for  use  in 
night  attacks. 

The  experiences  gathered  and  lessons  gained  by  the 
Allies  in  the  Winter  engagements  v/ere  arranged  and  com- 
piled by  General  Joffre  into  the  Regulations  of  April  16, 
1915,  entitled:  "Aims  and  Prerequisites  of  the  General  Of- 
fensive," which  shortly  after  publication  fell  into  German 
hands.  The  procedure  established  therein  was  that  the 
troops,  after  a  concentrated  heavy  artillery  fire  of  all  cali- 
bers ("drum  fire")  lasting  for  from  four  to  five  hours  and 


60  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

Arrangement  of  the  Field  of  Attack. 

Hoetile  position 


l^"  Dressing  Station 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  61 
According  to  Joffre's  Plan 


Legend  : 

3P  =       Advanced  trenches 

O   =      Exit  trench  (Paralle  de  Depart)  1  meter  broad 

^  =       Approaching  trench 

/i   =       Trench  of  the  1st  Line,  1  meter  broad 

B    =      Approach  trenches,  1  meter  broad 
two  for  each  company 

^    =       Assembly  stations  of  the  1st  Line 
two  each  for  one  platoon 

l>  =  Communicating  trench,  2  meters  broad 

JE    =  Approach  trench,  2  meters  broad,  one  for  each  company 

F    =  Evacuation  trench 

G    —  Side  tracks 

H  =  Assembly  stations  of  the  2d  Line 

%F    —  Connecting  trenches,  2  meters  broad 

|X|j^=  Headquarters  location  (Bn,  regt,  Brig.,  Div.) 
mkZf  —  Observation  Stations  of  Artillery 

Position  in  Readiness  to  Attack 

German  Front  (about  600  rifles) 

^200  m 


i 


*6  companies  of  eaoh  of  the  1st  regiments  in  a  single  deose  skirmish  line— 2400  Jri&ea 

•*6  companies  of  the  2d  regiments  in  same  formation  as  those  of  the  Ist  regiments — 
1200  rifles 


Distance  variable,  at  head  of  field  of  attack.  6th  Co.,  2d  Regiment 

Second  Brigade  at  rest,  but  in  readiness 

The  attack  is  made  in  the  start  by  the  1st  Brigade  only  with  18  companies,  l.e., 
with  3600  rifles,  placed  in  readiness  on  a  stretch  of  ground  122  m.  broed  and  15U  m. 
deep. 


62  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

concentrated  on  a  very  limited  space  with  great  rapidity  of 
fire  were  to  be  brought  up  under  cover  to  assault  distance 
(150  to  200  meters  from  the  enemy)  and  placed  in  readiness 
under  cover  and  in  the  assembly  trenches.  During  the 
night  preceding  the  attack  a  line  of  departure  for  the  at- 
tack was  to  be  constructed.  If  the  fire  preparation  proved 
insufficient  to  annihilate  the  materiel  and  moral  resistance 
of  the  defender,  then  the  fire  was  to  be  extended  to  several 
days.     The  attack  was  to  commence  with  the  assault. 

It  was  intended  to  overrun  the  hostile  line  on  a  broad 
front  (1200  to  1500  meters  for  each  division)  and  in  strong 
formation  in  depth,  column  of  brigades  and  regiments.  By 
continuous  advance  of  successive  echelons  the  movement 
was  to  be  kept  up  to  a  designated  attack  objective  deep  in 
the  hostile  position.  The  attacking  waves  followed  each 
other  with  little  distance  and  consisted  of  entire  companies 
deployed  with  intervals  of  only  half  a  pace  between  skirmish- 
ers, so  that  3600  men  were  together  on  a  space  of  1200  me- 
ters extent  and  170  meters  deep.  The  attack  was  initiated 
only  by  the  1st  Brigade,  while  the  2d  Brigade  remained  on 
the  alert  in  its  quarters.  Placing  the  regiments  in  column 
led  to  a  complete  mixing  of  units  and  prevented  the  exer- 
cise of  command.  Penetrating  a  position  is  impossible  by 
successive  waves,  as  the  ones  following  in  rear  cannot  find 
any  room  to  pass  through  the  halting  masses  of  the  leading 
lines.  It  is  evident  that  there  is  danger  that  the  supports 
will  be  hung  up  in  the  first  line  on  account  of  the  small  in- 
tervals. Jofl^re's  procedure  changed  the  division  into  a 
single  unwieldy  phalanx  which,  once  started  moving  could 
only  advance  straight  ahead  or  turn  back  in  complete  disor- 
der. In  this  illogical  scheme  no  opportunity  for  leadership 
or  exercise  of  initiative  was  allowed.  A  minor  portion  of 
the  artillery  was  to  hold  down  the  hostile  artillery,  one-third 
of  the  field  artillery  being  assigned  to  destroy  the  obstacles 
and  two-thirds  to  prepare  the  hostile  trenches  for  the  as- 
sault. In  this,  to  each  200  meters  two  75-cm.  batteries  were 
assigned  with  80  to  100  rounds  per  piece.  Of  the  heavy  cali- 
bers 40  to  50  rounds  for  each  220-mm.,  50  to  60  for  each 
150-mm.,  and  60  to  80  for  each  120-mm.  piece  were  allotted. 
This  plan  of  attack  precluded  all  surprise,  though  as  late  as 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  63 

March  1st  the  army  had  seen  in  surprise  the  "indispensable 
factor  of  success."  The  plan  of  attack  was  based  on  the 
effect  of  superior  expenditure  of  ammunition  and  the  weight 
of  the  assault  by  superior  infantry  that  had  been  saved  there- 
for. It  demanded  the  time-consuming  removal  of  enormous 
quantities  of  earth  and  forced  the  command  to  attack  only 
where  the  two  opponents  were  at  assault  distance.  To  de- 
feat such  an  attack  the  German  measures  were :  Great  dis- 
tance between  the  rear  lines  protected  by  obstacles  and  sup- 
plied with  numerous  shelters  which  had  to  be  occupied  sim- 
ultaneously with  the  front  line ;  full  utilization  of  the  flank- 
ing effect  of  machine  guns  and  single  field  pieces ;  the  ene- 
my's penetration  to  be  answered  by  an  immediate  counter- 
attack; hostile  batteries  that  could  be  seen,  to  be  engaged 
prior  to  the  attack ;  demolition  of  the  hostile  assault  works 
by  heavy  guns  of  high  angle  fire  and  minenwerfers  for  the 
purpose  of  delaying  the  attack ;  during  the  attack  the  heavy 
artillery  to  keep  up  its  fire  on  the  hostile  front  trenches  to 
cut  off  the  hostile  supports. 

Joffre's  army  orders  of  September  14,  1915,  designated 
"the  present  moment  as  especially  favorable  for  the  offen- 
sive." Found  by  the  Germans,  these  orders  pointed  out 
the  danger,  while  at  the  same  time  the  results  of  the  Ger- 
man ground  and  aerial  reconnaissances  as  well  as  the  state- 
ment of  prisoners  and  deserters  furnished  valuable  infor- 
mation of  attack  preparations  against  the  line  Auberive — 
Ville  sur  Tourbe,  that  was  then  held  by  only  four  divisions 
(33  kilometers) .  General  von  Castelnau  led  the  attack.  On 
September  27,  at  7:00  A.M.,  reinforced  artillery  fire  opened 
which  the  defender  sought  to  reduce  by  regular  firing  on  the 
hostile  batteries.  Gas  was  liberally  used  by  the  attacker. 
French  airplanes  ascertained  the  effect  of  the  fire,  and 
sought  to  interrupt  traffic  in  the  hostile  rear  by  dropping 
bombs.  The  French  attack  divisions  had  been  in  the  front 
line  a  short  time  to  get  familiar  with  the  terrain  and  the 
position,  and  had  then  been  taken  back  to  the  vicinity  of 
Chalons  for  rest.  Thus  it  was  that  as  early  as  September 
22d  we  knew  18  of  the  30  hostile  attack  divisions.  Com- 
pletely fresh  troops,  that  had  the  advantage  of  the  super- 
iority in  numbers  and  materiel  were  to  make  the  attack 


64  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

against  the  weak  German  first  line  divisions  which  for  the 
most  part  had  been  in  the  trenches  for  several  months.  The 
preparations  for  the  attack  were  completed  by  the  22d.  Thor- 
ough preparation  to  the  minutest  detail  was  absolutely 
essential  for  success.  Improvement  of  the  approach  and 
assembly  trenches  was  demanded.  Even  preparations  for 
concealed  assembly  places  for  and  provision  for  advancing 
the  cavalry  divisions  in  columns  of  twos,  had  been  made. 
The  morning  of  the  24th  the  drum  fire  was  suspended  for 
a  short  time,  so  that  reconnoitering  detachments  could  as- 
certain its  effect.  The  grouping  of  the  French,  different 
from  Joffre's  attack  method  was  the  same  along  the  entire 
front.  In  each  front  line  division  3  regiments  were  placed 
abreast  with  the  4th  in  reserve.  In  the  regiments  the  bat- 
talions were  in  column,  each  in  dense  skirmish  lines  at  50 
meters  distance.  The  first  wave  was  preceded  by  hand  gren- 
ade squads  and  followed  by  detachments  to  clear  the 
trenches  (nettoyeurs)  and  detachments  to  salvage  captured 
material,  to  break  any  surviving  resistance  and  to  bring 
back  the  prisoners. 

Some  battalions  were  accompanied  by  65-mm.  moun- 
tain guns  to  fire  on  machine  guns.  In  order  to  have  the  ar- 
tillery distinguish  their  own  troops  the  men  wore  white 
cloths  sewed  on  their  backs. 

Along  the  33-kilometer  battle  front  the  French  had  de- 
ployed 1285  light  and  650  heavy  guns,  or  40  light  and  20 
heavy  guns  per  kilometer.  Prior  to  the  attack  the  50th  In- 
fantry Division  (German)  had  only  12  gun  batteries,  one 
Russian  15-cm.  gun  battery,  and  2  heavy  field  howitzer  bat- 
teries; the  15th  Reserve  Division  (German)  had  only  6 
gun  batteries,  one  10-cm.  gun  battery,  4  heavy  field  howitzer 
batteries  and  4  mortar  batteries.  Thus  the  French  super- 
iority in  artillery  was  ten  to  one. 

During  the  night  of  the  24-25th,  trench  work  on  a  large 
scale  took  place  to  provide  assault  positions.  Routes  of  ap- 
proach permitted  reserves  to  be  brought  up  under  cover  to 
within  4  to  5  kilometers.  In  order  to  have  the  entire  day  for 
development  of  the  success,  and  after  a  drum  fire  that  had 
lasted  72  hours,  at  9:15  A.M.  the  attack  started  with  22 
divisions  in  the  first  line  and  eight  divisions  in  the  second, 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  65 

along  the  front  Massiges — Auberive  (33  kilometers)  against 
the  position  held  by  four  German  divisions  after  the  artil- 
lery fire  about  7:00  A.M.  had  again  been  increased  to 
maximum  volume. 

The  French  assault  positions  were  about  80  to  400  me- 
ters from  the  foremost  German  trenches.  Generally  the 
distance  was  about  200  meters,  which  was  still  more  de- 
creased by  the  leading  French  waves  which  in  order  to  avoid 
the  defensive  barrage,  had,  shortly  before  the  attack,  taken 
position  lying  down  in  the  open  ground  in  front  of  their 
trenches.  Considering  this  short  distance,  the  defender 
could  not  man  the  fire  positions  at  all  points  at  the  proper 
time ;  but  the  resistance  was  not  broken  thereby.  Each  squad, 
each  individual  kept  on  fighting.  The  53d  Infantry  Regi- 
ment (50th  Infantry  Division)  which  had  furnished  4  com- 
panies for  the  corps  reserve,  held  a  sector  of  2250  meters 
front  with  only  3  companies  in  front,  3  companies  in  rear 
and  2  companies  in  second  line.  The  attack  of  4  French  regi- 
ments with  8  battalions  was  directed  at  that  point,  these 
battalions  close  alongside  each  other.  The  front  lines  were 
overrun  by  the  attacker,  it  is  true ;  but  the  stubborn  resis- 
tance of  the  53d  Regiment  was  broken  by  envelopment  and 
attack  in  the  rear.  All  honor  to  this  brave  regiment,  which 
here  succumbed  to  superiority  in  numbers,  but  the  remains 
of  which,  reinforced  by  a  few  reserves  held  their  place  until 
the  evening  of  October  1st.  From  September  22d  to  October 
10th  the  regiment  lost  56  officers  and  2583  men.  In  conse- 
quence of  the  superiority  in  men  and  materiel  and  of  the 
stubborn  resistance  of  the  front  line,  heavy  losses  in  pris- 
oners could  not  be  avoided.  The  French  army  communique 
of  the  evening  of  the  26th,  reports  for  the  entire  front  16,000 
unwounded  prisoners,  200  of  whom  were  officers  and  24  guns 
captured.  The  evening  of  the  29th  they  reported  23,000 
prisoners  and  121  guns  captured. 

The  excellent  conduct  of  that  regiment  stands  by  no 
means  alone.  I  shall  cite  only  the  stubborn  resistance  of 
the  2d  Battalion,  65th  Infantry,  under  an  efficient  cavalry 
captain  on  Hill  196  at  Le  Mesnil,  in  a  reverse  slope  position 
which  could  not  be  reached  by  the  flat-trajectory  guns.  The 
troops,  though  attacked  in  flank  and  rear,  held  their  posi- 


66  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tion;  gained  time  by  counter-attacks;  and  by  the  evening 
of  the  first  day  of  the  battle  had  captured  300  prisoners  and 
2  machine  guns  from  the  enemy,  they  themselves  losing  8 
officers  and  180  men  (only  60  killed)  and  5  prisoners. 

We  cannot  emphasize  too  much  in  peace  training  that 
threatening  and  envelopment  of  the  flanks  are  of  themselves 
no  justification  for  withdrawing;  that  a  well  constructed 
trench  system  can  be  held  even  under  very  unfavorable  con- 
ditions, while  retreat  across  an  open  terrain  will  almost  al- 
ways lead  to  annihilation.  On  the  French  side  the  main 
cause  for  the  failure  of  the  attack  was  attributed  to  the 
efficient  employment  of  the  German  machine  guns. 

It  appears  that  the  main  plan  was  to  break  through 
along  the  four  main  roads  leading  northward.  The  objec- 
tive of  the  attack  was  to  be  the  Vouzieres — Rethel  road, 
about  24  kilometers  distant.  We  will  not  go  into  details 
here.  However,  a  deep  penetration  succeeded  only  on  both 
sides  of  the  Souain — Somme  road  for  a  width  of  17  kilome- 
ters and  a  depth  of  3.5  kilometers.  At  another  point  the 
French  had  penetrated  only  to  a  depth  of  1500  to  2000 
meters.  The  German  defense  was  by  means  of  barrage  fire. 
Though  this  fire  did  not  break  up  the  first  waves,  it  still  had 
the  effect  of  delaying  the  succeeding  waves;  and  in  many 
cases  stopped  them.  Where  the  penetration  had  been  suc- 
cessful, advancing  reserves  strove  to  gain  the  fruits  of 
that  success,  regardless  of  the  losses  they  suffered. 

This  resulted  in  the  mixing  of  units  and  in  confusion 
which  was  increased  by  the  French  fire  and  the  stubborn 
defense  of  the  intermediate  ground  by  the  German  troops 
held  in  readiness.  In  the  evening  the  battle  came  to  a  halt 
in  front  of  the  second  position,  which  had  been  located,  after 
the  experiences  of  the  Winter  battles,  on  the  rear  slope  of 
the  hill.  Attempts  by  the  cavalry  to  exploit  the  success 
met  with  a  bloody  defeat.  The  attack  preparations  had 
been  thoroughly  planned  up  to  the  penetration  and  regulated 
to  the  minutest  details;  and  from  there  on  the  command 
left  everything  to  the  initiative  of  the  subordinates,  who 
failed. 

The  next  few  days  passed  in  minor  actions  with  no  re- 
sults.   The  artillery  required  till  October  4,  1915,  to  deploy 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  67 

in  new  positions.  The  attack,  resumed  then,  gained  no  suc- 
cess, as  by  that  time  sufficient  German  reserves  had  ar- 
rived.   The  battle  died  out  by  the  end  of  the  month. 

Prior  to  the  attack  it  had  been  presumed  that  the  Ger- 
man resistance  would  be  completely  broken  by  the  artillery 
fire.  This  presumption  did  not  materialize.  The  artillery 
support,  in  connection  with  support  of  airplanes,  had  been 
excellent;  the  "drum  fire"  had  annihilated  all  works  that 
could  be  seen;  but  after  the  penetration,  connection  with 
the  artillery  was  entirely  lost.  The  skill  of  the  individual 
French  infantryman  in  clinging  to  the  ground  and  in 
rapidly  and  skillfully  strengthening  the  terrain,  showed  up 
advantageously ;  but  less  successful  was  the  leadership  from 
the  company  commanders  up,  for  the  leaders  did  not  under- 
stand how  to  keep  their  men  in  hand.  The  effect  of  the  ar- 
tillery fire  was  disappointing,  for  in  spite  of  the  enormous 
expenditure  of  ammunition,  it  did  not  have  the  power  of 
annihilating  a  very  numerically  inferior  opponent. 

It  was  deduced  from  the  Autumn  battle,  as  far  as  posi- 
tion warfare  is  concerned,  that  each  defensive  system  must 
consist  of  at  least  two  positions,  which  should  be  so  far 
separated  that  the  enemy  cannot  overcome  by  his  artillery 
fire  the  second  from  the  first ;  and  that  the  main  purpose  of 
the  second  position  is  to  prevent  the  attacker  moving  by  the 
flank  after  penetrating  the  first  position  in  order  to  extend 
his  success.  Each  position  should  consist  of  two  lines,  sep- 
arated by  a  distance  of  50  to  100  meters  and  connected  by 
numerous  trenches  capable  of  being  defended.  The  most 
advanced  line,  in  which  the  larger  portion  of  the  machine 
guns  should  be,  should  form  the  main  battle  line.  It  was 
found  that  flanking  fire  along  the  front  of  the  line  was  es- 
pecially important.  Obstacles  should  be  placed  in  several 
rows  rather  than  in  a  single  row.  Although  it  is  desirable 
to  assume  formation  in  depth  to  decrease  the  losses,  this 
should  not  lead  to  splitting  up  commands.  A  trench  garri- 
son, attacked  from  all  sides,  must  hold  out  at  all  costs  in 
the  expectation  of  relief  by  a  counter-attack  that  is  certain 
to  come.  Narrow,  deep  rifle  trenches,  if  well  revetted,  en- 
dured on  quiet  fronts.  Deep  and  broad  trenches  lasted  bet- 
ter under  artillery  fire.    Loopholes  were  also  used.    Dugouts 


68  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

had  to  be  proof  against  the  continual  high-angle  fire  of  the 
15-cm.  pieces.  The  entire  garrison  of  the  first  and  second 
line  had  to  be  given  protection  against  artillery  fire.  Ma- 
chine guns  should  be  placed  in  casemate-like  shelters  and 
sited  for  flanking  fire.  The  advantages  of  taking  position 
on  the  rear  slope,  just  behind  the  crest  of  a  hill,  had  been 
clearly  shown.  The  decisive  factor  in  the  selection  of  the 
position  continued  to  be  primarily  the  location  of  the  ar- 
tillery observation  stations,  from  which  it  should  be  pos- 
sible to  observe  to  a  considerable  depth  the  terrain  over 
which  the  enemy  would  advance,  and  secondarily  the  pos- 
sibility of  organizing  our  own  artillery  positions  in  sufficient 
depth.  Part  of  the  artillery  was  assigned  for  the  general 
defense  and  part  for  closed  defense  against  the  assaulting 
troops.  The  latter,  distributed  by  platoons  or  pieces,  was  to 
be  kept  hidden  from  hostile  observation  up  to  the  time  of 
the  assault ;  but  in  most  instances  it  betrayed  itself  by  the 
size  of  its  cover;  and  being  placed  in  the  front  line,  it  was 
always  sacrificed  during  the  preparatory  drum  fire.  The 
generally  weak  artillery  of  the  defense  did  not  justify  such 
a  detachment  on  a  part  of  the  artillery. 

The  first  German  attempt  to  break  the  position  warfare 
was  the  attack  on  Verdun,  which  had  originally  been 
planned  for  February  12,  1916;  but  was  postponed  to  the 
21st  on  account  of  bad  weather ;  and  executed  after  a  drum 
fire  lasting  for  24  hours  on  the  bank  of  the  Meuse.  Whether 
this  attempt  should  not  have  been  made  earlier  and  in  an 
effectual  manner,  we  shall  not  discuss  here.  Of  course  sur- 
prise had  not  been  fully  safeguarded.  Nevertheless,  the 
enemy  lacked  time  to  prepare  counter  measures.  The  ad- 
vance commenced  (according  to  French  reports  by  the  3d, 
18th  and  7th  Army  Corps)  on  the  22d  on  the  12-kilometer 
front,  Consenvoye — Azannes.  The  French  positions  were 
overrun  on  a  10-kilometer  front  for  a  depth  of  3  kilometers. 
Then  a  second  advance  started  from  the  direction  of  Etain. 
On  the  25th  Fort  Douaumont  and  the  village  of  Vaux  were 
taken.  From  the  middle  of  March,  the  attack  was  also  con- 
ducted on  the  west  bank  of  the  Meuse.  Unfortunately  army 
headquarters  had  neglected  to  place  reserves  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  attack.     Toward  the  end  of  March  the  front 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  69 

of  attack  had  been  decreased,  by  pushing  in  the  arc,  from 
72  to  55  kilometers.  The  advance  on  that  front  was  car- 
ried to  a  depth  of  8  kilometers.  Early  in  April,  on  the  east 
bank  of  the  Mouse,  6  German  corps  and  on  the  west  bank, 
9  German  corps  carried  on  the  offensive  while  the  French 
gradually  placed  in  the  line  more  than  30  corps.  The 
French  command  attempted  in  vain  to  throw  back  the  Ger- 
mans. In  the  shifting  of  the  location  of  the  attack  lay  the 
possibility  of  surprise  for  either  opponent.  By  the  middle 
of  July,  the  battles  came  to  a  standstill  on  the  recommen- 
dation of  the  Crown  Prince,  on  account  of  the  enormous  ex- 
penditure of  forces.  The  French  command  had  conducted 
the  battle  as  offensively  as  possible ;  but  the  employment  of 
artillery  and  the  power  of  the  German  infantry  proved 
superior  to  the  French  defense  in  a  battle  terrain  that  had 
been  prepared  in  time  of  peace  and  during  18  months  of 
war  and  was  densely  covered  with  woods  in  many  places. 
The  forces  available  were  insufficient  to  carry  on  the  de- 
fensive battle  on  the  Somme  and  at  the  same  time  force 
a  decision  on  the  Meuse.  The  lessons  learned  by  all  arms 
were  of  special  importance  in  subsequent  attacks.  They 
pointed  out  before  all  else  the  necessity  of  the  closest  co- 
operation with  the  artillery,  pioneers,  and  aerial  forces. 
Minenwerfers  proved  themselves  to  be  an  auxiliary  means 
especially  well  suited  for  the  attack.  As  large  a  number 
of  men  as  possible  should  be  trained  in  the  employment  of 
machine  guns  and  hand  grenades.  Everywhere  it  was 
learned  that  best  method  of  advance  of  the  infantry  in  as- 
sault was  on  a  broad  front  and  in  waves  following  closely 
the  preparation  by  the  artillery  and  minenwerfers,  and  ac- 
companied by  machine  guns,  pioneer  detachments,  and  ar- 
tillery. Intervals  between  skirmishers  should  be  about  3 
meters;  distance  between  waves,  about  30  to  50  meters  in 
order  to  pass  through  the  barrage  fire.  Every  advantage 
that  offers  itself,  such  as  gaps  in  obstacles  and  favorably 
situated  shell-holes,  must  be  utilized  in  the  attack.  The 
stubborn  French  defense  from  pill-boxes  and  dugouts  located 
in  woods  and  the  failure  of  the  attack  under  the  fire  posi- 
tions arranged  for  close  defense  but  unknown  to  and  unob- 
served  by   the   attackers,   compelled   the   employment   of 


70  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

"assault  groups"  of  a  strength  of  1  to  3  infantry  squads  in 
conjunction  with  a  pioneer  squad,  machine  guns,  minenwer- 
fers  and  flame  throwers.  The  "assault  groups"  were  spe- 
cially trained;  and  in  the  attack  remained  in  rear  of  the 
front  line  at  the  disposal  of  the  company  eommanders.  In 
place  of  the  rigid  skirmish  line  which  was  too  easily  stopped 
by  organized  resistance,  the  employment  of  series  of  small 
assault  detachments  was  considered,  in  which  the  personali- 
ty of  the  leader,  on  which  everything  depended,  was  brought 
into  greater  use.  Adopting  this  method,  on  July  7,  1915, 
the  Bavarian  Ersatz  Division  captured  a  position  of  1800 
meters  front  to  the  4th  line  within  twenty-five  minutes 
after  an  artillery  preparation  of  only  seventy-five  minutes, 
the  same  precedure  having  had  satisfactory  results  on 
May  5th  and  14th.  The  one  rule  governing  the  attack  is 
rapid  advance,  utilization  of  the  smallest  success,  and  ad- 
vance as  far  as  the  effect  of  our  own  artillery,  the  broken 
morale  and  the  losses  of  the  enemy  will  permit.  Artificial 
construction  of  an  attack  forces  us,  in  attacks  with  a  limited 
objective,  not  to  cross  the  established  line.  From  an  artil- 
lery viewpoint,  the  defense  was  organized  on  barrage  fire 
lasting  initially  three  or  four  minutes  and  then  decreasing 
and  counter-offensive  preparation  in  which  stretches  of  hos- 
tile trenches  are  fired  upon  and  which  secures  relief  for  our 
heavily  pressed  infantry.  The  realization  of  the  necessity 
for  offensive  employment  of  the  artillery,  even  in  defense, 
had  not  yet  become  general.  In  the  attack,  the  hostile 
artillery  was  to  be  held  down  effectively,  while  the  infantry 
was  to  work  its  way  up  close  to  the  place  where  our  artil- 
lery projectiles  fell.  "Our  infantry  must  absolutely  rid  itself 
of  all  nervousness  when  our  own  artillery  fire  strikes  close  to 
them.  Co-operation  between  heavy  and  field  artillery  should 
be  improved.  Our  artillery  fire  should  be  supplemented 
by  minenwerfer  fire."  The  superiority  of  the  enemy  in 
the  matter  of  heavy  flat- trajectory  guns  was  sorely  felt 
by  us.  Aside  from  consideration  of  the  kind  of  gun  and 
organization  of  mixed  artillery  groups  proved  uniformly 
advantageous  in  the  solution  of  tasks  and  facilitated  co- 
operation with  the  infantry.  For  support  of  the  infantry 
only  the  common  tasks,  frontal  and  flanking  effect  combined, 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  71 

as  well  as  conditions  for  observation  and  communication, 
but  not  the  location  of  the  batteries,  are  decisive.  With  this 
understanding  the  issuance  of  clear  orders  and  satisfactory 
liaison  are  gained,  and  personnel  (observers,  artillery  liai- 
son officers,  telephone  operators)  and  implements  are  hus- 
banded. To  facilitate  co-operation  with  the  infantry  it 
became  necessary  to  locate  the  command  posts  of  artillery 
group  and  infantry  regimental  commanders  as  close  to- 
gether as  possible.  These  requirements  in  the  defense  led 
to  a  well  advanced  long-range  artillery  group  taking  the 
hostile  artillery  as  its  principal  target  and  a  close  range 
group,  kept  farther  in  rear,  to  fire  on  the  hostile  infantry. 
All  artillery  groups  were  under  the  orders  of  the  artillery 
commander.  Whether  that  artillery  commander  should  be 
under  the  orders  of  the  division  or  corps  commander  was 
a  matter  of  discussion  for  a  long  time.  Finally,  differing 
from  the  French  policy  which  placed  the  main  portion  of 
the  artillery  under  orders  of  the  corps  commander,  our 
entire  artillery,  except  the  heaviest  artillery,  was  placed 
under  the  orders  of  the  division  commander. 

LESSONS  OF  THE  BATTLE  ON  THE  SOMME  AND  THE 

BATTLES  IN  FRONT  OF  VERDUN  IN  THE 

LATE  FALL  OF  1916. 

After  the  Autumn  battle  the  Allies,  while  still  employed 
in  defense  against  the  German  attacks  on  Verdun,  started 
preparations  for  a  new  battle  on  both  banks  oof  the  Somme, 
which  was  to  be  a  joint  operation  by  British  and  French; 
but  considerations  in  the  matter  of  training  the  British 
troops  compelled  the  attack  to  be  postponed  to  the  end  of 
June.  The  Russian  attack  in  Volhynia  occurred  in  the 
meantime. 

It  may  have  been  thought  that  the  cause  of  the  failure 
in  the  Autumn  battle  was  insufficient  ammunition  supply, 
but  now,  in  addition  to  a  pronounced  superiorly  in  the  air 
which  made  its  importance  felt  in  the  observation  of  fire 
and  in  the  participation  by  airplanes  in  the  ground  battle, 
such  an  amount  of  ammunition  was  to  be  supplied  that  ac- 
cording to  all  human  calculations  the  resistance  of  the  de- 
fender should  be  completely  broken.     Thus  was  created 


72  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  "Battle  of  Materiel"  which  could  be  fought  to  a  finish 
only  by  timely  and  maximum  exertion  of  all  munition  in- 
dustries. Delays  at  home  reacted  bitterly  on  the  troops 
that  had  to  face  that  storm.  The  ammunition  brought 
from  home  in  the  first  weeks  was  hardly  sufficient  for  the 
barrage  fire  and  for  the  absolutely  essential  support  of  the 
infantry.  There  was  no  ammunition  for  counter-battery 
work.  In  addition  the  attention  of  the  supreme  command 
was  fixed  completely  on  the  battles  around  Verdun  when 
the  first  signs  of  another  serious  battle  on  the  Somme  be- 
came noticeable.  Thus  the  German  defense  was  from  the 
very  beginning  under  very  unfavorable  conditions;  but 
what  did  it  not  achieve  in  spite  of  these ! 

According  to  French  reports  the  leading  German  posi- 
tion consisted  of  3  main  lines  of  a  total  depth  of  500  tc 
1000  meters,  between  which  there  were  underground  shel- 
ters and  machine  gun  nests.  A  second  position,  consisting 
of  1  or  2  main  lines  and  protected  by  excellent  obstacles, 
was  2  to  4  kilometers  distant  from  the  first,  so  that  the 
artillery  of  the  attack  would  be  forced  to  change  position. 
Between  the  two  positions  preparation  had  been  made  for 
conduct  of  the  battle  by  "lock"  trenches. 

In  April,  a  systematic  artillery  fire  took  place  on  the 
British  wing;  the  road  net  was  extended;  positions  rein- 
forced; mine  warfare  started;  and  plenty  of  ammunition 
and  subsistence  stored.  By  the  end  of  April  the  German 
command  no  longer  doubted  that  an  attack  was  to  be  ex- 
pected here.  On  June  22,  1916,  the  artillery  preparation 
began.  During  the  concentration  of  the  hostile  artillery, 
however,  the  German  artillery  had  been  able  to  cause  heavy 
losses.  The  number  of  allied  guns  was  materially  larger 
than  in  the  Autumn  battle  in  the  Champagne ;  the  method 
of  the  bombardment  differed  by  the  fire  being  more  con- 
centrated against  single  stretches  of  trenches;  and  strong 
gas  bombardment  was  interspersed  "from  June  24,  1916, 
to  July  1,  1916,  on  a  front  of  25  kilometers  in  forty  differ- 
ent places."  (Haig.)  Our  drum  fire,  fire  against  the  Somme 
bridges  and  gassing  the  ground  in  rear,  occurred  from 
June  25  to  June  30.  Hostile  reconnaissance  operations, 
started  in  the  last  week  prior  to  the  attack,  proved  excel- 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  73 

lent.  They  furnished  important  information  concerning 
the  effect  of  the  fire  on  trenches  and  batteries.  On  June 
25th  battle  airplanes  made  an  attack  against  German  cap- 
tive balloons,  destroying  9  of  them.  The  attack,  which  was 
to  start  on  June  30th  according  to  the  statement  of  a  de- 
serter, started  at  7 :30  A.M.,  July  1st  south  of  the  Somme, 
and  two  hours  later,  north  of  the  river.  It  was  apparent 
that  thereby  the  attention  of  the  German  reserves  was  to 
be  distracted ;  but  that  two  hours'  space  of  time  served  only 
to  preclude  surprise  on  that  part  of  the  battlefield. 

Joffre's  systematic  conduct  of  attack,  reckoning  only 
on  mechanical  means  and  merely  frontal  pressure  by  masses, 
declining  the  use  of  cover  offered  by  the  terrain  and  favor- 
ing the  mixing  of  all  units,  was  changed  in  this  Somme  bat- 
tle. Front  line  units  stood  alongside  each  other  with  great 
formation  in  depth.  Thus  in  each  regiment  6  companies  no 
longer  were  formed  abreast  in  a  dense  skirmish  line;  but 
only  8  half -platoons  from  4  companies  were  formed  abr<3ast 
in  light  skirmish  lines,  with  intervals  from  4  to  5  paces.  The 
regular  construction  of  trench  system  had  been  abandoned. 
More  attention  had  been  paid  to  surprise.  Stress  was  laid 
on  the  necessity  of  the  artillery  accompanying  the  infantry 
by  fire  in  such  manner  that  the  fire  would  be  lifted  to  posi- 
tions in  rear  only  immediately  preceding  the  penetration. 
Airplanes  were  employed  as  "infantry  observation  planes" 
to  locate  the  positions  of  the  infantry  in  the  terrain.  Joff re's 
demand  of  a  penetration  deep  into  the  enemy's  lines,  to  con- 
nect the  operative  penetration  with  the  tactical  penetration, 
could  not  be  carried  out  in  the  Autumn  battle  and  the 
French  attacks  came  to  a  stand-still  in  front  of  our  weakly 
held  second  positions.  In  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  this  pro- 
cedure was  followed  as  a  fixed  rule.  The  enemy  contented 
himself  with  attacks  against  a  fixed  objective,  renewing 
the  same  procedure  after  renewed  artillery  preparation. 
This  "eating  through"  the  entire  position  system  was  char- 
acteristic of  the  Somme  battle.  The  French  attack  carried 
the  first  position,  but  then  encountered  serious  resistance. 
The  British  attack,  preceded  by  explosion  of  mines  and  ac- 
companied by  smoke  clouds,  did  not  initially  have  the  same 
success,  though  its  objectives  were  only  6  kilometers  dis- 


bapacmf. 


\leSan 


'AlSEFT 


PKROMNB 


Battle    of    the    Sommb 

^Loss  in  terrain  in  the 
month  of  Ju  li  1916 

Aitgnst  1916 

Sep!tnrb.l916 

ObU>ber  1916 

Noventb.  1916 

<  Dividing  line  between  British 
and  French  up  to  the  end 
of  September.  1916 


i^HoJtu 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  75 

tant.  The  successes  of  the  center  and  the  right  of  the  at- 
tack were  exploited  by  the  employment  of  reserves,  so  that 
finally  the  left  also  made  progress.  According  to  Marshal 
Haig's  report  a  night  attack  on  a  large  scale  took  place  on 
July  14th.  After  a  march  covering  1200  meters  a  position 
was  taken,  at  a  distance  of  250  to  400  meters  from  the 
enemy,  under  cover  of  security  detachments  on  a  front  of 
6  kilometers  and  the  attack  started  at  3:25  A.M.  against 
the  Trones  woods,  Longueval  and  Bazentin  le  Petit.  After 
the  artillery  preparation  that  had  started  on  July  11th,  the 
attack  resulted  in  the  capture  of  the  Trones  woods.  It  is 
stated  that  cavalry  performed  excellent  service  in  this  at- 
tack. On  July  1st  the  defense  had,  north  of  the  Somme, 
five  German  divisions  on  a  36-kilometer  front;  and  south 
of  the  river,  four  divisions  on  a  33-kilometer  front.  From 
July  19th  on,  the  defensive  front  was  formed  into  2  armies 
in  place  of  2  army  corps  as  previously,  separated  by  the 
Somme.  On  the  average,  1  German  division  held  7  to  8 
kilometers,  against  which  the  enemy  brought  3  to  4  divi- 
sions. Placing  fresh  troops  into  line  and  thereby  changing 
the  sector  limits  did  not  prove  advantageous  to  the  battle 
command. 

On  September  15th  tanks  were  used  for  the  first  time. 
In  the  beginning  they  gained  success  by  surprise,  which 
however  did  not  last  long.  Far  more  annoying  was  the 
firing  on  the  trenches  by  low  flying  battle  airplanes  equipped 
with  machine  guns.  The  fear  of  being  seen  by  the 
airplanes  and  then  annihilated  by  the  hostile  artillery  fire 
started  by  the  information  given  by  the  airplanes,  prevented 
the  infantry  for  some  time  from  taking  countermeasures 
until  they  became  convinced  that  this  fear  was  groundless. 
Automatic  rifles  of  the  allies  played  a  very  important  and 
effective  role  during  the  attack.  Locally  they  proved  of 
great  value  in  the  defense,  wherever  buildings  with  cel- 
lars were  available  for  defense.  Thanks  to  its  "catacombs" 
Combles  was  held  from  September  15th  to  26th,  when  it 
was  voluntarily  evacuated  by  the  few  German  defenders. 
An  opportunity  offered  during  the  evening  to  the  cavalry 
held  in  readiness  in  an  advance  by  way  of  Sailly  eastward, 
was  not  noticed  by  the  British. 


76  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

The  Somme  battles  concluded  with  a  heavy  attack  on 
November  11th.  The  penetration  had  not  been  accom- 
plished; but  the  object  of  the  British  command  in  the  at- 
tack, of  holding  the  German  forces  had  been  accomplished. 

For  their  success,  the  Allies  had  to  thank  the  enormous 
expenditure  of  ammunition  and  their  superiority  in  the  air, 
vi^hich  could  only  be  offset  gradually.  A  numerically  inferior 
artillery  can  in  the  end  hold  down  a  superior  artillery  if  it 
has  superior  aerial  observation  facilities.  But  an  artillery 
superiority  should  make  itself  doubly  felt  if  the  enemy,  as 
was  the  case  on  the  Somme,  is  superior  both  in  number  of 
guns  and  aerial  forces.  But  in  spite  thereof  the  Allies  had  not 
been  able  to  destroy  the  weak  German  artillery,  but  only 
lessened  its  effectiveness.  In  place  of  the  destruction  of 
the  hostile  materiel,  the  attack  demanded  annihilation  of 
men  or  even  only  the  reduction  of  their  power  of  resistance 
for  the  decisive  moment  of  the  assault.  This  led  to  gassing 
shelters  of  the  defense.  The  German  infantry,  though  in- 
ferior in  numbers,  understood  how  to  evade  the  hostile  fire 
by  moving  forward  or  sideways;  and  was  not  shaken  to 
the  extent  the  enemy  had  expected.  It  is  true  that  the 
trenches  were  in  a  very  short  time  changed  into  a  field  of 
shell-holes;  but  the  deep  shelters  with  overhead  cover  six 
meters  thick,  held  out  and  were  found  useful  as  long  as  the 
entrances  were  kept  open.  The  artillery  defense  consisted 
mainly  in  firing  a  barrage  which  however  was  ineffective 
when  the  signals  from  the  front  line  were  not  observed  or 
when  the  larger  portion  of  the  guns  had  been  destroyed  by 
the  hostile  artillery  preparation.  This  caused  ceaseless  com- 
plaints concerning  the  lateness  of  the  barrage  or  its  lack 
of  density.  The  infantry,  trusting  entirely  too  much  to 
the  barrage,  easily  failed  to  defend  itself  independently. 
Orders  from  higher  headquarters  at  this  time  compelled  the 
artillery  defense  to  be  conducted  offensively  before  the  at- 
tack proper  started.  The  exhausted  German  divisions  needed 
relief.  Though  the  quickly  exhausted  infantry  could  be 
withdrawn  the  relief  of  the  weak  artillery  could  not  be  ac- 
complished. Thus  units  were  disrupted.  As  a  result  the 
commanders  of  the  infantry  and  the  artillery  were  not  per- 
sonally known  to  each  other  any  longer.    Fresh  divisions  ar- 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  77 

riving  after  the  loss  of  the  first  position  found  very  bad  and 
weak  fortifications,  which  contained  nothing  necessary  for 
a  successful  defense.  Labor  within  the  zone  of  the  hostile 
fire  was  impossible.  Still  those  troops  held  out  bravely, 
cheered  by  the  example  of  their  officers.  It  is  no  wonder 
that  the  infantry  during  these  heavy  battles  in  which  it 
had  to  suffer  patiently  under  the  heaviest  kind  of  fire,  de- 
teriorated in  battle  efficiency.  Only  timely  relief,  thorough 
training  during  the  rest  periods  and  offensive  conduct  of  the 
defense  could  return  to  the  German  infantry  its  former 
superiority  over  the  enemy.  The  hostile  airplanes  found 
special  difficulties  in  locating  for  their  artillery  the  German 
lines  in  that  shell-torn  ground,  so  that  the  latter  had  to  be 
content  with  merely  sweeping  certain  portions  of  the  ter- 
rain. Losses  for  the  defense  were  thereby  decreased.  Posi- 
tions, that  could  be  definitely  determined  by  the  airplanes, 
were  destroyed  and  obliterated  in  a  very  short  time.  This 
explains  why  our  men  were  much  opposed  to  converting 
shell-holes  into  trenches.  At  any  rate,  the  losses  increased 
as  soon  as  the  trenches  appeared  on  the  photos  taken  by  the 
airplanes.  Trenches  thus  rapidly  constructed  could  of 
course,  not  offer  the  same  protection  as  would  trenches  on 
which  weeks  of  labor  had  been  expended.  The  troops  soon 
adopted  the  expedient  of  digging  trenches  in  rear  of  the 
shell-holes  that  were  to  be  defended.  This  diverted  the 
fire  from  the  occupied  shell-holes;  and  during  lulls  in  the 
battle  and  at  night,  offered  protection  against  weather.  It 
was  a  question  whether  on  the  whole  it  would  not  be  better 
to  abandon  the  time-consuming  construction  of  trenches 
and  confine  ourselves  to  the  mere  construction  of  obstacles 
and  shelters.  Though  this  might  have  been  justified  in  case 
of  the  first  construction  of  works  in  rear,  it  was  on  the 
other  hand,  extremely  dangerous  to  abandon  trench  con- 
struction completely.  Command,  subsistence  of  the  men, 
care  of  the  wounded,  issuance  of  orders,  and  the  service  of 
information  would  have  been  made  more  difficult.  In  addi- 
tion, there  was  the  rapid  consumption  of  man  power  in  the 
damp  Autumn  weather.  In  the  shell-holes  the  men  were 
in  no  way  protected  against  the  weather  and  often  stood 
in  water  up  to  their  waists.    As  obstacles  were  lacking  in 


78  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  shell-torn  terrain  the  dispersed  troops  were  open  to  at- 
tack by  any  hostile  patrol  and  it  would  have  been  difficult 
to  organize  a  counter-attack.  The  difficulty  of  giving  our 
artillery  the  exact  location  of  our  men,  decreased  the  possi- 
bility of  laying  the  barrage  exactly  in  front  of  our  line.  In 
addition  in  a  position  in  the  shell  torn  terrain  there  was 
continuous  movement  caused  by  relief  and  by  the  inclina- 
tion of  the  men  to  evade  striking  projectiles.  This  caused 
loss  of  contact  and  co-operation  with  adjacent  troops.  As 
we  have  learned,  contact  by  eye  alone  with  the  neighboring 
units  does  not  suffice  in  general.  The  commanders  must 
consult  and  agree  on  combined  action.  Troops  holding  their 
place  stubbornly  in  a  frontal  attack  pay  no  attention  to 
the  flanks,  if  they  know  supporting  troops  are  there.  If  an 
adjacent  unit  gives  way  and  the  attacker  follows  him  up 
and  turns  toward  the  flanks,  the  troops  holding  their  ground 
will  find  themselves  in  a  precarious  situation,  which  they 
can  overcome  only  by  withdrawing  (defense  of  Combles) 
or  by  a  counter-attack.  The  points  of  contact  of  two  units 
become  weak  points,  against  which  the  enemy  preferably 
directs  his  attack  and  which  the  defense  meets  by  placing 
in  readiness  a  special  connecting  detachment.  The  neces- 
sity of  reducing  the  effect  of  the  hostile  artillery  led  to  a  dis- 
tribution of  all  works  in  depth.  It  was  found  best  to  post 
the  machine  guns,  withdrawn  from  air  observation,  between 
the  first  and  second  positions,  especially  when  it  was  possi- 
ble by  constructing  obstacles,  to  guide  the  attack  into  defin- 
ite directions.  In  the  intermediate  terrain  nothing  was 
shown  which  would  draw  the  artillery  fire ;  and  on  the  other 
hand,  false  works  may  have  a  good  effect  in  diverting  the 
hostile  fire.  The  artillery  also  had  to  form  its  observation 
stations  and  battery  positions  in  depth  with  numerous  alter- 
native positions,  so  that  the  hostile  infantry  could  not  re- 
duce them  in  one  effort.  In  this  disposition,  of  course,  we 
had  to  reckon  on  the  loss  of  the  foremost  batteries. 

There  is  no  hard  and  fast  rule  governing  the  strength 
with  which  a  position  should  be  occupied.  At  Gommecourt 
the  defender  believed  he  would  be  able  to  get  along  in 
trenches  without  shelters  employing  1  rifle  to  every  3 
meters,  whereas  prior  to  the  attack  of  July  1,  1916,  in  the 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  79 

well  constructed  sector  of  Fricourt,  there  were  800  rifles 
and  8  machine  guns  for  each  1000  meters  and  this  was  be- 
lieved insufficient.  The  more  the  offensive  defense  is  pre- 
pared in  advance,  and  the  more  the  hostile  fire  strikes  only 
the  leading  trenches,  the  smaller  the  garrison  of  the  lead- 
ing trenches  may  be.  In  the  12th  Infantry  Division  (Ger- 
man) it  was  found  sufficient  to  have  on  a  front  of  6  kilome- 
ters, 1  battalion  per  500  meters.  2  companies  of  each  bat- 
talion were  in  the  front  trenches,  each  company  having  1 
platoon  in  the  front  line,  li  platoons  in  the  second  line,  and 
^  platoon  in  the  third  line.  1  company  of  each  battalion  was 
in  battalion  and  1  in  regimental  reserve. 

On  the  German  side,  it  had  been  sufficiently  perceived 
that  a  serious  attack,  involving  a  penetration,  could  be 
stopped  only  by  a  position  of  great  depth,  so  that  it  was  im- 
material to  absolutely  hold  the  first  trenches  requiring  dense 
skirmish  lines  and  resulting  in  increased  losses.  It  was 
seen  that  it  would  be  far  more  advantageous  to  conduct  the 
defense  offensively  by  giving  way  under  the  hostile  fire, 
and  then  seeking  a  decision  by  an  independently  organized 
counter-attack  by  the  troops  in  readiness  and  by  the  posi- 
tion reserves,  so  that  at  the  end  of  the  battle  the  trenches 
would  be  again  in  the  hands  of  the  defender.  At  the 
Somme  there  was  an  absence  of  reserves  at  many  points, 
but  wherever  a  counter-attack  struck  the  enemy  imme- 
diately after  his  entry  into  the  position,  success  was  com- 
plete and  nullified  the  entire  artillery  preparation  of  the  at- 
tack (Fricourt,  July  1,  1916).  If  the  counter-attacks  exe- 
cuted by  the  troops  in  readiness  immediately  behind  the 
position  within  about  400  meters,  are  not  successful,  then 
commanders  of  all  rank  must  immediately  do  everything 
they  can  to  prevent  the  extension  of  the  penetration.  Ex- 
tension in  depth  must  be  prevented  by  using  the  lines  in 
rear,  extension  toward  the  flanks  by  the  use  of  approach 
trenches ;  and  around  the  enemy's  nest  we  must  immediately 
create  a  certain  "locking"  position,  the  most  threatened 
comers  requiring  special  reinforcement.  The  commander 
must  be  at  once  notified  of  the  creation  of  such  a  nest.  Fre- 
quently, because  of  human  reasons  the  extension  of  the 
penetration  is  reported  as  a  minor  one,  and  that  fact  leads 


80  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

to  arranging  a  counter-attack  with  insufficient  forces.  And 
just  those  very  "French  nests"  that  had  been  created  by 
penetration  facihtated  the  subsequent  hostile  attack  very 
materially,  because  they  were  made  points  of  departure  of 
new  operations. 

It  was  found  urgently  necessary  by  army  headquarters 
to  have  fresh  divisional  and  army  artillery  in  readiness  for 
insertion.  Only  thus  was  it  possible  to  withdraw  the  infan- 
try and  artillery  simultaneously  from  the  fighting  line  and 
to  give  them  some  rest  for  recuperation,  for  replacement  of 
men  and  for  training  prior  to  putting  them  in  line  along  a 
quieter  front.  During  the  Somme  battle  this  was  impossi- 
ble and  had  its  effect  on  the  morale. 

The  Battle  of  the  Somme  led  to  a  complete  change  of 
views  concerning  the  conduct  of  the  defense.  The  passive 
endurance  of  the  hostile  fire  ceased.  A  fresh,  offensive 
spirit  was  incorporated  in  the  conduct  of  the  defense.  On 
August  29,  1916,  Field  Marshal  von  Hindenburg,  who  had 
been  promoted  from  Colonel-General  was  assigned  to  the 
supreme  command  and  General  von  Ludendorff  was  ap- 
pointed First  Quartermaster  General.  At  once,  in  a  new 
regulation  "the  Defensive  Battle,"  the  new  method  of 
fighting  was  presented:  "The  object  of  battle  defense  con- 
sists in  letting  the  attacker  wear  himself  out,  bleeding  him- 
self white,  but  saving  our  own  forces.  The  defense  will  be 
conducted  not  by  putting  in  line  large  numbers  of  men,  but 
mainly  by  inserting  machines  (artillery,  minenwerfers,  ma- 
chine guns,  etc.) .  At  the  same  time,  in  addition  to  the  ques- 
tion of  numbers,  organization,  employment  and  co-ordina- 
tion, all  bear  an  influence.  In  the  distribution  of  forces,  the 
fundamental  consideration  is  saving  of  personnel."  The 
troops  only  reluctantly  accepted  the  general  rule  of  weakly 
holding  the  front  line  because  it  was  feared  that  that  line 
could  be  retaken  only  with  difficulty.  But  with  the  very 
short  assault  distance  over  which  the  attacker  passed,  it 
happened  only  too  frequently  that  the  strong  garrisons 
could  not  leave  their  shelters  in  time  and  were  captured. 
In  addition  to  the  thin  occupation  of  the  front  line,  narrow 
sectors  (250  meters  for  a  company  of  150  men,  on  quiet 
fronts  500  meters)  and  great  depth  formation  were  or- 
dered to  facilitate  a  stubborn  resistance. 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  81 

The  Autumn  Battles  Around  Verdun  became  of  special 
importance.  The  enormous  German  attack  in  February 
was  followed  by  French  counter-attacks,  which  made  great 
progress  only  when  General  Nivelle,  a  colonel,  commanding 
an  artillery  regiment  at  the  outbreak  of  war,  was  assigned 
to  the  command  of  the  army  group  at  Verdun.  The  battles 
of  October  24  and  December  15,  1916,  showed  a  very  pecu- 
liar method  of  attack,  by  thoroughly  discarding  the  Joffre 
method  based  on  a  systematic  procedure,  declining  the  use 
of  the  cover  of  the  terrain  and  by  assigning  deeper  objec- 
tives to  the  attacks  then  had  been  the  case  in  the  battle  of 
the  Somme.  The  first  attack-shock  was  to  end  at  least  in 
the  hostile  artillery  position.  Difficult  points  of  attack  were 
to  be  covered  sparingly  by  infantry  but  thoroughly  covered 
by  artillery.  Weak  points,  especially  in  defiles  and  depres- 
sions were  to  be  penetrated  by  strong  forces  which,  paying 
no  attention  to  what  happened  on  the  right  or  left,  took 
possession  of  important  sections  of  the  terrain.  Everything 
that  still  held  on  the  flank  of  or  in  rear  of  these  shock  col- 
umns which  had  pushed  far  ahead,  had  to  fall  by  flank  and 
rear  attacks.  "If  we  have  once  opened  a  door  in  a  wall  that 
has  to  be  crossed,  then  nobody  would  possibly  think  of  climb- 
ing over  the  wall."  From  this  resulted  quite  naturally  the 
organization  of  the  units  into  assault  units  and  reserves, 
corresponding  to  the  points  to  be  attacked.  The  front  of 
the  assault  columns  was  dependent  on  the  battle  task;  the 
deeper  the  troops  were  to  penetrate  into  the  hostile  battle 
position,  the  narrower  the  front  and  the  greater  the  depth. 
The  zone  of  attack  of  a  "division  de  breche"  of  9  battalions 
was  to  be  2000  to  2400  meters  wide,  according  to  Joffre's 
views  only  1200  to  1500  meters  in  case  of  12  battalions.  The 
division  might  be  formed  either  in  column  of  regiments  or 
with  regiments  abreast,  the  latter  in  column  of  battalions 
separated  by  a  distance  of  500  meters.  The  attack  pro- 
ceeded automatically  so  that  the  leading  battalion  halted  on 
reaching  its  objective,  the  succeeding  battalion  passed 
through  to  a  more  distant  objective.  The  reserve  divisions 
followed  at  distance  of  only  2000  meters.  In  the  uninter- 
rupted advance  by  the  troops  lay  the  best  help  for  adjacent 
troops,  should  the  latter  not  advance  rapidly  enough  or  be 


82  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

held  up.  As  the  initial  penetration  was  almost  always  easy, 
the  determining  factor  lay  with  the  reserves.  It  was  their 
duty  to  conduct  the  subsequent  attack.  They  must  follow 
up  as  rapidly  as  possible  and  deepen  the  penetration.  Nivelle 
counted  on  the  fact  that  second  positions  are  not  completely 
occupied,  and  that  in  all  cases  gaps  would  be  found  through 
which  detachments  under  skilled  leaders  could  work.  As 
the  attack  was  made  on  a  broad  front,  an  abundance  of  ar- 
tillery was  necessary.  On  the  one  hand,  artillery  protec- 
tion for  the  infantry  was  attained  by  a  rolling  barrage,  auto- 
matically advancing  100  meters  every  four  minutes,  and  on 
the  other  hand,  by  forming  a  mobile  artillery  reserve,  which 
was  taken  from  divisions  not  designated  for  the  attack. 
Success  of  the  attack  rested  primarily  on  surprise,  and  then 
on  artillery  effect.  Surprise  required  that  we  abandon  all 
thoughts  of  time-consuming  earthworks,  such  as  routes  of 
approach,  bomb-proof  battery  emplacements  and  reserv'e 
trenches,  and  especially  the  position  from  which  the  attack 
is  to  depart  be  not  advanced.  It  is  better  to  make  the  at- 
tack across  an  extended  open  stretch  under  protection  of 
the  artillery,  than  to  lose  the  advantage  of  surprise.  For 
that  reason  the  air  forces  should  not  be  increased  prema- 
turely on  the  attacking  front.  A  planned  attack  against  the 
hostile  captive  balloons  should  not  be  started  earlier  than 
one  day  prior  to  the  artillery  preparation.  Counter-battery 
work  is  of  particular  importance.  The  hostile  artillery  must 
be  neutralized  before  the  artillery  preparation  proper  be- 
gins ;  then  the  hostile  artillery  must  still  be  kept  under  fire. 
Nivelle  planned  an  artillery  preparation,  dependent  on  bat- 
tle conditions,  of  6  days.  An  increase  in  the  volume  of  fire 
prior  to  the  attack  was  not  to  take  place.  Special  emphasis 
was  laid  on  the  necessity  of  using  fresh  troops  in  the  attack, 
which  had  been  trained  in  the  rest  area  behind  the  front. 
Weak  points  are  encountered  in  every  position.  If  the  at- 
tack finds  them,  a  penetration  of  the  position  system  is  possi- 
ble in  case  the  position  lacks  sufficient  depth.  This  shows 
the  necessity  of  special  protection  for  the  artillery  of  the 
defense.  The  batteries  should  at  least  have  some  machine 
gun  protection  in  order  to  give  the  artillery  an  opportunity 
to  participate  in  the  fighting  for  the  intervening  terrain 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  83 

(with  positions  for  observation  close  to  the  batteries) .  Thus 
too,  is  evident  the  necessity  of  previously  prepared  plans  for 
strong  and  timely  counter-attacks,  which,  however,  can 
be  effective  only  if  arrangements  for  prompt  transmission 
of  information  have  been  perfected. 

Prior  to  the  December  attack  the  4  French  Divisions 
(37th,  38th,  126th,  133d)  had  been  trained  from  5  to  6  weeks, 
commencing  with  the  school  of  the  soldier  and  ending  with 
division  maneuvers,  in  a  terrain  similar  to  that  over  which 
the  attack  was  to  be  made.     The  attack  was  to  be  made 
from  the  east  bank  of  the  Meuse  to  the  village  of  Vaux  in 
a  northerly  direction  towards  Louvemont,  Hill  378  and  Be- 
zonvaux  on  a  front  of  9  kilometers.    On  December  11,  1916, 
the  assault  divisions  were  brought  up  by  auto  trucks.    The 
artillery  preparation  began  at  the  same  time.    On  the  night 
of  December  13-14th  the  divisions  took  their  places  in  the 
line;  and  early  on  the  15th,  all  were  in  position.    The  re- 
serve divisions  which  were  to  relieve  them  later  were  in 
readiness  in  rear.    The  left  division  (126th)  was  to  pene- 
trate the  German  position  only  500  meters,  the  other  to 
penetrate  up   to   about   3000  meters.     At   12   o'clock    (10 
o'clock  French  time)   the  penetration,  without  increasing 
the  artillery  preparation,  was  to  start  either  in  skirmish 
lines  or  small  assault  columns.    The  surprise  succeeded,  so 
that  the  German  barrage  came  too  late,  and  men  in  the  deep 
shelters  were  taken  completely  by  surprise.    The  turning 
off  by  the  penetrating  troops  to  the  flanks  proved  correct. 
Special  units  had  been  placed  opposite  the  division  sector 
limits  and  in  depressions,  as  the  least  resistance  was  ex- 
pected there,  with  the  mission  of  advancing  against  the 
flanks  and  rear  of  hostile  units  still  holding  out.    It  was  left 
to  the  initiative  of  all  subordinate  commanders  to  exploit 
the  success  should  the  troops  encounter  little  or  no  resis- 
tance.   General  Nivelle  undoubtedly  gained  a  great  victory. 
The  main  cause  of  the  failure  of  the  defense  was  probably 
the  lack  of  proper  advance  preparation  of  the  intermediate 
terrain,  and  of  preparation  for  co-operation  between  infan- 
try and  artillery  in  the  event  of  the  loss  of  the  leading  ob- 
servation positions.    In  addition  the  defense  was  conducted 
completely  passive,  though  four  divisions  were  in  readiness 


84  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

behind  the  front.  It  was  shown  plainly  that  a  single  forti- 
fied line  was  not  sufficient  to  stop  an  attack  formed  in  depth. 
Fortified  areas  in  great  depth  have  to  be  arranged  which  will 
enable  us  to  hold  the  terrain  even  if  separate  portions  are 
lost.  In  this  organization  the  different  field  works  must 
support  each  other,  and  we  must  also  be  able  to  prevent 
the  enemy  from  extending  towards  the  flanks  after  he  has 
penetrated. 

In  December,  1916,  Nivelle  was  appointed  commander- 
in-chief  of  the  troops  in  France.  His  instructions  for  at- 
tack dated  December  16,  1916,  were  captured  two  months 
later  by  German  troops  in  the  successful  operation  against 
the  heights  south  of  Ripont  on  February  15,  1917. 


The  XVI  Army  Corps  had  become  engaged  in  stubborn 
battles  in  the  Argonnes.  Mountainous,  broken  forest  ter- 
rain and  a  tenacious  enemy,  superior  in  numbers,  allowed 
but  slow  progress  so  that  even  mine  warfare  was  again 
resorted  to  and  minenwerfers  played  a  great  role.  Attacks 
with  limited  objective  started.  The  smaller  attacks  proved 
less  successful  than  attacks  on  a  larger  scale. 

Thus,  positions  could  be  taken  only  after  thorough  pre- 
paration by  artillery  and  minenwerfers.  Requirements 
were  that  the  positions  for  departure  of  attacks  should  be 
as  close  to  the  enemy  as  would  permit  firing  on  the  trenches 
by  minenwerfers  without  at  the  same  time  firing  on  our 
own.  A  charge  across  30  to  40  meters  ground  in  open  ter- 
rain was  accompanied  by  extraordinary  high  losses.  In 
most  instances,  the  time  for  the  assault  was  chosen  so  that 
the  hostile  trenches  could  be  taken  before  dark  in  order 
that  the  troops  organizing  the  position  for  occupation  and 
defense  might  be  hidden  from  the  hostile  fire.  Preceding 
the  attack,  the  assault  detachments  of  infantry  and  pioneers 
underwent  careful  practice  behind  the  front,  in  position  and 
open  warfare,  which  included  accurate  synchronization  of 
watches.  If  the  enemy  had  been  thoroughly  shaken  the 
assault  generally  succeeded  easily  and  quickly.  If  we  al- 
lowed even  a  few  minutes  for  the  enemy  to  recover,  the 
hope  of  success  faded ;  and  even  if  the  attack  succeeded,  it 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  85 

was  only  at  too  great  a  cost.  The  assault  itself  demanded 
accurate  co-operation  between  infantry  and  artillery.  The 
assaulting  troops  must  not  deviate  from  the  procedure 
agreed  upon.  Otherwise  they  would  run  into  our  own  artil- 
lery fire.  The  main  weapon  of  the  assault  was  the  hand 
grenade.  The  troops  were  to  pay  no  attention  to  connec- 
tion with  neighboring  troops.  They  were  to  charge  through 
to  the  designated  objective  and  then  seek  to  help  the  less 
fortunate  neighbor.  The  assault  against  the  hidden  pill- 
box was  very  difficult.  Their  resistance  was  most  quickly 
overcome  by  the  use  of  flame  throwers. 

UTILIZING  THE  EXPERIENCES  GAINED 

On  November  18,  1916,  the  Battle  of  the  Somme  was 
concluded  with  a  final  British  attack;  the  battle  had  lasted 
four  and  a  half  months.  The  Training  Regulations  for  Foot 
Troops  (German)  of  January,  1917,  published  the  exper- 
iences of  all  for  the  benefit  of  all.  General  introduction  of 
hand  grenades,  automatic  rifles  and  steel  helmets,  facili- 
tated the  command  in  the  infantry.  Light  minenwerfers, 
flame  and  grenade  throwers  were  assigned  as  auxiliary 
weapons.  The  winter  battles  in  the  Champagne  demanded 
well  trained  men  to  handle  these  weapons. 

For  support  in  specially  heavy  attacks,  and  also  for 
use  as  shock  troops,  special  assault  battalions  were  formed 
which,  armed  with  the  auxiliary  weapons  (machine  guns, 
flame  throwers  and  infantry  guns) ,  were  attached  by  groups 
or  platoons  to  the  infantry.  These  shock  battalions  were 
basically  different  from  the  Russian  Scout  Detachments 
which  were  formed  from  the  best  men  of  the  companies. 
These  scout  detachments  in  consequence  of  their  special 
training,  performed  valuable  services.  They  operated  under 
the  direct  orders  of  the  regimental  commander.  There  can 
be  no  doubt  of  their  usefulness  in  diflficult  terrain  and  occa- 
sionally in  minor  warfare;  but  in  large  battles,  there  was 
a  lack  of  the  necessary  maneuvering  space  for  their  em- 
ployment. Combining  the  best  elements  of  a  company  into 
a  special  detachment  appears  always  dangerous,  for  the 
troops  cannot  do  without  their  best  men  to  replace  fallen 
leaders  and  to  serve  as  the  backbone  of  the  company  in  dif- 


86  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

ficult  situations.  In  the  Boer  war  the  battle  value  of  the 
British  infantry  decreased  rapidly  through  the  continual 
detachment  of  the  best  men  for  duty  with  mounted  infan- 
try. A  well  trained  infantry  unit  should  be  able,  under  its 
own  commanders  to  perform  the  same  services  as  a  scout 
detachment.  On  the  other  hand,  the  assault  troops  remained 
with  their  companies  where  they  were  useful  as  leaders  in 
the  fight,  and  for  particular  missions  they  may  also  be 
temporarily  employed  away  from  their  companies.  The 
"assault"  battalions  were  complete  units,  which  get  their 
recruits  from  all  arms  and  are  about  equal  to  Jager  bat- 
talions. In  France  also,  about  January,  1917,  assault  groups 
were  organized  (groupes  francs)  or  {gremidiers  d' elite). 
In  the  Russian  army  (August  24,  1917),  a  shock  battalion 
of  four  companies  (each  of  3  platoons)  was  formed  in  each 
division  and  formed  into  a  technical  unit. 

The  shock  squads  (1  noncommissioned  officer  and  6  to 
8  men)  "lead  the  infantry  at  difficult  points  to  open  the 
points  of  entry  into  the  hostile  position,  roll  up  hostile 
trenches,  capture  hostile  machine  guns  and  pill  boxes  and 
support  the  infantry  in  consolidating  the  captured  position." 
(Field  Training  Regulations,  I,  389.)  The  method  of  the 
trench  fighting  taught  progressively  on  the  training  ground 
should  be  participated  in  also  by  the  infantry  shock  squads. 
"The  company  possesses  in  its  assault  squads,  composed  of 
the  best  men,  suitable  leaders  in  the  fight  who  should  be 
placed  at  points  where  the  strongest  hostile  resistance  is 
expected"  (244).  Arrangements  should  be  made  for  the 
participation  of  auxiliary  weapons  where  artillery  is  lack- 
ing for  strong  fire  preparation.  Assault  squads  advance 
during  an  assault  with  the  leading  wave  which  is  to  pene- 
trate to  the  farthest  objective. 

Machine  guns  are  attached  to  the  assaulting  infantry, 
and  also  distributed  to  the  waves  in  rear,  for  taking  strong 
points,  for  flank  protection  and  to  neutralize  hostile  machine 
guns.  In  the  defense,  the  automatic  rifles  form  the  main 
weapon  of  defense  against  the  assault,  while  the  machine 
guns  will  find  their  most  effective  employment  in  rear  of  the 
front  line  and  are  placed  in  the  front  line  only,  in  numbers 
absolutely  necessary,  to  furnish  harassing  and  barrage  fire. 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  87 

Defiladed  and  concealed  positions  are  essential  for  their 
effective  employment.  As  "weapons  of  the  intervening  ter- 
rain" they  facilitate  stubborn  resistance  and  also  find  em- 
ployment in  defense  against  airplanes. 

The  needs  of  the  defense  govern  the  dispositions  of 
troops  for  the  first  line.  The  regiments  are  placed  abreast 
and  are  generally  divided  into  position  battalions,  reserve 
battalions,  and  rest  battalions.  The  first  are  the  front  line 
battalions  with  attached  auxiliary  arms  and  artillery  ob- 
servers. The  second  are  the  battalions  which,  reinforced 
by  security  detachments,  support  the  front  line  battalions 
in  their  most  important  task,  by  emergency  garrisons  and 
"joint"  detachments  reinforced  by  machine  guns ;  and  which 
independently  eject  the  enemy  from  the  leading  trenches 
he  may  have  taken. 

The  Regulations  gave  special  attention  to  the  offensive 
defense.  The  trench  garrison  must  hold  out  at  all  costs, 
even  though  in  danger  of  being  surrounded  by  the  attacker. 
"The  holding  of  the  position  then  depends  on  the  success  of 
counter-attacks.  Until  the  latter  start,  every  man  of  the 
garrison  and  every  gun  must  hold  his  or  its  place"  (227). 
Counter-attacks  should  be  made  at  once  and  without  await- 
ing orders,  not  alone  in  our  own  but  also  into  a  lost  adjacent 
sector. 

Based  on  subsequent  experiences  and  after  the  lapse 
of  one  year,  the  Regulations  for  Field  Training  II  appeared. 

"Thorough  training  in  the  use  of  the  rifle  and  machine 
gun  as  well  as  efficient  handling  of  hand  grenades  enable 
the  infantry  to  successfully  carry  out  its  task.  The  rifle 
and  hand  grenade,  however,  can  only  achieve  their  very 
best  effect  by  supplementing  each  other"  (177).  The  last 
sentence  is  of  special  importance,  as  the  troops  were  in- 
clined (and  even  our  opponents  complained  of  it)  to  neglect 
the  rifle  in  favor  of  the  hand  grenade.  The  first  thing  to 
do  is  to  stop  the  enemy  with  the  rifle  and  to  resort  to  the 
hand  grenade  only  when  the  enemy  is  within  throwing  dis- 
tance or  when  he  can  no  longer  be  fired  on  with  the  rifle 
(192) .  A  new  note  in  these  regulations  was  the  demand  that 
"all  noncommissioned  ofl[icers  and  men  must  be  trained  in 
the  shock-squad  procedure/'  and  that  shock  squads  for  spe- 


88  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

cial  tasks  be  formed  "from  specially  suited  men  from  time 
to  time"  (226). 

The  directions  for  fighting  against  tanks  (416-419)  and 
against  low  flying  battle  airplanes  (420-429)  were  also  new. 
Each  machine  gun,  that  is  not  occupied  in  the  battle  against 
ground  targets,  must  direct  its  fire  on  low  flying  airplanes 
(423). 

The  general  directions  for  the  conduct  of  position  bat- 
tles were  proven  correct  throughout.  The  machine  guns 
had  been  specially  useful  as  arms  in  the  intermediate  ter- 
rain, especially  in  nests  of  one  to  three  guns  under  infantry 
protection.  These  nests  were  again  combined  under  one 
leader  into  defense  groups,  to  which  dispersed  men  were 
to  hasten.  Skillfully  nested  in,  and  hidden  from  hostile  ter- 
restrial and  air  observation,  the  machine  guns  opened  fire, 
only  at  the  moment  of  the  first  hostile  assault,  by  surprise, 
and  with  flanking  effect  whenever  possible  (406) . 

The  battalion  commander  of  the  front  line  battalion 
was  the  "fighting  troops"  commander.  Heavier  emphasis 
than  in  the  first  Regulations  was  laid  on  the  offensive  de- 
fense and  the  necessity  of  cutting  out  security  detach- 
ments. For  the  counter-attack  the  commander  of  the  bat- 
talions in  readiness  must  not  await  request  for  counter- 
attack. To  his  companies  battle  tasks  and  definite  battle 
sectors  can  be  assigned  before  the  start,  in  which  they  are 
responsible  for  timely  and  independent  counter-attacks 
(445).  The  battalion  commander  was  responsible  that  the 
counter-attack  hit  the  enemy  before  he  has  had  a  chance 
to  consolidate  the  captured  position. 

THE  BATTLES  IN  1917 

In  the  Spring  of  1917  the  German  command  reckoned 
on  a  repetition  of  larger  attacks  in  the  Champagne  and  in 
Picardy.  Valuable  basis  for  the  conduct  of  the  defense  was 
furnished  by  Nivelle's  Regulations  in  conjunction  with  the 
experience  gained  at  Verdun.  It  was  seen  that  the  best 
counter-means  for  the  new  attack  procedure  was  a  weak 
garrison  of,  and  even  temporary  abandonment,  of  unfavor- 
ably situated  first  lines.  Absolute  abandonment  of  the  fore- 
most trenches  had  given  the  usual  French  strong  reconnais- 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  89 

sance  shocks  prior  to  the  attack  a  new  point  for  starting 
the  assault,  and  had  not  made  it  necessary  to  insert  stronger 
forces.  If  the  penetration  succeeded,  then  the  assaulting 
troops  were  to  be  attacked  by  the  garrison  holding  the  in- 
termediate terrain  from  all  sides  with  fire  and  held,  so  that 
the  French  infantry  would  lose  the  protection  of  the  auto- 
matically advancing  fire  wave,  and  that  was  the  prerequisite 
for  the  subsequent  offensive  defense  by  all  arms  from  the 
depth,  and  by  reserves  brought  up.  The  method  of  the  French 
fire  distribution  left  no  attentive  defender  in  doubt  concern- 
ing the  selected  point  of  entry,  so  that  the  reserves  could 
be  placed  in  position  in  time.  The  immediately  started  coun- 
ter-shock— into  the  uncertain — was  the  finger  mark  of  the 
new  leadership.  Thus  was  created  the  elastic  defense,  tem- 
porary evasion  of  the  annihilation  fire  to  the  front — which 
however  found  its  limits  at  the  obstacles — and  then  the 
assault-shock  of  the  reserves.  This  method  required  also 
special  artillery  preparation:  locating  the  observation  posi- 
tions in  direct  proximity  to  the  batteries,  and  special  ar- 
rangements for  communication.  Of  importance  were  the 
directions  that  pauses  in  the  hostile  fire  must  not  lead  the 
defensive  artillery  into  inactivity,  as  those  very  pauses 
allowed  the  enemy  to  bring  up  ammunition,  to  complete  his 
attack  preparations  and  to  bring  up  his  assault  troops. 
From  these  facts  we  can  now  judge  why  the  German  army 
leadership  decided,  in  the  face  of  the  progressing  attack  of 
the  enemy,  to  evacuate  a  large  projecting  arc  of  the  West 
front,  and  to  go  back  to  the  "Siegfried  Position,"  under  the 
protection  of  independent  detachments  which  had  been  left 
behind,  and  after  the  execution  of  extensive  destructions. 
The  object  had  been  attained,  time  had  been  gained,  and  the 
enemy  had  been  compelled  to  abandon  his  plan  of  attack. 
The  Allies  were  forced  to  far  separated  attacks  at  Arras,  on 
the  Aisne  and  in  the  Champagne. 

Possession  of  the  terrain  plays  a  very  minor  role, 
though  it  had  long  been  considered,  especially  at  home,  as 
the  means  of  determining  whether  a  situation  is  favorable 
or  a  little  less  favorable,  and  though  the  enemy  credited 
himself  with  success  in  taking  possession  of  a  piece  of  ter- 
rain that  had  been  voluntarily  abandoned  by  his  opponent. 


90  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

Thereafter  the  German  command  husbanded  its  strength 
and  held  terrain  only  as  long  as  it  was  warranted  by  the 
means  that  had  to  be  used  therefor. 

On  the  side  of  the  Allies  also  no  time  was  lost  in  with- 
drawing their  attack  divisions  temporarily  to  the  rear  in 
order  to  practice  in  the  open  terrain  the  attack  against  the 
German  trench  system  (4  to  5  kilometers  depth).  This 
practice  began  with  the  platoon.  In  addition  to  the  battle 
and  march  practice  proper  and  to  training  in  the  service  of 
special  arms,  rifle  firing  and  physical  training  was  carried 
on,  with  and  without  packs.  To  hasten  the  advance,  move- 
ment across  country  as  well  as  by  approach  trenches  was 
directed,  thus  minimizing  the  effect  of  the  German  machine 
gun  fire.  Intervals  between  skirmishers  were  4  to  5  paces 
(3  to  3.75  meters) .  In  terrain  devoid  of  trenches  all  column 
of  fours  were  to  be  discarded,  the  platoons  to  advance  in 
open  order,  as  units  or  in  lozenge  formation  (see  plate),  to 
lessen  the  effect  of  hostile  artillery  fire. 

COMPANY    IN    LOZENGE    FORMATION 
1. 

II 

8.  2. 


4. 


In  forests  the  troops  assumed  single  formation.  Cap- 
ture of  villages  was  left  to  the  tanks.  Woods  were  entered 
only  after  the  artillery  had  fired  upon  them  for  at  least  20 
minutes. 

In  the  attack  within  the  division,  1  regiment  was  gen- 
erally placed  as  a  shock-detachment  with  3  battalions  (each 
750  meters,  companies  250  meters  front)  abreast  on  a  front 
of  2400  meters.  2  regiments  followed  in  reserve.  The  com- 
pany was  formed  into  2  waves,  following  each  other  at  30 
meters  distance.  The  distance  of  the  battalion  reserve  was 
400  meters. 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  91 

The  preparations  of  the  British  Army  for  the  Battle  of 
Arras  were  made  in  the  same  manner;  it  appears  that  spe- 
cial weight  was  attached  to  increasing  the  artillery  materiel. 
In  a  sector  north  of  Arras  on  a  5-kilometer  front  456  light, 
240  heavy  and  heaviest  guns  and  68  minenwerfers  were 
counted.  On  April  9,  1917,  after  an  enormous  expenditure 
of  ammunition,  the  British  infantry  forced  its  way  into  the 
German  position  under  protection  of  a  rolling  barrage  and 
tanks  on  a  front  of  17  kilometers.  Between  Gavrelle  and 
Roeux  (5  kilometers)  a  depth  of  penetration  of  6  kilometers 
was  attained.  By  the  well  laid  and  exceedingly  heavy  bar- 
rage portions  of  the  German  garrisons  in  the  front  trenches 
were  completely  cut  off  from  their  reinforcements.  Through 
the  loss  of  dominating  ridges  in  the  leading  line,  which  had 
been  boxed  in  by  the  British  artillery,  the  hostile  fire  com- 
pelled a  withdrawal  at  some  points  of  4  kilometers.  Gas 
was  employed  on  a  very  large  scale.  The  guns  that  had  to 
be  abandoned  to  the  advancing  enemy  were  made  unservice- 
able and  blown  up.  A  British  attempt  to  penetrate  at 
Roeux  with  a  strong  force  of  cavalry  was  defeated  by  strong 
fire.  On  the  23d  the  front  of  the  penetration  was  increased  to 
34  kilometers ;  any  further  increase  or  advance  was  made  im- 
possible by  the  energetic  counter-attacks  of  the  German 
reserves. 

After  artillery  preparation  lasting  for  days  the  British 
divisions  attacked  with  the  assistance  of  tanks  along  a  divi- 
sion front  of  1500  to  2000  meters,  mostly  with  2  brigades 
(4  battalions)  in  four  waves.  These  were  to  pass  through 
each  other  in  such  manner  that  the  leading  wave  halted  on 
the  first  objective,  where  the  second  wave  passed  through 
the  first  wave  to  the  second  objective ;  and  similarly  followed 
by  the  third  and  fourth  wave  ("leap-frog  system").  In 
this  manner  an  organized  front  was  always  to  be  offered  to 
the  German  counter-shock.    (See  plate.) 


92  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

FORMATION  OF  A  BATTALION 
(1917) 

Of  the  31st  Inf.  Div 
C                B                A 
2  platoons 


Of  the  9th  Inf 
B 

.  Div. 
A 

50 

m 

35  m 

1   platoon  

50  m                                                                                                     45  m 
1    platoon  


50  m  90  m 

D 


50  m  D 


50  m 


Note: — In  England  the  companies  are  designated  by  letters. 

The  infantry  was  formed  into  waves  or  followed  in  nar- 
row, short  columns,  which  were  preferred,  in  order  to  avoid 
losses,  from  the  creeping  barrage  closely  preceding  the 
troops,  from  shorts  or  from  fragments  thrown  back.  Ev- 
erything had  been  very  minutely  arranged  in  orders  and 
nothing  was  left  to  chance  or  to  the  initiative  of  the  com- 
manders. In  order  to  avoid  the  standing  barrage  of  the  de- 
fender, the  first  two  lines  (the  first  in  very  open  skirmish 
line,  4  to  5  meters  intervals  between  skirmishers,  the  sec- 
ond often  in  short  narrow  single  columns)  were  sent  before 
the  assault  beyond  the  leading  trench,  while  the  third  line 
occupied  that  trench  and  the  fourth  immediately  formed 
in  rear  of  it.  At  the  start  of  the  assault  the  artillery  laid 
its  fire  on  the  front  to  be  penetrated  and  moved  it  forward 
slowly  (for  instance  90  meters  in  four  minutes)  first  the 
heavy  calibers,  followed  by  the  field  artillery  with  the  ma- 
chine guns  between  the  two.  In  many  cases  advance  was 
made  under  protection  of  smoke  clouds.     The  assaulting 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  93 

infantry  followed  the  creeping  barrage  immediately.  Losses 
by  its  own  artillery  fire  had  to  be  reckoned  with.  Halts 
were  made  to  prevent  the  creeping  barrage  running  away 
from  the  infantry.  The  barrage  was  then  designated  a 
standing  barrage.  It  was  intended  to  produce  an  effect 
on  any  counter-attack  and  gave  the  infantry  the  oppor- 
tunity to  entrench  in  expectation  of  a  counter-attack  and 
to  reorganize.  The  first  wave  remained  in  that  position, 
while  the  rest  continued  the  advance  in  the  rear  of  the 
creeping  barrage.  It  is  true  that  the  necessity  of  taking 
advantage  of  the  initial  success  was  theoretically  acknowl- 
edged, but  exploiting  the  success  was  left  to  the  subordinate 
commanders  up  to  the  battalion  commander,  who,  being 
insufl!iciently  trained,  completely  failed.  In  every  instance 
it  was  proven  a  mistake  to  put  in  cavalry  masses  without 
attaching  infantry   to   them   as   "pace-makers"    (to  clear 

PLATOON  IN  FORMATION  UNDER  HOSTILE 
ARTILLERY  FIRE 

1  squad  hand  grenade  throwers  (HG) ;  1  squad  automatic  rifles 

(AR) ;  1  squad  riflemen  (RM) ;  1  squad  rifle  grenade 

throwers   (RG) ;  total  10  officers,  40  men. 


i 


< 

100  meters 

> 

RM 

•\                      /\ 

RG 

jjQ     12  to  20  m 

i 

X 

12  to  45  m 

15  to  25  m 

AR 

\y                      \y 

Platoon  commander  with  4  messengers. 

Platoon  in  Two 

Waves 

RM 

i 

HG 

12  to  20  m 

RG  AR 

\/ 


Trench  moppers-up,  12  m  distance. 


94  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  way).  Employing  divisions  to  gather  the  fruits  of 
the  victory,  was  not  resorted  to  for  reasons  which  may 
probably  be  accounted  for  by  insufficient  training  of  officers 
and  men.  Thus,  in  the  Arras  battle  an  entrance  into  the 
position  was  made,  which,  however,  was  not  followed  up 
by  a  penetration  because  the  British  command  did  not  ex- 
ploit initial  successes.  The  attacking  troops  were  pre- 
maturely relieved  while  they  still  possessed  sufficient  fight- 
ing power.  The  troops  were  trained  entirely  too  theoreti- 
cally or  according  to  a  hard  and  fast  scheme  for  the  attack, 
and  everything  depended  on  the  success  of  the  creeping  bar- 
rage. They  reasoned  that  any  attack  that  came  to  a  halt  had 
better  be  at  once  discontinued,  and  tried  at  some  other 
point.  In  that  case  we  must  hope  to  strike  some  portion  of 
the  front  that  is  weaker,  or  occupied  with  more  or  less  worn 
out  troops. 

The  extensive  French  preparations  for  attack  in  the 
Western  Champagne  could  not  be  hidden  from  the  German 
airplanes,  and  had  been  materially  corroborated  by  state- 
ments of  prisoners.  Nivelle's  main  idea  of  avoiding  portions 
of  the  front  lines  that  were  difficult  to  attack  and  taking  them 
subsequently  by  flank  and  rear  attacks,  was  to  be  carried 
out  on  a  large  scale.  Such  portions,  or  supporting  points, 
were  the  Brimont  and  Berry  sectors  in  the  Western  Cham- 
pagne. An  army  was  to  attack  beyond  the  Aisne  against 
Laon,  to  secure  the  left  flank  of  the  main  attack  and  then  to 
take  up  the  pursuit.  The  main  attack,  in  the  Champagne,  was 
planned  so  that  a  stretch  of  20  kilometers  was  to  be  left  free 
in  the  center  at  and  east  of  Reims  between  Bethany  and 
Prouvais.  On  the  left  the  5th  Army  (as  had  been  gleaned 
from  an  order  captured  April  4,  1917,  at  Sapigneul)  with  the 
32d  Corps  was  to  push  forward  towards  Brienne  and  Prou- 
vais; with  the  next  division  (37th),  to  Suippe;  and  with  the 
next  division  (14th),  supported  by  the  Russians,  to  the  Bri- 
mont. On  the  right  wing  a  corresponding  advance  was  then 
to  be  made  by  way  of  Auberive.  As  strong  forces  were  also 
concentrated  around  Chalons,  it  is  not  improbable  that  here 
a  strong  group  was  placed  in  readiness  for  attack,  probably 
in  the  direction  of  Vouziers  and  for  furnishing  flank  protec- 
tion.   If  the  German  center  made  a  stand,  its  fate  would  be 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  95 

sealed,  provided  the  wings  succeeded.  Thus  it  was  a  Cannae 
battle  in  position  warfare ! 

According  to  the  captured  orders,  prematurely  issued, 
the  attack  of  the  20th  Corps,  to  be  started  at  6:00  A.M., 
April  16th,  was  to  reach  the  village  of  Lierval  situated  about 
16  kilometers  north  of  the  Aisne  and  to  occupy  the  flats 
west  thereof  as  far  as  the  canal  in  the  vicinity  of  the  vil- 
lage of  Uzel.  Thus  the  rear  of  the  new  Siegfried  position 
would  be  gained  and  the  attack  would  work  towards  the 
British.  The  6th  Corps  had  the  task  of  working  its  way 
up  west  of  the  20th  (on  the  Soissons — Laon  road)  and  to 
occupy  that  village  as  well  as  the  terrain  to  the  west.  Then 
the  pursuing  army  was  to  push  through  this  gap.  This  or- 
der assigned  to  the  39th  Infantry  Division  of  the  20th  Corps 
for  its  first  objective  the  German  position  on  the  Chemin  des 
Dames;  for  its  second,  the  Aillette;  for  its  third,  Lierval 
and  the  flats  to  the  Aisne — Oise  Canal.  In  this  operation 
the  153d  Regiment  of  the  39th  Infantry  Division  had  the 
task  of  advancing  to  the  attack  in  column  of  battalions. 
The  3d  Battalion  was  to  take  the  first  objective;  the  2d  Bat- 
talion, the  second  objective ;  and  the  1st  Battalion,  the  third 
objective.  The  orders  contained  similar  instructions  con- 
cerning the  adjoining  regiments  (146th  and  156th).  The 
132d  and  106th  Regiments  of  the  56th  Infantry  Division  of 
the  6th  Army  Corps  were  ordered  to  advance  as  far  as 
Chavignon.  The  132d  Regiment  was  to  advance  alongside 
the  canal,  the  106th  Regiment  to  ascend  the  Bovette  Hill 
through  the  Bois  des  Comites  d'Or  and  then  push  forward 
in  the  direction  of  La  Croix-sans-Tete, 

Nivelle  intended  to  overrun  three  or  four  German  posi- 
tions and  expected  an  advance  of  10  kilometers  in  8  hours, 
taking  the  Brimont  the  first  forenoon  and  Laon  the  morning 
of  the  second  day.  On  the  second  and  third  day  of  the  at- 
tack the  advance  was  to  be  more  rapid  and  was  to  be  made 
in  the  direction  of  Sedan  and  Namur  to  the  southern  comer 
of  Holland.  Nivelle  held  the  view  that  the  penetration  of 
the  German  front  could  be  made  within  24  hours,  or  at  the 
most  48  hours.    Otherwise  the  battle  could  not  be  won. 

The  opening  of  the  battle  was  fixed  for  the  British  on 
April  9th,  for  the  French  left  wing  at  first  on  the  15th  (later 


96  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

on  the  16th),  and  for  the  French  right  wing  on  the  17th. 
The  blowing  up  of  the  Aisne — Champagne  front  line  sector 
and  the  accompanying  fan-like  rolling  up  to  the  east  and 
north  showed  a  plan,  well  thought  out  and  on  large  lines, 
which,  however,  would  be  successful  only  if  the  penetra- 
tion could  be  accomplished  on  the  first  day,  or  not  later  than 
the  second  day  and  to  the  depth  ordered.  If  the  attacks 
did  not  succeed  one  after  the  other  in  rapid  succession,  the 
plan  had  to  fall  to  pieces  of  itself.  It  was  unfortunate  for 
the  attack  that  at  the  very  start  the  above  mentioned  at- 
tack orders  for  the  infantry  of  the  6th  Army  Corps  in  min- 
ute detail  should  fall  into  German  hands.  Though  this  fact 
was  known  to  the  French  headquarters,  the  preparations 
for  the  attack  were  not  changed.  Thus  the  advantage  of 
surprise  was  lost. 

On  the  German  side.  Headquarters  of  the  1st  Army 
(General  of  Infantry — Fritz  von  Below)  was  placed  between 
the  7th  and  3d  Armies.  These  headquarters  had  been  able 
to  gather  valuable  experience  on  the  defensive  in  the  battle 
of  the  Somme.  As  each  army  (the  7th  and  3d)  detached  the 
corps  on  its  interior  wing  continuity  in  the  issuance  of  or- 
ders was  assured  on  the  battlefield.  Nevertheless  disad- 
vantages were  connected  therewith.  Headquarters  of  the 
1st  Army  assumed  command  over  the  two  corps  while  the 
attack  preparations  of  the  French  were  in  full  swing;  and 
conduct  of  the  defense  was  made  more  difficult  by  the  later 
insertion  of  fresh  divisions.  It  was  found  inadvisable  to 
decrease  division  fronts  by  putting  new  divisions  into  the 
line.  It  would  have  been  better  to  attach  a  fourth  regiment 
to  the  divisions  already  in  line  and  to  retain  the  remainder 
of  the  new  divisions  as  interference  divisions  (in  reserve). 
Besides  it  was  incorrect  to  make  the  division  sectors  too 
small,  as  then  it  became  difficult  to  post  the  artillery  and 
facilitate  changes  in  its  position.  One  division  with  an  inter- 
ference (reserve)  division  in  its  rear  could  perfectly  well 
hold  a  sector  of  4  to  5  kilometers  front,  although  the  front 
of  a  division  should  not  be  extended  beyond  3  kilometers. 

The  attack  was  commenced  by  heavy  artillery  fire  reach- 
ing far  into  the  hostile  rear.  Towards  evening  of  April  6th, 
near  Reims,  an  attack  by  artillery  fire  on  a  large  scale, 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  97 

against  the  German  captive  balloons  and  planes,  was  started ; 
but  was  unsuccessful,  presumably  on  account  of  gassing 
by  German  defensive  guns. 

Differing  from  the  Somme  battle,  in  the  "Easter"  bat- 
tle the  Germans  had  a  superiority  in  the  air  even  prior  to 
the  French  attack,  which  fact  became  of  special  use  to  the 
artillery  counter-preparation  by  enabling  the  defense  to 
adjust  its  fire  on  the  hostile  batteries  and  other  targets  far 
into  the  hostile  rear.  If  a  destructive  fire  was  specially  di- 
rected against  any  part  of  the  German  line,  the  hostile  hne 
opposite  was  immediately  taken  under  a  destructive  fire. 

In  the  French  5th  Army,  the  course  of  the  attack  was 
about  as  follows:  April  6th  to  11th  an  artillery  prepara- 
tion including,  on  the  first  day,  attack  against  the  German 
air  forces.  On  the  12th,  a  decrease  of  the  artillery  fire,  which 
in  the  evening  again  increased  to  "drum"  fire.  On  the  12th 
and  13th,  reconnaissance  attacks  (raids).  On  the  13th,  a 
diminution  of  the  fire,  presumably  assault  troops  going  into 
position.  On  the  14th  and  15th  resumption  of  heavy  fire 
preparation,  directed  methodically  on  the  second  position. 
Night  firing  on  the  routes  of  approach  and  shelters,  prepara- 
tions for  bringing  up  artillery.  Early  on  the  16th  "drum" 
fire  again.    At  7 :00  A.M.,  the  assault. 

The  German  trenches,  that  could  in  most  cases  be  easily 
observed,  had  been  changed  into  a  stretch  of  shell-holes  by 
the  strong  artillery  fire.  Attempts  to  repair  trenches  under 
this  fire,  merely  increased  the  losses.  On  the  other  hand, 
it  was  possible  to  construct  in  the  shell-hole  terrain  in  rear 
of  the  selected  line  of  resistance  a  continuous  trench,  which  in 
daytime  had  the  effect  of  a  false  position,  and  which  at  night 
offered  shelter  from  the  bad  weather,  to  the  garrison  of 
the  front  trenches.  Now  the  advantages  and  disadvantages 
of  advanced  elements  of  the  position  came  into  considera- 
tion ;  and  emphasis  was  laid  on  the  necessity  of  declining  to 
hold  or  recapture  unfavorable  portions  of  the  terrain  in  place 
of  accepting  the  heavy  losses  necessary  to  hold  them.  The 
German  conduct  of  the  defense  was  well  known  to  General 
Nivelle.  It  was  mainly :  weak  occupation  of  the  first  line ; 
contending  for  the  first  trenches  by  automatic  counter-at- 
tack of  the  troops  in  readiness,  thus  delaying  the  assault 


98  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

while  the  creeping  barrage  continued  on  its  way ;  defense  of 
the  intermediate  terrain  by  machine  guns ;  and  then  decis- 
ive counter-attack  by  the  reserves  starting  at  the  same 
time  the  attack  commenced.  General  Nivelle  demanded  raids 
on  a  broad  front,  prior  to  the  commencement  of  the  assault, 
in  order  to  induce  the  machine  guns  in  the  intermediate  ter- 
rain to  open  fire  prematurely  and  to  cause  the  reserves  to 
be  committed  to  the  counter-attack.  Captured  trenches 
were  to  be  held  as  positions  of  departure  for  the  further  ad- 
vance. Special  weight  was  laid  on  the  prompt  forward  dis- 
placement of  the  artillery  immediately  after  the  initial 
success.  "If  we  require  two  months  to  prepare  a  new  at- 
tack, thus  permitting  the  enemy  to  dig  in  on  a  new  front, 
we  simply  play  into  his  hands.  The  time  of  preparation 
must  be  limited  to  the  time  necessary  to  bring  forward  the 
artillery.  The  period  of  two  months  must  be  diminished  to 
but  a  few  days,  even  if  the  question  is  one  of  attack  against 
fortified  positions."  The  battle  confirmed  the  correctness 
of  this  German  conception  concerning  the  conduct  of  de- 
fense; but  also  showed  its  weakness  which  lay  at  the  junc- 
tion of  two  sectors.  Only  too  easily  could  differences  in  the 
estimate  of  the  situation  concerning  the  main  defensive 
position  arise  in  the  different  sectors;  and  in  that  case  co- 
operation in  conducting  the  counter-attacks  was  not  as- 
sured and  liaison  with  the  neighboring  artillery  was  likely 
to  be  interrupted.  "Joint"  (meaning  junction,  where  sec- 
tors adjoin)  detachments  could  offset  these  disadvantages 
only  in  part.  The  danger  of  occupying  large  tunnels  im- 
mediately in  rear  of  the  leading  line  came  into  prominence. 
This  procedure  of  course  held  the  large  garrison  thereof 
firmly  in  the  hands  of  the  commander ;  but  on  the  other  hand 
the  garrison  was  in  danger  of  being  shut  in  by  a  caving-in 
and  of  falling  helplessly  into  the  enemy's  hands.  According 
to  French  reports,  in  the  Cornillet  Tunnel  the  garrison,  num- 
bering several  hundred  men,  was  killed  by  gases  of  explo- 
sions. Permanent  evacuation  of  portions  of  the  position 
was  made  only  by  direct  orders  from  higher  headquarters. 
This  was  of  great  importance  in  the  conduct  of  counter-at- 
tacks. Instructions  that  portions  of  rifle  trenches  should 
be  prepared  so  as  to  provide  all  round  defense  appeared  nee- 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  99 

essary.  The  known  French  method  of  conducting  the  at- 
tack insisted  that  each  unit  assure  itself  of  connection  on 
its  flanks.  The  commander  was  not  merely  to  ascertain 
that  troops  were  there  but  he  had  also  to  ascertain  how  and 
in  what  line  those  troops  were  to  fight.  The  battle  confirmed 
the  frequent  previous  experiences:  that  portions  of  the 
position  which  had  been  observed  by  the  enemy  were  quickly 
annihilated ;  that  routes  of  approach  observed  in  quiet  per- 
iods very  soon  became  unserviceable  during  battle;  that 
troops  in  the  open  suffered  less  losses  than  those  remaining 
in  known  trenches,  which,  after  evacuation,  served  well  as 
false  positions.  Counter-attacks  conducted  by  even  weak 
detachments  had  surprising  success  if  they  were  started 
immediately  after  the  enemy's  entry.  The  enemy  must  be 
counter-attacked  as  long  as  he  has  not  overcome  the  resis- 
tance of  the  position,  and  as  long  as  he  has  not  reorganized ; 
and  therefore  the  counter-attack  must  be  started  under  en- 
tirely unknown  conditions  even  under  the  danger  of  being 
started  too  early.  The  new  conception  of  the  counter-at- 
tack gained  more  and  more  in  value ;  it  was  not  only  to  off- 
set a  local  defeat  but  the  intention  was  to  destroy  the  enemy. 
This  required  the  introduction  of  larger  infantry  forces; 
and,  as  we  could  not  absolutely  count  on  the  co-operation 
of  the  artillery,  light  horse-drawn  batteries  had  to  be  at- 
tached to  the  infantry.  The  "interference"  (reserve)  divi- 
sions were  designated  for  independent  counter-attack.  This 
employment  of  the  reserves  made  it  necessary  to  keep  posi- 
tions in  rear  garrisoned  by  weak  security  detachments.  But 
if  counter-attack  could  not  take  place  within  a  short  time 
after  the  penetration,  it  became  necessary  to  make  specially 
careful  preparation  for  a  systematic  counter-attack.  Great 
difficulties  were  encountered  in  taking  up  a  position  under 
cover  close  to  the  attack  objective.  Reorganization  of  the 
formation  in  depth  after  success  also  presented  difficulties. 
The  more  time  the  troops  were  given,  the  more  certain  was 
success. 

Early  on  April  18,  1917,  the  5th  and  6th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions with  weak  artillery  arrived  about  8  kilometers  north 
of  the  ridge  from  Comillet  to  Hochberk  and  Pohlberg, 
which  since  the  17th  had  been  in  French  hands ;  they  moved 


100  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

forward  on  the  19th  in  conjunction  with  a  detachment  of 
the  145th  Infantry  Regiment  on  their  right  and  with  the 
23d  Infantry  Division  on  their  left.  They  intrenched  them- 
selves on  the  ridge,  but  did  not  recapture  the  Fichtel  hills 
and  the  first  positions  at  that  time,  as  the  enemy  was 
ready  for  defense  in  a  prepared  position  and  had  brought 
up  his  artillery.  A  counter-attack  started  on  May  27th 
against  the  Pohlberg  was  successful  at  first  but  the  cap- 
tured terrain  could  not  be  held.  A  few  days  later  the  Hoch- 
berg  was  also  recaptured.  Lack  of  forces  prevented  a  sim- 
ultaneous attack  along  the  entire  front,  which  surely  would 
have  had  more  success,  than  several  partial  attacks  follow- 
ing each  other,  repeating  the  same  attack  procedure. 

The  French  main  attack  had  gone  to  pieces  with  bloody 
loss.  The  tanks  had  not  measured  up  at  all  to  what  had 
been  expected  from  them.  For  political  reasons  Nivelle's 
resignation  was  demanded;  and  in  his  place  stepped  Gen- 
eral Petain,  who  had  come  into  prominence.  The  main 
causes  for  the  defeat  lay  principally  in  that  surprise  was 
not  attained — which  is  easily  explained  in  such  a  large  at- 
tack; that  the  German  artillery  had  shown  a  tenacity  and 
power  beyond  what  had  been  expected,  and  that  the  very 
elastic  defense  was  doubtless  a  great  surprise.  The  French 
command  renounced  large  attacks  for  the  present.  During 
the  subsequent  battles  of  the  year  the  French  satisfied  them- 
selves, as  the  British  did  also,  with  limiting  the  objectives 
in  breadth  and  depth,  and  in  most  cases  the  object  of  the 
attack  was  merely  the  capture  of  a  single  position  by  strong 
forces  with  great  formation  in  depth  (the  division  on  a 
1200-meter  front).  After  thorough  artillery  preparation — 
including  strong  gas  concentrations  on  the  attack  objective 
and  after  arrangements  had  been  made  for  the  employment 
of  tanks,  the  dense  skirmish  lines  started.  If  they  suc- 
ceeded in  their  attack,  everything  was  prepared  to  meet  the 
counter-attack.  As  the  attacks  were  of  shallow  depth  such 
counter-attacks  were  successful  only  when  they  struck  the 
enemy  while  still  moving.  The  attack  could  be  carried  be- 
yond the  objective  only  by  direct  approval  of  the  army  com- 
mander. A  position  of  departure  for  the  attack  500  meters 
from  the  enemy,  and  never  closer  than  200  meters,  was  re- 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  101 

commended.  The  assault  was  to  advance  under  protection 
of  a  creeping  barrage;  and  if  the  target  objective  was  dis- 
tant, intermediate  halts  were  to  be  made.  If  intermediate 
objectives  were  designated  frequently  a  change  would  be 
made  in  the  assaulting  troops  for  the  subsequent  continua- 
tion of  the  attack.  The  attack  was  composed  of  a  series  of 
successive  offensive-shocks,  which  finally  led  to  a  penetra- 
tion. 

The  attack  against  the  Laffaux  Corner  (October  23, 
1917)  the  base  line  of  which  was  closed  by  the  Aisne  Canal, 
was  a  specially  good  example  of  the  new  French  tactics. 
The  7th  Army  had  no  doubts  whatever  of  the  coming  attack. 
Even  the  day  and  hour  had  become  known.  As  the  attack 
had  to  be  accepted  under  conditions  very  favorable  to  the  de- 
fense, it  had  to  be  decided  whether  it  would  be  more  desirable 
to  consider  the  Laffaux  Corner  as  a  foreground  zone  and  to 
execute  the  defense  proper  north  of  the  Canal.  Army  head- 
quarters, however,  insisted  on  stubborn  defense  of  the  lead- 
ing positions  in  front  of  the  Canal  contrary  to  the  wishes 
of  the  troops  and  to  the  views  of  Imperial  headquarters. 
The  French  intended  to  penetrate  at  Pinon  and  Fort  Mal- 
maison  with  the  support  of  tanks,  then  to  turn  in  in  rear 
of  the  German  position  and  to  cut  off  the  projecting  corner. 
October  16,  1917,  the  artillery  preparation  commenced  with 
greatly  superior  artillery  (for  instance,  in  the  14th  Infantry 
Division  125  against  32  German  batteries) ,  which  very  soon 
reduced  the  effectiveness  of  the  German  artillery.  The  crea- 
tion of  a  strong  gas  barrage  in  the  canal  lowland  of  such  ex- 
tent and  density  that  bringing  up  supplies  and  reserves  to 
the  front  line  was  absolutely  impossible  was  employed  for 
the  first  time.  The  interference  divisions  posted  in  rear 
were  distributed  by  battalions  to  the  troops  in  the  first  line 
of  the  defense.  Shelters  that  had  been  located  from  aerial 
photos  were  systematically  destroyed.  The  French  were 
satisfied  with  the  line  they  reached  on  October  23d,  and  did 
not  even  interfere  with  the  German  retreat  across  the 
canal.  The  simultaneous  battles  at  Verdun  show  similar 
events.  It  was  specially  noticeable  that  the  French  under- 
stood how  to  overcome  garrisons  by  attacking  them  from 
flank  and  rear.    The  advance  of  the  assault  troops,  delayed 


102  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

by  the  defense  of  the  intermediate  terrain,  was  very  slow. 
In  many  instances  two  hours  were  consumed  in  covering  one 
Icilometer.  The  movements  of  the  defenders  under  artillery 
fire  were  not  much  quicker,  when  gassed  spaces  under  heavy 
fire  had  to  be  crossed.  There  were  no  more  attempts  at 
united  shocks  by  entire  interference  divisions.  The  diffi- 
culties of  bringing  the  troops  through  the  shell-torn  and 
covered  terrain  were  great  but  where  counter-attacks  suc- 
ceeded, they  always  had  fine  results. 

The  British  Army  attached  more  weight  than  the 
French  to  the  change  in  the  conduct  of  the  attack. 

The  British  attack  was  marked  by  careful  preparation 
and  utilization  of  the  different  offensive  means.  Against 
the  Wytschaete  Arc,  the  extension  of  which  projected  about 
15  kilometers  beyond  the  line  Double  Hill  60  at  Zillebeke  and 
Warneton,  the  attack  preparations  had  so  far  progressed 
that  by  the  end  of  April  we  had  to  reckon  with  an  attack. 
In  the  beginning  of  May  the  artillery  preparations  com- 
menced, then  a  pause  occurred  from  May  16  to  21,  1917,  on 
the  22d  of  May  a  second  preparation,  increasing  continually 
in  volume,  commenced  so  that  there  was  no  doubt  whatever 
(without  considering  the  numerous  raids  and  statementi  of 
a  flyer,  captured  on  June  6th)  that  the  assault  was  imminent. 
On  the  German  side,  the  means  were  insufficient  for  bringing 
up  to  the  defensive  troops  (35th,  2d,  40th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions) reinforcements  in  troops  and  materiel.  In  addition, 
the  defensive  line  was  situated  on  the  front  slope  of  the 
hOl.  This,  the  British  engineers  had  skillfully  taken  ad- 
vantage of  since  1914.  The  statements  of  infantry  that 
the  noise  of  mining  could  be  heard,  were  said  by  our  pioneers 
to  be  incorrect.  The  standing  barrage  of  the  defense  was 
too  weak.  The  heavy  batteries  brought  up  a  few  days  be- 
fore had  been  destroyed,  except  a  few  guns.  Field  artil- 
lery, that  had  arrived  shortly  before  the  attack,  had  gone 
into  position  in  rear  of  the  third  position  and  remained  there 
unmolested  by  the  hostile  artillery.  The  infantry  had  also 
suffered  so  much,  that  the  battalions  kept  in  readiness  and 
resting  had  already  been  drawn  up  into  the  first  line. 

On  June  7th,  at  4:00  A.M.,  enormous  explosions  oc- 
curred, followed  again  by  heavy  "drum"  fire,  gassing  of  the 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  103 

terrain  in  rear  and  employment  of  a  new  kind  of  burning 
mine.  At  5:40  A.M.  11  British  Divisions  of  the  2d  Army 
(Plummer)  started  on  a  front  of  15  kilometers.  They  con- 
tented themselves  mainly  with  reaching  an  assault  position 
in  front  of  the  German  "Sehne"  position.  The  resisting  power 
of  the  defender  was  broken  when  the  assault  began,  but 
everyone  that  could  possibly  fight,  held  out.  The  remnants 
of  the  2d  Infantry  Division  retreated  only  when  they  were 
enveloped  on  both  wings.  A  counter-attack  against  Mes- 
sines  started  with  portions  of  the  Bavarian  3d  and  the  1st 
Guard  Reserve  Division,  made  good  progress  at  first,  but 
was  attacked  in  the  right  flank.  Naturally  the  German 
losses  were  very  heavy.  As  in  all  these  battles  probably  a 
renewed  attack  with  fresh  forces  would  have  encountered 
but  little  resistance.  Apparently  the  British  did  not  think 
of  a  prompt  exploitation  of  the  success.  Their  reserves  were 
used  for  relieving  the  troops  in  the  first  line,  but  not  for  in- 
creasing the  entry  to  a  penetration. 

Even  the  subsequent  battles  show  the  same:  Destroy- 
ing by  "drum"  fire  a  relatively  small  sector  of  the  front  line 
through  enormous  artillery  effect;  the  attacking  infantry 
satisfied  with  assaults  of  minor  depth ;  the  advantages  of 
surprise,  not  utilized. 

The  attack  at  Cambrai  on  November  20,  1917,  against 
a  quiet,  weakly  held  front  to  a  depth  of  12  kilometers: 
against  the  20th  Landwehr  Division  and  the  54th  Infantry 
Division  brought  from  Russia,  shows  an  entirely  different 
picture.  It  seems  this  conduct  of  attack  can  be  used  only 
against  such  a  front.  Everything  was  based  on  surprise, 
which  was  rendered  more  probable  on  account  of  the  bad 
flying  weather.  The  broad  field  of  obstacles,  undestroyed, 
30  meters  and  at  some  points  100  meters  broad,  made  it 
appear  that  any  immediate  attack  was  impossible. 

In  this  instance  the  obstacles  were  not  to  be  destroyed 
by  a  long  protracted  artillery  fire  but  were  to  be  broken  down 
by  tanks  followed  by  the  infantry.  The  position  had  been 
excellently  constructed  and  had  not  suffered  in  any  manner 
whatever.  Statements  of  prisoners  on  November  19th  about 
the  impending  attack,  were  not  believed.  The  British  orders 
for  secrecy  had  been  strictly  complied  with.    Large  move- 


104  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

merits  of  troops  and  vehicles  were  permitted  only  at  night 
and  without  lights.  The  attacking  troops  did  not  come  into 
any  contact  with  the  front  line  troops  already  known  to  us, 
so  that  prisoners  taken  by  us  were  only  from  the  latter 
troops,  who  naturally  could  not  know  or  report  anything 
about  the  attack.  Strict  orders  were  issued  not  to  fire  from 
new  positions  of  the  front  line  artillery  prior  to  the  opening 
of  the  assault.  The  front  line  artillery  kept  up  its  normal 
fire.  As  late  as  the  17th  the  2d  German  Army  reported 
that  hostile  attacks  on  a  large  scale  were  probably  not  to  be 
expected  and  that  there  were  no  indications  thereof  on 
the  northern  half  of  the  army  zone  as  indicated  by  railroad 
traffic  observed.  A  dense  fog,  artificially  reinforced,  hid 
the  position  in  readiness.  Bursts  of  destructive  fire  drowned 
the  noise  of  the  tanks,  so  that  when  the  waves  of  tanks  ap- 
peared the  German  security  detachments  were  completely 
surprised.  After  an  immediately  inserted  standing  barrage 
they  disappeared  in  the  fog  and  appeared  by  surprise  in 
front  of  the  German  batteries. 

The  penetration  was  made  by  6  divisions  on  a  front  of  6 
kilometers  in  a  first  and  a  second  line.  4  cavalry  divisions 
were  to  work  through  the  German  position  and,  turning  off 
to  the  north,  to  cut  off  the  sectors  north  of  the  front.  To 
each  British  division  1  tank  battalion  had  been  attached, 
consisting  of  3  companies,  each  of  4  platoons,  each  of  4 
tanks.  The  attack  was  preceded  by  6  tanks  to  ride  down  the 
obstacles.  These  were  followed  by  2  lines,  of  18  and  12 
tanks  respectively,  with  30  and  50  meters  distance  and  a 
rate  of  advance  of  3.2  kilometers  per  hour.  The  infantry 
followed  at  100  to  300  meters  distance.  The  attack  was 
preceded  as  every  other  attack  bjy  a  creeping  barrage. 
Thanks  to  the  surprise  and  the  new  method  of  fighting,  the 
penetration  succeeded  the  first  day  to  a  depth  of  3.5  kilo- 
meters; but  had  sufficient  artillery  of  the  defense  been  at 
hand,  the  attack  would  have  gone  to  pieces. 

Tanks  probably  can  take  a  position,  but  cannot  hold 
it.  They  take  the  place  of  accompanying  batteries  and  pro- 
duce an  effect  on  the  morale  of  the  defenders  who  feel  so 
helpless.  A  difference  is  made,  according  to  armament,  be- 
tween male  and  female  tanks,  the  former  having  2  light 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  105 

field  guns  and  4  automatic  rifles,  the  latter  6  machine  guns. 
Older  tanks  are  used  for  carrying  supplies.  Tanks  are  to 
open  a  road  for  the  infantry,  destroying  the  obstacles  or 
by  direct  support  of  the  infantry  in  beating  down  machine 
gun  nests  and  supporting  points.  In  attacking  villages 
tanks  were  frequently  used.  Considering  their  limited 
height  and  slow  velocity,  the  employment  of  tanks  against 
artillery  is  precluded.  The  capacity  of  tanks  is  small.  In- 
fantry carriers  can  haul  20  to  30  men  and  5  machine  guns. 
Mobility  in  the  terrain  is  very  good,  the  tanks  can  traverse 
slopes  of  1  to  2,  and  can  cross  ditches  2.5  meters  wide. 
Serious  obstacles  are  offered  to  tanks  by  swampy  ground, 
brooks,  and  watercourses  about  60-cm.  deep.  The  "passive 
defense"  against  tanks  consists  in  such  obstacles,  construc- 
tion of  automatic  mines,  which  will  permit  passage  of  in- 
dividuals, but  will  explode  on  the  passage  of  heavy  weight 
vehicles.  Bridges  of  great  bearing  capacity  had  better  be 
destroyed.  "Tank  traps"  on  roads  are  of  minor  value,  as 
the  tanks  can  run  across  country.  As  the  garrison  within 
the  tanks  is  deafened  by  the  noise  of  the  tank  in  motion, 
and  as  the  narrow  loopholes  permit  only  a  very  limited  view 
of  the  battlefield,  it  is  necessary  to  assign  men  to  accompany 
the  tanks  to  inform  the  garrison  of  the  tank  where  the 
enemy  still  holds  out.  In  any  case  the  tanks  never  fight  in- 
dividually but  always  in  mass;  and  never  unaccompanied; 
but,  like  the  accompanying  batteries,  whose  place  they  take, 
in  close  conjunction  with  infantry.  The  tanks  rapidly  use 
up  their  power.  Therefore  relief  and  formation  in  depth 
are  absolutely  required. 

The  gun  remains  the  best  defensive  weapon  against 
tanks.  If  the  troops  of  the  defense  have  once  become  used 
to  the  effect  and  impression  created  by  tanks,  then  light 
tanks  can  be  disposed  of  by  machine  guns  using  armor- 
piercing  bullets;  the  heavy  tanks  by  use  of  increased 
charges,  or  by  direct  flat  trajectory  fire  of  the  light  minen- 
werf  ers  or  by  the  fire  of  specially  constructed  anti-tank  guns. 
Even  larger  caliber  (13-mm.)  rifles  with  special  ammuni- 
tion has  been  found  effective.  The  more  the  fire  of  the 
different  arms  of  the  defense  is  concentrated  on  the  assault- 
ing tanks,  the  greater  will  be  the  losses  to  the  accompanying 


106  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

infantry,  and  the  more  will  that  infantry  lose  the  desire  to 
accompany  such  attacks.  We  cannot  deny  that  the  tanks, 
at  first  underestimated,  have  proven  themselves  to  be  a 
very  effective  means  of  attack.  The  success  must  not  be 
accredited  to  the  new  tactics  proper,  but  only  to  the  change 
in  the  conduct  of  the  attack,  and  thus  must  be  credited  to 
surprise.  But  if  the  defender  is  once  prepared  for  this 
change  in  tactics  and  if  he  has  abundant  defensive  means, 
the  hopes  of  success  diminish. 

Before  the  end  of  the  year,  November  30th,  the  German 
position,  lost  on  the  20th,  was  recaptured  by  a  brilliant 
counter-attack  on  a  large  scale,  based  on  surprise,  against 
the  enemy's  flank  and  rear.  It  was  a  good  example  of  the 
importance  of  surprise  as  the  enemy  did  not  expect  any 
attack.  We  succeeded  in  guarding  the  secret,  so  that  the 
enemy  did  not  observe  the  artillery  and  minenwerfers  going 
into  position.  In  one  division  sector,  33  batteries  had  to  be 
placed  in  position  in  7  days;  and  in  3  days,  60  heavy  and 
medium  minenwerfers.  For  the  first  time,  accompanying 
batteries  were  assigned  to  the  infantry,  and  to  each  of  these 
batteries  1  platoon  of  pioneers  and  1  automatic  rifle  was  at- 
tached. The  success  justified  this  measure.  After  an  ar- 
tillery preparation  lasting  only  one  hour,  the  infantry  broke 
into  the  hostile  position  with  ease.  The  initial  penetration 
was  made  without  loss.  The  second  wave  and  the  attached 
accompanying  guns  finished  the  British  machine  guns.  It 
was  found  of  great  use  to  signal  the  progress  of  the  infan- 
try across  each  line  by  light  signals  of  different  kind  and 
color  agreed  upon  in  advance.  All  participants  emphasized 
the  importance  of  keeping  the  advance  moving  or  avoiding 
any  halt  under  any  circumstances.  It  was  believed  that 
rapidity  of  advance  was  of  more  importance  than  formation, 
which  latter  would  soon  be  lost  in  the  maze  of  trenches.  It 
was  shown  again,  that  the  advance  in  a  number  of  waves 
corresponding  to  the  lines  of  resistance  was  advantageous 
and  that  the  leading  and  strongest  wave  should  be  assigned 
the  most  distant  objective.  Differing  from  this,  the  British 
have  their  single  waves  pass  through  each  other,  which  takes 
more  time.  Skirmish  lines  have  not  always  been  found 
best,  but  a  wave  consisting  of  shock  squads  was  proven  the 


POSITION  WARFARE  IN  THE  WEST,  1914-1917  107 

best  formation  in  working  through  a  position  system.  Shock 
squads  were  inserted  against  points  where  they  could,  pre- 
sumably, make  the  best  progress.  In  any  case  this  exper- 
ience brought  forward  the  idea  of  forming  flexible  battle 
lines.  Fighting  in  the  intermediate  terrain  was  specially 
bloody.  Fighting  machine  gun  nests  consumed  very  much 
time,  as  co-operation  of  the  different  auxiliary  arms  had  to 
be  arranged  first.  This  took  much  time  and  thus  the  in- 
fantry lost  the  help  of  the  creeping  barrage,  which  kept 
moving  on.  A  suggestion  was  made  that  assault  groups  be 
organized,  for  such  tasks  in  each  battalion  and  regiment, 
consisting  of  infantry,  light  minenwerfers  and  machine 
guns  accompanied  by  artillery  which,  for  thorough  co-op- 
eration, were  to  be  trained  in  advance  for  the  capture  of 
supporting  points  and  machine  gun  nests.  The  light  minen- 
werfers were  indispensable  in  the  assault  preparation;  but 
were  at  that  time  still  too  heavy  to  accompany  the  infantry 
attack.  Here  a  change  had  to  be  made.  The  depth  of  the 
penetration  did  not  suffice.  Most  of  the  divisions  penetrated 
not  more  than  four  kilometers  into  the  British  position  sys- 
tem. This  was  mainly  due  to  the  fact  that  the  reserves 
were  not  close  enough.  "The  deep  penetration,"  reports  a 
division  that  had  participated  in  the  attack,  "would  not 
have  succeeded,  had  not  the  artillery  followed  the  infantry 
directly.  In  the  afternoon  of  the  first  day  and  especially 
on  the  second  day,  counter-attacks  by  tank  battalions  would 
not  have  been  defeated  with  such  success  had  not  the  artil- 
lery been  immediately  in  rear  of  the  infantry Two 

cavalry  charges  were  defeated,  in  which  a  portion  of  the 
batteries  had  to  face  about.  Unfortunately  the  loss  in  offi- 
cers in  the  division  in  the  first  line  were  specially  high, 
which  influenced  the  conduct  of  battle."  But  in  any  event 
the  command  had  gained  the  conviction  that  a  penetration 
on  the  West  front  was  possible,  especially  against  the  Brit- 
ish. Thus,  after  a  long  period,  a  brilliant  attack  had  suc- 
ceeded, an  excellent  omen  for  the  future! 


IV.     The  War  in  the  East  and  in  Italy 

RUSSIA 

The  Russian  army  entered  the  thoroughly  popular 
World  War  excellently  equipped.  The  Regulations  pub- 
lished in  1912  were  complete  in  all  respects;  they  prescribed 
the  attack  in  accordance  with  Russian  war  intentions,  but 
had  paid  little  attention  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  Russian 
people ;  they  had  not  yet  become  the  very  life  of  the  troops 
when  war  opened  with  the  Central  Powers.  The  leaders 
had  their  men  firmly  in  hand.  The  higher  officers  were 
the  weakest  part,  they  were  too  much  inclined  to  wait  and 
be  guided  by  events  as  they  arose.  The  high  command 
sank  into  inactivity  when  its  own  measures  were  met  by 
the  firm  will  of  its  opponent;  in  attack  it  endeavored  to 
reach  its  objective  by  brute  force  and  an  inconsiderate  sacri- 
fice of  men.  The  general  staff  was  theoretically  well 
trained  and  worked  better  in  the  execution  of  this  war  than 
in  prior  ones.  There  was  more  seriousness,  more  critical 
supervision,  more  self-restraint  in  the  staffs,  more  under- 
standing of  minor  tactical  work  on  the  part  of  subordinates 
and  troops,  than  ever  before.  The  infantry — the  Siberian 
troops  were  especially  good — was  brave  in  attack  and  tena- 
cious in  defense,  but  was  handicapped  by  insufficient  fire 
training  (it  was  inclined  to  long  range  fire),  poor  march- 
ing ability,  and  also  by  a  mass-training  which  had  done 
away  with  all  independence.  The  conduct  of  rear  guard 
fighting  was  brilliant,  the  troops  were  skillful  in  gaining 
positions  and  in  constructing  field  fortifications.  The  cav- 
alry was  very  aggressive ;  it  performed  excellent  service  in 
reconnaissance  and  in  dismounted  fighting;  and  sought  op- 
portunities to  attack  the  hostile  infantry.  Though  the  ar- 
tillery preferred  firing  at  long  ranges  it  had  made  great 
progress  in  technical  firing  and  training,  in  comparison  with 
the  other  arms  since  the  Russo-Japanese  war,  and  it  formed 
the  backbone  of  the  army  in  the  first  months  of  the  war. 

Taken  as  a  whole,  the  Russian  was  superior  to  our  al- 
lies, and  was  also  a  menace  by  reason  of  his  numerical 

108 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  109 

strength.  "We  can  fight  down  the  Russian  only  if  we  en- 
ergetically utilize  all  the  advantages  caused  by  our  better 
armament,  our  excellent  human  material  and  our  iron  dis- 
cipline, and  if  we  train  each  individual  to  a  sense  of  abso- 
lute superiority  over  his  opponent;  increasing  his  military 
knowledge  and  aptitude,  and  steeling  his  firm  and  unshak- 
able will  to  gain  victory." 

During  the  course  of  the  campaign  the  experiences  in 
actual  war  were  found  advantageous  in  the  training  and 
the  conduct  of  the  Russian  troops,  but  the  great  losses  in 
men  and  material  had  a  retarding  influence  on  their  battle 
activity. 

In  a  handbook  compiled  by  Captain  Ignatowitsch  of  the 
General  Staff,  based  on  experiences  gained  in  war,  it  was 
recommended  that  the  attack,  adhere  as  long  as  practicable 
to  close  formation,  from  which  deployment  in  depth  and 
breadth,  or  in  half  companies  could  be  made,  and  to  take  up 
the  battle  formation  only  at  1500  paces  (1065  meters). 
The  advance  was  then  to  be  made  in  long  and  broad  rushes, 
from  firing  position  to  firing  position,  under  fire  protec- 
tion of  neighboring  detachments,  and  without  firing  from 
intermediate  positions.  Intrenching  during  attacks  was  no 
longer  mentioned.  The  closer  the  troops  came  to  the  ene- 
my, the  shorter  became  the  rushes.  Charging  distance  was 
to  be  50  to  100  paces  (35  to  70  meters) .  Entry  of  the  posi- 
tion was  to  be  facilitated  by  grenade  throwers.  Very  ef- 
fective was  a  simultaneous  charge  against  flank  and  rear, 
even  if  conducted  by  only  a  few  men.  In  night  attacks  the 
rifle  should  also  be  used;  and  the  advance  made  in  close 
order  formation  with  increased  intervals  between  ranks. 
Prior  to  contact  hand  grenades  were  to  be  used.  Should 
the  troops  encounter  an  undestroyed  obstacle,  they  were  to 
lie  down  at  100  to  200  paces  in  front  of  it,  fire  rapidly  for  3 
to  5  minutes,  and  allow  two  wire  cutting  squads  to  cut  two 
roads  through  for  each  company.  It  was  not  stated  if  the 
charge  was  to  be  made  with  or  without  shouting. 

In  the  construction  of  positions,  narrow  and  deep 
trenches  similar  to  our  reinforced  ones,  which  in  most  cases 
were  to  be  covered  with  shrapnel  proof  roofs,  were  re- 
commended; defensive  fire  through  loopholes.     Shelter  for 


110  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

about  10  men  each  were  to  be  constructed  in  rear  at  a  dis- 
tance not  more  than  one-half  of  the  distance  between  the 
leading  trenches  and  the  enemy.  Defense  by  rifle  fire  with 
regulation  sight  elevation  (600  paces — 420  meters)  and  by 
advancing  to  the  counter-attack  up  to  50  paces  (30  meters) 
distance  was  advocated.  The  counter-attack  was  not  re- 
commended if  the  enemy  had  already  made  a  penetration. 
At  night  the  troops  protected  themselves  by  cossack  posts, 
which  were  advanced  200  to  400  paces,  each  company  of 
the  leading  line  securing  itself  by  2  double  posts  sent  out 
30  to  70  paces,  and  for  2  companies  1  field  picket  also  to 
be  sent  out.  One  part  of  the  defensive  force  remained  in 
reserve;  the  strength  of  this  post  depended  on  the  prob- 
ability of  attack  and  the  discipline  of  the  troops  and  might 
amount  to  two-thirds  of  the  force.  The  rest  of  the  men 
were  to  sleep;  distribution  of  the  men  should  provide  that 
the  wakened  and  sleeping  men  were  equally  divided  behind 
the  works.  Counter-attack  was  recommended  for  the  de- 
fense. "The  morale  of  the  troops  is  more  valuable  than 
numerical  superiority." 

The  high  losses  in  men  forced  the  adoption  of  position 
warfare  in  Russia  as  well  as  on  the  west  front.  In  the 
West,  excellent  communication  arrangements,  and  a  highly 
developed  industry  had  been  able  to  supply  half  the  world 
with  war  implements  of  all  sorts  in  almost  unlimited  quan- 
tities, while  a  highly  trained  people  furnished  the  men  to 
work  the  machines.  In  Russia  financial  difficulties,  a  limi- 
ted number  of  ice-free  harbors  and  greater  distances  pre- 
vented the  utilization  of  these  auxiliary  means.  Thus,  in 
Russia  machines  had  to  be  replaced  by  men,  which  we  en- 
deavored to  save  in  the  West.  The  Central  Powers  could 
not  compete  with  the  Russians  in  numbers  of  troops,  any 
more  than  the  Western  Powers  could  compete  in  the  matter 
of  material  and  ammunition ;  therefore,  in  the  East,  the  di- 
visions scantily  supplied  with  artillery,  had  to  be  assigned 
to  relatively  broad  fronts  (in  the  Winter  of  1916-17  sectors 
of  from  20  to  30  kilometers),  in  which  two-thirds  of  the 
troops  were  placed  in  the  front  lines.  The  disadvantage 
of  broad  stationary  barrage  fire  had  to  be  taken  into  con- 
sideration, and  less  depth  in  formation  was  possible. 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  111 

In  contrast  with  the  West,  a  minor  warfare  resulted  in 
which  we  learned  that  the  Russian  was  our  equal  and  fre- 
quently our  superior.  It  was  supported  by  a  brilliantly 
carried  out  espionage  system,  but  the  German  infantry 
knew  how  to  get  the  best  of  that.  After  1916  the  Russians 
employed  the  "drum"  fire,  but  this  did  not  reach  the  same 
development  as  on  the  Western  front,  so  that  only  in  excep- 
tional cases  did  the  front  trenches  become  a  shell-holed  ter- 
rain. This  naturally  led  to  a  stronger  occupation  of  the 
front  line  trenches.  The  artillery  fire  also  was  not  strong 
enough  to  destroy  the  wire  entanglements,  and  the  hostile 
charges  went  to  pieces  on  it.  Important  places  were  cov- 
ered by  strongly  constructed  supporting  points  in  the  front 
line,  surrounded  by  obstacles.  The  reckless  Russian  high 
command  sought  to  gain  an  entrance  by  a  mass  attack.  It 
is  true,  in  some  instances  that  the  enormous  masses  suc- 
ceeded in  entering  a  position  at  some  points,  but  they  were 
ejected  by  the  counter-attack  of  fresh  troops. 

The  Russian  tactics  were  strongly  dominated  by  Joffre's 
views,  but  the  Russians  were  unable  to  obtain  the  enormous 
artillery  effect  used  in  the  West,  and  which  was  a  material 
factor  in  the  success  of  the  French  method  of  attack.  In 
the  Spring  of  1916  the  diflficult  situation  of  the  French 
troops  in  front  of  Verdun  forced  the  Russian  Allies  to  a 
partial  offensive  by  the  Ewert  Army  Group,  though  the 
Russian  Army  had  not  yet  completed  its  preparations.  This 
probably  also  was  the  reason  the  Army  Group  of  Brussilow 
did  not  simultaneously  start  the  attack  between  the  Polish 
and  Rumanian  frontier. 

In  an  order  issued  by  General  Ewert,  Wilna  and  the 
Wilna-Dunaberg  railroad  were  designated  as  the  main  ob- 
jective. Points  of  entry  were  to  be  gained  by  the  weight  of 
a  crushing  mass.  Minute  details  concerning  their  tasks 
were  prescribed  for  the  troops  and  for  headquarters.  The 
assaulting  troops  had  been  made  to  believe  that  the  artil- 
lery alone  would  perform  all  the  work.  At  the  same  time 
it  was  thought  necessary  to  portray  to  the  troops  the  hor- 
rible tortures  they  would  suffer  if  taken  prisoners.  "After 
capturing  the  trenches  of  the  enemy,  the  attackers  must 
not  allow  themselves  to  be  stopped.     The  penetration  must 


112  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

suffer  no  interruption  .  .  .  The  artillery  must  take  all 
measures  to  avoid  firing  on  its  own  troops.  Herein  lies 
the  real  strength  of  co-operation  of  infantry  with  artillery." 
This  was  a  peculiar  confession  of  lack  of  tactical  co-operation 
and  conception  of  the  principles  of  fighting  of  both  arms. 
Peculiar  for  the  reason  that  paragraph  7  of  the  or- 
der almost  demanded  certain  preparations  for  firing  on  its 
own  troops :  "It  must  be  drilled  into  the  troops  that  the  re- 
serves and  the  artillery  will  open  fire  on  them  in  case  the 
attackers  show  any  inclination  to  let  themselves  be  cap- 
tured." Cossacks  also  were  detailed  to  drive  forward  with 
knouts  troops  that  vacillated  in  the  charge. 

The  Summer  offensive  undertaken  by  General  Brus- 
silow  was  also  without  success;  it  started  about  the  time 
the  Somme  battles  began  in  the  West,  and  had  some  hope 
of  success  in  the  beginning.  Officers  and  men  had  been 
trained  during  a  long  rest.  Shock  troops  had  been  formed 
from  picked  men,  artillery  and  ammunition  had  been  brought 
up  in  plenty ;  and  thus  nothing  seemed  forgotten  that  could 
achieve  success.  The  orders  issued  by  Brussilow  for  the 
battle  are  of  special  interest,  as  the  Russians  also  per- 
ceived the  correctness  of  the  view  that  attacks  had  to  be 
made  on  a  broad  front  to  make  it  impossible  for  the  enemy 
to  shift  his  reserves.  "The  simultaneous  attack  on  all 
fronts  must  be  conducted  so  that  in  each  army,  and  in  each 
corps  a  persevering  attack  is  made  against  a  definite  sector 
of  the  hostile  position.  At  a  few  points  along  the  line 
the  attack  will  be  made,  and  for  that  purpose  I  shall  con- 
centrate reserves  from  the  other  fronts  of  the  armies." 
The  attack  was  to  be  conducted  in  such  breadth  that  the  de- 
fender could  not  fire  on  the  troops  from  the  flanks.  This 
would  require  a  breadth  of  penetration  of  at  least  10  kilo- 
meters and  of  not  more  than  30.  In  a  normal  15  kilome- 
ters attacking  front  of  an  army  two  corps  were  to  be  em- 
ployed, each  reinforced  by  one  brigade,  which  then  at- 
tacked with  one-half  of  their  force  in  four  waves — skir- 
mish interval  of  2  paces — ^while  the  other  half  formed  the 
shock-reserve.  For  a  division  of  16  battalions  the  Rus- 
sians reckoned  on  an  attacking  extension  of  2  kilometers. 
Brussilow  was  opposed  to  the  extensive  use  of  "drum"  fire 
and  did  not  mention  gassing. 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  113 

Co-operation  of  the  artillery  with  the  infantry  was 
deemed  a  prerequisite  of  any  success.  For  this  purpose  the 
batteries  under  the  orders  of  the  commander  of  attacking 
infantry  went  within  2  kilometers,  the  heavy  batteries  with- 
in 3  to  4  kilometers  of  the  enemy.  Stress  was  laid  on  the 
opening  of  "roads"  through  the  wire  obstacles — several 
roads  required,  so  that  no  crowding  would  ensue — on  firing 
on  machine  guns  and  on  flanking  works.  The  infantry  at- 
tack immediately  followed  the  artillery  preparation.  On  the 
the  other  hand,  the  infantry  was  not  to  demand  endless 
firing  on  the  sectors  to  be  attacked.  The  infantry  attack 
was  to  be  made  in  not  less  than  3  to  4  waves,  following  each 
other  at  150  to  200  paces  distance,  machine  guns  with  the 
third  and  fourth  wave.  Squad  columns  were  to  be  in  rear 
of  the  wings  for  flank  protection,  reserves  in  rear  of  the 
shock  troops  for  immediate  repetition  of  unsuccessful  at- 
tacks. Assault  distance  about  300  paces  from  the  line  to 
be  attacked ;  arrangement  of  the  starting  point  as  with  the 
Joffre  attack  procedure — one  wave  for  each  hostile  trench. 
Capture  of  the  first  position  by  one  attack  with  reliable 
flank  protection  was  demanded.  The  German  counter- 
attack was  to  be  defeated  by  fire ;  if  that  succeeded  then  a 
trial  was  to  be  made  immediately  to  take  the  next  positions 
by  following  attacks.  "After  successful  penetrations,  a 
promising  field  of  activity  opens  to  the  cavalry,  supported 
by  its  riflemen  and  its  artillery.  I  order  that  our  numer- 
ous cavalry  be  made  as  much  use  of  as  possible." 

Emphasis  was  laid  on  the  fact  that  by  means  of  con- 
tinuous insertion  of  strong  infantry  forces  the  entrance 
could  be  forced  even  if  the  first  troops  had  no  success.  This 
led  to  mass  attacks,  in  which  the  troops — being  cautioned 
that  in  case  they  stopped  they  would  be  fired  on  by  Russian 
machine  guns  and  field  guns — were  driven  forward  even  un- 
der the  knout.  In  consequence  of  this  lack  of  considera- 
tion and  the  tactical  inefficiency  of  the  subordinate  com- 
manders the  charges  were  executed  in  even  denser  and  more 
vulnerable  formation  than  had  been  planned  by  the  leaders. 
Lying  down  during  pauses  was  even  forbidden.  The  losses 
were  enormously  increased.  In  working  up  to  the  assault 
position,  the  infantry  showed  itself  very  adept  and  seldom 


114  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

more  than  two  or  three  men  could  be  seen;  but  the  exten- 
sive earthworks  and  the  systematic  "road-firing"  of  the  ar- 
tillery swept  away  all  doubts  concerning  the  points  to  be  at- 
tacked. When  the  attack  did  not  succeed  in  gaining  a  foot- 
hold at  assault  distances,  attacks  were  made  at  longer  dis- 
tances, 300  to  1100  meters,  on  the  run  with  interspersed 
walking  periods.  Large  losses  resulted  in  crowding  through 
the  "roads"  the  artillery  had  opened  in  the  wire  entangle- 
ments, and  which  could  not  be  made  sufficiently  wide.  What- 
ever was  lacking  in  artillery  preparation  (for  time  for  pre- 
paration was  between  2  and  5  hours,  and  10  to  15  rounds  were 
reckoned  for  the  running  meter  of  the  position)  was  at- 
tained by  the  mass  insertion  of  troops.  The  German  ar- 
tillery positions  were  bombarded  only  when  their  location 
had  been  accurately  ascertained.  The  artillery  often  de- 
ployed in  2  and  3  lines  in  rear  of  each  other  and  plentiful 
use  was  made  of  false  works  and  development  of  smoke 
clouds.  Special  weight  was  attached  to  flanking  fire,  there 
was  no  hesitation  in  bringing  batteries  forward  into  posi- 
tions where  they  were  not  at  all  expected  (for  instance  in 
the  sand  dunes  in  the  swampy  terrain)  and  which  had  been 
considered  impassable  even  for  the  infantry.  Single  field 
pieces  were  brought  into  the  most  advanced  lines  to  fight 
the  machine  guns.  The  Russian  attached  little  importance 
to  surprise ;  it  expected  to  be  victorious  by  force  of  numbers ; 
terrain  obstacles  had  no  terror  for  Russian  troops  in  attack ; 
the  Russian  infantry  even  attacked  going  through  swamp 
and  water  up  to  the  neck.  The  activity  of  the  artillery  was 
excellent;  hov/ever,  lack  of  materiel  and  ammunition  pre- 
vented it  from  displaying  its  power  to  the  fullest  extent. 

In  1917  the  German  high  command  calculated  on  a  con- 
tinuation of  the  Russian  offensive  taking  advantage  of  the 
experiences  in  the  West.  In  May  the  signs  became  more 
numerous  that  an  offensive  was  about  to  start  against  the 
South  Army,  with  minor  attacks  in  the  direction  of  Sloczow 
•:rid  Stanislau,  and  then  against  Krewo-Smorgen  and  Duna- 
burg.  Everything  pointed  to  the  fact  that  this  time  the 
Russian  offensive  would  assume  the  character  of  a  "materiel 
battle,"  which  was  the  more  required  as  the  disinclination 
of  the  Russian  troops  for  a  repetition  of  Brussilow's  bloody 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  115 

attacks  had  resulted  in  open  mutiny.  After  the  strongest 
artillery  preparation,  which  swept  obstacles  away,  which 
changed  the  front  battle  positions  into  shell-holes,  the  at- 
tack commenced  on  June  30,  1917,  against  the  South  Army 
and  against  the  Sloczow  sector;  on  July  6th  also  against 
the  Austrian  3d  Army  at  Stanislau.  This  latter  attack, 
originally  considered  a  minor  one,  had  an  unhoped-for  suc- 
cess (loss  of  the  heights  on  the  Bystrzyca  and  the  Lomnica 
position  in  rear  and  capture  of  Halusch) ,  which  was  skill- 
fully utilized  by  the  Russian  high  command  in  bringing  up 
fresh  forces.  At  Koniuchy  the  position  of  the  Austrian  9th 
Corps  was  also  entered  to  an  extent  of  an  area  20  kilometers 
broad  and  4.8  kilometers  deep.  In  expectation  that  forces 
had  been  taken  from  the  fronts  that  had  not  yet  been  at- 
tacked and  brought  into  Galicia,  an  attack  was  made  on 
July  21st  at  Krewo-Smorgon,  and  on  the  23d  at  Dunaburg. 
The  Russian  high  command  prepared  the  first  part  of  the 
attack  most  excellently.  All  plans  had  been  prepared  to 
insure  a  successful  attack,  if  only  the  tools  had  corres- 
ponded to  the  demands  of  the  commander.  One  main  cause 
for  its  non-success  was  the  inefficiency  of  the  subordinate 
leaders,  whose  power  of  decision  and  independence  did  not 
meet  expectations.  The  attack  went  to  pieces  on  the  firm 
stand  of  the  German  infantry,  which  was  supported  by  an 
inferior  artillery;  the  Russian  batteries  knew  how  to  pre- 
pare the  attack  but  not  how  to  support  it.  Lack  of  am- 
munition compelled  firing  to  cease  altogether  at  night  and 
the  fire  did  not  reach  as  far  into  the  terrain  in  rear  as  it 
did  in  the  West.  Differing  from  the  attack  in  1916  the 
artillery  also  was  fired  on,  but  without  effect  due  to  lack 
of  artillery  airplanes.  The  scheduled  gassing  had  no  suc- 
cess. Tanks,  inserted  in  insufficient  numbers,  had  no  effect. 
The  Russian  infantry  attacked,  after  heavy  "drum"  fire, 
in  dense  skirmish  lines  by  divisions  with  their  brigades 
alongside  each  other,  and  at  an  extension  of  1.5  kilometers. 
In  the  brigade  the  regiments  were  formed  in  rear  of  each 
other,  3  battalions  with  550  men  each  in  first  line,  battal- 
ions with  4  companies  divided  into  half -companies  and 
formed  in  depth  with  50  paces  distance.  The  newly  or- 
ganized regimental  pioneer  companies  were  distributed  to 


116  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  battalions.  The  4th  Battalion  followed  at  100  paces, 
then  followed  at  the  same  distance,  the  2d  Regiment  of  the 
brigade.  In  the  assault  the  officers  were  in  front.  Ac- 
companying cannon  and  trench  guns  that  had  kept  silent 
up  to  the  assault  fired  over  the  heads  of  the  infantry.  The 
attack  was  to  be  carried  within  the  German  artillery  posi- 
tion. 

The  German  high  command  had  early  pointed  to  a  pos- 
sibility of  a  "materiel"  battle,  so  that  as  a  matter  of  course 
the  same  changes  were  made  here  that  were  made  in  the 
West.  In  place  of  a  defense  by  a  densely  garrisoned  front 
line,  the  infantry  was  organized  into  weaker  garrisons  of 
the  front  trenches  with  stronger  troops  in  readiness  in  rear 
and  reserve,  which  carried  on  the  battle  offensively  around 
the  front  trenches.  The  counter-attacks  immediately 
started  were  successful ;  more  power  was  gained  by  the  de- 
fence through  strongly  fortified  but  weakly  occupied  sup- 
porting points  in  the  intermediate  terrain. 

The  battle  in  Eastern  Galicia  found  a  brilliant  finish 
in  the  transition  from  the  defensive  to  the  offensive,  which 
demanded  great  exertions,  especially  from  the  troops  of  the 
South  Army,  which  joined  the  advance  of  the  Group 
"Sloczow"  without  preparation. 

The  penetration  executed  with  10  divisions  on  a  fron- 
tal extension  of  39  kilometers,  one  flank  on  the  Sereth,  was 
a  complete  success  and  the  Russian  lines  far  into  Rumania 
were  terribly  shaken,  and  the  Russian  offensive  was  forced 
to  stop.  The  German  attack  proved  a  far  better  means 
of  relieving  the  front  that  had  been  attacked,  than  direct 
support  by  the  Austrian  3d  Army  could  have  been.  Such 
a  counter  offensive  is  at  all  times  the  best  means  to  defeat 
a  penetration  attempted  at  another  point,  which,  starting  a 
short  time  after  the  commencement  of  the  infantry  attack  on 
a  neighboring  front,  will  presumably  strike  troops  weaker 
and  probably  already  worn  out.  The  German  troops  proved 
themselves  equal  to  the  demands  of  battle  even  if  the 
lack  of  practice  in  marching,  the  difficulties  of  transporta- 
tion, and  insufficient  supplies  for  headquarters  and  troops 
for  mobile  warfare  weighed  heavily  against  them.  The 
troops  going  from  position  to  mobile  warfare  had  to  get 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  117 

used  not  only  to  marching,  but  to  other  battle  conditions ; 
they  had  to  releam  to  attack,  to  advance  again  without  hav- 
ing close  touch  with  comrades,  and  to  conduct  attacks 
without  the  support  of  large  artillery  masses.  The  insuffi- 
cient training  of  the  subordinate  commanders,  who  in  most 
instances  knew  mobile  warfare  only  theoretically,  was  sore- 
ly felt.  The  experience  gained  at  this  time  was  especially 
valuable  to  us  in  the  subsequent  battles  on  the  Western 
theater  of  war. 

A  brilliantly  prepared  penetration  of  the  bridgehead  at 
Jakobstadt  took  place  on  September  21,  1917.  In  the  early 
morning  hours  of  September  1st  a  crossing  of  the  Duna  was 
accomplished.  The  troops  then  turned  along  the  roads 
leading  from  Riga  northeastward,  which  caused  the  imme- 
diate evacuation  of  the  bridgehead  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
river.  The  Russian  high  command  firmly  believed  in  an 
impending  attack  against  the  southeast  front  of  the  bridge- 
head and  did  not  believe  the  reports  coming  in  concerning 
preparations  for  a  crossing  above  Riga.  This  is  a  good 
example  of  the  value  of  so-called  "reliable  reports." 

In  all  battles  the  Russian  infantry  showed  an  enviable 
skill  in  overcoming  difficult  terrain,  considered  by  us  in 
most  cases  as  impassable. 

BATTLES  IN  NORTHERN  ITALY 

May  23,  1915,  the  Italian  Army  joined  our  enemies, 
after  it  had  adopted  as  early  as  1911,  contrary  to  its  prior 
custom,  a  gun  of  French  manufacture  (Deport,  same  cali- 
ber as  the  French  field  gun)  and  modeled  its  Regulations 
for  the  Higher  Command  and  Staff  on  the  French  Regula- 
tions. In  Austria  they  had  well  learned  the  method  of 
battle  peculiar  to  the  Italians. 

The  Italian  commander-in-chief.  General  Cadorna,  had 
neglected  at  the  opening  of  the  war  to  bring  the  superiority 
of  his  army  into  immediate  account  by  an  offensive  against 
the  weak  Austrian  frontier  guard  troops ;  and  as  the  latter 
could  not  count  for  the  present  on  reinforcements,  a  posi- 
tion warfare  resulted  on  the  Isonzo  that  shows  the  same 
characteristics  as  the  one  in  France.  Not  until  June  29, 
1915,  was  commenced  the  first  "Isonzo  Battle,"  which  was 


118  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

without  result;  and  the  subsequent  battles  (the  tenth 
fought  from  May  5,  to  June  7,  1917,  after  Joffre's  methods) , 
showed  only  a  minor  gain  in  territory,  in  spite  of  strong 
artillery  preparation  and  mass  insertion  of  Italian  infantry. 
Based  on  the  experiences  of  the  tenth  Isonzo  battle,  Gen- 
eral Capello,  commander-in-chief  of  the  Second  Army,  is- 
sued a  general  "Maxims  for  the  Employment  of  Infantry 
and  Artillery  in  Attack." 

The  infantry  was  not  to  carry  the  special  training  too 
far;  attack  was  to  be  executed  in  waves  with  great  depth 
(double-barreled  Fiat-Revelli  pistols — corresponding  to  the 
light  minenwerfers — in  the  first  wave,  machine  guns  in  the 
succeeding  waves)  and  up  to  the  final  attack  objectives. 
The  importance  of  machine  guns  for  flanking  fire  was  pointed 
out;  the  troops  were  to  endeavor  to  avoid  the  trench  war- 
fare proper,  which  consumed  too  much  time.  Similar  to 
the  methods  in  Eastern  Galicia,  on  October  24,  1917 — after 
the  11th  Isonzo  battle — the  counter-attack  of  the  14th  Army 
(Otto  von  Below)  with  the  adjoining  Austrian  1st  Isonzo 
Army  was  started  against  superior  Italian  forces.  The  at- 
tack, oblique  to  the  Italian  front,  conducted  from  about  the 
line  Flitch-Tolmein  in  the  general  direction  of  Cividale 
turned  into  a  penetration.  Through  this  penetration  the 
adjoining  south  front  was  drawn  into  the  defeat  of  the 
Italian  Second  Army.  The  direction  of  the  attack  across 
the  Bainsizza  plateau  and  by  Flitch-Tolmein  had  become 
known  to  the  Italians  as  well  as  the  time  the  attack  was  to 
be  made.  The  unfavorable  condition  of  our  forces  did  not 
permit  us  at  this  time  to  utilize  the  favorable  situation  in 
Southern  Tyrol. 

On  September  8,  1917,  the  first  orders  for  the  offensive 
were  issued.  The  attacking  troops  of  the  14th  Army  had 
been  assembled  in  the  basin  of  Krainburg  and  north  of  the 
Karwanken.  There  the  preparations  for  the  war  in  the 
mountains  were  completed.  The  "Tolmein  Group"  had  to 
be  concentrated  in  the  narrow  spaces  of  the  basin  near  Flitch 
and  Tolmein,  Along  two  narrow  mountain  passes,  60  kilo- 
meters distance,  with  heavy  grades,  several  divisions  had 
to  be  brought  forward  behind  each  other  (as  well  as  half 
the  artillery  and  minenwerfer  groups)  in  the  face  of  dom- 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  119 

mating  hostile  positions  allowing  an  extensive  view.  This 
was  accomplished  in  such  manner,  that  the  Groups  Flitch 
and  Tolmein  stood  in  readiness  with  5  divisions  in  the  first 
line,  and  3  divisions  in  each  of  the  second  and  third  lines. 
In  spite  of  the  unfavorable  weather  the  march  proceeded 
without  friction.  The  concentration  of  the  artillery  and 
minenwerfers  took  from  September  27th  to  October  17th. 

The  experiences  of  the  Carpathian  mountains,  of  the 
Vosges,  and  Alpine  battles,  pointed  out  the  road  to  the 
offensive  tactics;  rapid  advance  in  uninterrupted  attack 
across  the  connecting  land  bridges  from  height  to  height, 
utilization  of  the  valley  roads  to  bring  up  the  artillery  re- 
serves and  supplies;  forcing  dominating  ridge  positions 
by  enveloping  attack  in  flank  and  rear,  and  by  marching 
around  them;  and  mutual  support  between  the  frontal  and 
enveloping  groups. 

With  this  in  mind,  the  following  operations  were  start- 
ed with  a  view  to  the  simultaneous  penetration  at  several 
points :  The  Group  Krauss  as  right  wing  of  the  14th  Army 
by  Saga  towards  the  Stol  ridge ;  a  strong  left  column  was  to 
open,  after  the  capture  of  the  Vrsik,  the  basin  of  Karfreit 
by  taking  direction  on  Ravna — Karfreit  and  roll  up  the  Stol 
ridge  from  the  East.  The  Groups  Stein  was  started  against 
Mt.  Matajur.  The  capture  of  this  area  opened  the  Karfreit 
basin  from  the  Southeast  and  thus  supported  the  simul- 
taneous operation  of  the  Group  Krauss  having  the  same 
mission.  The  Group  Berrer  was  started  against  the  Hu- 
mand  for  simultaneous  advance  via  Drenchia  against  the 
San  Martino  in  conjunction  with  the  Group  Stein.  The 
Group  Scotti  received  the  task  of  assisting  the  Isonzo  Army 
in  its  crossing  of  the  Isonzo  by  attacking  with  the  objec- 
tive Globocak — Kostanjewitza.  By  the  middle  of  October 
the  offensive  preparations  had  make  such  progress  that  the 
general  attack  could  be  ordered  to  start  the  third  week  in 
October. 

The  plan  had  been  worked  out  down  to  the  minutest 
details.  After  a  gas  bombardment  from  2  to  6  A.M.,  gen- 
eral fire  was  to  be  opened  at  daybreak.  After  a  short  but 
steadily  increasing  bombardment  the  entry  was  to  be  made 
into  the  positions  along  the  entire  Flitch-Selo  front.    How- 


120  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

ever,  unfavorable  weather  delayed  the  attack  till  the  morn- 
ing of  October  24,  1917.  This  day  was  foggy,  which  was 
favorable  to  the  advancing  troops. 

The  Italian  2d  Army  under  Lieutenant  General  Capello 
awaited  the  shock  of  the  Allies  in  strong,  apparently  invin- 
cible mountain  positions  in  the  Julian  Alps.  The  prepara- 
tions for  the  attack,  the  filtering  through  of  our  divisions 
along  the  narrow,  distant  but  visible  valley  roads,  and  the 
attack  formations  could  not  remain  hidden.  Inexplicable 
seems  the  small  efforts  put  forth  by  the  enemy  during  the 
final  days  prior  to  the  attack.  In  the  district  from  Rombon 
to  the  Krn  the  Italian  4th  Corps  (50th,  43d  and  45th  In- 
fantry Divisions)  blocked  the  valley  road  of  Saga  and  the 
basin  of  Karfreit.  Forces  from  the  17th  Army  Corps  could 
keep  the  Tolmein  basin  under  fire  from  the  line  Kolovrat 
Ridge  to  vicinity  of  the  Auzza  Canal.  The  narrow  frontal 
sector  of  the  plateau  of  Bainsizza — Heiligegeist  was  de- 
fended by  the  25th,  60th  and  30th  Infantry  Divisions  (14th 
Army  Corps)  in  strong  positions.  North  of  the  Monte  San 
Gabriele  the  line  was  prolonged  by  the  2d  Corps  (23d,  53d 
and  8th  Infantry  Divisions).  At,  and  north  of  Gorz,  stood 
the  4th  Army  Corps  (68th,  24th  and  48th  Infantry  Divi- 
sions) as  the  south  wing  of  the  Second  Army  joining  the 
Third  Army  under  the  Duke  of  Aosta.  Not  less  than  56 
brigades  and  4  Alpine  groups,  a  total  of  possibly  350  bat- 
talions of  the  Second  Army  were  to  stop  the  attack. 

Cadoma  was  fully  confident  and  reported :  "The  oppo- 
nent, strongly  supported  by  German  troops  and  war  muni- 
tions, has  assembled  material  forces  for  an  offensive  on  our 
front.  The  hostile  attack  finds  us  firm  and  well  prepared." 
At  2:00  A.M.,  October  24th,  the  gas  cannonade  opened 
against  the  hostile  batteries.  At  daylight,  an  annihilating 
fire  for  effect  was  started  by  the  entire  artillery  and  minen- 
werfers.  Instructions  for  the  forward  displacement  of  ar- 
tillery for  adjustment,  and  for  fire  for  effect  were  conformed 
to  and  the  roads  were  opened  to  the  infantry  for  the  at- 
tack. At  8:00  A.M.  the  infantry  started  the  attack  be- 
tween Tolmein  and  Flitch.  By  2 :00  P.M.  the  Group  Krauss 
had  stormed  the  positions  on  the  Rombon  upon  the  right 
wing  of  the  army.  In  an  intrepid  charge  Austrian  infantry 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  121 

advanced  from  the  right  wing  of  the  Group  Stein  and  took 
the  positions  on  the  line  Krn — western  slope  of  the  Mrzli. 
In  the  meantime  the  German  Division  Lequis  pushed  for- 
ward along  the  valley  road  of  Tolmein.  It  is  true  that  the 
enemy  held  on  the  left  and  right  the  dominating  hill  posi- 
tions. But  fog  banks  prevented  a  view  tv^  the  far  horizon 
and  into  the  valley.  The  Italians  did  not  suppose  that  deep 
below  German  infantry  had  pushed  its  way  through  to  Kar- 
freit,  that  already  El  Kammo,  and  shortly  after  2  P.M., 
Ideersko  on  the  Isonzo  was  reached.  The  left  wing  of  the 
Group  Stein,  after  overruning  the  front  valley  position 
southwest  of  Tolmein,  attacked  in  conjunction  with  the 
Group  Berrer,  the  hostile  main  position  on  the  Kolovrat 
ridge.  Attacking  infantry,  under  hostile  fire,  crept  up  the 
steep  slopes  from  the  valley  for  more  than  1000  meters. 
The  crest  of  the  Kolovrat  formed  the  key  point  of  the  entire 
system  in  the  strongly  fortified  position  on  Hill  1114.  In 
the  afternoon  the  attack  against  Hill  1114  and  the  neighbor- 
ing massive  Hafnik  could  be  started.  Farther  south  the 
position  on  the  Jeza  block  went  to  pieces  under  the  attack 
of  the  Group  Berrer.  Without  stopping,  the  south  wing  of 
the  army  (Group  Scotti)  pushed  its  way  across  the  Hrad 
Vrh  against  the  Blobocak  chain. 

By  the  evening  of  October  24th,  the  Flitch  basin  was 
opened  to  immediately  east  of  Saga.  The  southern  slopes 
of  the  Km  had  been  stormed.  Karfreit  in  the  Isonzo  valley 
and  the  ridges  west  and  southwest  of  Tolmein  had  been 
taken.  No  addition  to  or  change  in  the  army  orders  was 
made.    The  attack  proceeded. 

The  gas  bombardment  shortly  before  the  attack  un- 
doubtedly played  a  great  role  in  its  success,  as  the  Italian 
gas  masks  did  not  offer  any  protection  against  it.  The 
infantry,  though  well  trained  for  fighting  in  the  higher 
mountains,  up  to  this  time  was  acquainted  with  only  the 
lowland  and  the  intermediate  mountains,  yet  performed  its 
very  best.  The  superiority  of  troops  equipped  for  and 
trained  in  high  mountain  warfare,  was  plainly  discernible. 
The  Italian  infantry  could  not  cope  with  such  troops.  Up 
to  the  evening  of  the  26th  the  Furttemberg  Mountain  Bat- 
talion captured  over  100  officers,  among  them  2  regimental 


122  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

commanders,  4500  men,  60  machine  guns,  20  guns,  and  25 
caissons.  Its  own  losses  were  but  7  killed  and  28  wounded. 
The  skill  of  our  riflemen  in  moving  in  the  mountains,  and 
the  skill  of  the  subordinate  commanders  saved  the  battalion 
from  heavier  losses.  Another  thing  had  its  influence;  the 
Italian  infantry  had  no  experience  in  defense;  till  then  it 
had  always  attacked;  its  front  trenches  were  densely  occu- 
pied; active  defense  of  the  intermediate  terrain  had  not 
been  prepared  in  advance.  The  Italians  had  correctly  per- 
ceived that  in  the  mountains,  possession  of  a  certain  ridge 
line  depends  on  the  holding  of  a  few  dominating  points. 
These  points,  against  which  the  fire  of  the  attacker  was 
principally  directed,  were  occupied  by  the  Italians  entirely 
too  strongly,  when  they  should  have  attempted  to  hold  them 
from  the  side.  The  attacker's  fire  had  an  annihilating 
effect.  No  plans  had  been  made  for  using  the  reserves,  their 
place  should  have  been  immediately  in  rear  of  the  dominat- 
ing points  which  the  attacker  was  forced  to  take ;  the  roads 
the  attacker  had  to  take  were  also  well  defined,  and  a  thor- 
ough study  of  the  terrain  should  have  furnished  exact 
knowledge  where  to  employ  the  reserves.  The  Italian  ar- 
tillery occupied  positions  from  which  it  could  have  well  sup- 
ported an  attack,  but  from  which  it  could  hardly  carry  on 
the  defense ;  positions  for  defense  should  have  been  selected 
which  commanded  the  ascent  on  both  slopes  of  a  mountain 
ridge.  Flanking  fire  is  most  effective  and  can  be  employed 
almost  everywhere;  frontal  defense  had  best  be  left  to  the 
minenwerfers. 

The  penetration  was  immediately  followed  by  a  bril- 
liant pursuit  by  the  German  troops  to  across  the  Taglia- 
mento ;  the  fleeing  masses  and  their  army  impedimenta  were 
congested  at  the  crossings  of  Codroipo  and  Latisana,  and 
only  the  delay  of  the  slowly  following  Isonzo  army  prevented 
a  greater  capture  of  prisoners  and  supplies.  An  attempt 
to  take  possession  of  the  Tagliamento  crossing  at  Dignano 
by  infantry  carried  on  auto-trucks  miscarried. 

MOUNTAIN  WARFARE 

No  one  could  have  foreseen  in  time  of  peace  that  Ger- 
man troops  would  ever  be  called  on  for  mountain  warfare; 
we  shared  the  opinion  of  our  neighbors  that  it  required 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  123 

special  training  for  mountain  warfare,  that  recruits,  natives 
of  the  lowlands,  would  take  a  long  time  to  get  accustomed 
to  mountains.  Only  well  trained  mountain  troops  who  in 
their  sports  do  not  forget  the  objects  of  war,  are  suited  for 
this  special  work.  We  will  point  out  that  fostering  snow- 
sports  and  "Alpinism"  is  the  best  foundation  for  carrying 
on  war  in  mountains,  as  was  the  case  in  the  Alps,  in  the 
Carpathians  and  in  the  ice  and  snow  covered  lower  moun- 
tain warfare,  but  troops  that  had  no  such  training  met  the 
requirements  after  some  time.  The  German  troops  received 
aid  from  their  Allies,  who  had  gathered  rich  experiences 
concerning  equipment,  march  capacities,  and  methods  of 
fighting.  In  the  ignorance  of  high  mountains,  every  inex- 
perience must  be  paid  for  bitterly ;  the  first  adverse  effects 
will  be  noticed  on  the  pack  animals,  and  through  them  the 
supply  of  ammunition  and  subsistence  will  suffer.  Tacti- 
cal measures  must  conform  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  ter- 
rain, high  mountains  (Alps)  clear  of  forests,  demand  dif- 
ferent measures  than  snow  or  forest  covered  lower  moun- 
tains (Vosges,  Carpathians).  Terrains  with  and  without 
glaciers,  summer  and  winter  conditions,  continually  con- 
front the  leader  with  changing  situations.  During  the  win- 
ter battles  in  the  mountains  demand  the  greatest  possi- 
ble exertions.  Losses  by  frost  bite  and  death  by  freez- 
ing can  assume  the  same  proportion  as  the  hostile  effect 
of  arms.  "The  main  thing  for  troops  in  the  mountains 
is  mobility  and  endurance.  Troops  will  then  have  the  best 
success  if  they  overcome  more  and  greater  difficulties  than 
the  enemy  believed  possible,  and  when  they  know  how  to 
work  their  way  through  apparently  impassable  terrain." 
(Training  Regulations  for  the  Austrian  Army,  1911.)  The 
accomplishment  of  these  demands  presupposes  special  train- 
ing. 

The  battle  of  man  against  nature  becomes  more  pro- 
nounced in  mountain  warfare.  Troops  must  become  accus- 
tomed to  the  impressions  and  dangers  of  fog,  of  the  break- 
ing off  of  projections,  of  snowslides.  Fortunately  service 
in  the  mountains  also  offers  moments  that  increase  the 
capacity  of  the  troops  and  have  a  favorable  effect  on  their 
spirit  and  morale.  First  comes  the  danger,  which  undoubt- 
edly has  a  high  educational  value.    The  troops  find  them- 


124  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

selves  not  only  in  difficult,  but  also  in  dangerous  situations, 
in  which  it  becomes  clear  to  every  one  that  only  strict  obe- 
dience and  unity  of  effort  will  avert  the  peril.  If  that  suc- 
ceeds, trust  in  the  leader  increases.  The  spirit  of  self-pre- 
servation drives  many  a  weakling  forward  on  the  march 
who  otherwise  would  have  reached  the  limits  of  his  endur- 
ance. The  troops  have  to  learn  to  march  and  breathe  dif- 
ferently, for  the  rules  of  the  lower  altitudes  do  not  apply. 

As  a  general  rule,  single  file  will  be  the  method  of 
marching  in  mountains.  This  requires  special  training  and 
an  entirely  different  method  of  issuing  orders.  To  pass 
orders  through  a  column  of  files  will  frequently  be  entirely 
impossible,  and  even  messengers  will  have  difficulty  in  get- 
ting to  the  rear.  The  deep  column  in  single  file,  or  in  col- 
umn of  twos,  increases  most  surprisingly  in  length  and  is 
beyond  any  calculation.  This  is  specially  annoying  when 
starting  the  march  and  when  deploying  stronger  columns 
for  fighting.  Keeping  the  same  pace  and  cadence  is  very 
difficult  especially  when  part  are  ascending  and  part  de- 
scending. A  battalion  of  800  men  will  occupy  a  depth  of 
1.5  to  2  kilometers,  which  corresponds  to  about  one  hour  of 
deployment.  Depth  formation  makes  division  into  single 
detachments  unnecessary,  the  sending  ahead  of  one  rein- 
forced security  detachment  will  generally  suffice.  Columns 
of  more  than  1  battalion  can  be  employed  only  if  the  troops 
are  used  to  mountains,  as  otherwise  they  get  too  clumsy. 
The  change  from  teams  to  pack  animals,  hard  to  handle, 
the  equipment  of  the  troops  with  snow  spurs  and  snow- 
shoes  requires  far  reaching  changes.  Marching  difficulties 
are  especially  felt  in  shifting  of  troops,  in  counter-attacks, 
and  in  bringing  up  reinforcements;  we  can  count  on  the 
troops  only  that  are  in,  or  immediately  in  rear  of  the  fight- 
ing line.  In  comparison  with  earlier  wars  the  development 
of  the  use  of  high  explosives,  the  service  of  communication 
(wireless  stations,  visual  signal  means  of  all  kinds)  and 
methods  of  bringing  up  supplies  has  made  the  conduct  of 
mountain  warfare  easier,  but  all  our  fights  have  merely  con- 
firmed the  old  rule  that  in  mountain  fighting  the  value  of 
and  not  the  number  of  troops  is  decisive.  A  decisive,  active 
battle  leadership  can  make  for  success  in  mountains  even 
if  the  enemy  is  greatly  superior  in  numbers.    Fighting  in 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  125 

mountains  is  especially  difficult  for  large  bodies  of  troops. 
Decisive  battles  are  infrequent,  more  often  the  action  will 
result  in  forcing  deployment,  or  preventing  deployment,  out 
of  the  mountains.  Placing  light,  mobile  forces  along  the 
roads  through  passes  gives  opportunities  for  gathering  the 
fruits  of  success  in  mountain  fighting.  In  the  mountains 
themselves  the  possession  of  the  highest  ridge  is  decisive; 
on  account  of  the  far  view,  the  domination  of  the  important 
valley  roads  that  have  to  be  used  to  bring  up  supplies,  and 
on  account  of  difficulties  of  ascent  for  the  attacking  army. 
Considering  the  limited  number  of  troops  available,  not 
every  ridge  can  be  occupied,  but  points  on  the  flanks  must 
be  secured  from  which  the  domination  of  the  position  and 
connections  with  the  valley  is  possible.  The  defender  bar- 
ricades the  points  he  considers  passable.  Therefore  moun- 
tain troops  must  understand  how  to  work  up  through  appar- 
ently impassable  terrain,  in  order  to  strike  the  enemy's 
flanks  and  rear.  Frequently  the  more  appearance  of  minor 
detachments  on  heights,  difficult  of  ascent,  will  produce  a 
great  morale  effect,  to  which  probably  a  good  fire  effect  can 
be  added,  since  good  observation  is  generally  available.  The 
Italians  had  probably  considered  this  point  well  in  the  de- 
fense on  October  24,  1917,  but  they  had  occupied  the  points 
too  strongly  on  the  possession  of  which  depended  posses- 
sion of  the  crest  line,  instead  of  defending  them  by  flanking 
fire  and  fire  on  the  two  slopes  leading  up  to  these  points. 
Good  mountain  troops  will  always  find  a  way  out  of  serious 
difficulties,  while  troops  unused  to  same  easily  allow  them- 
selves to  be  taken  prisoners  when  their  retreat  is  endan- 
gered. As  machine  guns  display  a  great  fire  power  in  a 
narrow  space,  they  are  an  especially  preferred  arm  in  moun- 
tain warfare  when  but  few  troops  can  be  employed.  The 
arm  proper  in  such  warfare  is  the  infantry.  Cavalry  serves 
mainly  for  the  purpose  of  message,  connection,  and  securi- 
ty duties,  along  the  pass  roads.  Employment  of  airplanes 
is  made  more  difficult  by  the  frequency  of  fogs,  the  diffi- 
culties of  rapidly  gaining  military  altitudes  and  of  finding 
suitable  landing  places.  Artillery  and  minenwerfers  may 
be  brought  into  position  almost  everywhere,  of  course  it 
takes  time  and  labor,  but  the  fire  efficiency  suffers  under  the 


126  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

difficulties  of  influence  of  altitude  and  weather.  Minenwer- 
fers  are  of  especial  use  because  of  their  curved  trajectory. 
In  defense,  possession  of  heights  gives  freedom  of  ac- 
tion and  possession  of  the  valley;  therefore  forward  slopes 
of  the  valley  are  kept  occupied  as  long  as  the  troops  have 
the  reverse  slope  securely  in  hand.  There  is  nothing  more 
unfavorable  than  to  have  the  troops  surprised  by  fire  dur- 
ing the  ascent;  therefore  the  advance  is  made  by  bounds 
from  crest  to  crest.  Heights  dominating  the  line  of  march 
must  be  taken  possession  of  as  early  as  possible — frequently 
a  day  ahead  if  on  the  flanks  and  in  front — by  detachments 
sent  ahead  and  largely  supplied  with  mountain  artillery. 
The  organization  ordered  at  the  commencement  of  the 
daily  operation  remains  unchanged  for  that  day,  as  shift- 
ing consumes  time.  Division  into  several  columns  decreases 
in  a  desirable  manner  the  march  depth,  which,  however, 
the  defender  can  take  advantage  of  only  under  favorable 
conditions.  In  starting  the  attack  flank  effect  and  threaten- 
ing the  line  of  retreat  gains  greatly  in  importance  as  the 
enemy  in  most  cases  can  give  ground  only  in  a  definite  di- 
rection. The  decisions  in  forces  fighting  separately  will  be 
materially  independent  of  each  other,  and  in  the  case  of 
larger  units  will  vary  greatly  in  time;  frequently  the  pos- 
session of  a  portion  of  the  position  will  bring  about  the  final 
success.  It  is  the  task  of  the  highest  leader  to  perceive  the 
key  to  the  position  and  to  utilize  the  partial  success  by  the 
pressure  of  pursuit  and  by  starting  more  troops  against 
those  hostile  portions  that  have  not  yet  been  driven  off. 
Caution  is  necessary  in  following  up  a  retreating  enemy; 
with  systematic  leadership  he  will  attempt  to  find  oppor- 
tunities to  gain  success  by  fire  surprise  and  unexpected  coun- 
ter-attacks. 

The  defender  fights  under  more  unfavorable  condi- 
tions than  the  attacker,  who  can  select  time  and  place  of 
attack,  and  does  not  suffer  under  the  fire  of  the  defender  in 
the  same  measure  as  he  does  in  the  lowlands,  but  is  re- 
stricted in  the  employment  of  his  reserves  by  the  mountains. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  defender  aided  by  the  difficulties  the 
attack  encounters  in  the  terrain,  can  delay  the  attacker  for 
a  longer  time  with  but  weak  forces.    The  construction  of 


WAR  IN  THE  EAST  AND  IN  ITALY  127 

a  position  presents  great  difficulties,  trenches  can  be  con- 
structed in  many  cases  only  by  application  of  explosives; 
losses  through  flying  stones  (against  injury  from  which 
the  steel  helmets  offer  good  protection)  are  frequent.  In 
the  foothills  and  intermediate  mountains  the  conditions  are 
not  so  bad  as  in  the  higher  mountains.  One  of  the  inher- 
ent qualities  of  mountain  warfare  is  the  favorable  oppor- 
tunity which  the  defender  has  in  starting  a  counter-attack 
when  the  attacker  is  exhausted  by  a  hard  climb  and  ap- 
proaches the  crest  in  disorder.  It  is  only  necessary  that  the 
reserves  be  present  at  the  decisive  point,  which  can  fre- 
quently be  ascertained  from  a  study  of  the  map.  On  Octo- 
ber 24,  1917,  in  the  Tolmein  penetration,  the  Italians  lacked 
these  very  reserves  at  the  decisive  point.  The  decision  lies 
in  this  attack  brought  by  the  reserves,  which  if  made  by 
fresh  troops — if  possible  down  hill  and  against  the  flanks — 
has  excellent  chances  for  success  against  an  attacker  who 
is  exhausted  by  the  ascent.  Even  when  the  position  is  lost 
a  stubborn  defense,  based  on  rocks  and  ravines  may  still 
promise  success.  Only  troops,  well  trained  and  fresh,  can 
achieve  permanent  success  in  mountain  defense,  if  they 
endeavor  to  weakly  occupy  long  fronts  (but  with  plenty  of 
machine  guns),  keeping  strong  reserves  available  and  re- 
maining prepared  for  aggressive  action. 

Superior  force  plays  a  smaller  role  than  in  the  rolling 
country.  All  measures  are  good  which  prevent  the  attack 
of  positions  from  higher  points,  from  the  flank  or  by  envel- 
oping, supported  by  superior  artillery.  Making  the  ascent 
more  difficult  to  the  enemy  is  always  advantageous;  every 
opportunity  to  take  the  long  columns  of  the  enemy  under 
a  cross  fire  must  be  utilized.  This  method  leads  to  forma- 
tion in  squads  and  platoons  in  the  infantry  and  its  auxiliary 
arms.  Utilization  of  advanced  positions  on  main  lines  of 
resistance  on  the  rear  edge  of  a  crest  with  a  limited  field 
of  fire  will  offer  themselves.  We  must  caution  against  the 
danger  of  covering  everything;  the  defender  must  block 
the  hostile  routes  of  approach  by  advanced  detachments, 
must  delay  the  attacker  and  seek  the  decision  by  means  of 
reserves  kept  concentrated  in  rear.  The  terrain  difficulties 
must  positively  invite  the  attack;  at  no  place  are  cordon 
positions  more  dangerous  than  in  mountains. 


128  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

The  Austrian  defense  of  the  Southern  Tyrol  in  1866  will 
always  remain  an  excellent  pattern. 

As  early  as  the  winter  of  1914-15  mountain  formations 
were  adopted  for  employment  in  the  Vosges,  after  the 
French  had  forced  us  to  adopting  snowshoes  in  that  region. 
The  Bavarian  General  v.  Hoehn  demanded  that  the  following 
be  equipped  with  snowshoes: 

"1.  Infantry  in  strength  from  patrols  to  company;  suited  for 
reconnaissance,  security  and  fighting,  messengers,  signal  and  tele- 
phone troops,  litter  bearers,  and  machine  gun  platoons. 

"2.  Artillery  headquarters,  artillery  officer's  patrols  for  target 
reconnaissance,  fire  control  and  observation  for  artillery. 

"3.  Commanders,  general  staff  officers,  personnel  of  the  staff, 
telephone  squads." 

Snowshoe  runners  can  be  employed  also  for  tramping 
down  roads  for  detachments  in  close  order. 

The  very  useful  drawing  of  two  to  three  snowshoe  run- 
ners by  troopers  was  not  adopted;  but  the  transportation 
of  machine  guns  on  snowshoe  sleds  proved  advantageous. 

In  the  Masurian  battles  snowshoe  runners  were  em- 
ployed, but  thawing  weather  setting  in,  their  usefulness 
soon  ceased.  Snowshoe  runners  of  the  German  2d  Snowshoe 
Battalion  were  used  by  the  German  South  Army  for  minor 
operations  successfully,  for  instance,  to  gain  flanking  fire 
positions. 


V.     Technique  In  War 

Utilization  of  all  the  peace  time  technique  for  pur- 
poses of  war  conforms  to  the  nature  of  a  people's  army. 
Only  with  the  start  of  the  position  warfare  could  the  pro- 
per basis  be  secured  which  this  technique  required  for  the 
full  development  of  its  capacity.  In  time  of  peace,  this  is 
easy  but  it  is  very  difficult  in  mobile  warfare.  Thus,  the 
technique  will  either  accomplish  something  brilliant,  or  its 
tools  and  implements  will  become  mere  ballast.  Nothing 
would  be  worse  than  to  place  our  reliance  principally  on 
technical  means.  The  moral  forces  in  the  breast  of  the 
commander  and  in  the  soul  of  the  entire  people  are  the 
qualities  which  have  finally  turned  the  scales  in  war.  "Only 
the  psychically  qualified  may  chain  chance  to  fortune" 
(Goethe)  or,  as  Moltke  expressed  it  "Only  the  efficient  has 
fortune  permanently."  Possibly  even  more  than  at  the 
opening  of  the  19th  Century,  the  words  written  by  Scham- 
horst  in  April,  1806,  have  importance :  "We  have  started  to 
appraise  the  art  of  war  higher  than  military  virtues.  This 
has  caused  the  collapse  of  peoples  in  all  times.  Never  do 
the  moral  qualities  rest,  they  fall,  as  soon  as  they  cease  to 
strive  for  improvement." 

In  a  more  confined  sense  the  military  technique  had 
been  prepared  by  peace  establishments  and  was  gradually 
increased  to  the  enormous  extent  demanded  by  the  World 
War.  The  utilization  of  our  highly  developed  industries  and 
chemistry  by  the  military  departments  was  difficult  as  there 
was  a  lack  of  a  central  governing  authority.  Recommenda- 
tion and  control  by  some  bureau  was  of  decisive  importance. 
In  addition  to  the  utiUzation  of  industrial  establishments 
and  raw  materials  captured  in  the  enemy's  country  we  will 
merely  mention:  Concrete  construction,  light  and  water 
supply,  etc.  In  Germany  the  lack  of  raw  materials  was  of 
special  importance.  It  is  possible  that  more  could  have 
been  achieved,  and  more  rapidly,  by  the  use  of  digging  ma- 
chines (especially  in  construction  of  cable  trenches)  and 
with  drill  machines  in  the  construction  of  positions.    Con- 

129 


130  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

struction  of  positions  finally  demanded  a  closer  study  of 
"war  geology."  In  what  follows  we  will  treat  only  of  the 
war  technique  in  a  closer  sense. 

The  principal  question  was  to  replace  the  animal  trains 
by  mechanical  trains  through  adoption  of  auto  trucks  for 
more  rapid  transportation  of  men,  supplies  and  materiel. 
In  Italy,  in  France,  and  finally  also  with  us  auto  trucks  were 
used  on  a  large  scale  for  shifting  reserves,  and  with  suc- 
cess. The  disadvantages  of  disrupting  units,  the  separation 
of  the  dismounted  men  from  their  horses  and  vehicles  could 
not  be  avoided.  A  further  link  in  the  chain  was  the  intro- 
duction of  "tanks"  for  traveling  across  country.  The  pos- 
sibility of  demolishing  obstacles  by  their  means,  was  a  minor 
result.  They  were  in  the  first  line  an  attack  weapon,  under- 
estimated by  us  at  the  start,  the  more  so  as  they,  appearing 
in  small  number,  could  be  quickly  put  out  of  commission ; 
toward  the  end  of  the  war,  however,  our  defensive  means 
were  insufficient  to  meet  the  unexpected  mass  employment. 
Our  defensive  measures  could  not  keep  pace  with  the  in- 
crease of  the  fighting  means,  though  our  industries  achieved 
the  almost  impossible.  "The  best  arms  against  tanks  are 
the  nerves,  discipline  and  intrepidity.  Only  with  the  de- 
cline of  discipline  and  weakening  of  the  fighting  power  of 
our  infantry  did  the  tanks  in  their  mass  employment  and 
in  conjunction  with  artificial  fog  gain  a  dangerous  influ- 
ence on  the  course  of  military  events."     (Ludendorff.) 

The  French  had  heavy  tanks  (40  to  60-ton)  under  con- 
struction, possessed  medium  (24  to  30-ton)  and  light  tanks 
(model  Renault,  6.5  ton).  Medium  tanks  were  organized 
by  fours,  in  groups  (3  batteries)  and  sur-groups  (3  groups 
each).  Small  tanks  were  formed  into  platoons  (5  tanks), 
companies  (15  tanks)  and  battalions  (45  tanks).  Marching 
on  roads  was  to  be  avoided  because  of  the  tracks  left  and 
the  damage  done  to  the  roads. 

For  attack  each  army  corps  received  1  "tank  regiment," 
consisting  of  several  battalions  light  tanks  and  sur-groups 
of  heavy  tanks.  The  light  tanks  were  allotted  to  the  divi- 
sions participating  in  the  attack,  in  general,  1  tank  bat- 
talion (45  battle  tanks)  to  the  division.  The  heavy  tanks, 
on  the  other  hand,  were  a  unit  attached  to  that  attack  sec- 


TECHNIQUE  IN  WAR  131 

tor  in  which  the  greatest  resistance  was  expected.  In  or- 
der to  keep  close  connection  between  infantry  and  tanks, 
the  tank  units  were  placed  under  direct  orders  of  the  com- 
manders of  the  attacking  troops  down  to  the  battalion  com- 
mander. 

The  medium  tanks  had  to  be  directly  accompanied  by 
special  troops  in  the  fight,  who  helped  them  across  espe- 
cially difficult  obstacles.  One  infantry  company  was  required 
for  this  for  each  group  of  medium  tanks  (12  tanks).  That 
company,  which  was  usually  taken  from  some  unit  not 
designated  to  participate  in  the  battle,  received  special  train- 
ing for  14  days.  It  usually  was  divided  into  2  detachments ; 
1  advanced  with  the  first  infantry  wave  and  executed  the 
heaviest  repair  work  (ditch  and  trench  crossings,  alleys 
through  entanglements,  foot  bridges).  The  other  detach- 
ment furnished  3  selected  men  for  each  tank  who  followed 
the  tanks  directly,  furnished  connections  between  the  men 
in  the  tank  and  the  exterior  world  and  served  as  supports 
in  possible  accidents.  Removal  of  obstacles  which  can  delay 
the  march  must  be  finished  at  the  latest  by  evening  of  the 
day  before  the  battle.  The  most  dangerous  enemy  of  the 
tank  is  the  artillery,  which  must  be  destroyed,  or  engaged 
by  airplanes.  Tanks  quickly  give  out,  so  depth  formation 
is  necessary. 

In  attack  the  heavy  tanks  preceded  the  infantry  and 
the  light  tanks,  to  open  the  road  for  the  infantry  and  to 
cover  it  during  the  cleaning  up  of  the  hostile  position.  The 
light  tanks  advanced  with  the  infantry.  The  light  tank 
platoon  as  a  rule  fought  in  close  order  against  definite  tar- 
gets. As  soon  as  success  was  attained,  the  platoon  was 
again  at  the  disposal  of  the  infantry  commander  to  whom 
it  reported  for  orders,  and  followed  the  infantry  on  recon- 
noitered  roads. 

The  infantry  must  quickly  perceive  and  utilize  the 
freedom  of  action  given  it  by  the  tanks.  It  must  keep  close 
to  the  tanks ;  it  must  be  a  point  of  honor  with  the  infantry 
never  to  let  a  tank  fall  into  the  enemy's  hands.  In  no  case 
must  the  infantry  retreat  if  it  sees  the  tanks  traveling  to 
the  rear,  as  they  have  probably  turned  around  only  to  fight 
against  nests  reappearing  in  rear,  or  to  assemble. 


132  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

If  at  some  points  a  block  occurs  in  the  forward  move- 
ment through  fire  from  some  trench,  or  from  a  machine  gun 
nest,  the  tanks  fight  down  the  resistance.  The  parts  of 
the  infantry  not  struck  by  the  fire  must  not  let  themselves 
be  stopped  in  the  forward  movement.  If  that  piece  of  ter- 
rain has  been  cleaned  up,  the  troops  that  for  a  time  re- 
mained behind  advance  again  with  the  tanks. 

In  England  3  battalions  (36  tanks  in  3  companies) 
were  formed  into  a  brigade.  In  addition  to  the  new  large 
battle  tank  (35-ton)  and  the  light  (Whippet)  tanks  there 
were  transport  tanks  for  infantry  (20  to  30  men  with  5 
machine  guns)  and  for  guns  (12.7  CM.).  Each  division  had 
1  tank  battalion  (36  tanks),  which  was  formed  into  2  waves 
and  its  first  wave  traveled  30  paces  in  rear  of  the  creeping 
barrage,  which  was  intensified  by  smoke  and  fog  shells. 
Infantry  remained  with  platoons  deployed  in  squads  up  to 
180  meters.  Immediately  behind  these  infantry  platoons 
1  tank  of  each  tank  platoon  remained  as  reserve  to  fill  up 
resulting  gaps  in  the  line  and  to  fight  down  reappearing 
resistance.  Then  followed  the  mass  of  the  infantry,  which 
overcoming  the  stationary  barrage,  closed  up  and  gained 
the  necessary  depth  in  the  further  advance.  The  distance 
of  the  second  tank  wave  from  the  first  differed.  It  was  the 
task  of  the  second  wave  (which  also  was  followed  by  infan- 

A  BRITISH  TANK  ATTACK,  1918  (POSITION  IN  READI- 
NESS—ADVANCE GUARD) 

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A  second  battalion  follows  in  reserve 


TECHNIQUE  IN  WAR  138 

try)  to  fight  down  the  resistance  nests  that  remained  in  the 
intermediate,  terrain,  and  attack  any  new  target.  Some- 
times a  third  wave  was  formed  which  had  the  same  tasks 
as  the  second.  If  a  tank  became  disabled  and  could  not  pro- 
ceed, the  crew  had  orders  to  descend  with  1  or  2  machine 
guns  and  gain  a  foothold  in  the  terrain  until  the  infantry 
came  up.  In  crossing  watercourses  without  stable  bridges 
a  tank  may  be  used  as  a  bridge  tank. 

The  infantry  must  fight  as  if  no  tanks  were  present. 
It  must  make  full  use  of  its  auxiliary  arms  and  must  in  no 
case  halt  if  tanks  fall  out  or  remain  stationary. 

In  fighting  for  villages  the  infantry  at  the  start  pushed 
forward  to  the  edge  of  the  village  and  nested  itself  there. 
In  the  meantime  the  tanks  drove  to  the  side  and  outer  edge 
of  the  village  and  then  broke  through  the  houses  into  the 
interior. 

Because  of  the  enormous  demands  on  the  German  in- 
dustry for  supplies  of  all  kinds,  ammunition,  and  artillery 
materiel,  we  were  prevented  from  introducing  tanks  in  suffi- 
cient numbers,  as  the  main  point  was  to  keep  up  our  artil- 
lery, the  aerial  fighting  forces  and  the  submarines.  Only  by 
limiting  construction  of  these  essentials  could  we  have  man- 
ufactured tanks  in  sufficient  numbers.  The  United  States 
of  America  has  finally  adopted  the  last  word  in  transporta- 
tion of  guns  in  difficult  terrain  by  introducing  "motor  mules," 
which  are  not  limited  to  the  hard  surface  roads,  like  the 
draggers  of  the  heaviest  guns.  The  advantage  consists 
principally  in  the  greater  economy  (driving  power  for  80 
kilometers  at  only  25%  of  the  cost  of  the  teams),  lessening 
the  train  parks,  shortening  the  march  columns  (in  conse- 
quence of  greater  load  carriage)  and  increased  capacity. 

The  necessity  of  securing  to  the  higher  command  in 
position  warfare  quietness  for  work,  brought  about  a  draw- 
ing back  of  division  headquarters  from  the  front  lines  to 
about  10  kilometers.  From  there,  according  to  the  needs, 
officers  were  sent  forward  to  the  fighting  points  for  obser- 
vation and  as  representatives  of  the  commander.  As  the 
leader  no  longer  could  personally  view  the  terrain,  facilities 
for  making  reliable  maps  on  a  large  scale  (in  the  West 
1:80,000,  25,000,  10,000  and  5,000)  was  necessary.    These 


134  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

were  executed  with  the  assistance  of  photographs  taken 
from  airplanes  and  reproduced  in  large  quantities  in  three 
colors,  the  different  points  being  designated  by  numbers. 

For  connection  with  the  places  of  commanders,  tele- 
phone nets  were  established  with  other  points,  with  defense 
guns,  infantry  and  artillery.  Up  to  May,  1917,  there  were 
515,000  kilometers  (322,000  miles)  of  lines  in  the  West  and 
349,000  (220,000  miles)  in  the  East.  The  average  monthly 
expenditure  on  main  battle  front  in  the  West  was  in  1917 
1.7  kg  of  1mm  wire,  19  kg  of  2mm,  21  kg  of  3mm  and  20  kg 
of  4mm  wire  per  kilometer  of  front  (about  250  lbs.  per  mile 
of  front).  The  telephone  had  the  advantage  of  direct  per- 
sonal exchange  of  thoughts  and  thereby  became  an  unre- 
placeable  auxiliary  means  of  leadership,  even  if  there  was 
danger  of  interference  of  higher  headquarters  and  the  dan- 
ger of  attempts  to  influence  the  decisions  of  the  higher  leader 
by  direct  communication  between  adjutants  and  general 
staff  officers.  In  spite  of  ail  efforts  we  were  not  able  to 
overcome  many  disadvantages.  The  traffic  left  no  visible 
traces  behind  like  the  telegraph  instrument  with  writing 
attachment.  It  is  true  that  the  efficiency  of  the  wire  cir- 
cuits was  influenced  by  gun  fire  and  by  the  weather,  still 
we  succeeded  in  keeping  the  telephone  in  commission  under 
fire  by  seeking  out  stretches  where  the  fire  was  not  so  hot, 
by  avoiding  places  open  to  direct  bombardment,  by  laying 
the  wires  in  cables  in  trenches  from  0.5  to  0.8  meters  deep 
and  by  employing  numerous  "trouble"  squads.  The  dan- 
ger of  listening-in  (by  the  enemy)  was  grave;  this  we  at 
first  underestimated;  the  enemy  did  listen-in  at  ranges  of 
3  kilometers;  we  tried  to  overcome  that  by  construction  of 
double  lines  and  by  the  strictest  supervision  of  conversation, 
by  installing  special  "centrals"  (also  by  use  of  code,  by  lim- 
iting conversation  in  the  danger  zone  to  the  utmost  neces- 
sary, using  a  tone  of  voice  strange  to  the  enemy ;  and  by  us- 
ing a  foreign  language  or  dialect).  Wireless  telephones 
with  a  range  of  16  kilometers  (10  miles)  were  used  by  the 
British  toward  the  end  of  the  war  for  airplane  communica- 
tion. 

As  a  supplement  to,  or  to  take  the  place  of,  the  tele- 
phone, the  slow  relay  chain  of  messengers  or  mounted  mes- 


TECHNIQUE  IN  WAR  135 

sengers  proved  reliable  under  heavy  fire.  We  soon  aban- 
doned the  very  slow  wig-wag  signaling  of  peace  time,  while 
on  the  other  hand,  utilization  of  carrier  pigeons  found  favor 
(each  division  sector  in  the  West  was  allowed  about  4  cotes, 
situated  at  least  15  kilometers  behind  the  front) ;  these 
contained  80  to  120  pigeons,  which  were  freed  by  twos  or 
more.  Long  changes  of  location  of  the  cotes  should  be 
avoided,  but  minor  changes  up  to  3  kilometers  did  no  harm ; 
it  took  about  two  weeks'  training  for  the  pigeons  in  their 
new  home  when  the  change  was  longer.  The  pigeon  was 
little  influenced  by  hostile  fire  or  gas  and  the  altitude  at 
which  they  are  released  from  airplanes  (up  to  3500  meters) 
did  not  matter;  but  the  pigeons  were  dependent  on  clear 
weather.  The  flying  velocity  was  about  one  minute  per 
kilometer.  The  disadvantage  remained  that  the  pigeon 
should  be  used  only  in  one  flying  direction,  from  the  front 
to  the  rear.  It  was  a  reliable  means  of  information  coming 
from  the  first  line  and  could  be  also  advantageously  em- 
ployed during  the  range  finding  by  the  artillery. 

The  war  dog  (message  dog)  proved  very  good  up  to  a 
distance  of  2  kilometers  after  previous  training  (12  dogs 
per  regiment)  between  two  well  known  points  occupied  by 
commanders  whom  the  dogs  knew  and  who  knew  the  dogs. 
The  service  in  such  cases  was  excellent.  We  will  not  dis- 
cuss the  sentry  dogs  the  French  loved  to  employ;  it  is  not 
known  if  their  "attack"  hounds  were  a  success.  The  dogs 
found  their  road  even  in  very  difl[icult  terrain ;  but  we  must 
avoid  demanding  anything  beyond  their  abilities.  Only  a 
very  small  percentage  of  the  dogs  employed  were  failures. 
Some  dogs  carried  more  than  30  messages  per  day.  Occa- 
sionally their  work  was  decreased  by  their  being  fire-shy. 
To  overcome  this  was  a  matter  of  training.  Frequently 
under  very  heavy  fire  dogs  sought  cover  in  shelters  and 
bombproofs  and  continued  their  run  carelessly  as  soon  as 
the  fire  became  weaker.  Prerequisite  for  employment  was 
good  treatment  by  both  dog  masters,  and  that  no  one  else 
interfered  with  the  dog.  However,  in  case  of  disability  of 
one  of  the  dog  masters,  the  dog  was  useless.  Carrier  pig- 
eons and  message  dogs  frequently  were  the  only  means  of 
communication  between  the  fighting  troops  and  the  com- 
manders. 


136  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

Technically,  the  means  of  information  were  supple- 
mented by  message  projectiles,  by  the  message  throwing 
grenade  fired  from  the  rifle  at  a  range  of  1000  meters  and 
by  the  light  trench  mortar  with  a  range  of  1300  meters. 
During  the  course  of  the  campaign  the  light  signal  appara- 
tus, that  had  been  neglected  during  peace,  was  improved 
and  information  troops  were  equipped  with  the  large  flash- 
light apparatus.  The  infantry,  artillery,  pioneers  and  min- 
enwerfers  were  equipped  with  the  medium  and  small  flash- 
light apparatus.  Flash-light  No.  17  served  for  communica- 
tion with  airplanes.  The  source  of  light  was  an  electric 
lamp;  communication  was  by  means  of  the  Morse  code. 
Division  and  regimental  headquarters  (infantry  and  artil- 
lery), and  field  artillery  battalions  had  4  medium  signal 
apparatus,  No.  16,  and  brigade  headquarters  2  No.  16,  while 
infantry  battalions,  and  cavalry  rifle  regiments  had  eight, 
and  machine  gun  companies  two  small  signal  apparatus  No. 
16. 

Flash-light  stations  were  quickly  arranged,  but  they 
were  dependent  on  the  intermediate  terrain  and  could  not 
be  entirely  hidden  either  in  the  terrain  nor  on  the  aerial  pho- 
tograph. They  were  influenced  in  their  use  by  unfavorable 
weather  conditions  (fog,  rain,  snow),  and  the  transmission 
took  time,  as  all  messages  had  to  be  sent  in  code  as  the 
enemy  could  also  read  the  signals. 

Special  progress  was  made  in  equipping  the  divisions 
with  a  wireless  battalion  of  two  platoons.  This  battalion 
had  a  wheeled  wireless  station  with  a  range  up  to  100  kilo- 
meters ;  two  large,  portable  wireless  outfits  for  transmitting 
4  to  6  kilometers,  five  medium  for  transmitting  2  to  3  kilo- 
meters, and  6  smaller  portable  for  transmitting  0.5  to  1 
kilometers  range.  Bullet-proof  establishments  were  re- 
quired for  employment  in  position  warfare.  By  wireless 
communication  with  the  airplanes,  separated  detachments 
were  kept  in  touch  regardless  of  the  terrain,  but  we  had  to 
reckon  of  course  with  the  fact  that  the  enemy  could  listen 
in  and  so  might  gain  information  as  to  our  distribution  of 
forces.  The  French  claim  that  by  such  hstening-in  that 
they  received  information  of  movements  of  German  range- 
finding  airplanes  and  were  able  to  notify  the  pursuit  squad- 


TECHNIQUE   IN  WAR  137 

rons  to  interfere  with  the  hostile  activity.  Listening-in 
was  also  an  aid  in  the  location  of  hostile  artillery.  The  fact 
that  such  listening  or  cutting  in  is  possible  in  wire  and 
wireless  communication  offers  the  possibility  of  misleading 
the  enemy.  The  advantages  of  wireless  are  its  independence 
of  terrain  and  fire  effect,  and  that  short  messages  can  be 
rapidly  transmitted.  Interruptions  by  traffic  occurred  to  our 
own  and  hostile  stations,  so  that  placing  of  many  stations 
in  a  confined  area  was  impossible.  Wireless  can  be  com- 
pletely cut  out  by  aerial  electrical  currents. 

Of  special  importance  was  the  ground  telegraph,  by 
which  we  mean  the  transmission  without  wire  of  Morse 
signals,  where  geological  conditions  were  favorable,  up  to 
2  kilometers  distance,  when  communication  over  telephone 
lines  was  impossible.  As  the  enemy  could  listen-in,  mes- 
sages had  to  be  coded;  telephone  and  ground  telegraph 
could  not  be  used  simultaneously  alongside  each  other; 
ground  noises,  thunder  and  strong  currents  interfered. 
Ground  telegraph  instruments  performed  valuable  service 
during  advance  and  in  attack,  and,  at  a  distance  from  the 
message  assembly  stations,  and  frequently  were  the  only 
means  of  communication  with  the  flanks  of  the  divisions. 
It  proved  valuable  in  solving  the  communication  question 
from  company  to  battalion;  from  battalion  with  ground 
telegraph,  flash-light,  or  small  wireless  equipment  to  divi- 
sion battle  observing  station  and  to  the  division  message 
center;  and  from  the  artillery  observer  to  the  guide  bat- 
tery to  start  barrage  fire  by  agreed  signals. 

False  signals  sent  out  and  screening  of  the  service  of 
radio  communication  should  in  each  instance  be  carefully 
considered,  for  measures  that  are  too  crude  fail  in  their 
object.  Measures  for  receipt  should  be  the  same  in  all  dis- 
tricts under  hostile  observation.  To  screen  this  service  of 
communication  it  may  become  necessary  to  stop  the  divi- 
sion in  the  second  line  from  using  wireless.  Calls  should 
never  be  sent  out  in  the  clear  (for  instance,  one  Italian  army 
called  all  its  units  in  sequence  prior  to  our  offensive  in  Octo- 
ber, 1917).  Wireless  silence  and  then  a  sudden  renewed 
wireless  activity  are  almost  always  a  sure  sign  of  change  in 
the  tactical  situation  and  should  therefore  be  avoided. 


138  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

The  fifth  arm,  the  aerial  fighting  forces  owe  their  re- 
markable development  to  the  World  War.  Airships  (dirigi- 
bles) were  replaced  by  airplanes  due  to  the  developments  in 
size  and  capabilities  of  the  latter. 

The  primary  superiority  of  the  French  in  the  matter 
of  planes  did  not  last  long. 

At  the  opening  of  the  World  War  airplanes  were  only 
used  for  reconnaissance.  They  were  poorly  equipped  with 
photographic  apparatus  and  machine  guns  were  not  mounted 
nor  wireless  equipment. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  war,  airships  (dirigibles)  op- 
erated at  an  altitude  of  2400  meters  and  attained  a  velocity 
of  from  54  to  87  kilometers  per  hour.  Airplanes  operated 
at  an  altitude  of  approximately  1000  meters  with  a  velocity 
of  70  to  120  kilometers  per  hour,  and  an  effective  range  of 
350  kilometers.  Dropping  bombs  was  still  in  the  incipient 
stage.  At  the  most,  only  4  bombs  weighing  10  kg  each  could 
be  carried.  The  employment  of  improved  anti-aircraft  ar- 
tillery continually  forced  the  planes  to  seek  higher  operat- 
ing altitudes. 

Aerial  battles  were  not  thought  of  at  the  opening  of 
the  war,  airplanes  avoided  each  other,  unless  some  fired  with 
revolvers  at  others.  The  mounting  of  machine  guns  on 
airplanes  was  first  done  by  France.  This  forced  all  other 
states  to  follow  suit.  An  excellent  solution  of  firing  from 
an  airplane  was  found  by  synchronizing  the  machine  guns 
to  fire  through  the  revolving  propellor  without  interfering 
with  it.  The  mounting  of  37-cm.  guns  on  airplanes  inter- 
fered with  the  rate  of  speed,  so  that  procedure  was  aban- 
doned. Bomb  dropping  was  consistently  developed.  The 
Allies  dropped  bombs  on  open  cities  at  the  commencement 
of  the  war  and  made  no  secret  of  their  intentions  to  attack 
the  hostile  capital.  Wireless  communication  from  airplanes 
(adopted  by  the  Allies  in  December,  1915)  proved  of  incal- 
culable value  for  transmission  of  messages  and  exceeded  in 
reliability  all  heretofore  applied  means  of  communication. 

Captive  balloons  received  little  attention  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  war.  They  were  at  the  mercy  of  hostile  artil- 
lery and  planes.  The  gases  of  the  balloons  easily  caught 
fire,  and  the  protection  afforded  by  the  anti-aircraft  de- 


TECHNIQUE  IN  WAR  139 

fense  guns  was  seldom  sufficient.  Batteries  in  action  were 
seen  from  balloons  at  distances  of  14  kilometers  and  march- 
ing troops  and  columns  at  25  kilometers.  Hostile  artillery 
fire  forced  captive  balloons  to  be  kept  about  8  kilometers  in 
rear  of  the  front  lines.  The  balloon  observer  at  1000  meters 
altitude  could  see  from  30  to  40  kilometers.  He  also  had  a 
stationary  position  with  good  permanent  ground  communi- 
cation. These  advantages  were  so  great  that  captive  bal- 
loons were  universally  employed  for  observation  of  artillery 
fire  and  the  battlefield.  By  means  of  the  balloon  and  tele- 
phone, headquarters  received  reliable  information  on  both 
the  hostile  and  friendly  situation. 

Dirigibles  took  a  back-seat  in  the  war ;  they  offered  too 
large  a  target,  demanded  special  arrangements  for  landing, 
skillful  construction,  required  an  enormous  amount  of  ma- 
terial and  took  a  long  time  for  construction.  They  also 
required  a  large  suitable  landing  place,  and  an  expensive 
hangar  construction  which  took  more  time.  These  disad- 
vantages could  not  be  offset  by  the  fact  that  the  dirigi- 
ble could  carry  large  quantities  of  explosives  and  traffic  sup- 
plies. Employment  of  dirigibles  was  confined  to  naval  war- 
fare. 

With  the  development  in  the  capabilities  of  airplanes 
grew  the  manifoldness  of  their  tasks,  which  naturally  led 
to  dividing  the  airplane  organizations  into:  pursuit  squad- 
rons for  attacking  hostile  aerial  fighting  forces ;  protective 
squadrons  for  offensive  protection  for  observation  airplanes ; 
artillery  squadrons  for  adjusting  the  fire  of  the  artillery; 
attack  squadrons  for  fighting  ground  targets  with  machine 
guns;  and  infantry  squadrons  for  the  requirements  of  the 
infantry  in  their  battle  on  the  ground.  Bomb-dropping  was 
retained.  The  photographic  work  of  the  reconnaissance 
flights  steadily  increased  in  importance.  The  participation 
of  planes  in  an  attack  in  best  illustrated  by  the  attack  on  the 
Chaume  forest  (Ornes  sector  in  front  of  Verdun)  on  Sej)- 
tember  24,  1917,  by  the  13th  Reserve  Division,  to  which  5 
plane  detachments,  3  protective  and  8  pursuit  squadrons 
were  attached.  Route  of  attack  and  attack  objective  were 
photographed.  Based  on  these  photographs,  maps  were  re- 
produced showing  the  lines  to  be  reached  by  the  attacking 


140  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

troops  and  the  desired  route  to  be  taken  by  the  attack  squad- 
rons, and  these  maps  were  liberally  distributed  to  headquar- 
ters, troops,  and  airplane  organizations.  At  5:40  A.M.  the 
infantry  started  the  attack,  at  5:55  A.M.  the  first  attack 
squadron  with  6  planes  appeared  and  in  four  attacks  fired  on 
hostile  reserves  from  an  altitude  of  100  to  400  meters;  a 
second  squadron  repeated  the  procedure  and  dropped  bombs. 
Reconnaissance  planes  that  had  timely  perceived  the  start 
of  the  hostile  counter-attack,  called  for  barrage  fire  and 
caused  a  repetition  of  the  attacks  by  the  attack  squadrons. 
Pursuit  squadrons  prevented  hostile  planes  from  attacking 
during  the  entire  action. 

The  necessity  to  sweep  away  the  counter  effect  and  to 
reach  the  objective  in  spite  of  losses  suffered,  led  to  the 
employment  of  airplanes  in  formations ;  in  chains  (of  3  to 
4),  in  swarms  (2  to  3  chains),  or  as  pursuit  echelons.  Sev- 
eral of  the  latter,  assigned  to  a  troop  unit,  formed  a  pur- 
suit squadron,  several  squadrons  a  group.  Thus  aerial  bat- 
tle units  in  close  formation  of  50  to  70  airplanes,  had  their 
inception.  The  unit  was  under  the  orders  of  the  comman- 
der, who,  however,  had  authority  to  employ  the  unit  in  echel- 
ons or  squadrons,  or  as  a  complete  unit.  Captain  Boelke 
was  the  originator  of  the  organization.  The  third  year  of 
the  war  saw  squadron  fights  in  the  air.  Giant  airplanes 
served  for  the  purpose  of  dropping  bombs  on  important  tar- 
gets. A  prerequisite  for  the  solution  of  tasks  given  to  all 
airplane  organizations,  is,  supremacy  of  the  air — by  re- 
lentless attack,  never  by  defensive  tactics.  If  supremacy 
of  the  air  is  once  lost,  it  is  difficult  to  regain.  Screening  is 
possible  only  after  the  enemy  has  been  thoroughly  fright- 
ened. 

The  airplanes  found  support  in  the  anti-aircraft  guns 
which  compelled  the  hostile  airplanes  to  use  greater  caution 
and  to  operate  at  higher  altitudes.  Toward  the  end  of  the 
war  the  number  of  airplanes  brought  down  by  anti-aircraft 
defense  guns  increased  materially.  Machine  gun  fire  with 
some  tracer  ammunition  is  the  best  means  of  attacking  low 
flying  airplanes. 

How  the  fighting  conditions  developed  during  the  war 
is  shown  by  the  following  table: 


TECHNIQUE  IN  WAR  141 

The  following  airplanes  were  lost: 

In  September,  1915:  In  September,  1918: 

German     Britiah    French  German  Allitt 

In   aerial  battle 3  4  11  107  652 

By  firing  from  groiind 2  14  126 

Missing    2  3  7  ___  136 

Airplane  defense  searchlights  proved  to  be  a  valuable 
means  of  airplane  defense  at  night  for  the  protection  of 
important  works,  villages  and  roads.  They  forced  airplanes 
to  seek  higher  altitudes  and  thus  abandon  the  chance  of 
finding  the  marks  on  the  ground  so  necessary  for  correct 
orientation.  Blinding  the  airplane  pilot  by  the  direct  rays 
of  the  searchlight  deprived  them  of  their  assurance  in  the 
flight,  so  that  they  were  induced  to  drop  their  bombs  pre- 
maturely or  unaimed. 

The  attack  sections,  or  echelons  (6  airplanes),  organ- 
ized in  the  fourth  year  of  the  war  from  protective  echelons, 
produced  a  moral  effect  by  diving  from  high  to  low  altitudes, 
and  participating  in  the  fight  with  machine  guns,  bombs 
and  hand  grenades  at  the  moment  of  the  assault.  Their 
assault  was  directed  on  the  leading  infantry  lines  or  against 
the  artillery  which  was  laying  down  a  barrage.  In  the  de- 
fense, in  the  pursuit,  and  also  in  the  retreat  (holding  up 
advancing  cavalry  and  artillery)  attack  sections  found  far 
reaching  employment. 

Infantry,  airplanes  watched  permanently  over  the  bat- 
tlefield and  took  over  the  battle  reconnaissance,  transmitted 
signals  from  the  front  to  the  rear,  and  supplied  the  front 
line,  when  required,  by  dropping  orders,  subsistence,  ammu- 
nition and  hand-to-hand  fighting  means.  Details  of  our, 
or  the  enemy's  position,  were  noted  on  maps  or  photo- 
graphed. Of  special  importance  was  the  information, 
whether  or  not  the  hostile  trenches  were  filled,  where  the 
reserves  were  and  location  of  hostile  tanks.  To  be  able  to 
perceive  all  positions  in  readiness  in  hostile  trenches,  the 
airplane  had  to  descend  to  an  altitude  of  300  meters.  Infan- 
try airplanes  could  solve  their  task  only  if  the  infantry,  on 
demand,  showed  the  location  of  its  advance  line  with  either 
white  or  red  cloths,  according  to  the  color  of  ground,  or  by 
displaying  light  signals.  It  took  a  long  time  for  infantry 
to  lose  its  fear  in  thus  supporting  the  airplanes.  The  infantry 


142  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

airplane  frequently  was  the  only  means  of  communication 
between  the  fighting  troops  and  headquarters  and  thus  fur- 
nished the  first  basis  for  battle  conduct.  The  certainty  of 
being  recognized  by  its  airplanes  strengthened  the  moral 
feeling  of  the  infantry  and  induced  it  to  hold  out,  even 
if  surrounded  by  the  enemy.  Effective  firing  against  the 
enemy  offered  the  infantry  airplane  the  best  protection. 

The  development  of  photographic  reproduction  by  air- 
planes forced  troops  to  pay  more  attention  to  the  screening 
of  all  works  because  success  of  the  attack  was  primarily 
based  on  surprise.  The  rule  was  to  construct  the  works  so 
exact  in  color  and  shade  effect  that  they  could  not  be  distin- 
guished from  the  surrounding  ground. 

Screening  the  position,  which  must  absolutely  begin 
even  before  construction  of  the  position,  must  not  only  con- 
ceal important  works  from  view  (for  instance  gun  embras- 
ures, entrances  to  shelters),  but  must  also  not  attract  at- 
tention to  the  point  screened.  The  point  screened  must  not 
distinguish  itself  by  any  means  from  its  prior  appearance 
and  must  never  appear  unusual.  On  March  11,  1918,  the 
British  5th  Army  demonstrated  that  the  screening  should 
even  be  in  conformity  with  the  approaching  spring  colors. 
For  instance,  the  battery  commanders  had  to  state  the  color 
and  peculiarity  of  the  ground  where  their  batteries  stood. 

Camouflage  was  especially  improved  on  by  our  enemies. 
"The  Frenchman  suggests  hiding  from  sight  any  work  on 
the  ground,  even  before  starting  it,  by  cover  and  to  carry 
on  the  work  under  that  cover.  The  Englishman  does  not 
recommend  that  expressly.  The  Frenchman  believes  sow- 
ing and  setting  plants  on  artificial  works  to  be  especially 
effective ;  and  besides  this  he  uses  opaque  screening  or  grates 
covered  with  sod  or  painted  canvas.  The  Englishman  loves 
to  use  nets  to  the  meshes  of  which  colored  strips  of  cloth 
are  attached.  The  Frenchman  hides  his  batteries  prefera- 
bly in  old  or  not  yet  completed,  infantry  works ;  the  English- 
man likes  to  make  battery  positions  unperceivable  by  avoid- 
ing the  shadow  effect  and  to  then  camouflage  them  on  a 
large  scale  to  correspond  to  the  entire  surrounding  (decep- 
tion of  square  fields,  etc.)  or  to  give  them  a  very  irregular 
appearance  defying  detection.    For  the  rest,  both  French- 


TECHNIQUE   IN   WAR  143 

man  and  Englishman  place  the  same  value  on  the  fact  of 
having  the  terrain  well  guarded  by  airplanes  prior  to  and 
during  the  work. 

"The  French  have  within  their  airplane  units  certain 
'camouflage  detachments'  which  are  charged  with  advising 
other  troops  concerning  the  camouflage.  The  Englishmen, 
on  the  other  hand,  have  a  special  camouflage  officer  at  each 
corps  headquarters.  In  addition  they  have  special  camou- 
flage depots;  both  showing  that  they  carry  on  camouflage 
on  a  large  scale.  Even  the  pioneer  parks  keep  camouflage 
material  in  readiness.  As  such  thev  serve  special  nets  with 
attached  (to  the  meshes)  strips  of  material  made  of  gunny 
sack  and  scrim,  which  are  colored  corresponding  to  the  sea- 
son." 

In  the  last  months  of  the  war  the  airplanes  were  not 
only  means  of  reconnaissance  to  evade  battle  but  they  parti- 
cipated in  the  battle  in  many  ways,  such  as  described  in  the 
preceding  paragraphs.  Aerial  fighting  was  their  principal 
duty.  The  intention  to  prevent  the  enemy  from  accom- 
plishing its  manifold  aerial  tasks  was  merely  a  means  to  the 
object.  "There  can  be  no  doubts  whatever,  that  supremacy 
of  the  air  will  be  of  decisive  importance  in  future  wars.  The 
one  that  has  gained  supremacy  of  the  air  will  see  the  victory 
on  the  ground  fall  into  his  lap  like  a  ripe  fruit.  Wars  will 
be  of  short  duration,  if  they  are  not  smothered  in  their  in- 
ception. That  party  which  gains  a  complete  victory  in  the 
air  will  prevent  the  hostile  mobilization,  transportation  and 
concentration,  or  at  least  greatly  interfere  with  them.  The 
hostile  centers  of  industry,  the  hostile  capital  will  be  anni- 
hilated, no  matter  how  far  they  are  from  the  frontier.  No 
longer  are  there  protective  distances  in  the  face  of  modern 
airplanes  with  their  radius  of  action.  Protection  by  dark- 
ness is  cut  off  as  well,  as  parachutes  with  magnesium  lights 
can  change  night  into  day.  Even  low  flying  clouds  do  not 
interfere  with  the  activity  of  airplanes,  as  was  proven  by 
the  British  aerial  escadrilles  in  the  September  and  October 
days  of  1918.  All  defensive  measures  such  as  anti-aircraft, 
machine  guns,  searchlights,  etc.,  have  been  unable  to  ma- 
terially interfere  with  the  hostile  flying  activity,  have  not 
prevented  the  hostile  airplanes  from  successfully  dropping 
their  bombs,  in  diving  down  to  within  10  meters  of  the 


144  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

ground  and  attacking  march  columns  and  skirmishers  with 
machine  guns.  If  no  absolute  defense  means  is  found,  the 
aerial  arms  will  become  decisive.  This  knowledge  our  ene- 
mies took  into  account  in  the  peace  conditions,  by  prohibit- 
ing our  keeping  war  airplanes,  in  place  of  which  they  allowed 
us  to  keep  a  relatively  strong  cavalry." 

The  Hague  Conference  of  July  21,  1899,  prohibited, 
against  the  representations  of  England  and  the  United 
States,  "the  employment  of  projectiles  the  sole  purpose  of 
which  is  to  spread  choking  and  poisonous  gases," — this  with 
the  intention  of  preventing  the  adoption  of  a  form  of  mass 
killing  which  it  would  be  impossible  for  anyone  to  evade. 
Attempts  to  increase  the  effect  of  arms  by  the  use  of  gas 
originated  with  our  enemies. 

Attempts  to  use  gas  weapons  were  begun  in  France  as 
early  as  September,  1914,  and,  according  to  the  "Pall  Mall 
Gazette,"  these  weapons  were  employed  the  same  month  at 
the  front.  A  French  War  Ministry  Order,  dated  May  21, 
1915,  contained  directions  concerning  deadly  gas  projectiles 
(26-mm.  rifle  grenades) .  On  the  steamer  "Lusitania,"  which 
was  sunk  on  May  7,  1915,  there  were  2500  hundredweight 
of  tetrachloride  intended  for  the  production  of  poisonous 
gases.  The  French  began  to  use  stupifying  gases  March  1, 
1915,  and  subsequently  used  them  in  the  battles  of  Suippes 
(April  10-17,  1915,)  and  Verdun,  and  the  British  at  Ypres. 
We  made  the  first  gas  attack,  according  to  British  reports, 
on  April  22,  1915,  in  front  of  Ypres.  The  effects  of  this 
attack  were  the  more  marked  because  of  the  lack,  on  the 
part  of  the  enemy,  of  gas  defense  equipment.  A  gas  bom- 
bardment of  the  9th  Army,  at  Bolimow,  on  May  2,  1915,  was 
without  result. 

In  view  of  our  lack  of  raw  materials  for  manufacturing 
ammunition,  we  were  compelled  to  follow  the  example  set 
by  our  enemies,  and  the  highly  developed  chemical  industry 
in  Germany  was  called  upon  to  furnish  us  the  preponder- 
ance in  the  production  of  the  new  offensive  and  defensive 
materials.  At  first,  chlorine  and  certain  gases  which,  with- 
out being  poisonous,  affected  the  membranes,  were  used. 
These  were  later  replaced  by  phosgene,  and  finally,  in  1918, 
an  especially  effective  fighting  gas  was  found  in  the  "Yellow 


TECHNIQUE  IN  WAR  145 

Cross"  (called  "mustard"  gas  by  the  English,  and  Yperite 
by  the  French).  Poisonous  gases  are  the  more  effective  the 
less  they  can  be  detected  by  the  eye  (i.e.  when  colorless  and 
invisible)  and  the  nose ;  and  when  their  effects  make  them- 
selves felt  only  after  some  time.  Gases  may  be  made  effec- 
tive through  clouds  released  from  gas  cylinders  or  through 
the  use  of  gas  projectiles.  The  cylinder  discharge  is  depen- 
dent on  wind,  weather,  and  terrain.  Only  in  rare  cases  can 
these  prerequisites  be  brought  into  consonance  with  the  in- 
tentions of  the  commander.  Gas  clouds  can  be  employed 
more  effectively  for  generally  damaging  the  enemy.  When 
the  method  was  first  tried  out,  the  disadvantage  became  evi- 
dent that  in  a  change  of  the  wind  our  own  troops  must  be 
endangered,  and  frequently  the  cylinders  had  to  be  held  in 
readiness  for  a  long  time  awaiting  favorable  winds.  Par- 
ticularly wide  gas  attacks  are  required  when  it  is  desired 
to  extend  the  effects  so  as  to  nullify  hostile  flank  fire.  As 
a  rule  the  troops  underestimate  the  effects  of  a  gas  attack, 
as  shown  by  later  statements  of  prisoners.  In  all  cases 
the  execution  of  a  general  attack  as  a  follow-up  of  a  gas 
cloud  was  a  matter  of  chance,  dependent  on  the  wind.  We 
therefore  followed  the  lead  of  the  French  and  British,  who 
utilized  gas  clouds,  not  for  introducing  an  attack,  but  for 
the  general  damaging  of  the  enemy,  thereby  obviating 
the  necessity  of  assuring  the  diflficult  matter  of  co-operation 
with  the  infantry. 

More  independent  of  the  wind  is  the  employment  of 
minenwerfer  and  artillery  gas  shell,  which,  however,  can 
be  used  only  against  reserves  and  artillery  positions,  par- 
ticularly for  neutralizing  barrage  batteries,  but  not  against 
troops  in  the  front  line.  Against  the  use  of  the  heavy 
minenwerfer  shell,  there  is  to  be  considered  the  slow  rate 
of  fire  and  the  limited  range  of  this  weapon,  as  well  as  the 
great  weight  of  the  projectile;  its  advantage  lies  in  inde- 
pendence of  the  terrain.  In  case  heavy  minenwerfers  are 
installed  for  other  purposes,  however,  they  can  be  utilized 
for  gas  bombardments  at  any  time  by  bringing  up  the 
special  gas  ammunition.  The  effects  of  gases  depend  on 
the  terrain  (depressions,  cornfields,  and  low-lying  roads 
are  especially  favorable)  and  on  the  weather  (rain  during 


146  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

gas  firing  diminishes  its  effect) ;  in  the  matter  of  time, 
the  first  morning  hours  have  proven  best.  Gas  bombard- 
ments have  effect  only  when  large  areas  are  gassed,  with 
much  ammunition  and  for  long  periods  of  time,  as  other- 
wise the  troops  can  too  easily  avoid  the  bombarded  area. 
If  the  gas  is  to  be  effective,  it  must  appear  as  a  surprise, 
or  else,  by  its  long  duration,  exhaust  the  efficiency  of  the 
gas-mask  canister. 

If  we  fire  gas  in  connection  with  an  attack,  the  enemy 
does  not  know  how  long  this  will  continue  or  what  kind  of 
gas  we  are  using,  and  he  will  be  forced  to  wear  his  mask. 
This^  facilitates  the  hand-to-hand  fighting  for  us,  if  our 
infantry  has  been  fully  informed  and  instructed  concerning 
the  gas  fire;  the  small  possibility  of  incidental  damage  by 
gas  to  our  own  troops  must  be  borne  just  as  is  the  case 
with  occasional  loss  from  our  own  high-explosive  fire.  If 
it  becomes  necessary,  our  infantry  can  advance  with  masks 
on  across  short  stretches  where  they  may  happen  to  en- 
counter any  remaining  gas. 

A  particularly  valuable  improvement  was  brought  about 
by  the  introduction  of  gas  projectors.  These  were  used 
first  by  the  British  (April,  1917,  in  front  of  the  Sixth  Army) , 
and  were  afterwards  employed  by  us  with  advantage.  They 
were  dug  in,  in  the  style  of  earth  mortars,  in  a  number  of 
rows,  one  behind  the  other.  Fired  by  electricity,  a  burst 
of  900  projectors  could  be  fired  with  a  range  up  to  1800  me- 
ters (time  of  flight,  25  seconds).  Each  projectile  contained 
13.5  kgs.,  of  liquid  phosgene  or  chlorpicrin,  so  that  a  great 
concentration  of  gas  could  be  produced  on  a  limited  area. 
Projector  emplacements  could  be  detected  on  airplane  pho- 
tographs, so  that  by  timely  bombardments  the  emplacements 
could  be  destroyed.  Detection  of  the  projector  discharge 
could  not  be  prevented,  but  the  sudden  mass  strike  of  the 
projectiles  nevertheless  came  as  such  a  surprise  as  to  be 
effective  before  the  men  could  put  on  their  masks.  All  regu- 
larity in  the  employment  of  projectors  was  avoided.  A  pro- 
jector bombardment  was  accompanied  by  a  burst  of  other 
fire,  or  was  made  independently,  or  simultaneously  with 
an  attack,  thereby  befogging  the  point  of  penetration.  With 
gas  projectors  one  can  attain  a  far  greater  gas  density  than 


TECHNIQUE   IN  WAR  147 

with  cylinders,  and,  in  addition,  the  gas  is  released  directly 
at  the  target. 

The  matter  of  gas  protection  became  one  of  particular 
importance.  Each  unit  had  its  gas  defense  officers  and  non- 
commissioned officers,  who  were  charged  with  the  mainten- 
ance and  careful  fitting  of  masks  in  the  gas  chamber,  under 
the  full  responsibility  of  their  commanders.  Gas  masks  were 
also  used  for  horses  and  messenger  dogs.  Rapid  adjustment 
of  masks ;  removal  of  the  same  only  by  order  of  an  officer ; 
regulation  of  the  gas  alarm ;  practice  in  carrying  the  mask 
at  rest  and  while  in  motion;  and  training  in  wearing  the 
mask  at  exercises,  trench  work,  and  ammunition  work,  are 
necessary  to  avoid  losses.  Practice  with  masks  should  in- 
clude passing  orders  from  mouth  to  mouth,  giving  com- 
mands, estimating  distances,  aiming,  and  target  practice, 
throwing  of  hand  grenades,  serving  the  telephone,  repair 
of  telephone  lines,  and  first  aid  to  wounded.  In  addition  to 
the  ordinary  mask,  certain  self-contained  oxygen  breathing 
sets  were  used  for  protection  against  mine  gases,  for  which 
the  regular  gas  mask  offered  no  protection.  Toward  the 
end  of  the  war  the  use  of  gas  increased  continually,  so  that 
gas  defense  appliances  became  equally  as  important  as  the 
battle  weapons  themselves. 

Of  other  projectiles,  there  are  still  to  be  mentioned 
hand  grenades  (filled  with  irritating  and  smoke  charges), 
and  incendiary  and  smoke  shell.  The  British  were  the  first 
to  make  use  of  smoke  materials,  for  the  purpose  of  protect- 
ing the  flanks  of  advancing  infantry;  to  obscure  the  view 
of  an  observation  station  or  machine  gun;  for  deception, 
to  divert  the  attention  from  important  points;  to  simulate 
a  gas  attack ;  to  screen  troop  assemblies  in  the  open,  move- 
ments along  roads  and  the  flash  of  guns ;  and,  finally  for  the 
purpose  of  hiding  troop  concentrations  and  movements,  bat- 
teries, and  the  flash  of  guns  from  the  view  of  airplane  ob- 
servers. Batteries  were  completely  helpless  in  the  pres- 
ence of  smoke.  One  could  not  see  10  meters.  Progress  could 
therefore  be  made  from  gun  to  gun  only  by  clinging  to  guide 
ropes.  Registration  points  could  not  be  seen.  Security 
sentries  sent  out  could  not  find  their  way  back.  An  enemy 
attacking  from  the  flank  would  not  be  noticed  until  he 


148  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

reached  the  flank  piece.  Terrain  and  troops  in  rear  of  our 
own  smoke  screen  were  in  general  poorly  protected  against 
aerial  observation.  In  the  interior  of  the  smoke  cloud,  the 
men,  of  course,  could  not  be  seen,  but  were,  nevertheless, 
subjected  to  the  fire  directed  against  the  smoke  cloud.  For 
this  reason  troops  generally  kept  400  meters  in  rear  of  the 
smoke  cloud.  By  frequent  repetition  of  the  smoke  screens, 
the  enemy  may  be  made  to  believe  that  he  is  being  de- 
ceived, merely  to  draw  his  fire.  If  this  has  been  done  a  few 
times  an  attack  following  a  smoke  cloud  may  have  success. 
Troops  advancing  through  a  smoke  cloud  easily  lose  direc- 
tion. 

The  employment  of  minenwerfers  had  been  foreseen 
in  Germany  in  time  of  peace  for  use  in  fortress  warfare  for 
the  destruction  of  wire  entanglements.  In  position  warfare, 
the  need  was  soon  felt  of  supplementing  the  fire  of  the  high 
angle  artillery  by  some  additional  means  for  accurately  pro- 
jecting high-explosive  bombs  at  the  shorter  ranges.  Aux- 
iliary weapons  were  thus  introduced  in  the  form  of  "La- 
dungswerfer"  and  smooth-bore  minenwerfers.  Even  if  min- 
enwerfers could  not  compete  with  artillery  in  the  matter 
of  range,  improvements  nevertheless  seemed  desirable  in 
order  to  assure  greater  freedom  in  the  selection  of  emplace- 
ments. 

Minenwerfers  were  set  up  on  base  plates,  which  did  not 
become  firmly  emplaced,  however,  until  after  the  first  few 
rounds  were  fired.  The  light  minenwerfer  bomb  had  the 
explosive  force  of  the  field  artillery  shell,  but,  naturally, 
with  less  force  of  impact,  due  to  the  smaller  initial  velocity. 

With  like  weight  projectile,  the  propellant  charge  was 
less,  the  explosive  charge  larger,  and  the  dispersion  smaller 
than  is  the  case  with  artillery.  The  construction  was  sim- 
pler and  the  weight  of  the  barrel  smaller  than  for  guns  of 
the  same  caliber;  consequently  it  was  possible  to  produce  a 
larger  material  and  moral  effect  with  less  weapons  and  am- 
munition. But  the  gun  had  the  advantage  of  a  wider  field 
of  utilization ;  it  was  also  difl[icult  to  conceal  the  fire  of  the 
minenwerfer,  the  bringing  up  of  ammunition  was  difficult, 
and  the  rate  of  fire  was  far  less  than  that  of  field  guns. 
Minenwerfers  took  the  place  of  and  augmented  the  use  of 


TECHNIQUE  IN  WAR  149 

field  guns,  and  in  their  method  of  employment  conformed  to 
that  laid  down  in  artillery  regulations. 

The  problem  as  to  which  arm  of  the  service  the  minen- 
werfers — which  are  placed  in  position  and  served  by  pio- 
neers ;  intended  to  augment  the  fire  of  the  artillery,  and  for 
larger  battle  control  assigned  tactically  the  same ;  and  which 
must  be  employed  in  co-operation  with  and  emplaced  in  the 
area  on  the  infantry — were  to  be  assigned,  was  a  much- 
mooted  question  that  was  not  answered  conclusively  in  the 
World  War.  Probably  it  would  have  been  the  simplest  thing 
to  have  assigned  them  from  the  beginning  to  the  infantry. 

At  first  each  division  was  furnished  a  minenwerf er  com- 
pany by  the  pioneers,  in  which  all  3  kinds  of  minenwerfers 
(3  heavy,  6  medium,  and  12  light)  were  united,  and  which 
was  under  the  orders  of  the  pioneer  commander.  Finally 
these  companies  included  4  heavy  and  8  medium  minen- 
werfers. This  arrangement  was  not  satisfactory.  Then 
each  battalion  during  the  position  warfare,  until  May,  1917, 
was  equipped  with  4  light  minenwerfers,  which  were  served 
by  the  infantry,  and  which  were  employed,  in  defense,  for 
barrage  fire  and  against  trenches ;  in  attack  they  were  em- 
ployed especially  against  machine  guns.  The  instructions 
which  were  issued  to  combine  the  minenwerfers  of  a  regi- 
ment for  the  purpose  of  securing  uniformity  of  training  and 
employment,  prepared  the  way  for  the  organization  of  regi- 
mental minenwerfer  companies.  Distributing  the  minen- 
werfers to  companies  in  the  battalion  was  forbidden.  The 
difficulties  of  ammunition  transport  by  means  of  infantry 
carrying  parties  necessitated  the  adoption  of  minenwerfer 
carts.  With  the  introduction  of  a  wheeled,  flat-trajectory 
mount,  the  possibility  of  employing  minenwerfers  against 
tanks  and  machine  guns  was  very  much  increased.  Later, 
the  High  Command  held  a  large  number  of  minenwerfer 
units  at  its  disposition.  On  September  1,  1918,  the  division 
minenwerfer  companies  were  disbarided  and  their  place 
taken  by  regimental  minenwerfer  companies,  with  9  light 
minenwerfers,  horse-drawn  (1-horse) ;  and  with  3  medium 
minenwerfers,  unhorsed,  to  serve  as  reserve  material.  The 
order  to  organize  a  company  consisting  of  medium  and  heavy 
minenwerfers  came  to  naught  because  of  the  difficulties  of 
the  draft  replacement  situation. 


150  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

In  large  battles,  the  tactical  employment  of  minenwer- 
fers  was  in  accordance  with  the  orders  of  the  artillery  com- 
mander. The  minenwerfers  adopted  the  methods  of  fire 
of  the  artillery  (destruction,  harassing,  annihilation  and 
barrage  fire) .  This  was  especially  applicable  to  the  minen- 
werfer  battalions  of  General  Headquarters.  But  as  the 
minenwerfer  companies  were  integral  units  of  the  infan- 
try regiments,  they  had  of  course  to  revert  to  the  regiments 
at  the  proper  time.  Heavy  and  medium  minenwerfers  were 
unsuited  for  barrage  fire,  because  of  their  low  rate  of  fire. 
They  found  employment,  however,  in  destruction  fire  and 
also  in  gas  bombardments.  They  were  quite  effective  against 
obstacles.  When  equipped  with  flat-trajectory  mount,  the 
light  minenwerfers  were  employed  especially  against  live 
targets,  against  machine  gun  nests,  and  in  flat-trajectory 
fire  against  tanks.  They  performed  valuable  services  also 
in  mountain  warfare.  To  facilitate  fire  control,  the  minen- 
werfers were  formed  in  groups  according  to  target  and  ter- 
rain. It  was  estimated  that,  for  assault  preparation,  2  med- 
ium or  1  heavy  minenwerfer  bombs  were  required  for  each 
meter  of  front  of  the  hostile  position,  so  that  in  order  not 
to  extend  the  duration  of  the  preparation  too  much,  1  med- 
ium or  heavy  and  1  light  minenwerfer  were  employed  for 
every  50  meters  of  front. 


VI.     The  Defensive  Battle  in  Position  Warfare 

The  battles  during  the  year  1917  had  brought  opinion 
concerning  the  defense  to  a  final  conclusion.  All  battles 
confirmed  the  experience,  that  any  penetration  of  a  posi- 
tion can  be  stopped  only  by  a  properly  prepared  depth  zone ; 
this  of  course  demanded  enormous  labor  of  the  troops.  No 
matter  how  desirable  it  was  to  have  the  troops  construct 
the  position  in  its  entire  extent  of  breadth  and  depth  the 
necessity  of  having  the  troops  enjoy  complete  rest  at  times 
operated  against  this.  A  division  front  in  tranquil  sectors 
could  be  6  kilometers  and  more,  but  in  an  active  sector  that 
breadth  could  not  be  more  than  3  to  4  kilometers.  It  was 
difficult  to  determine  the  exact  time  when  the  division  sec- 
tors could  be  reduced  by  the  insertion  of  fresh  divisions ;  if 
reinforcements  came  too  late,  the  fresh  troops  did  not  have 
time  to  get  accustomed  to  their  new  surroundings.  As 
knowledge  of  the  terrain  is  one  of  the  principal  advantages 
the  defender  has  over  the  attacker,  it  is  better  to  hold  the 
fresh  troops  back  than  to  insert  them  too  late.  Even  the 
strongest  construction  went  to  pieces  in  the  course  of  time 
under  heavy  concentrated  fire.  The  trench  system  was 
changed  into  a  shell-torn  field.  Obstacles  were  swept  away, 
well  known  points  or  targets  destroyed  or  obliterated  in  a 
very  short  time,  while  inconspicuous  works,  that  did  not 
betray  themselves  on  the  airplane  photographs  by  tracks 
and  shadows,  had  an  unusually  long  life.  Artillery  positions 
in  the  open  protected  from  aerial  observation  lost  far  less 
than  well  entrenched  batteries.  Artillery  effect  can  be  di- 
minished only  by  extending  the  targets  in  breadth  and  depth. 
The  greater  is  the  distribution  of  works,  the  less  they  are 
perceived  by  the  enemy,  and  the  more  difficult  it  will  be  from 
a  question  of  ammunition  supply,  to  destroy  them. 

It  is  important  to  have  the  main  line  of  resistance  and 
observation  posts  withdrawn  from  direct  terrestrial  obser- 
vation. Of  less  importance  is  the  extent  of  the  field  of  fire, 
which  is  frequently  best  met  by  a  "Rear-slope  position"  with 

161 


152  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

direct  observation.  On  nearly  all  parts  of  the  front,  hostile 
attack  preparations  were  easily  perceived.  Surprise,  as  a 
prerequisite  for  success,  gained  increased  importance. 

In  tranquil  times,  earthworks,  with  shelters  and  ob- 
stacles, are  important  principally  as  they  force  the  attacker 
to  start  extensive  preparations.  His  artillery  fire  will  aid 
in  penetration,  and  therefore  will  be  directed  mainly  upon 
the  front  line  trenches ;  these  must  be  weakly  occupied  as 
"security"  trenches  and  equipped  with  only  a  few  small  shel- 
ters. In  the  2d  and  3d  line  trenches  the  rest  of  the  garri- 
son is  distributed  with  their  light  minenwerfers,  while  the 
heavy  minenwerfers  are  imbedded,  under  infantry  protec- 
tion, in  the  shape  of  a  checkerboard,  and  as  inconspicuously 
as  practicable,  to  serve  as  "strong  points"  in  the  interme- 
diate terrain.  It  is  the  task  of  the  troops  in  readiness  be- 
hind the  first  line  to  eject  the  enemy  by  an  immediate  coun- 
ter-shock. More  and  more  did  the  importance  of  a  deeply 
formed  gallery  system  become  evident.  There  was  a  lack 
of  labor  to  meet  this  demand.  Skillfully  constructed  ap- 
proach trenches,  arranged  for  fire  preparation,  proved  es- 
pecially suited  to  "lock-in"  an  enemy  that  had  entered. 

Battle  zones  must  extend  sufficiently  in  depth  to  force 
the  attacker  to  move  his  artillery  forward.  Every  oppor- 
tunity for  defense  between  the  lines  and  fighting  zones 
must  be  utilized  for  strong  points. 

Looking  back  we  will  once  more  emphasize,  that,  at  the 
beginning  of  the  position  warfare,  the  front  lines  (without 
regard  to  the  terrain)  were  where  our  attacks  had  stopped. 
For  reasons  of  morale  abandonment  of  terrain  was  rejected ; 
the  battle  was  conducted  on  a  single  line  with  the  resisting 
power  increased  by  all  possible  means  (Autumn  battle  in 
the  Champagne).  Even  in  favorable  cases  hostile  entry 
into  our  positions  was  prevented  only  with  heavy  losses. 
In  the  Somme  battle  the  attackers  succeeded  in  smashing 
with  their  artillery  our  front  line,  so  that  the  troops  in 
readiness  could  not  start  the  counter-attack.  That  had  to 
be  left  to  troops  farther  in  rear.  The  smashed  trenches  in 
front  could  have  been  temporarily  abandoned,  if,  at  the 
conclusion  of  the  battle,  the  terrain  was  still  in  our  hands. 
We  fought  for  the  possession  of  the  front  trench  at  a  heavy 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  153 

loss.  The  necessity  to  camouflage  all  works  from  air  and 
ground  reconnaissance,  in  order  to  deceive  the  hostile  ob- 
server by  color  and  form,  assumed  prime  importance  both 
to  us  and  our  enemies.  It  was  shown  in  1917  that  in  the 
face  of  the  increased  artillery  preparation  the  leading 
trenches  were  always  lost.  The  more  the  defense  insisted 
on  holding  the  leading  trenches,  the  more  severe  was  the 
loss  in  men  and  materiel  besides  the  loss  of  terrain.  Loss 
of  men  could  be  avoided  only  by  a  distribution  in  depth. 
Difficulty  of  replacing  our  losses  demanded  husbanding  our 
men.  "The  object  of  defensive  battle  is  no  longer  clinging 
to  possession  of  the  terrain,  but  rather  the  utmost  infliction 
of  damage  to  the  enemy  while  preserving  our  own  forces." 
If  possible,  unfavorable  terrain  should  be  left  in  the  hands 
of  the  enemy.  It  is  better  to  voluntarily  abandon  unfavor- 
able, shell  plowed  and  torn  positions  and  to  lose  terrain  only, 
not  men  and  valuable  materiel  in  addition.  "The  defender 
is  not  rigidly  bound  to  his  place,  he  is  far  rather  justified 
to  fight  mobile  on  the  battlefield,  that  is  to  advance  or  give 
way  according  to  need.  But  the  maxim,  that  at  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  battle  the  entire  battle  terrain  shall  be  in  pos- 
session of  the  defender  unless  direct  orders  are  received  to 
the  contrary  must  be  at  heavy  cost  in  men."  The  defender 
gave  way  under  the  hostile  fire,  the  battle  line  responded  to 
the  pressure  and  laid  itself  like  an  elastic  band  around  the 
attacker.  For  the  support  of  this  mobile  defense  "strong 
points"  were  created  in  the  intermediate  terrain  interspersed 
with  machine  guns  and  infantry  groups.  Through  skillful 
adaption  to  the  terrain  these  were  hidden  from  view,  and 
could  not  be  annihilated  by  the  artillery  preparation.  It 
was  their  task  to  stop  the  flood  that  rolled  forward  after 
the  shattering  of  the  front  trenches,  and  to  disorganize  it 
prior  to  its  reaching  our  rear.  Only  with  the  introduction 
of  tanks  was  it  possible  to  hold  down  our  machine  gun  fire 
during  the  attack.  Mobility  of  the  reserves  was  increased, 
regular  mobile  battles  ensued  within  a  position,  in  which 
horse  artillery  participated. 

That  was  the  substance  of  the  elastic  defense.  Thus, 
from  the  battle  for  possession  of  the  front  trench,  developed 
a  battle  in  a  depth  zone. 


154  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

By  the  fact  that  the  opposing  positions  were  very- 
close  to  each  other,  frequently  considerably  less  than  100 
meters  (believed  impossible  prior  to  the  war),  it  happened 
that  the  front  line  was  exposed  to  hostile  minenwerfers. 
This  proximity  of  front  lines  enabled  the  attacker  to  quickly 
pass  the  stationary  barrage,  and  be  in  the  hostile  trenches, 
before  the  garrison  could  leave  its  shelters.  Almost  with- 
out exception  the  weak  defender,  working  gradually  out  of 
his  shelters,  fought  against  superior  numbers.  This  fact 
accounts  for  the  large  number  of  prisoners  taken.  Creat- 
ing more  favorable  conditions  for  the  defender  could  be 
obtained  only  by  avoiding  crowding  the  front  trenches,  and 
prolonging  the  distances  the  attacker  had  to  cover.  This 
led  to  the  establishment  of  the  zone  defense.  Troops  in 
the  front  line  in  the  zone  defense  are  charged  with  the  same 
tasks  that  in  the  mobile  war,  falls  to  the  outposts. 

The  outpost  position  is  for  the  purpose  of  preventing 
the  enemy  gaining,  without  great  losses,  a  point  of  attack 
in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  our  main  line  of  resistance. 
Resistance  should  increase  the  deeper  the  enemy  penetrates. 
Deceiving  the  enemy  concerning  the  location  of  our  main 
line  of  resistance  and  creating  time  for  the  troops  in  rear 
to  be  ready  for  action,  is  the  duty  of  the  outpost  position. 
Whether  the  main  battle  runs  its  course  on  the  outpost  line, 
or  in  rear  is  the  business  of  the  highest  commander,  and 
not  of  the  troops.  The  troops  offer  a  stubborn  resistance 
at  the  point  designated,  until  different  orders  are  received. 
The  outpost  position  is  occupied  in  force  only  by  direct  or- 
ders of  the  commander  when  the  attack  has  been  perceived. 
In  tranquil  times,  the  outpost  position  is  held  lightly  but 
with  sufficient  force  to  drive  off  hostile  patrols,  or  eject  at 
once  a  hostile  raid.  The  effort  to  establish  two  fortified 
positions,  keep  them  up,  and  supply  them  with  means  of 
information  and  communication,  requires  too  many  troops 
for  the  labor  purposes. 

In  tranquil  times,  we  will  frequently  quarter  a  portion 
of  the  garrison  in  the  outpost  position,  and  withdraw  them 
at  the  opening  of  the  artillery  duel,  or  at  other  unmistakable 
signs  that  an  attack  is  about  to  commence.  To  deceive  the 
enemy  as  to  strength  of  garrison  is  difficult  at  all  times. 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  155 

Diminution  of  troops  and  the  traffic  as  well  as  the  up-keep 
of  the  position  will  soon  leave  traces  on  aerial  photographs. 
The  method  of  conducting  the  battle  cannot  be  kept  away 
from  the  troops,  and  may  be  brought  to  the  knowledge  of 
the  enemy  by  prisoners.  In  any  case  the  outpost  position 
must  have  sufficient  troops  to  compel  the  attacker  to  deploy 
his  full  force,  so  that  they  can  hold  the  hostile  advanced 
troops  with  the  means  at  hand  and  give  way,  according  to 
plan  only  when  it  is  clearly  seen  that  the  main  attack  is  im- 
minent, and  our  main  defensive  forces  have  been  alarmed. 
Only  when  we  strictly  insist  on  the  outpost  position  not  be- 
ing evacuated  without  orders,  can  we  overcome  the  disad- 
vantages connected  with  giving  way  to  the  rear.  The  out- 
post position  may  also  be  given  the  mission  of  offering  as 
much  resistance  as  possible  to  the  attack,  in  order  to  create 
favorable  conditions  for  the  counter-attack.  It  is  better  to 
sacrifice  the  garrison  than  to  abandon  the  original  battle 
plan.  If  the  attacker  succeeds  with  his  surprise,  then  the 
foreground  will  become  a  false  position.  In  such  case  we 
can  count  on  a  decrease  of  the  hostile  artillery  fire.  But 
if  the  defender  himself  intends  to  carry  out  extensive 
artillery  fire  on  the  hostile  back  areas,  there  is  nothing 
left  for  him  but  to  leave  a  portion  of  his  guns  in  the  fore- 
ground; it  will  be  questionable  in  case  of  a  heavy  attack  if 
the  guns  can  be  brought  back  in  time.  The  outpost  battle 
when  conducted  with  small  detachments  with  many  machine 
guns  firing  from  all  sides  will  delay  the  attacker.  Infantry 
in  the  outpost  acts  primarily  as  security  detachments  for 
machine  guns  and  advanced  artillery.  Reduction  of  the  in- 
fantry force  in  a  sector  leaves  no  doubt  in  the  minds  of 
the  troops  concerning  the  intention  of  our  high  command, 
and  natuarlly  does  not  increase  the  feeling  of  security  of 
the  garrison.  Consideration  of  plans  for  artillery  in  de- 
fense requires  a  decision  as  to  whether  the  falling-back  to 
its  final  position  is  to  be  made  in  one  move  or  whether  a 
temporary  halt  will  first  be  made  in  the  intermediate  ter- 
rain. The  longer  we  delay  the  enemy  in  front  of  our  main 
battle  position  the  better,  but  this  should  never  lead  to  the 
outpost  troops  being  cut  off.  Frequently  the  necessity  of 
keeping  possession  of  important  observation  posts  leads  to 


166  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  decision  to  hold  the  outpost  line.  In  this  case  the  main 
line  of  resistance  would  coincide  with  the  outpost  defensive 
line,  unless  terrain  in  front  could  be  gained  by  an  attack. 
The  primary  mission  of  artillery  is  protection  of  the  main 
battle  position  and  it  must  in  certain  cases  decline  the  im- 
portant artillery  duel  during  the  hostile  attack  preparation. 
Some  artillery  must  be  in  advanced  positions,  and  stationary 
barrage  and  annihilating  fire  must  be  assured  in  front  of 
the  main  line.  Detached  pieces  (advanced  guns)  which 
can  deceive  the  enemy  as  to  their  number  by  rapid  fire  from 
several  different  positions  are  efficacious.  As  we  learned, 
bringing  back  the  artillery  was  successful  beyond  all  ex- 
pectations. The  main  target  for  the  artillery  will  always 
be  the  hostile  infantry.  It  must  be  beaten  down  before  it 
reaches  the  main  battle  position.  This  requires  powerful 
and  accurate  fire  concentration  from  the  artillery's  own  and 
neighboring  sectors  against  definite  points  of  the  foreground. 
The  different  tasks  of  the  artillery  in  the  fight  for  posses- 
sion of  the  outpost  zone  of  the  main  battle  position  can  be  in 
most  cases  solved  only  from  many  different  positions.  The 
most  careful  preparatory  work  in  tranquil  times  covering 
supply  of  ammunition,  arranging  observation  posts,  laying 
lines  of  communication,  etc.,  is  essential.  Regard  for  se- 
crecy must  never  mislead  the  highest  commander  to  aban- 
don range  finding  for  the  primary  barrages  and  the  annihil- 
ating fire  directed  in  front  of  our  main  battle  position.  Nor- 
mal fire  in  tranquil  times  may  be  laid  on  zones  far  in  rear 
of  the  enemy.  With  increasing  activity  of  the  hostile  ar- 
tillery there  arises  increased  difficulties  in  distinguishing 
between  our  and  the  enemy's  hits,  a  temporary  evacuation  of 
portions  of  our  positions  may  be  ordered,  and  firing  data 
carefully  collected  in  quiet  times  must  be  available.  The 
main  point  is  to  hide  the  range-finding  from  the  attention 
of  the  enemy  by  proper  distribution  over  a  period  of  time. 
For  the  purpose  of  deception  it  was  found  well  to  use  for 
range-finding  shells  with  time-fuses,  or  fire  by  salvos  of 
three  pieces  against  the  enemy,  while  the  fourth  piece  found 
the  desired  range.  A  few  trial  shots  sufficed  for  the  ne- 
cessary firing  data. 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  157 

Theoretically,  the  idea  is  that  the  outpost  should  be 
evacuated  only  at  a  well  understood  signal  of  the  commander 
of  the  troops,  but  errors  in  this  are  very  easy.  How  is  this 
order  or  signal  to  be  made  known  to  neighboring  and  our 
own  troops?  If  the  departure  is  to  be  made  without  fric- 
tion, the  subordinate  commanders  and  troops  must  have  a 
clear  idea  concerning  the  course  of  the  retreat  fight,  and  this 
knowledge  will  betray  the  intention  of  the  commander. 
Probably  the  first  intimation  given  to  the  subordinate  com- 
manders that  the  position  will  be  evacuated  will  be  when 
the  artillery  is  drawn  back,  which  requires  at  least  one  or 
two  nights.  The  later  the  orders  are  issued,  the  more  diffi- 
cult will  it  be  to  transmit  them  through  the  increased  hostile 
fire.  Before  evacuation  begins  the  enemy  should  at  least 
be  compelled  to  resort  to  extensive  enveloping  work,  heavy 
losses,  and  expenditure  of  a  large  amount  of  ammunition. 
There  are  no  rules  governing  the  exact  time  these  orders 
should  be  issued ;  to  properly  determine  that  time  is  one  of 
the  most  difficult  tasks  of  leadership.  Raids,  increased  gass- 
ing, and  the  arrival  of  deserters,  are  sure  signs  an  attack 
is  imminent.  The  right  to  order  the  evacuation  had  best  be 
left  to  the  Army  or  Corps,  not  to  the  different  division  com- 
manders. There  may  be  cases  when  the  commander  of  the 
outpost  troops  should  have  authority  to  independently  order 
the  evacuation.  Orders  for  covering  fire  should  be  issued  by 
the  same  headquarters  at  the  same  time  evacuation  orders 
are  issued.  The  possibility  of  fully  utilizing  the  advantages 
of  the  outpost  terrain  depends  above  all  else  on  the  efficiency 
of  the  means  of  communication,  which  must  assure  battle 
control.  Increased  means  of  information  are  necessary. 
As  a  last  means  there  remains  communication  by  simple 
signals  with  our  airplanes.  Comimunication  between  troops 
on  the  ground  with  airplanes  is  difficult.  It  is  probably  too 
much  to  demand  the  troops  keep  one  eye  on  the  enemy  and 
one  in  the  air.  Every  lull  in  the  hostile  fire  should  be 
taken  advantage  of  to  move  troops. 

In  general  the  depth  of  an  outpost  zone  will  be  about 
500  meters  and  never  more  than  1000.  In  greater  depth, 
means  of  communication  are  insecure.  Barrage  fire  to  the 
flank  on  portions  of  the  position  which  are  holding  out  be- 


i5d  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

come  ineffective  and  personal  observation  which  the  com- 
mander should  have  is  difficult.  If  any  foreground  is  less 
than  100  meters,  the  advantage  of  compelling  the  opponent 
to  cross  a  fire  swept  zone  is  lost.  In  any  case,  the  weaker 
our  artillery  is,  and  the  less  time  available  to  prepare  the 
position,  the  greater  will  be  its  depth.  A  prime  requisite 
for  success  is  concealment. 

After  an  attack  has  been  stopped  the  troops,  by  coun- 
ter-attack, at  once  regain  possession  of  the  foreground.  If 
this  is  not  done,  we  will  finally  be  forced  to  evacuate  our 
position.  But  the  danger  that  the  decisive  battle  may  take 
place  too  far  in  advance  must  be  called  to  attention ;  if  we 
desire  to  hazard  that,  it  must  be  done  with  firm  decision  and 
not  left  to  the  subordinate  commanders. 

The  strength  of  the  outpost  garrison  is  generally  fixed 
at  1  to  2  infantry  squads  and  one  machine  gun  squad  for 
each  company;  this  is  in  general  better  than  to  place  an 
entire  company  on  a  broad  sector.  We  generally  disliked 
to  do  without  the  light  minenwerfers  of  the  infantry;  me- 
dium and  heavy  minenwerfers,  considering  their  limited 
range,  have  to  be  placed  far  to  the  front.  These  can 
hardly  be  brought  back  in  time  because  of  their  poor  mo- 
bility, but  they  are  excellent  means  of  misleading  the  ene- 
my, and  if  they  succeed  in  deceiving  and  inflicting  loss 
on  the  enemy  their  own  loss  has  been  weir  paid  for.  The 
outpost  zone  has  proved  its  value  in  the  battles  in  Flanders. 
The  events  at  Verdun  speak  less  in  its  favor. 

The  infantry  soon  felt  that  strong  occupation  of  the 
front  trenches,  unnecessarily  increased  the  losses.  When 
the  Allies  concentrated  their  heavy  fire  more  and  more  on 
the  trenches  in  rear,  it  was  quite  natural  that  all  eluded  the 
fire  by  moving  forward  and  thus  again  made  more  dense  the 
occupation  of  the  front  trenches  (October,  1917,  in  Flan- 
ders) ;  large  losses  were  the  result. 

The  demand  came  from  the  troops  themselves  not  to 
occupy  the  front  trenches  systematically.  This  procedure 
undoubtedly  would  have  been  advantageous  at  the  time  of 
the  hostile  artillery  preparation  in  attacks  on  a  large  scale. 

There  must  be  sufficient  troops  to  stop  an  attack  and 
the  individual  must  have  a  neighbor  in  his  vicinity  to  in- 
crease his  self-confidence. 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  159 

The  losses  among  the  defenders  of  the  front  line  can 
not  be  avoided ;  the  commander  however,  must  refrain  from 
continually  reinforcing  that  line,  for  the  losses  then  would 
be  unjustifiable.  The  reserves  must  seek  the  decision.  The 
general  rule  within  the  division  was  to  place  the  infantry 
regiments  abreast  with  battalions  in  column.  These  were 
known  as  fighting,  readiness,  and  rest  battalions,  and  were 
changed  about  every  two  weeks.  In  the  matter  of  forma- 
tion it  was  advised  that  from  the  front  line  battalion  of  4 
companies  to  every  200  meters  front  there  should  be  one-half 
of  each  company  occupying  the  main  position,  one-sixth 
of  each  company  with  their  automatic  rifles  200  meters  in 
advance  for  security  purposes  and  to  resist  weak  attacks 
by  raiding  parties,  about  one-third  of  each  company  with  2 
automatic  rifles  forward  as  a  support.  Before  a  threatened 
attack  the  support  was  withdrawn  to  the  main  line  of  re- 
sistance. The  supporting  battalion  deployed  on  a  depth 
of  500  meters  was  brought  up  to  within  200  meters,  and 
in  case  of  an  attack  the  2  companies  automatically  took 
the  place  vacated  by  the  support  while  the  2  rear  companies 
take  the  place  of  the  2  front  companies.  The  regiment  had 
a  front  of  800  meters  with  both  its  forward  battalions  hav- 
ing a  depth  of  about  1000  meters.  Proper  consideration 
was  given  to  holding  only  weakly  the  front  line,  only  80 
men  with  12  automatic  rifles,  while  in  the  main  line  of  re- 
sistance were  240  men  with  12  automatic  rifles  and  8  ma- 
chine guns,  which  were  reinforced  by  160  men  with  4  ma- 
chine guns,  while  for  a  counter-attack  240  men  with  12 
automatic  rifles  and  the  Machine  Gun  company  were  in 
readiness.  This  was  the  arrangement  made  for  strong 
counter-attacks.  Against  hostile  attacks,  artillery  counter- 
offensive  preparation  fire  proved  specially  effective,  whereas 
barrage  fire  was  always  a  makeshift  as  in  most  cases  it 
came  too  late,  and  on  account  of  the  intensive  artillery 
counter  preparation  was  undertaken  by  fewer  guns  than 
had  originally  been  intended.  The  "stationary  barrage" 
required  material  augmentation  by  light  minenwerfers  and 
by  the  fire  of  machine  guns  withheld  until  the  moment  of 
the  assault.  It  was  intended  to  stop  the  hostile  reinforce- 
ment by  placing  barrage  fire  on  critical  points,  to  delay  by 


160  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tenacious  resistance  within  the  position  the  progress  of  the 
hostile  infantry,  at  least  enough  to  prevent  their  having 
the  protection  of  the  creeping  barrage.  Only  artillery  which 
co-operates  fully  with  infantry  and  which  observes  every 
nook  and  corner  of  the  battlefield  is  equal  to  the  demands 
of  the  defensive  battle.  In  the  forces  held  in  readiness  in 
rear  lies  the  decision. 

In  the  penetration  planned  by  General  Nivelle  certain 
troops  held  in  readiness  were  to  be  thrown  in  if  the  attack 
had  passed  over  the  trench  system.  It  was  realized  that 
the  deeper  the  penetration  the  weaker  would  be  the  leading 
detachments,  the  more  insufficient  the  artillery  support  and 
the  deeper  the  flank.  To  counteract  the  effect  of  the  pene- 
tration that  might  cross  our  trench  system,  an  "interfer- 
ence"* division  was  placed  in  readiness  behind  the  trench 
system.  This  division  could  be  used  if  the  attacker  endeav- 
ored to  reach  far  off  objectives  beyond  the  main  position. 
But  when  General  Petain  perceived  the  German  method  of 
defense  he  contented  himself  with  limited  objectives  at 
close  range  aided  by  a  systematic  barrage  of  shell  and  gas. 
Nothing  therefore  remained  for  us  but  to  execute  the  coun- 
ter-attack with  troops  consisting  of  all  arms  in  the  position 
system.  If  the  counter-attack  is  not  launched  immediately 
the  reserve  troops  remain  inactive  and  are  finally  destroyed 
by  fire.  The  commander  of  the  defense  has  to  reckon  with 
a  deep  penetration  and  also  with  an  attack  against  a  limited 
objective.  The  task  of  the  interference  troops  is  difficult; 
they  must  be  at  the  proper  point  and  beyond  hostile  artil- 
lery fire.  They  must  not  be  frittered  away  by  piece-meal, 
but  must  be  thrown  as  a  unit  into  the  counter-attack. 

The  local  counter-attack  and  the  general  counter-at- 
tack differ  only  in  point  of  time  when  they  become  effective. 
The  local  counter-attack  acts  automatically,  inunediately 
when  the  enemy  enters.  The  disorder  among  the  hostile 
troops,  the  impossibility  of  support  by  artillery  facilitate 
the  counter-attack  and  explain  the  success  achieved  by  even 
weak,  but  well  led  detachments. 

The  general  counter-attack  is  a  systematic  attack,  made 
after  thorough  artillery  preparation  unless  the  situation  per- 


*Interference  troops  are  those  held  in  readiness  for  counter-attack. 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  161 

mits  surprise.  "Local  counter-attacks  launched  too  late 
do  not  differ  from  overhasty  general  counter-attacks;  they 
are  useless  and  must  be  prohibited." 

In  the  general  counter-attack  preparations  can  be  made 
only  after  a  definite  decision  has  been  reached.  The  time 
element  is  immaterial.  General  counter-attacks  have  been 
successful  when  the  leadership  understood  how  to  wait  and 
not  endeavor  to  recover  every  loss  of  ground.  It  is  an  er- 
ror to  be  led  into  making  any  attack  insufficiently  prepared. 
Frequently  the  measures  taken  by  the  enemy  are  insufficient 
to  retain  what  he  has  gained. 

In  the  local  counter-attack  all  preparations  must  have 
been  completed  beforehand.  If  the  enemy  has  entered, 
that  is  the  signal  for  starting  the  local  counter-attack;  if 
we  delay  all  hopes  of  success  will  fade.  In  tranquil  times 
local  and  general  reserves  must  utilize  the  available  time 
for  practicing  counter-attacks.  Any  counter-attack  comes 
too  late  if  the  enemy  has  succeeded  in  arranging  his  de- 
fense, that  is,  if  he  has  regulated  his  depth  formation,  is- 
sued his  orders  and  prepared  artillery  barrage,  and  coun- 
ter preparation  fire.  The  better  we  have  prepared  our  de- 
fensive zone  the  more  effectively  our  machine  guns  can 
participate  from  all  sides,  the  more  decisive  the  counter- 
attack will  be  executed,  and  the  more  stubborn  will  strong 
points  hold  out.  The  more  time  leading  waves  can  be  held 
up  in  overcoming  strong  points  and  machine  guns  the  less 
will  the  attacker  profit  from  the  protection  of  his  steadily 
advancing  barrage.  Only  in  this  manner  can  we  account 
for  the  surprising  success  gained  by  small  detachments.  If, 
however,  the  troops  hesitate  only  a  short  time  and  allow  the 
attacker  to  reorganize  the  terrain  it  is  not  improbable  that 
the  shock  of  even  a  prepared  detachment  will  not  be  suc- 
cessful. 

A  prime  requirement  for  success  is  that  the  commander 
of  the  troops  in  readiness  carefully  observes  conditions  of 
the  front  line,  that  he  does  not  allow  himself  to  be  drawn 
into  making  a  jump  in  the  dark,  or  an  uncertain  start. 
Interference  troops  held  in  rear  of  the  defensive  zone  are 
reserves  in  the  hands  of  the  higher  commander.  They 
form  a  support  to  the  fighting  front.    They  may  relieve 


162  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

front  line  divisions  by  furnishing  security  detachments, 
connecting  groups  and  finally,  battle  reserves,  so  that  the 
divisions  in  the  front  line  can  insert  their  last  man  without 
fear  in  holding  the  position.  When  the  battle  reserves  of 
the  division  in  the  front  line  are  inserted,  portions  of  the 
interference  division  may  take  their  place  as  battle  reserves, 
their  own  places  being  then  taken  by  troops  from  the  rear. 
Through  this  systematic  closing  up  of  the  reserves,  the 
sharp  and  rapid  counter-attack  is  assured.  Places  of  readi- 
ness for  troops  depend  on  the  task  and  the  possibility  of 
shelter.  In  tranquil  times  it  will  be  advisable  to  advance 
from  each  division,  what  is  called  an  interference  third  (3 
battalions,  3  batteries,  pioneer  company  and  telephone  de- 
tachment) ,  to  the  edge  of  the  zone  of  hostile  fire.  Attach- 
ing labor  parties  to  the  interference  third  to  construct 
covered  trenches  is  desirable.  The  remainder  of  the  troops 
of  the  interference  division  remain  in  their  quarters  in  rear 
and  in  their  sectors  complete  their  training.  For  bringing 
up  troops  and  supplies,  horses  are  useful  in  tranquil  times. 
The  message  service  performed  by  troopers,  proved  very 
satisfactory  in  Flanders  and  at  Verdun.  Only  thus  can  we 
avoid  the  regimental  units  becoming  lost  or  losing  touch 
with  their  commanders.  From  the  base  of  attack  forward, 
the  employment  of  horses,  however,  will  be  impracticable, 
from  there  on  the  message  dog  and  above  all  the  efficient 
battle  runner,  starts  his  work. 

Reinforcing  the  front  line  almost  always  proceeds  under 
the  pressure  of  events  and  under  heavy  hostile  fire.  Only 
prior  knowledge  of  the  battle  terrain,  of  its  shelter,  com- 
munication, organization,  and  plan  of  defense,  may  procure 
favorable  conditions  for  the  success  of  the  interfering 
troops.  It  is  necessary  that  the  plan  be  so  completely  pre- 
pared that  it  can  be  started  at  a  given  work  or  signal. 

As  a  matter  of  experience,  the  division  in  the  front 
line  had  best  keep  control  of  its  interference  troops;  that 
division  knows  the  progress  of  the  battle  information  con- 
ditions, and  the  terrain,  and  has  the  greatest  interest  in 
holding  its  fighting  zone.  Only  in  this  way  may  we  assure 
unity  in  battle  action.  For  the  same  reason  it  is  advisable 
to  have  the  headquarters  of  the  division  in  the  front  line 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  163 

and  the  interference  division  at  one  and  the  same  command 
post.  If  the  interference  division  covers  several  division 
sectors,  then  personal  conferences  should  take  place  prior 
to  the  battle  and  it  will  be  advisable  to  send  liaison  officers 
to  the  divisions  in  the  front  line.  In  the  same  manner, 
connection  between  the  interference  regiments  and  the  regi- 
ments in  the  front  line  will  be  required.  Headquarters 
should  be  at  one  and  the  same  point  if  for  nothing  else 
than  mutual  exchange  of  experiences  and  utilizing  the  shel- 
ter facilities  that  have  already  been  prepared. 

Rank  of  the  commanders  must  not  be  allowed  to  inter- 
fere. By  placing  the  interference  division  under  the  or- 
ders of  the  division  in  the  front  line,  there  is  danger  that 
the  latter  will  absorb  gradually  the  battalions  of  the  for- 
mer for  mere  defensive  purposes.  This  absorption  has  no 
bearing  on  the  final  result  of  the  battle,  and  is  absolutely 
dangerous.  In  nearly  all  battles,  portions,  sometimes  strong 
forces,  of  the  interference  division  remain  immobile.  In 
most  cases  the  commanders  of  the  troops  in  the  front  posi- 
tion have,  without  good  reason,  requested  that  units  should 
remain  in  a  certain  place  in  order  to  reinforce  some  endan- 
gered part  of  the  position.  No  attention  must  be  paid  to 
such  requests.  The  commander  who  declines  will  take  the 
responsibility  for  declining.  Orders  for  starting  local 
counter-attacks  can  be  given  only  by  the  headquarters  of 
the  division  in  the  front  line.  Headquarters  of  interfer- 
ence divisions  knows  too  little  about  the  situation,  and  its 
orders  in  any  case  would  arrive  too  late.  The  commander 
of  the  interfering  troops  had  better  orient  himself  with  his 
own  means  at  hand,  concerning  the  situation,  and  indepen- 
dently order  the  general  counter-attack.  Army  Headquar- 
ters ordered,  and  not  without  justification:  "It  is  strictly 
forbidden  to  delay  local  counter-attacks  while  permission  of 
next  higher  headquarters  is  requested."  That  is  indeed 
very  correct:  such  a  question  merely  shows  that  the  com- 
mander is  lacking  in  decision  and  energy,  and  in  waiting  for 
an  answer  so  much  time  is  lost  that  the  shock  would  come 
too  late.  This  holds  good  equally  for  small  and  large  en- 
gagements. The  question,  when  the  division  counter-attack 
shall  be  started,  is  of  very  great  importance.     At  Verdun  it 


164  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

took  in  favorable  cases,  from  1^  to  2  hours  after  the  divi- 
sion orders  were  issued  until  the  troops  started.  In  heavily 
shelled  terrain  we  can  count,  in  favorable  cases,  on  45  min- 
utes for  covering  1  kilometer,  and  frequently  it  is  even  more 
than  double  that  time.  Not  only  the  hostile  fire,  but  the 
difficult  passage  over  the  shell-torn  terrain,  obstacles,  and 
the  necessity  of  making  detours  to  avoid  being  seen,  increase 
the  period  of  time.  Haste  can  be  made  only  by  an  indomi- 
table will  and  by  the  example  of  the  leaders.  A  premature 
start  is,  in  any  case,  a  lesser  fault  than  to  wait  too  long. 
The  main  point  is  not  to  come  too  late !  A  premature  start 
may  result  in  a  jump  in  the  dark,  but  delayed  too  long,  the 
counter-attack  leads  to  a  costly  defeat,  or  in  the  most  fav- 
orable case,  to  a  mere  densifying  of  the  troops  in  the  front 
line.  It  is  wrong,  therefore,  to  wait  for  the  results  of  re- 
connaissance. Considering  the  incalculable  slowness  of  the 
service  of  communication,  and  the  march,  we  will  surely 
come  too  late  and  lose  the  best  opportunity.  Therefore, 
without  question,  we  must  start  without  the  usual  battle 
reconnaissance. 

The  lack  of  reconnaissance  also  increases  the  difficulties 
of  the  flanking  counter-attack,  which  presupposes  that  the 
commander  knows  the  exact  location  of  the  enemy.  It  is 
wrong  to  move  forward  and  then  change  direction  to  gain 
a  favorable  attack  position.  Great  losses  will  be  the  con- 
sequence, troops  will  be  used  up  before  they  gain  contact 
and  will  probably  arrive  too  late.  Such  an  attack  had  there- 
fore best  be  executed  by  troops  in  a  neighboring  sector. 
It  would  be  unjustifiable  independence  unless  a  very  favor- 
able opportunity  offered,  to  push  a  flanking  attack  into  a 
neighboring  sector  without  orders  from  higher  headquar- 
ters, which  can  see  the  whole  situation.  Only  commanders 
of  connecting  groups  may  act  in  this  manner. 

Flaking  counter-attacks  demand  reconnaissance  of  the 
terrain,  so  that  obstacles  will  not  be  encountered  unexpect- 
edly. They  further  require  special  protection  on  the  flank 
towards  the  enemy.  The  attacking  troops  should  not  be 
bothered  with  their  own  flank  protection.  Flanking  coun- 
ter-attacks have  the  advantage  of  forcing  the  enemy  to 
execute  a  change  of  front  and  further  of  avoiding  the  hos- 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  165 

tile  box  barrage.  Finally,  in  the  flanking  counter-attack 
the  occupation  of  the  captured  position  is  by  no  means  sim- 
ple, but  if  the  attack  succeeds,  the  prize  in  prisoners  and 
supplies  is  large. 

Carrying  the  counter-attack  rapidly  forward,  is  the 
surest  guarantee  for  success  and  for  lessening  the  losses. 
But  an  attack  can  be  carried  through  rapidly  only  if  it  is 
supported  by  the  necessary  fire.  This  is  not  the  business 
of  the  assaulting  troops,  but  of  the  attached  automatic  rifle, 
machine  guns,  light  minenwerfers,  infantry  guns,  and  ar- 
tillery. If  we  must  transfer  the  fire  preparation  to  the  in- 
fantry, we  must  then  form  strong  firing  lines  at  long  ranges, 
and  not  employ  open  skirmish  waves,  and  thus  suffer  greater 
losses.  The  open  skirmish  waves  are  not  for  fighting  but 
a  movement  formation.  The  advance  without  firing  can 
be  made  as  soon  as  the  hostile  infantry  is  held  in  their  shel- 
ters by  our  machine  gun,  and  artillery  fire.  Only  when 
that  has  not  been  accomplished  must  our  infantry  work  it- 
self up  to  the  hostile  position  under  protection  of  its  own 
fire.  Only  the  skill  of  the  subordinate  commanders  and 
the  eflSciency  of  the  troops  can  find  the  right  road  to  suc- 
cess. We  may  say,  in  general,  that  in  such  cases  our  old 
attack,  conforming  to  the  drill  regulations,  promises  the 
best  success.  Working  up  by  rushes,  with  fire  support  by 
all  available  machine  guns  and  with  sufficient  support  by 
the  accompanying  artillery  using  direct  fire  against  the  hos- 
tile machine  guns. 

The  general  rule,  to  close  rapidly  with  the  enemy,  is 
frequently  influenced  by  the  endeavor  to  keep  the  proper 
direction.  The  direction  is  the  enemy.  Therefore  it  is  the 
general  maxim  never  to  wait  for  one's  neighbor ;  if  we  wait, 
there  is  no  assurance  that  the  troops  will  get  to  the  enemy. 
The  less  open  the  terrain,  the  more  depressions  and  woods 
prevent  a  view  on  the  points  of  direction,  the  more  neces- 
sary is  it  that  a  "leading"  company  precede  with  carefully 
sought  out  intermediate  points,  straight  along  the  compass 
direction.  Companies  following  in  echelon  may  utilize 
without  hesitancy  any  cover  the  terrain  affords  if  they  al- 
ways regain  their  proper  position  in  regard  to  the  "leading" 
company. 


166  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

Whenever  possible,  our  old  line  of  trenches  must  be  re- 
taken in  the  counter-attack.  If  that  is  not  done,  absolute 
connection  with  the  artillery  must  be  arranged  so  that  the 
latter  can  regulate  its  fire  accurately.  It  is  advisable  to 
attach  liaison  officers  from  supporting  artillery  to  the  at- 
tacking troops.  Frequently  at  the  most  important  moments 
reconnaissance  to  the  flanks  and  connection  with  the  rear 
is  neglected.  If  the  line  is  reached  all  available  weapons 
must  be  fully  utilized  in  pursuing  fire,  and  steps  taken  at 
once  to  reorganize  the  position.  Of  importance  is  depth 
formation.  Rapid  re-establishment  of  depth  formation 
must  therefore  be  practiced  in  advance,  like  the  counter- 
attack itself.  In  most  cases  establishment  of  depth  forma- 
tion can  be  done  only  at  night.  Immediate  withdrawing  of 
detachments  may  be  considered  by  weak  minds  as  a  sign 
of  an  intended  retreat. 

In  taking  the  measures  for  the  counter-attack,  the  high 
command  must  always  consider  that  the  troops  may  lack 
the  necessary  material  for  constructing  and  holding  the 
position  after  their  success.  To  lay  out  panels  is  possible 
only  after  the  action  has  been  brought  to  a  close  and  this 
had  best  be  done  by  selected  detachments,  when  requested 
by  the  infantry  airplanes.  Fog  and  smoke  increase  the 
difficulties  of  observation,  the  position  has  been  changed 
into  a  shell-torn  terrain  and  infantry  airplanes  have  to 
descend  very  low  to  distinguish  by  its  uniforms  their  own 
infantry. 

Co-operation  of  artillery  and  infantry  has  been  men- 
tioned several  times.  Generally  one  artillery  battalion  of 
two  gun  and  two  howitzer  batteries  is  attached  to  each  in- 
fantry regiment  as  accompanying  artillery.  It  has  the  task 
of  sweeping  obstacles  out  of  the  path  of  the  infantry,  and 
especially  of  destroying  hostile  machine  guns.  After  the 
assault,  the  accompanying  artillery  gives  the  necessary  sta- 
bility to  the  victorious  infantry,  and  supports  it  during  the 
first  critical  hours.  This  is  impossible  from  positions  far 
off  and  under  cover.  Accompanying  the  infantry  attack  is 
necessary  also  for  moral  reasons.  It  is  said  that  the  artil- 
lery loses  time  in  moving  forward  but  that  is  much  better 
than  to  keep  silent  in  positions  in  rear,  because  in  critical 
situations  it  may  fear  to  fire  on  its  own  infantry. 


DEFENSIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE  167 

The  fire  of  the  defense  artillery  must  stop  the  enemy 
who  has  entered,  then  annihilate  him.  During  a  hostile 
attack  with  limited  objectives  the  artillery  in  defense  is 
uncertain  as  to  what  is  taking  place  behind  the  rolling  bar- 
rage. The  questions :  How  far  did  the  attacker  push  for- 
ward ?  Do  our  troops  hold  out  ?  Are  local  counter-attacks 
being  made?  cannot  be  answered  with  any  degree  of  cer- 
tainty. One  of  the  duties  of  defense  artillery  is  "locking-in 
the  enemy  that  has  entered,"  that  is  cutting  off  by  fire  hos- 
tile reinforcements  as  well  as  keeping  up  the  artillery  pro- 
tection for  the  nighboring  sector.  Only  where  the  enemy  can 
be  absolutely  distinguished  in  our  position  can  he  be  im- 
mediately fired  on.  Systematic  locking-in  to  the  rear  pre- 
pares in  the  best  way  our  counter-attack.  Counter  pre- 
paration fire  which  should  be  laid  by  all  available  batteries 
on  the  space  in  rear  of  the  barrage  can  then  be  of  decisive 
effect.  When  the  enemy  steps  into  the  open,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  his  creeping  barrage,  moving  slowly  to  the  front, 
the  task  becomes  easier.  The  situation  is  then  clear  and 
locking-in  takes  a  back  seat. 

The  aerial  fighting  forces  are  of  great  importance  in 
the  execution  of  the  counter-attack.  Infantry  airplanes 
should  not  be  given  too  many  tasks.  The  commander  must 
be  moderate.     He  should  demand  only: 

1.  Where  is  our  front  line  infantry? 

2.  Where  is  the  point  of  entry? 

3.  Conduct  of  the  enemy  (advancing  in  what  direction,  rolling  up, 
etc. ? ) . 

Pursuit  squadrons  did  excellent  service;  their  appear- 
ance at  low  altitude  over  the  battlefield  and  their  participa- 
tion with  machine  guns  and  bomb  never  failed  to  create  a 
deep  impression  on  friend  and  foe.  Especially  effective  is 
their  participation  at  the  moment  of  the  assault.  In  coun- 
ter-attack the  leading  hostile  infantry  is  the  most  impor- 
tant objective.  The  main  point  is  to  confuse  it,  to  hold  it 
down,  and  to  defeat  it.  Hostile  machine  guns,  minenwer- 
fer  positions,  as  well  as  batteries  firing  on  our  infantry's 
advance  are  proper  targets  for  our  machine  gun  fire.  By 
the  help  of  panels  staked  out  at  the  headquarters  it  is  pos- 
sible to  give  the  battle  airplanes  information  of  the  direc- 


168  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tion  of  the  hostile  penetration  and  to  demand  a  repetition  of 
flights  and  complete  reports. 

When  well  prepared  counter-attacks  did  not  have  good 
results  as  at  Verdun  and  in  Flanders,  the  reason  always  lay 
in  the  piecemeal  manner  of  making  the  attacks,  generally 
too  late.  Giving  missions  that  are  not  clear,  insufficient 
co-operation  between  troops  in  the  front  line  and  supporting 
artillery,  and  transfer  of  reserve  to  various  commanders 
should  be  avoided. 


VII.     German  Attacks  with  Limited  Objectives 

Attacks  with  limited  objectives  occurred  along  the  en- 
tire front  for  the  purpose  of  securing  local  advantages  such 
as  obeervation  positions.  These  generally  succeeded  after 
artillery  preparation  with  relatively  small  loss.  Frequently 
more  material  losses  occurred  in  holding  what  had  been 
gained.  These  operations  proved  to  be  effective  means  of 
increasing  the  morale  of  the  troops.  The  desire  for  the  exe- 
cution of  such  operations  was  expressed  by  the  troops  them- 
selves and  they  were  encouraged  even  though  the  expendi- 
ture of  ammunition  and  the  losses  suffered  were  not  always 
commensurate  with  the  success  attained.  The  narrower  the 
attacking  front,  the  easier  can  the  defender  concentrate 
his  artillery  fire  on  it.  In  the  winter  of  1916-1917  a  large 
number  of  operations  took  place  on  the  Somme  (9th  Army 
Corps  Maisonnette,  October  29,  1916;  Pierre  Vaast  Forest, 
November  20,  1916),  in  the  Champagne  (Hill  185,  south  of 
Ripont,  February  15,  1917)  and  around  Verdun  (13th  In- 
fantry Division  on  Hill  304,  January  15,  1917)  and  others, 
which  offered  valuable  lessons  in  attacks  with  limited  ob- 
jectives. The  selection  of  the  places  to  be  entered  and  of 
the  attack  objective  has  to  be  made  so  that  a  sector  shall 
be  captured  in  the  hostile  trench  system  which  cannot  be 
easily  flanked  by  the  enemy  himself  and  which  can  be  easily 
incorporated  into  our  trench  system.  Through  mining  and 
entrenching,  flank  protection  and  routes  of  approach  must 
be  prepared  in  advance. 

Conditions  of  the  ground  also  have  to  be  considered. 
Heavy  rains  frequently  render  the  assault  terrain  too  slip- 
pery and  soft.  Progress  across  No  Man's  Land  will  be  very 
slow.  Under  certain  conditions  the  operation  may  have  to 
be  delayed. 

The  plan  for  the  attack,  made  by  division  headquarters, 
is  submitted  to  the  Corps.  It  is  important  in  such  matters 
that  Corps  Headquarters  should  not  discourage  the  initia- 
tive of  the  division  commanders  by  unimportant  objections. 
Any  order  that  is  sound  is  better  than  a  technically  correct 

169 


170  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

order  that  is  carelessly  carried  out.  Battalion  and  company 
commanders  issue  their  orders  in  the  form  of  sketches  and 
tables  which  should  include  position  in  readiness,  attack 
objectives,  roads,  formations,  composition  of  the  waves, 
time  and  place  of  issue  of  equipment,  etc.  The  artillery  com- 
mander, assures  proper  range  finding,  and  in  his  order  covers 
the  artillery  fire  activity  and  co-operation  with  the  minen- 
werfers  and  the  infantry. 

An  important  element  for  any  attack  is  the  correct  de- 
signation of  time  and  watches  must  be  repeatedly  compared. 
Orders  must  be  in  the  hands  of  the  troops  at  least  24  hours 
prior  to  the  attack  and  should  be  repeated  back  to  assure 
correctness. 

Surprise  is  one  of  the  decisive  elements  in  the  success 
of  the  attack.  Every  repetition  of  a  former  method  of  at- 
tack makes  success  questionable.  False  operations  (insert- 
ing flame  throwers,  exploding  mines,  sudden  artillery  fire 
at  different  points  and  cessation  after  5  minutes)  will  mis- 
lead the  enemy.  There  should  also  be  pauses  in  the  artil- 
lery preparation,  increase  in  the  volume  of  fire,  which  the 
enemy  will  in  most  cases  reply  to  with  stationary  barrages, 
so  that  at  the  assault  proper  the  final  fire  is  delivered  with- 
out increasing  the  volume  and  with  shells  with  time  fuses. 
The  assault  will  hardly  be  noticed  by  the  enemy,  and  this 
will  make  it  easier  for  our  infantry  closely  following  the 
barrage.  A  slow  forward  creeping  barrage  in  front  of  the 
assaulting  troops  has  been  found  very  effective.  The  in- 
fantry must  endeavor  to  push  forward  under  the  hostile 
barrage  in  close  order  and  take  depth  formation  subse- 
quently. The  less  the  distance  between  starting  point  and 
final  objective  the  greater  the  possibilities  of  success.  Lift- 
ing of  the  barrage  and  the  sudden  start  of  the  assault  is 
made  by  watches  that  have  been  accurately  synchronized. 

The  time  of  attack  had  best  be  set  shortly  before  dark, 
so  that  the  troops  will  have  about  an  hour's  daylight  to  find 
their  way  into  the  position,  to  strengthen  it  and  to  regulate 
the  barrage.  The  longer  it  remains  light,  the  more  time 
will  the  enemy  have  to  direct  counter  preparation  fire  on 
the  position ;  a  strong  gassing  of  the  hostile  batteries  after 
the  assault  is  launched  will  benefit  our  infantry,  while  gass- 


ATTACKS  WITH  LIMITED  OBJECTIVES  171 

ing  prior  to  the  assault  merely  attracts  the  enemy's  atten- 
tion. Darkness  also  facilitates  the  use  of  more  troops  for 
labor,  but  these  must  be  withdrawn  before  daylight  to  lessen 
the  losses. 

We  must  absolutely  adhere  to  the  hour  and  minute  fixed 
for  the  start  of  the  assault.  New  troops  generally  underes- 
timate the  time  absolutely  required  for  issuing  orders  and 
believe  that  it  is  possible  to  change  an  attack  at  the  last 
hour.  That  is  impossible  and  leads  only  to  losses  and  fail- 
ure. 

The  leader  must  decide  whether  he  can  base  his  success 
on  surprise,  or  whether  a  longer  artillery  preparation  will 
be  required.  A  mixing  up  of  both  methods  almost  always 
leads  to  defeat.  Along  battle  fronts  troops  are  on  the  qui 
vive  and  a  surprise  will  be  difficult.  We  select  that  method, 
nevertheless,  when  there  is  no  chance  of  assembling  the 
assaulting  troops  under  cover.  The  better  the  construction 
of  the  hostile  position,  the  deeper  the  attack  is  to  penetrate, 
the  more  thorough  must  be  the  artillery  preparation.  This 
will  be  more  effective  the  more  it  is  crowded  into  a  short 
space  of  time.  In  about  3  hours  a  heavy  field  howitzer  bat- 
tery can  batter  down  a  trench  of  100  meters  with  from  400 
to  600  rounds.  For  light  howitzers  it  would  take  one-half 
more  of  that  amount  of  ammunition,  and  for  mortars  one- 
half  less.  Destruction  of  hostile  obstacles  may  be  an  addi- 
tional artillery  task  during  the  preparation,  or  this  mission 
may  be  assigned  to  the  minenwerfers  during  the  artillery 
preparation.  It  may  be  best  to  assign  to  the  artillery  the 
task  of  counter  battery  fire  and  to  make  the  preparation 
on  hostile  trenches  by  minenwerfers,  concentrated  with 
maximum  fire  for  about  5  minutes.  Heavy  and  sudden  min- 
enwerfer  fire,  in  any  case,  has  a  great  moral  effect.  About 
20  medium  and  heavy  minenwerfers,  per  1000  meters  of 
trench  will  be  needed  for  this  five-minute  preparation.  The 
preparation  has  to  be  so  regulated  that,  even  if  no  view  can 
be  had,  the  artillery  fire  runs  like  clockwork.  Besides  mak- 
ing the  position  ripe  for  assault,  our  artillery  must  fire  on 
hostile  headquarters  and  places  where  it  is  known  reserves 
are  held  in  readiness  as  well  as  on  routes  of  approach.  The 
hostile  artillery  must  be  neutralized  prior  to  our  attack.  As 


ITS  DETELOPICENT  OF  TACT: 


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FORMATION 

of  a  battalion  in  attack  from  trench  to  trench,  piercing  depth  into  the  trench  system 

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3  officers   (off.  aapiranta),  22  squad  leaders  and  MG  comdre, 

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Flank    protection 


Flank  protection 


Plane  defense 


Fire  support  thru   firing   overhead 

6  mach.  guns  and  4  It,  minenwerfers 

Strength    of   a    company : 


'•        \Va%-f» 

'      Officers     ^ 

Squad 

and 

MG 

leaders 

/ 

Musician 

24 

Men 

••            W 

t          m            4 

m 

m 

(* 

24 

•• 

•*•              •» 

1        M          3 

» 

» 

m 

/ 

Musician 

22 

w 

—       4 
3  LM.G.3 

ft 

>• 

am 

i 

Dnimrnpr 

,20 
22 

" 

6 

automatic 

MG 

As  a  rule  companies  with  less  than  120  men  are  formed  into  two  platoons.  3  au- 
tomatic mach.  guns  with   12   men  and  cartridges  for  each  gun  are  in   5th   Wave. 

The  necessary  24  litter-bearers  have  to  be  famished  by  the  bearer  company  con- 
sidering the  small  strength  of  the  fighting  companies.  The  grenade  thrower  squad  is 
also  in  the   5th   Wave. 


174  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

rage  on  the  hostile  routes  of  approach  as  well  as  counter 
battery  fire.  Range  adjustment  must  be  done  without  at- 
tracting attention  and  with  the  aid  of  balloon  observation. 
Considering  the  small  distance  between  the  opposing  lines 
hostile  front  line  fire  by  our  artillery  can  hardly  be  accom- 
plished without  endangering  our  own  infantry.  Early  artil- 
lery fire  against  the  hostile  artillery  betrays  the  coming 
assault.  The  barrage  fire  of  the  artillery  increased  by  the 
fire  of  the  minenwerfers  starts  simultaneously  with  the  in- 
fantry. After  the  successful  assault  it  remains,  gradually 
lessening,  on  a  spot  beyond  the  objective  and  thus  forms  the 
stationary  barrage  for  the  new  position. 

The  entrance  of  the  infantry  in  the  hostile  trenches 
following  directly  on  the  bursting  of  the  last  shell  has  al- 
ways proven  comparatively  easy;  it  takes  some  time  before 
the  opponent  regains  his  senses  and  perceives  the  situation ; 
that  condition  the  attacker  must  take  full  advantage  of  by 
rapidly  pushing  forward.  The  deeper  he  pushes  his  way 
into  the  enemy's  position  the  larger  is  the  gain  in  prisoners 
and  the  less  will  be  his  own  losses. 

Success  of  the  attack  depends  on  rapidity  and  on  sys- 
tematic co-operation  between  infantry  and  artillery;  this 
requires  that  after  reaching  the  objective,  the  infantry  does 
not  advance  beyond  it ;  otherwise  the  infantry  will  be  anni- 
hilated by  its  own  artillery  fire.  Careful  arrangements  must 
be  made  as  to  the  action  to  be  taken  in  the  event  that  the 
assault  miscarries,  or  is  perceived  by  the  enemy  ahead  of 
time.  There  is  no  hope  of  sending  orders  to  the  first  line ; 
the  time  consumed  is  incalculable,  and  it  would  only  lead 
to  a  portion  of  the  troops  assaulting  without  artillery  sup- 
port and  they  would  surely  be  annihilated. 

When  the  objective  has  been  reached  it  must  be  clearly 
made  visible  to  our  artillery  and,  on  demand,  to  our  air- 
planes, and  communication  to  the  rear  must  be  promptly 
established.  The  artillery  immediately  starts  range  ad- 
justment for  barrage. 

More  difficult  than  taking,  is  the  holding  of  hostile 
trenches.  In  most  cases  counter-attacks  accompanied  by 
artillery  will  be  started.  The  subordinate  commanders  must 
be  prepared  to  combat  the  carelessness  and  the  disinclina- 


ATTACKS  WITH  LIMITED  OBJECTIVES  175 

tion  for  labor  that  so  easily  takes  hold  of  troops  after  a 
success. 

Occupation  must  permit  active  defense  in  depth;  all 
crowding  is  to  be  avoided;  approach  and  communication 
trenches  towards  the  enemy  must  be  blocked  by  fire  or  oth- 
erwise, as  the  first  counter-attacks  will  come  from  these. 
Experience  has  shown  that  after  a  successful  assault  there 
generally  is  a  lack  of  hand  grenades  and  means  of  illumina- 
tion. 

Raids  are  undertaken  along  the  same  lines;  the  main 
question  is  that  of  returning  to  the  exit  point  after  a  short 
stay  in  the  hostile  trenches.  The  necessity  of  these  recon- 
naissances in  force  is  for  the  capture  of  prisoners.  In  these 
operations  also  we  may  achieve  much  with  weak  detach- 
ments. 


VIII.     Machine  Guns 

MACHINE  GUN  EQUIPMENT  AT  THE  OUTBREAK  OF 
THE  WORLD  WAR 


No 


Qoo 


HS 


3 

tH 


s 


uo}»tat(j    V 


^1 
•11 


d  o 


S  3 


3  M 


CO  a>  S 


S"©  3 
■S+^  3 


OS  5  * 
>  V 

O  (U    o 

E^   - 

M  '-I    & 

Wo43 


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X  «  c 
3       ci 

I  '* 

eI-o 


fa 


176 


MACHINE   GUNS  '  177 

Based  on  the  experiences  of  the  Russo-Japanese  War 
all  armies  had  gradually  come  to  about  the  same  number  of 
machine  guns,  viz.,  2  guns  per  battalion  and  about  2  guns  per 
cavalry  brigade.  In  Germany  and  Russia  the  machine  gun 
platoons  had  been  consolidated  into  machine  gun  companies 
of  8  guns,  while  France  and  England  preferred  the  platoon 
formation  and  regulated  the  tactical  consolidation  of  pla- 
toons according  to  requirements.  In  any  case,  the  company 
was  enabled  to  more  easily  cover  greater  spaces  in  depth 
with  its  3  platoons  than  could  have  been  done  by  single  sep- 
arated platoons.  Doubtless  all  experiences  gained  in  war 
speak  for  tactical  employment  by  platoon,  while  for  admin- 
istration the  company  formation  is  better.  While  Germany 
had  decided  to  transport  the  guns  on  wagons,  almost  all 
other  countries  favored  transportation  on  pack  animals 
(load  of  pack  horse  130  to  150  kg) .  The  latter  method  ena- 
bled the  machine  guns  to  follow  the  troops  everywhere  and 
offered  smaller  targets,  but  the  amount  of  ammunition  that 
can  be  carried  is  limited,  and  getting  into  action  is  retarded 
as  gun  and  tripod  have  first  to  be  assembled.  Should  a  pack 
animal  fall  the  gun  may  not  get  into  action  at  all.  Saddle 
sores  cannot  be  avoided  no  matter  what  care  is  taken.  And 
finally  the  question  depends  on  the  number  of  pack  animals 
available  in  the  country.  But  in  spite  of  all  these  obvious 
disadvantages,  on  the  battlefield  it  is  probably  preferable 
to  transport  machine  guns  on  pack  animals  instead  of 
wagons. 

In  a  technical  relation,  there  were  differences  in  the 
various  armies,  first  in  the  mounts,  second  in  the  manner  of 
cooling  the  barrel  by  air,  or  by  enclosing  the  barrel  with  a 
heavy  waterjacket  and,  third,  in  the  manner  of  ammunition 
supply  either  by  clip  of  25  rounds,  or  by  means  of  belts  hold- 
ing up  to  250  rounds.  The  endeavor  of  the  manufacturers 
had  been  directed  to  simplify  the  arm  (System  Schwarzlose 
has  only  one  spring,  while  the  breech  of  the  Maxim  has  22 
parts)  and  to  decrease  the  weight  so  much  that  it  would  be 
possible  to  equip  companies  and  troops  with  several  guns 
carried  by  the  men.  At  the  opening  of  the  World  War  ex- 
periments had  not  been  completed  in  use  of  machine  guns  in 
airplanes.    The  question  of  employment  of  bicycles  had  been 


178  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

sufficiently  cleared,  for  instance  in  Austria  in  1913,  the  cy- 
clist company  of  4  Jager  battalions  received  a  fourth  pla- 
toon of  4  machine  guns.  The  question  of  ammunition  sup- 
ply had  not  been  solved ;  if  we  did  not  desire  to  adopt  loading 
clips,  as  in  France,  we  had  to  fall  back  on  the  time  consum- 
ing loading  belts  with  cartridges.  It  is  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  rifle  and  the  machine  gun  should  fire  the  same  am- 
munition, and  also  use  the  same  way  of  packing,  so  that  the 
loading  clips  of  the  rifle,  attached  to  each  other  may  be 
readily  used  by  the  machine  guns.  The  machine  gun  gave 
the  opportunity  of  developing  the  strongest  possible  infan- 
try fire  effect  on  a  narrow  space  in  the  shortest  time,  es- 
pecially against  upright  targets.  Considering  the  possi- 
bility of  jamming,  the  rapid  expenditure  of  ammunition, 
and  the  difficulties  of  ammunition  supply  the  arm  was  con- 
sidered suited  in  the  first  line  only  for  taking  advantage  of 
short,  momentary  periods  for  flank  and  defensive  fire  but 
by  no  means  for  carrying  on  a  long  fire  fight.  The  cone  of 
dispersion,  itself  very  narrow,  either  has  no  effect  at  all,  or 
a  brilliant  moral  and  material  effect.  This  opinion  caused 
the  machine  guns  to  be  posted  in  dominating  or  flank  posi- 
tions, allowed  them  to  fire  through  gaps  in  the  fighting  front, 
or  under  strict  limitation,  to  fire  over  the  heads  of  the  front 
lines.  If  placed  in  the  front  lines,  machine  guns  required 
a  protective  shield  to  enable  them  to  await  the  proper  time 
for  going  into  action,  but  the  size  and  shape  of  the  shield 
soon  drew  the  hostile  artillery  fire.  Test  showed  that  even 
on  the  level  ground  at  a  range  of  1500  meters,  with  100-meter 
disperision  in  depth,  it  was  practicable  to  fire  over  our  ad- 
vancing infantry.  In  firing  over  the  infantry  we  must  re- 
member that  in  continuous  fire  dispersion  increases  and 
finally,  when  the  barrel  gets  hot,  the  bullets  no  longer  main- 
tain the  same  trajectory.  It  was  an  acute  disadvantage  that 
the  various  positions  of  the  machine  guns  naturally  attracted 
the  hostile  artillery  fire  and  that  information  between  infan- 
try and  machine  guns  was  always  diflftcult.  All  these  condi- 
tions were  materially  simplified  when  the  machine  guns 
were  placed  in  the  firing  line.  In  mobile  warfare  the  Ger- 
man machine  gun  companies  adhered  to  the  general  rule  to 
"support  the  infantry  fight  directly"  with  all  means  at 
hand,  and  they  abandoned  the  maxim  that  the  arm  "is  not 


MACHINE   GUNS  179 

enabled  to  carry  on  a  protracted  fire  fight."  They  were 
crowded  prematurely  into  the  firing  line,  where  the  heavy 
weight  of  the  sleds  was  very  troublesome  when  the  mission 
was  to  keep  up  with  the  advancing  infantry.  Regulations 
requiring  them  to  keep  in  place  during  the  assault  until  the 
hostile  position  had  been  taken  was  felt  to  be  onerous,  the 
more  so  as  reverses  were  attributed  to  their  belated  arrival. 

In  France  the  light  mount  was  fully  utilized  for  the 
employment  of  the  gun  from  effective  points,  for  instance, 
from  trees  and  houses.  French  tactics  did  not  advocate 
their  use  in  the  firing  line,  and  favored  employing  the  guns 
as  a  "nerveless  firearm"  for  defense  at  close  range.  Objec- 
tion to  air  cooling  was  emphasized  on  the  ground  that  the 
barrel  became  red  hot  after  only  a  few  hundred  rounds, 
making  handling  and  transportation  more  difficult;  that 
heat  waves  rose  above  the  barrel  and  prevented  aiming,  and 
that  the  dispersion  increased  continually.  We  have  not  heard 
of  any  cases  where  the  cartridges  exploded  of  themselves; 
to  prevent  that  orders  were  issued  that  no  more  than  200 
rounds  should  be  fired  per  minute.  The  British  machine 
guns  proved  especially  serviceable  in  all  respects  and  fre- 
quently fired  over  the  heads  of  the  troops.  In  Russia  also 
it  appears  that  the  machine  guns  were  in  the  beginning 
looked  on  as  a  defensive  arm  at  short  range;  they  found 
little  employment  in  the  offensive,  while  the  regulations  in 
defense  were  that  positions  could  be  held  by  machine  guns 
alone.  However  the  idea  of  using  them  in  separated  "nests" 
soon  arose. 

In  position  warfare  the  machine  gun  soon  gained  special 
value  as  a  flanking  arm  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  an 
assault.  As  it  is  difficult  to  hide  them  in  a  frontal  fight  from 
sight  and  fire,  and  as  this  fact  was  realized  there  grew  up 
masked,  bullet-proof  shelters  in  checkerboard  formation, 
where  machine  guns  were  concealed  prepared  to  fire  only 
when  necessity  demanded.  During  the  attacks  on  a  large 
scale  by  the  Allies  in  1915,  placing  the  machine  guns  in 
well  constructed  positions  in  the  front  line,  even  in  con- 
crete positions,  did  not  prove  of  advantage,  as  the  guns  gen- 
erally were  put  out  of  the  fight  by  heavy  artillery  drum  fire 
even  before  the  attack  actually  started.    From  shelter  in 


180  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

deep  chambers  below  the  ground  the  guns  could  not  be  ra- 
pidly brought  into  the  firing  position  in  time  to  be  of  assis- 
tance considering  the  short  distance  the  attack  had  to  cover. 
After  the  Autumn  battles  in  the  Champagne,  the  conclusion 
was  reached  that  machine  guns  had  best  not  be  placed  in 
well  constructed  positions  in  the  front  line — except  a  few 
guns  designated  for  flank  fire — but  should  be  placed  in  in- 
conspicuous positions  in  rear  of  the  front  line.  The  unex- 
pected opening  of  fire  of  a  single  machine  gun  under  effi- 
cient leadership,  even  if  served  by  only  a  few  cool  men,  has 
several  times  been  the  decisive  factor  in  victory  and  defeat. 
Good  training  must  overcome  malfunctioning  of  the  gun. 
No  matter  how  excited  the  man  may  be,  the  constant  readi- 
ness for  fire  depends  on  his  training.  He  should  be  able  to 
repair  stoppages  in  about  20  seconds  as  these  are  annoying 
and  hard  to  perceive.  Only  continual  practice  and  training 
can  insure  that  the  men  quickly  perceive  the  cause  of  the 
trouble  and  rapidly  repair  it. 

(  The  importance  of  the  machine  guns  in  battle  was  pro- 
perly estimated  by  friend  and  foe  in  position  warfare.  In 
Germany  single  machine  gun  platoons  of  3  guns  each  were 
organized  as  early  as  1914,  and  soon  combined  into  com- 
panies. In  1915  each  infantry  regiment  received  a  second, 
in  September  1916,  a  third  machine  gun  company.  Machine 
gun  sharpshooter  battalions,  used  by  army  headquarters  at 
the  most  important  battle  fronts,  formed  a  material  rein- 
forcement of  the  fighting  power;  they  were  posted  from  1 
to  3  kilometers  from  the  front  line  and  principally  under- 
took the  protection  of  the  artillery.  In  the  Spring  of  1917 
the  number  of  guns  of  a  company  was  increased  from  6  to 
9  and  later  to  12;  but  for  mobile  warfare,  companies  of  6 
guns  proved  better. 

In  France,  in  1916,  considering  the  difficulties  of  bring- 
ing up  supplies,  battalions  of  3  infantry  companies  and  1 
machine  gun  company  of  8  guns  were  formed.  In  addition 
each  company  received  a  reinforcement  of  8  automatic  rifles. 

In  England  the  machine  guns,  first  attached  to  the  bat- 
talions, had  been  organized  into  a  brigade  machine  gun  com- 
pany of  16  guns.  In  its  place  the  battalions  received  8  to 
12  automatic  rifles.    The  Lewis  type  gun  weighing  12.5  kg. 


MACHINE   GUNS  181 

drum  magazine,  air-cooled,  fire  rapidity  300  rounds  per  min- 
ute, being  materially  lighter  could  accompany  the  troops 
on  any  kind  of  terrain.  A  mobile  reserve  was  formed  by 
the  machine  gun  batteries  transported  on  motorcycles.  In 
the  battle  of  the  Somme  the  Allies  attempted  to  gain  the 
decision  by  an  enormous  use  of  material.  A  new  methed 
was  the  liberal  use  of  the  automatic  rifles  by  the  Allies. 
These  accompanied  the  front  waves  of  the  attacking  troops 
and  offered  them  a  rallying  point  in  counter-attacks.  We 
could  have  done  the  same  in  Germany,  had  we  been  willing 
to  do  without  the  sled  and  utilize  the  sandbag  mount.  Num- 
erous automatic  rifles  were  an  absolute  necessity.  Issue  of 
these  was  delayed  for  a  long  time,  so  that  the  troops  in 
many  cases  used  the  ones  that  had  been  captured.  At  first 
2  "Bergmann"  guns  (model  08.15)  were  issued  to  each  com- 
pany, these  were  gradually  increased  to  6  per  company  in 
the  fighting  line.  The  weight  was  about  15  kg.  A  disadvan- 
tage was  that  it  was  impossible  to  fire  over  high  grain  or 
grass  fields.  We  must  not  forget  that  the  automatic  rifle 
can  perform  good  service  only  at  ranges  from  600  to  800 
meters,  provided  the  troops  are  well  drilled  in  handling  the 
piece,  and  that  the  arm  is  not  suited  for  firing  over  the  heads 
of  our  infantry.  Firing  while  in  motion  may  be  of  advan- 
tage. 

The  infantry  found  it  very  annoying  in  the  Battle  of 
the  Somme  to  be  exposed  to  the  machine  gun  fire  of  the  low 
flying  hostile  airplanes,  against  which  they  were  helpless  at 
the  beginning.  The  actual  effect  was  not  very  material, 
but  the  infantry  exaggerated  it  at  first  and  erroneously  as- 
sumed that  each  airplane  was  able  to  get  its  artillery  to  im- 
mediately open  fire  on  any  desired  target,  and  that  the 
pilot  could  observe  any  movement  on  the  ground  even  that 
of  an  individual.  They  soon  learned  their  fears  were  ground- 
less and  that  they  could,  with  machine  guns,  fight  these 
airplanes  successfully.  It  was  especially  beneficial  that  in- 
fantry officers  by  making  trips  in  the  airplane  could  per- 
sonally convince  themselves  that  the  observer  could  by  no 
means  see  everything,  much  less  hit  everything.  In  any 
case,  the  danger  of  attracting  the  artillery  fire  was  less  than 
giving  the  hostile  airplane  the  opportunity  to  carry  on  its 
business  undisturbed.    During  the  Winter  of  1916-17  the 


182  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

airplane  defense  was  materially  improved  by  constructing 
anti-aircraft  mounts  and  by  the  construction  of  a  circular 
front  sight  for  the  rifle,  which  in  a  very  simple  manner,  in- 
dicated the  range  at  the  arrival  and  departure  of  the  air- 
plane from  view  (arranged  for  800  meters  range  and  150 
kilometers  per  hour  airplane  velocity).  Machine  gun  fire 
is  especially  annoying  to  airplanes.  They  cannot  evade  it. 
A  firing  machine  gun  can  be  perceived  only  at  a  low  alti- 
tude, and  can  be  heard  only  at  400  meters,  with  the  airplane 
motor  cut  off.  The  activity  of  the  hostile  airplanes  forced 
us  to  equip  batteries  and  columns  with  2  machine  guns  each ; 
these  guns  were  also  for  use  at  short  range  fighting.  The 
rule  for  airplane  protection  is  that  up  to  the  commencement 
of  the  infantry  battle  proper  anti-aircraft  machine  guns  fire 
on  every  airplane  within  range,  while  the  remainder  take 
cover  in  order  not  to  betray  themselves.  At  the  commence- 
ment of  the  infantry  fight  the  number  of  hostile  airplanes 
will  increase,  so  when  each  machine  gun,  not  employed 
against  the  hostile  infantry  attack,  must  take  part  in  the 
anti-aircraft  defense. 

According  to  battle  experiences  the  effectiveness  of 
machine  guns  in  the  first  line  was  a  failure  as  the  available 
shelters  were  unable  to  withstand  the  heavy  artillery  bom- 
bardment. Far  better  service  was  performed  by  the  machine 
guns  when  dispersed  in  the  intermediate  terrain,  protected 
by  weak  infantry ;  these  guns  found  protection  in  shell-holes 
or  behind  the  remnants  of  destroyed  trenches  where  they 
could  best  be  hidden  from  the  airplanes.  Thus  they  evaded 
the  systematic  artillery  fire  and  had  to  be  destroyed  singly 
by  the  guns  accompanying  the  infantry  of  the  attackers. 

For  fighting  detached  German  machine  guns  the  Brit- 
ish Regulations  laid  down  (April  17,  1917) :  "Cautious  ad- 
vance under  protection  of  covering  detachments  which  lo- 
cate machine  gun  nests  and  call  for  artillery  fire  against 
them.  Our  own  machine  guns  are  to  cover  the  advance  of 
the  light  mortars  and  infantry.  It  will  be  found  advisable 
frequently  to  attract  the  attention  of  the  German  machine 
guns  by  opening  fire  with  a  Lewis  gun  in  a  certain  direction. 
Attack  from  the  flanks,  especially  with  rifle  and  smoke  shells 
usually  leads  to  the  desired  result." 


MACHINE   GUNS  188 

The  employment  of  machine  guns  in  embrasures  re- 
quired thorough  practice  in  firing  over  the  infantry  in  the 
front  trenches  and  then  gradually  lifting  the  fire  over  troops 
advancing  to  the  attack  in  depth  formation.  In  peace  time 
the  machine  gun  firing  regulations  had  made  this  procedure 
dependent  on  a  number  of  limitations,  but  in  the  face  of  the 
enemy  we  had  to  proceed  with  fewer  restrictions.  Under  the 
conditions  of  the  position  warfare,  firing  over  the  heads  of 
our  infantry  could  become  a  very  important  factor  in  attack 
operations.  New  barrels,  that  had  not  yet  fired  5000  rounds, 
must  be  used  and  water  must  be  replenished  after  every  500 
rounds.  Very  close  connection  with  the  troops  to  be  fired 
over  has  to  be  maintained,  and  the  wishes  of  the  troops  must 
be  rapidly  transmitted.  Bullets  that  strike  twigs,  grass,  etc., 
will  be  easily  deflected  and  endanger  our  own  men. 

Employment  of  reserve  machine  guns  leads  quite  na- 
turally to  the  employment  of  indirect  fire.  Machine  gun- 
ners at  first  satisfied  themselves  with  the  simple  means  of 
"hidden  rifle  fire,"  with  the  range  ascertained  by  trial  shots, 
from  a  position  out  of  view  of  the  enemy.  Technique  of 
machine  gun  fire  soon  improved;  instead  of  aiming  on  tar- 
gets hard  to  distinguish,  we  employed  auxiliary  targets  that 
could  easily  be  seen,  thereby  simplifying  fire  control  and  in- 
creasing the  effect.  As  the  gun  itself  was  hidden,  it  was 
not  exposed  to  the  hostile  artillery  fire. 

In  the  defense  it  may  be  advisable  to  conduct  the  fight 
with  machine  guns  with  small  infantry  protection,  and  to 
hold  the  infantry  companies  back  for  counter-attacks.  "First 
let  machines  produce  effect,  and  only  then  men."  If  we  ex- 
pected in  the  defense,  heavy  hostile  artillery  preparatory 
fire,  we  would  decline  the  defense  of  lines,  and  form  the 
machine  guns  in  depth.  The  battles  of  1917  showed  the 
necessity  of  separating  tasks  for  automatic  rifles  and  ma- 
chine guns.  For  the  battle  in  the  firing  line  the  automatic 
rifles  were  employed  as  well  as  for  fighting  in  the  interme- 
diate terrain ;  the  machine  guns  were  for  firing  over  the  at- 
tacking waves  against  reserves.  Depth  formation  of  machine 
guns  is  best  arranged  by  machine  gun  nests,  surrounded  by 
obstacles,  with  infantry  guard  under  specially  selected  lead- 
ers, and  in  close  connection  with  observation  and  command 


184  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

stations  of  the  artillery.  Distributed  generally  by  platoons, 
in  checkerboard  formation,  they  offer  the  possibility  of 
keeping  the  front  position  and  every  point  in  the  interme- 
diate terrain  under  fire.  As  fire  comes  from  two  or  more 
directions  the  enemy  cannot  immediately  locate  it.  Special 
attention  must  be  given  points  which  our  artillery  cannot 
reach.  Flanking  fire  was  employed  as  much  as  possible. 
When  these  detached  machine  guns  should  open  fire  the 
commander  alone  can  decide.  Not  every  attack  is  planned 
for  a  penetration ;  in  many  instances  reconnaissance  attacks 
on  a  broad  front  are  undertaken  prior  to  the  attack  proper 
in  order  to  draw  the  fire  of  the  machine  guns.  The  effective- 
ness of  the  machine  guns  depends  on  remaining  unobserved 
until  the  main  assault.  The  machine  gun  nests  formed  the 
natural  rallying  points  for  the  defender  and  facilitated  coun- 
ter-attacks with  their  fire.  But  their  participation  was  effec- 
tive only  if  they  did  not  betray  themselves  on  the  aerial  pho- 
tographs; attention  was  attracted  to  them  especially  by 
their  obstacles  and  through  tracks  left  by  the  daily  move- 
ments. They  are  best  assumed  to  be  in  the  proximity  of 
trenches,  ditches,  and  shelters,  in  single  clumps  of  woods, 
projecting  angles  of  villages,  etc.  The  more  inconspicuous 
the  position,  the  longer  life  will  the  machine  gun  have.  Sur- 
prised from  all  sides  by  machine  gun  fire,  even  well  prepared 
attacks  make  progress  with  difficulty  after  the  primary  suc- 
cess. In  many  cases  it  was  found  the  attacker  turned  about 
or  threw  himself  down,  and  was  finally  overcome  by  the 
counter-attack.  The  first  dangerous  enemy  to  the  machine 
gun  was  the  tank.  All  machine  guns  have  their  definite 
tasks  (barrage,  defense  of  the  zone  in  depth,  support  of 
their  neighbor,  protection  of  the  artillery) ,  which  they  must 
solve  from  several  prepared  positions. 

Machine  guns  drawn  back  are  by  no  means  to  be  used 
for  the  purpose  of  serving  as  replacement  for  guns  disabled 
in  the  front  line.  These  latter  must  be  replaced  from  a  re- 
serve held  out  by  the  commander  from  the  beginning.  We 
allowed  for  each  machine  gun  about  3000  cartridges  in 
belts  and  2  water  jackets ;  a  liberal  supply  of  spare  parts  and 
grease,  in  expectation  of  a  gas  attack,  decreased  the  danger 
of  jams.  It  is  very  advisable  to  construct  a  shelter  for  the 
belt  filling  squad  in  a  position  in  rear. 


MACHINE   GUNS  185 

The  fire  of  the  attacker  compels  the  defender  to  seek 
cover  so  that  the  latter  no  longer  offers  a  target  for  infan- 
try fire.  It  is  therefore  well  to  work  up  as  close  as  possible 
to  the  enemy  under  the  protection  of  artillery  and  machine 
gun  fire.  Machine  guns  sweeping  across  the  cover  of  the  de- 
fender, keeps  him  below  ground. 

According  to  "Training  Regulations  for  Foot  Troops" 
the  automatic  rifles  were  distributed  to  platoons  and  bore 
the  brunt  of  the  fire  fight.  They  wore  down  the  enemy. 
If  that  was  accomplished  then,  and  then  only  our  costly 
infantry  materiel  was  to  be  employed  for  a  rapid  advance. 
It  was  very  favorable  if  the  first  firing  position  of  the  in- 
fantry was  so  close  to  the  enemy  that  from  it  the  assault 
could  be  delivered. 

In  the  offensive  battle  a  certain  depth  formation  can- 
not be  avoided;  when  the  automatic  rifles  had  tasks  under 
500  meters  range,  the  rifles,  model  '08,  had  targets  beyond 
that  range.  The  diflSculty  in  reaching  favorable  firing  posi- 
tions in  open  terrain  forced  the  machine  guns  to  be  em- 
ployed at  extreme  ranges.  In  many  cases  nothing  remained 
but  to  put  the  guns  in  action  early  and  let  them  go  forward 
with  the  skirmish  lines.  If  a  gun  was  once  inserted  in  the 
skirmish  line,  it  suffered  in  changing  position  in  the  ad- 
vance by  rushes.  If  the  infantry  delayed  the  rush,  for  the 
slower  machine  guns,  favorable  moments  were  lost.  In 
many  cases  infantry  frequently  missed  the  supporting  fire 
of  the  machine  guns  at  the  moment  of  the  rush,  and  the 
guns  reached  the  new  firing  position  later  than  the  skir- 
mishers and  thus  betrayed  themselves. 

An  attack  method  may  consist  in  the  infantry  working 
up,  under  the  fire  protection  of  machine  guns,  together  with 
automatic  rifles  to  a  short  distance  from  the  enemy,  the 
latter  facilitating  that  working  up  from  advanced  "attack 
nests." 

Frequently  from  elevated  positions  in  conjunction  with 
the  artillery,  machine  guns  facilitate  the  deployment  of  the 
troops,  the  advance  to  the  first  fire  position,  or  the  assault. 
Time  for  coordination  and  timely  reconnaissance  of  the 
next  firing  positions  are  necessary.  It  may  be  well  to  send 
ahead  supplies,  water  jackets  and  ammunition  even  during 


186  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  fire  fight.  A  portion  of  the  guns  may  be  designated  anti- 
aircraft defense.  In  the  attack  from  trench  to  trench  ma- 
chine guns  take  over  the  preparatory  fire  as  soon  as  the  ar- 
tillery and  minenwerfers  lift  their  fire  farther  to  the  front. 
They  remain  in  action  as  long  as  possible  without  endanger- 
ing their  infantry  moving  forward  to  the  assault.  Direct 
fire  is  the  general  rule ;  indirect  fire  may  be  employed  against 
terrain  in  rear  of  the  enemy.  As  soon  as  practicable  the 
machine  gun  companies  follow  in  platoon  echelons  and  assist 
with  the  fire  protection  of  the  infantry.  From  elevated  posi- 
tions, they  break  up  counter-attacks  and  assist  neighboring 
sectors  by  rapid  flanking  fire.  "The  final  purpose  of  the 
machine  guns  remains  always  the  same:  To  assist  the 
relentless  pushing  forward  of  our  infantry  by  the  shock 
power  of  their  fire." 

In  open  warfare  the  fire  of  the  machine  guns  assists 
the  infantry,  together  with  the  automatic  rifles,  in  reach- 
ing the  first  firing  position.  "Machine  gun  squads  of  1  gun 
with  8  men,  a  very  mobile  fire  power,  form  the  skeleton  of 
the  infantry  attack."  Liaison  between  squads  is  necessary 
for  mutual  co-operation  and  increase  of  fire  power.  In  the 
attack  from  trench  to  trench,  automatic  rifles  are  sent  ahead 
during  the  artillery  preparatory  fire  as  "attack  nests."  At 
the  cessation  of  the  artillery  fire,  or  when  that  fire  lifts, 
they  take  over  the  fire  fight  and  cease  only  when  the  first 
waves  of  infantry  overrun  the  enemy.  There  are  also  auto- 
matic rifles  in  the  first  wave  which  fire  at  short  range  dur- 
ing the  advance.  If  guns  in  the  leading  waves  are  disabled, 
they  are  replaced  from  the  rear. 

The  advance  of  infantry  under  fire  protection  demands 
much  initiative  on  the  part  of  all  subordinate  machine  gun 
commanders.  They  must  understand  how  to  concentrate 
fire  against  points  where  the  enemy  still  offers  resistance, 
and  after  the  successful  assault  to  take  over  the  fire  pro- 
tection of  the  troops  that  are  reestablishing  the  position. 

In  the  advance  the  skirmish  squads  are  in  groups  or  in 
single  file ;  the  gaps  resulting  can  be  used  to  fire  through  by 
machine  guns  in  rear.  Automatic  rifles  go  with  their  skir- 
mish squads.  The  line  upon  which  the  general  fire  fight  is 
to  be  taken  up  can  seldom  be  designated  in  advance ;  if  it  is 
known,  the  machine  guns  kept  back  must  work  up  to  it. 


^^ 


MACHINE   GUNS  187 

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Gun    commander 


An  important  element  for  success  is  that  the  machine 
guns  succeed  in  reaching  the  firing  position  unperceived ; 
machine  guns  that  have  been  seen  are  easily  annihilated  by 
an  alert  enemy.  In  the  fire  fight  the  automatic  rifles  will 
fire  short  bursts,  say  5  to  10  rounds,  and  save  the  duration 


188  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

fire  for  specially  favorable  moments.  For  the  assault  the 
fire  on  the  move  gains  special  importance,  although  the  ac- 
tual effect  of  this  fire  was  below  expectations. 

At  the  time  of  the  large  offensive  in  March,  1918,  equip- 
ment of  divisions  in  machine  guns,  were  as  follows : 

Germany:  9  battalions  to  the  division  with  9  machine  gun  com- 
panies of  6  guns  (12  guns)  a  total  of  54  (108)  machine  guns  and  144 
automatic  rifles. 

France:  9  battalions  to  the  division,  with  9  machine  gvm  com- 
panies of  8  (12)  guns,  a  total  of  72  (108)  machine  guns  and  216 
automatic  rifles,  8  (12)  per  company. 

Great  Britain:  12  battalions  to  the  division;  3  Brigade  machine 
gun  companies  of  16  gims — 48  and  1  division  machine  gun  company 
with  16  guns  a  total  of  64  machine  guns  and  192  automatic  rifles,  4 
per  company, 

Italy:  12  battalions  to  the  division.  Each  battalion  had  1  machine 
gun  company  of  6  guns,  a  total  of  72  machine  guns  (additions  had 
been  arranged  for) ,  each  battalion  1  to  2  platoons,  24  to  48  automatic 
rifles. 

United  States:  3  battalions  to  the  division.  Each  regiment  of 
infantry,  1  machine  gun  company  of  12  gxms;  each  brigade  1  bat- 
talion of  4  machine  gun  companies  and  the  division,  1  battalion  of  2 
motorized  machine  gun  companies  with  12  g^ins  each.  This  makes  a 
total  of  168  machine  guns  and  768  automatic  rifles.  16  automatic  rifles 
in  each  company. 


IX.     The  Infantry  Attack  in  Open  Warfare 

REQUIREMENTS 

Fighting  methods  are  governed  by  the  technical  pro- 
gress of  arms  and  armament  and  their  resulting  moral  ef- 
fect on  the  troops.  Both  have  to  be  considered  in  training 
troops  and  in  the  conduct  of  battle,  if  we  want  to  be  equal 
to  the  demands  of  war  and  safeguard  ourselves  against  dis- 
appointments. France  underestimated  the  effect  of  the 
German  infantry  and  machine  gun  fire,  while  we  were  sur- 
prised by  the  effect  of  the  French  field  artillery.  At  the 
opening  of  the  World  War  the  effect  of  the  flat-trajectory 
fire  of  all  arms  had  been  increased  to  its  fullest  extent,  but 
the  development  of  high-angle  fire  had  been  neglected.  Only 
Germany  and  England  had  sufficient  high-angle  fire  artil- 
lery, while  gas  projectiles  were  unknown.  At  the  conclu- 
sion of  the  World  War  we  see  the  demand  that  infantry 
and  artillery  must  be  equipped  for  high-angle  and  flat- 
trajectory  fire,  to  force  the  enemy  into  his  shelters  and  still 
reach  him  at  short  range. 

The  French  infantry  was  the  first  to  realize  the  pos- 
sibilities of  short  range,  high-angle  fire;  in  1915  it  intro- 
duced the  automatic  rifle  and  the  rifle  grenade,  but  confined 
the  equipment  with  hand  grenades  to  but  a  few  individuals, 
while  we  equipped  all  our  men  with  both  hand  and  rifle 
grenades.  Since  the  Franco-Prussian  War  the  number  of 
batteries  of  an  infantry  division  has  at  least  trebled  and 
the  other  arms  have  materially  increased,  it  is  clear  that 
the  influence  of  firearms  on  the  fighting  of  infantry  is,  at 
the  present  time,  far  different  than  was  the  case  in  the 
campaign  against  France  in  1870-71.  This  appeared  most 
plainly  during  attacks  in  position  warfare.  Divisions  had 
more  artillery  at  their  disposal  than  in  mobile  warfare  and 
the  question  was  not  one  of  covering  with  fire  a  wide  front, 
but  only  of  a  narrow  sector  with  the  fire  lifted  from  trench 
to  trench.  When  the  infantry  attacks  in  mobile  warfare, 
its  road  is  opened  by  artillery  and  machine  guns  which 

1S9 


190  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

force  the  enemy  to  take  cover.  The  result  is  the  attacking 
infantry  sees  no  target.  Prior  to  the  war,  this  matter  had 
been  carefully  considered  in  France;  there  appeared  doubt 
that  fire  superiority  could  be  attained  as  French  artillery 
had  no  high-angle  guns,  and  the  hostile  infantry,  in  trenches, 
could  not  of  course  be  reached  by  rifle  and  shrapnel.  On 
the  other  hand  it  was  believed  that  their  field  artillery  could 
overcome  any  halt  forced  on  the  troops  by  hostile  fire.  It 
was  held  that  the  infantry  would  not  fire  except  when  ab- 
solutely necessary;  it  was  to  advance  under  the  protection 
of  its  artillery  without  firing  a  shot,  keep  on  the  move  and 
close  with  the  enemy.  In  Germany,  the  infantry  was  cau- 
tioned to  never  wait  for  our  own  fire  superiority,  which  as 
had  been  learned  no  one  could  perceive.  The  infantry 
should  far  rather  compel  the  enemy,  by  its  advance,  to 
occupy  his  position  thereby  offering  shrapnel  targets  to  our 
artillery.  This  did  not  happen  at  all  times,  however,  as 
the  main  role  in  defense  was  not  left  to  the  infantry  but  to 
the  artillery.  The  attacking  artillery  must  finally  lift  its 
fire  from  the  defender  so  as  not  to  iendanger  its  own  ad- 
vancing infantry.  In  Germany  we  attached  special  impor- 
tance to  "carrying  forward  the  fire  to  the  enemy,"  in  case 
of  need  to  the  closest  possible  range.  Thereby  sanguinary 
hand-to-hand  fights  resulted  before  a  final  decision,  in  which 
the  German  infantry  finally  gathered  the  fruits  of  its  thor- 
ough training  on  the  rifle  range,  though  under  heavy  losses. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  suffered  out  of  all  proportion,  if  it 
attempted  to  gain  the  assault  position  without  waiting  for 
fire  preparation. 

The  Russian  infantry  gained  the  same  experiences  in 
the  Russo-Japanese  War.  The  bayonet  training  preached 
by  Dragomiroff  had  its  roots  in  the  belief  of  the  moral  in- 
fluence of  the  bayonet,  as  well  as  in  the  knowledge  of  the 
poor  marksmanship  of  the  troops ;  thus  it  came  about  that 
(with  the  intention  of  getting  up  to  the  enemy  as  rapidly 
as  possible)  the  infantry  pushed  forward  without  proper 
fire  preparation.  Fire  success  attained  by  infantry  and  ar- 
tillery, are  due  to  better  target  practice,  fire  control,  fire 
discipline,  better  cover,  and  the  concentration  of  a  larger 
number  of  projectiles  on  the  decisive  point.     Thus,  the  ene- 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  191 

my's  resistance  is  finally  overcome,  he  no  longer  dares  to 
raise  his  head  above  ground,  even  if  the  fire  temporarily 
abates,  and  our  movements  are  no  longer  interrupted  by 
fire.  With  the  defender,  individual  men  attempt  to  escape, 
followed  by  entire  squads,  while  with  the  attacker,  active 
groups  encouraged  by  small  losses,  attempt  by  quick  rushes 
to  get  ahead.  We  then  speak  of  the  fire  superiority  of  the 
attacker. 

The  attacker  should  always  feel  out  the  fire  superiori- 
ty when  he  attempts  to  advance,  and  ascertain  if  the  ene- 
my is  able  to  prevent  his  advance  by  its  fire.  Fire  super- 
iority can  generally  be  gained  only  through  a  costly  fire 
fight  lasting  for  hours.  Machine  guns  hurl,  with  less 
guns  and  less  men,  the  same  number  of  bullets  upon  the 
enemy  in  shorter  time  and  with  greater  accuracy,  while  the 
number  of  casualties  decrease  due  to  fewer  men  in  the  fir- 
ing line.  Thus,  we  can  replace  the  infantry  fire  at  the 
shortest  ranges  by  automatic  rifles,  and  at  mid  and  long 
ranges  by  machine  guns.  For  instance,  one  infantry  regi- 
ment could  insert  on  a  1,000-meter  front  20  automatic  rifles 
and  18  machine  guns  throwing  about  10,000  projectiles  per 
minute.  The  main  fire  power  of  the  infantry  platoon  lies 
in  the  automatic  rifle,  its  shock  power  in  the  skirmish  squads. 
The  endeavor  to  preserve  the  power  of  the  skirmish  squads 
as  long  as  possible  for  the  decisive  shock,  leads  to  the  fire 
fight  being  conducted  principally  by  automatic  rifles  and 
machine  guns.  As  a  general  rule  we  must  gain  a  point  as 
close  to  the  enemy  as  possble  before  opening  fire.  We  must 
demand  of  well  trained  troops  that  they  open  fire  only  when 
special  effect  can  be  secured  from  use  of  rifle  and  machine 
gun.  This  will  be  the  case  in  open  terrain  at  ranges  less 
than  1,000  meters.  Our  new  tactics  for  the  attack  seeks 
rapid  decision,  with  a  minimum  use  of  shock-tactics.  It 
seeks  to  save  men.  Maximum  use  of  machines  at  the  start 
before  throwing  into  the  battle  the  very  costly  human  ele- 
ment, so  hard  to  replace,  is  the  rule.  But  the  decision  pro- 
per, as  always,  lies  in  the  hands  of  the  infantry,  whose  phy- 
sical endurance  and  moral  power  must  be  increased  to  the 
highest  possible  point  by  all  available  means.  This  battle 
method  has  been  proved  correct.  It  demands  thorough 
training  in  the  co-operation  of  all  arms. 


192  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

Besides  our  own  fire  effect  utilization  of  the  terrain  has 
a  special  importance  in  working  up  to  the  enemy.  Battle 
reconnaissance  must  ascertain  the  difficulties  of  deployment 
from  any  cover  in  the  terrain.  Utilization  of  cover  pre- 
supposes flexibility  of  the  skirmish  line,  both  at  a  halt  and 
moving-  forward.  The  whole  idea  is  wrong  if  the  demand  is 
made  to  cover  the  entire  terrain  equally  with  skirmishers 
under  any  and  all  conditions. 

PROCEDURE  OF  ATTACK 

Our  training  regulations  distinguish  between  rencontre 
attacks,  against  an  enemy  deployed  for  defense,  and  against 
a  fortified  position.  We  shall  hereafter  adhere  to  these 
distinctions.  Air  reconnaissance  may  be  able  to  procure 
information  as  to  what  degree  the  defender  has  made  pre- 
paration for  defense.  We  may  always  be  sure  that  trenches, 
and  false  works,  have  been  established  in  a  greater  or  lesser 
degree  of  completeness.  The  construction  of  extensive  ob- 
stacles and  the  presence  of  numerous  sheltering  works 
(which  it  takes  weeks  to  construct)  made  a  "fortified  posi- 
tion," the  capture  of  which  demands  reinforcement  and  in- 
crease of  artillery  and  technical  troops.  The  German  Army 
has  always  preferred  the  attack  knowing  that  by  the  attack 
alone  can  a  victory  be  won.  Even  situations  which  strate- 
gically force  defense  upon  the  troops  can  be  solved  tactically, 
in  many  cases,  better  by  attack  than  by  defense.  The  de- 
cision whether  the  commander  shall  attack  or  defend  does 
not,  as  is  the  case  so  frequently  in  peace  maneuvers,  lie  in 
the  relation  of  strength  of  the  two  forces.  We  hardly  ever 
know  at  the  moment  of  having  to  make  a  decision,  anything 
but  the  general  situation  and  the  mission.  The  enemy  is  in 
the  same  uncertainty  as  we.  A  sharp  quick  attack  may 
convince  him  that  we  are  stronger.  Frederick  the  Great 
cautioned  his  troops,  which  in  almost  all  instances  had  to 
fight  against  superior  numbers :  "Attaquez  done  toujours." 

Troops  trained  in  the  will  to  attack  will  always  be  able 
to  attack.  Not  the  number  of  rifles  is  necessary  for  the 
success,  but  the  fighting  power  gained  in  training,  the 
equipment,  the  skill  of  leaders  and  troops,  the  co-operation 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  193 

of  the  arms,  the  utilization  of  the  terrain,  and  rapidity  and 
decision  in  the  fight.  Attacks,  without  fire  support,  are 
useful  only  in  surprise  situations  or  occasionally  at  night. 
The  normal  method  consists  in  combining  fire  and  move- 
ment. It  is  the  task  of  regulations  to  point  out  the  correct 
relation  between  fire  tactics  and  shock  tactics.  Infantry 
regulations  state:  "The  best  means  for  working  up  to  the 
enemy  is  by  securing  fire  superiority,"  which  is  made  known 
by  the  decrease  of  the  hostile  fire  or  the  enemy's  bullets 
flying  high  and  wild.  Field  Training  Regulations  presents 
another  viewpoint  based  on  experiences  in  war.  "Rifles 
and  machine  guns  bear  the  brunt  of  the  fire  fight;  the  de- 
cision is  brought  about  by  the  shock  power  of  the  infantry," 
and  "Opening  and  carrying  on  the  fire  fight  will  generally 
be  left  to  machine  guns;  they  must  make  the  enemy  take 
cover,  and  then  only  will  our  infantry  appear  in  the  intre- 
pid attack."  First,  the  effect  of  machines,  then  insert  men. 
Par.  324,  I.  D.  R. :  "The  attack  consists  in  carrying 
forward  the  fire."  It  is  demanded  of  well  trained  troops 
that  they  open  fire,  even  in  terrain  devoid  of  cover,  only 
at  mid  range  (800  to  1200  meters).  Today,  when  all 
means  of  fire  have  been  improved  and  augmented,  we  must 
demand  more.  The  infantry  must  work  up  without  firing 
a  shot  so  close  to  the  enemy  that  the  fire  will  be  opened  as 
late  as  possible — in  any  case  less  than  1,000  meters.  The 
time  to  open  fire  is  when  the  troops  can  work  forward  under 
the  hostile  fire  only  with  great  loss.  The  front  of  a  divi- 
sion sector  will  hardly  ever  be  less  than  2  kilometers,  which 
will,  of  course,  not  be  covered  equally  by  skirmishers.  In- 
fantrymen may  be  replaced  without  loss  of  fire  power  by 
machines  (guns,  machine  guns),  etc.  An  attack  that  is  to 
be  carried  deep  into  the  enemy  requires  formation  in  depth. 
This  cannot  be  secured  if  the  front  is  too  wide.  If  too  wide 
nothing  remains  but  to  make  a  portion  of  the  division  sec- 
tor strong,  place  the  center  of  gravity  there  and  penetrate 
deep  into  the  enemy,  while  other  portions  of  the  sector  have 
to  be  satisfied  with  near  objectives.  The  enemy  which  was 
threatened  only,  and  not  directly  attacked,  will  later  on  fall 
upon  the  flanks  of  the  penetrating  attack. 


194  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

NEAR  RECONNAISSANCE 

Troops  approach  in  march  column  the  effective  zone  of 
the  hostile  fire,  and  without  having  to  face  long  range  bat- 
teries, we  must  count  on  the  route  being  fired  upon  when 
within  10  kilometers  of  the  front.  This  requires  the  forming 
of  the  march  column  into  separate  elements,  "Deployment." 
In  view  of  the  modern  long  range  guns  it  may  easily  hap- 
pen that  the  enemy's  projectiles  will  arrive  sooner  than  the 
first  reports  of  the  reconnoitering  units ;  thus,  the  infantry 
will  have  to  feel  its  way  after  it  reaches  the  fighting  zone. 
In  no  case  must  troops  enter  the  hostile  zone  of  fire  in  close 
order. 

All  arms  participate  in  battle  reconnaissance.  As 
shown  by  experience,  after  the  first  reports  have  been  re- 
ceived concerning  the  enemy,  there  will  be  for  a  time  a  lack 
of  information  which  may  be  explained  by  the  cavalry  giv- 
ing way  towards  a  wing  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  and  by  the 
other  arms  pushing  out  reconnoitering  parties.  We  must 
also  not  forget  that  a  column  marching  along  a  road  is  more 
easily  distinguished  than  troops  advancing  deployed.  While 
patrols  can  overlook  entire  hostile  columns  advancing  along 
roads,  they  are  when  observing  deployed  troops  confined  to 
only  small  portions,  and  this  observation  will  be  made  more 
difficult  by  the  opponent's  cavalry  which  after  deployment, 
can  protect  his  flanks  more  thoroughly  than  was  possible 
with  the  long  march  column.  Should  the  patrols  neverthe- 
less succeed  in  getting  through  the  opponent's  cavalry  to 
their  infantry  they  will  in  most  cases  only  be  able  to  make  a 
hasty  long  range  reconnaissance  as  they  will  now  be  afraid 
of  the  hostile  infantry  and  of  being  discovered  in  a  precar- 
ious situation.  What  happens  between  the  wings  of  the  op- 
ponent they  can  neither  see  nor  report.  Natural  cover  will 
increase  the  difficulties  of  view.  Observation  of  the  imme- 
diate front  can  of  course  furnish  local  information  only.  Pa- 
trols may  ride  far  enough  to  the  front  to  be  fired  on,  and 
report  that  fire,  but  what  hostile  troops  fired  and  the  exact 
direction  from  which  the  fire  came  they  will,  in  most  cases, 
be  unable  to  correctly  ascertain,  as  the  troops  firing  are 
hidden  and  the  smokeless  powder  conceals  the  direction  from 
which  the  shots  came. 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  195 

There  must  be  no  interruption  in  the  reconnaissance, 
and  it  must  be  carried  on  with  great  care:  not  however,  to 
excess  so  that  it  may  delay  the  battle  action,  and  thus  ren- 
der questionable  the  final  success.  Only  cavalry  can  deter- 
mine the  position  of  the  enemy  along  extensive  lines,  ascer- 
tain extension  of  wings,  location  and  movement  of  reserves, 
and  approach  of  probable  reinforcements.  This  while  im- 
portant lacks  the  details  so  necessary  for  the  conduct  of  the 
infantry  battle.  Details  of  the  hostile  position  can  be  gained 
only  if  the  enemy  is  careless  or  unskillful;  false  and  ad- 
vanced positions  can  be  discovered  only  during  the  course  of 
the  battle.  Terrain  reconnaissance  will  include  the  fol- 
lowing points :  Up  to  v/hat  point  may  the  troops  move  un- 
der cover  and  in  what  formation?  Where  does  the  terrain 
allow  cover  for  portions  of  the  troops  only  ?  Where  will  be 
the  first  firing  position  and  what  is  its  nature?  Where  are 
the  supporting  points  for  the  attack  located?  Where  are 
dead  angles  in  front  of  the  line  to  be  attacked?  What  are 
the  difl^culties  to  be  encountered  in  passing  over  the  field  of 
battle? 

A  simple  sketch  showing  the  above  points  will  help  the 
leader  to  think  himself  into  the  situation.  Concerning  the 
actual  view  of  the  hostile  position  a  good  sketch  will  be  val- 
uable. Airplanes  will  generally  have  much  other  work  to 
do  to  meet  the  requirements  of  the  high  command.  Artillery 
patrols,  usually  sent  out  only  when  definite  reports  have 
been  received  of  the  presence  or  advance  of  the  enemy,  must 
ascertain  what  is  necessary  to  know  for  the  artillery. 
Strength,  deployment  and  location  of  the  hostile  artillery, 
as  was  demanded  at  the  opening  of  the  war,  they  will  be 
able  to  ascertain  only  in  exceptional  cases.  This  had  best 
be  left  to  aerial  reconnaissance.  Location  of  hostile  obser- 
vation positions  is  especially  valuable.  It  is  not  correct  to 
charge  artillery  patrols  with  reconnoitering  roads  and  firing 
positions ;  these  patrols  must  not  allow  themselves  to  be  di- 
verted into  such  general  reconnoitering  tasks,  or  to  help 
other  arms.  On  the  other  hand,  artillery  patrols  must  es- 
tablish connection  with  the  reconnoitering  units  of  the 
other  arms  and  exchange  information  with  them. 

The  infantry  must  be  called  on  in  good  time  for  near 
reconnaissance,  as  well  as  for  the  usual  battle  reconnais- 


196  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

sance.  The  main  difficulty  for  the  infantry  lies  in  the  fact 
that  their  cyclists  are  bound  to  the  roads,  that  the  mounted 
officers  must  be  temporarily  withdrawn  from  their  proper 
duties,  and  that  there  is  a  lack  of  men  to  accompany  the 
officer's  patrols  to  send  back  messages.  But  this  should  not 
preclude  (it  must  even  be  demanded)  that  officers  ride  to 
points  permitting  a  good  view  and  observe  through  field 
glasses.  But  if  they  personally  ride  back  to  report,  the  re- 
connaissance is  interrupted,  a  great  disadvantage.  Infan- 
try patrols  move  slowly  and  send  in  their  reports  more 
slowly  which,  before  reaching  the  desired  point,  may  have 
been  overtaken  by  events.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  with 
correct  use  of  cover  they  can  get  very  close  to  the  enemy  un- 
observed. At  the  same  time  they  possess  a  certain  fighting 
power  especially  when  machine  guns  are  attached. 

Near  reconnaissance  at  the  present  time  is  of  more 
importance  than  ever  before.  Changes  of  front  with  de- 
ployed lines  is  impossible  and  troops  coming  under  hostile 
fire  in  close  order,  suffer  losses  amounting  almost  to  aimi- 
hilation.  The  reconnaissance  becomes  more  difficult  as  we 
have  to  reckon  with  the  enemy's  covering  forces  and  we  may 
be  sure  he  will  not  voluntarily  permit  us  to  get  a  view  from 
high  points.  Weak  infantry  can  neither  break  the  hostile 
covering  forces  nor  force  them  back  sufficiently  for  the 
leader  to  reconnoiter  personally.  In  many  cases  strong 
forces  will  be  required.  From  these  reconnaissance  patrols 
we  come  to  the  reconnaissances  in  force.  Unless  we  threaten 
an  attack,  the  defender  will  not  uncover  his  positions.  Re- 
connaissances in  force  must  be  resorted  to,  because  we  can 
immediately  make  use  of  its  results. 

Infantry  reconnaissance  must  be  carried  on  with  great 
care,  proper  arrangements  must  be  made  during  the  march, 
distribution  of  tasks,  and  plans  for  sending  messages  back 
must  be  thought  out.  If  we  for  instance  send  infantry  pa- 
trols with  automatic  rifles  along  the  march  route  and  along 
neighboring  roads  as  soon  as  the  first  cavalry  reports  of 
the  enemy  are  received,  these  patrols  will  offer  a  certain 
stability  to  our  cavalry  patrols,  while  they  increase  the 
enemy's  difficulties  of  reconnaissance.  The  leader  had  best 
reconnoiter  personally  and  not  rely  entirely  on  the  tactical 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  197 

knowledge  of  his  subordinates.  He  must,  under  infantry 
protection,  see  for  himself  and  then  he  can  the  better  use 
his  troops.  Sending  out  company  commanders  for  recon- 
naissance which  is  much  done  in  peace  maneuvers,  should  be 
avoided.  Exaggerated  thoroughness,  especially  on  short 
winter  days,  may  delay  the  reconnaissance  so  much  that 
the  success  of  the  attack  will  become  questionable.  It  would 
be  entirely  wrong  and  our  attacking  power  would  be  weak- 
ened if  we  delayed  the  decision  for  the  attack  until  we  have 
full  knowledge  concerning  the  enemy's  strength  and  group- 
ing. Clearness  in  this  regard  can  be  attained  only  after  the 
battle.  The  general  situation  in  the  first  line  decides  the 
question  of  attack.  The  situation  may  force  immediate  ac- 
tion without  awaiting  the  results  of  the  reconnaissance. 
Conditions  of  the  terrain  and  degree  of  known  preparations 
of  the  enemy  will  govern  the  leader  in  deciding  whether  to 
attack  at  once,  to  await  darkness  to  bring  up  the  troops,  or 
to  maneuver  the  opponent  out  of  his  position. 

DEPLOYMENT  AND  DEVELOPMENT 

The  near  reconnaissance  is  supplemented  by  systematic 
observation.  From  favorable  observation  points,  by  means 
of  good  field  glasses,  the  distribution  of  the  enemy  and  his 
routes  of  approach  can  often  be  observed.  The  results  of 
such  observations  are  collected  first  at  the  regiments  and 
form  the  basis  for  battle  orders. 

Within  the  division  regiments  receive  a  battle  sector 
of  from  600  to  1000  meters.  The  regimental  commander 
equally  divides  his  sector  into  battalion  sectors  of  about  300 
to  500  meters.  Each  battalion  receives  with  its  battle  sec- 
tor its  fighting  mission.  Regimental  orders  cover,  connec- 
tion with  the  artillery,  arrangement  of  means  of  informa- 
tion, orders  for  the  combat  train,  and  for  the  regimental  aid 
station. 

Generally  the  battaHon  will  assign  2  companies  for  the 
front  line,  each  on  a  200  meters  front,  the  other  2  follow  in 
the  second  line.  The  machine  gun  company  remains,  as  a 
general  rule,  with  the  battalion,  but  may  temporarily  be 
employed  otherwise:  "As  support  for  special  tasks,  flank 
protection,  independent  support  of  the  firing  line  from  dom- 
inating positions,  etc." 


198  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

In  addition  the  regiment  disposes  of  its  minenwerfer 
company  and  its  information  detachment.  The  liberal  sup- 
ply of  means  of  information  furnished  during  the  World  War 
permitted  telephone  connection  from  division  headquarters 
to  the  division  artillery  commander,  from  there  to  the  ar- 
tillery battalions,  and  from  division  headquarters  via  bri- 
gade headquarters  to  the  infantry  regiments  and  from  the 
latter  to  their  battalions.  The  possibility  of  division  head- 
quarters conversing  directly  with  different  battalions  must 
never  lead  to  its  interference  with  the  detailed  conduct  of 
the  same. 

The  development  of  the  attacker  must  be  made  under 
the  assumption  that  heavy  artillery  fire  may  start  at  any 
moment,  and  the  larger  his  force  the  sooner  will  the  enemy 
open  fire.  The  utilization  of  the  cover  offered  by  terrain, 
assuming  formations  calculated  to  lessen  the  effect  of  fire, 
timely  removal  of  all  vehicles  from  the  column,  and  their 
movement  from  cover  to  cover,  are  the  best  means  of  avoid- 
ing the  hostile  artillery  fire.  Of  course,  this  covered  ap- 
proach takes  time,  but  it  saves  loss.  In  a  rencontre  battle 
such  a  loss  of  time  may  be  fatal,  but  something  will  have 
to  be  hazarded.  In  the  attack  against  an  enemy  deployed  for 
defense,  time  consumed  has  not  the  same  importance  as  loss 
in  men. 

Narrow  formations — (the  French  even  reject  march 
column  of  fours  on  the  battlefield) — of  little  depth,  irregu- 
larly dispersed  over  the  terrain,  have  proved  best  in  cross- 
ing ground  swept  by  the  hostile  fire.  French  and  British 
almost  always  divided  their  platoons  into  4  separate  squads 
and  lessened  the  losses.  In  general  we  adhere  to  division  of 
platoons  into  half -platoons.  However,  when  the  hostile  fire 
becomes  effective  a  further  division  should  be  made,  with 
due  consideration  of  loss  of  time  and  control.  But  if  the 
advance  is  not  to  be  completely  disrupted,  a  line  has  to  be 
designated.  This  line  should  be  under  cover  and  at  close 
range.  The  class  of  artillery  fire  will  in  each  case  demand 
a  special  procedure.  If  the  hostile  artillery  seeks  to  find 
the  range  to  a  unit  with  some  short  or  over  shorts,  that  unit 
will  at  once,  lessen  the  effect  of  the  expected  fire  by  deploy- 
ing into  smaller  and  narrower  units,  dispersing  over  the 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  199 

terrain,  or  by  rapid  backward  or  forward  movements.  In 
many  cases  the  enemy  artillery  will  find  the  range  to  some 
point  in  the  terrain,  one  task  of  the  near  reconnaissance  is 
to  locate  those  points  and  warn  troops  not  to  stop  near  them, 
but  pass  quickly  by  without  offering  large  targets.  Sweep- 
ing fire  is  best  avoided  after  exact  observation  of  the  spaces 
that  are  comparatively  free  from  the  fire,  and  those  spaces 
crossed  in  close  order,  the  commander  keeping  his  troops  well 
in  hand.  Much  depends  on  luck.  It  is  far  more  difficult  to 
move  forward  and  so  observe  counter  preparation  fire ;  a  bat- 
talion that  is  struck  by  such  fire  can  do  nothing  better  than 
to  lie  down  and  wait,  fail  to  give  the  enemy  any  guide  for 
regulating  his  fire  and  avoiding  conspicuous  appearances 
such  as  horses,  standing  officers,  etc.  Meanwhile  units  more 
favorably  situated  continue  the  forward  movement.  Assum- 
ing that  the  hostile  batteries  are  ready  for  action  and  await- 
ing the  appearance  of  favorable  targets,  we  must  never  offer 
large  targets  but  attempt  to  gain  ground  by  squads  or  in- 
dividuals. Detours  are  frequently  correct.  While  in  the 
next  cover  the  troops  are  reassembled  and  an  attempt  made 
to  continue  the  movement.  By  paying  due  regard  to  these 
experiences  we  have  been  able  to  pass  through  heavy  artil- 
lery fire  without  material  losses. 

ARTILLERY  OF  THE  ATTACK 

Simultaneously  with  the  infantry  advance  the  attack- 
ing artillery  from  covered  positions  fire  at  a  range  of  about 
3000  to  4000  meters.  Its  fire  no  longer  comes  from  long, 
inflexible  lines,  which  make  the  firing  comparatively  easy, 
but  from  groups,  hugging  the  conformation  of  the  ground 
which  can  be  located  by  airplanes  only.  This  echelonment 
of  guns  has  an  advantage  for  infantry  and  artillery  in  that 
infantry  no  longer  crosses  the  line  of  its  artillery  support 
at  one  time.  A  consequence  of  the  old  method  of  lines  of 
batteries  was  that  the  defender  succeeded  in  a  very  short 
time  in  ascertaining  the  position  of  the  hostile  artillery,  and 
could  apply  sweeping  fire  within  relatively  small  zones  thus 
effectively  carrying  on  the  artillery  duel.  One  saw  from  the 
point  where  noise  of  cannon  came,  that  thunder  suddenly 
cease,  and  at  the  same  time  skirmishers  appeared  working 


200  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

forward  by  rushes,  or  several  columns  with  exact  intervals 
came  over  the  rise  and  the  hostile  artillery  again  resumed 
the  fire. 

Even  though  valuable  time  may  be  lost  and  another 
unit's  battle  zone  temporarily  invaded  it  is  better  to  go  round 
than  to  cross  a  fire  swept  zone. 

A  portion  of  the  artillery  will  hold  down  the  hostile 
artillery,  while  as  many  guns  as  possible  direct  their  fire  on 
the  hostile  infantry.  The  danger  must  never  be  underesti- 
mated that  at  long  ranges  there  is  doubt  concerning  the 
situation  of  the  hostile  position,  which  can  be  cleared  up 
gradually  only  by  infantry  observers  and  the  artillery  liai- 
son officers  who  have  gone  ahead  with  the  infantry. 

Defensive  artillery  should  not  reply  to  the  guns  of  the 
attack.  Its  target  is  the  hostile  attacking  infantry;  only 
when  that  target  cannot  be  fired  on  will  it  fire  on  the  hostile 
batteries. 

Whether  the  attacking  artillery  succeed  in  holding 
down  the  defender's  artillery  depends  on  how  exactly  the 
batteries  of  the  defender  have  been  located.  The  outcome 
of  the  artillery  duel  is  doubtful,  but  it  is  absolutely  neces- 
sary for  the  success  of  the  battle.  Thus,  the  underlying 
teachings  of  earlier  regulations  to  seek  with  all  means  at 
hand  to  gain  the  fire  superiority,  before  starting  the  infan- 
try to  the  attack  could  not  be  discarded.  Even  if  the  artil- 
lery duel  has  not  been  absolutely  decided  in  our  favor,  the 
infantry  must  not  decline  the  execution  of  the  attack  as  an 
impossibility. 

How  many  batteries  of  the  attacker  may  fire  on  the  de- 
fensive artillery  depends  upon  the  effect  of  the  latter.  K 
the  defender's  artillery  can  materially  increase  the  diflficul- 
ties  of  advance  for  the  attacker,  then  he  must  place  a  por- 
tion of  his  guns,  which  have  heretofore  fired  on  the  enemy's 
infantry,  against  the  artillery;  the  task  of  such  guns  may 
be  then  taken  over  by  machine  guns.  It  cannot  be  avoided 
at  times  that  a  portion  of  the  defensive  artillery  is  not  fired 
on  and  can  direct  its  fire  on  the  advancing  skirmishers. 

WORKING  UP  TO  THE  ENEMY 

We  must  lay  down  the  following  maxims  for  the  at- 
tack : 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  201 

1.  The  attacking  infantry  advances  under  the  protection  of 
its  artillery  and  machine  gun  fire  as  close  to  the  enemy  as  the 
hostile  fire  permits;  it  would  be  simpler  if  the  assault  could  be 
taken  up  from  the  first  halt,  as  was  laid  down  in  Troop  Training, 
but  which  was  found  to  be  not  always  feasible. 

2.  The  defensive  artillery  attempts  to  drive  off  the  skirmishers 
of  the  attack;  the  attacking  artillery  fires  on  the  defensive  ar- 
tillery only  with  as  many  guns  as  is  necessary  to  hold  down  effec- 
tively the  latter's  fire. 

3.  Attacking  artillery  will  finally  be  forced  to  enter  into  a 
time  and  ammunition  consuming  artillery  duel  (to  relieve  the  at- 
tacking infantry  from  the  defender's  artillery  fire)  and  the 
attacking  infantry  will  be  forced  into  an  infantry  fire  fight. 

The  main  fire  power  of  the  infantry  platoon  lies  in  the 
light  minenwerfers.  We  have  thoroughly  proven  during 
the  war  that  the  machine  gun  is  an  excellent  arm  of  oppor- 
tunity but  not  suited  for  a  long  continued  fire  fight.  The 
increase  of  machine  guns  in  all  armies,  has  made  move- 
ments in  long,  regular,  dense  skirmish  lines  impossible; 
thereby  finally  and  definitely  answering  the  question  whether 
it  is  correct  to  make  long  and  broad  or  short  and  narrow 
rushes.  The  former  are  far  too  costly  under  machine  gun 
fire,  not  even  considering  the  fact  that  a  platoon  in  a  thin 
skirmish  line  cannot  be  controlled  any  longer  by  its  com- 
mander. It  is  different  in  situations  where  we  are  not 
directly  under  machine  gun  fire,  for  if  the  troops  can  get 
rapidly  forward,  long  and  broad  rushes  are  in  order.  Short 
rushes  by  no  means  shorten  the  time  during  which  troops 
are  visible;  they  only  increase  the  enemy's  difl^culties  in 
directing  a  well  aimed  fire  on  the  skirmishers.  Under  pro- 
tection of  our  own  effective  fire  we  can  make  each  rush  long, 
provided  we  do  not  prefer  to  advance  at  the  walk.  For  train- 
ing reasons  we  will  generally  adhere  to  long  rushes  with 
great  breadth;  they  are  executed  as  soon  as  the  effect  of 
the  fire  permits. 

We,  as  well  as  our  enemies,  saw  ourselves  in  the  World 
War  forced  to  make  our  skirmish  lines  thinner  and  thin- 
ner. The  176th  Infantry  Regiment  adopted  the  interval 
between  skirmishers  at  two  meters,  while,  based  on  ex- 
periences of  the  Boer  War,  the  British  adopted  in  the  fire 
deployment  an  interval  ranging  between  5  and  15  meters, 
which  shortly  before  the  assault  could  be  diminished  to 
0.90  meters.  In  Russia,  based  on  the  experiences  of  the 
Russo-Japanese  War,  it  was  thought  that  one  rifle  to  every 


202  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

4  meters  (2.5  to  3  meters  interval)  was  sufficient.  Train- 
ing Regulations  required  an  interval  of  6  paces,  which  could 
be  diminished  according  to  need  to  one  pace.  France  perma- 
nently favored  the  formation  of  dense  skirmish  lines. 

The  more  the  intervals  were  enlarged,  the  more  diffi- 
cult became  control,  as  the  individual  skirmishers  were  left 
more  to  themselves.  But  even  the  thin  skirmish  lines  were 
exposed  to  heavy  loss  when  under  machine  gun  fire,  and  the 
machine  gun  carriers  in  the  skirmish  lines  could  be  easily 
distinguished.  It  was  therefore  found  advisable  to  make 
the  lines  irregular  especially  shortly  before  the  opening  of 
fire.  Advance  by  squads  in  single  file  with  intervals  or  by 
skirmish  squads  with  little  intervals,  but  with  gaps  between 
them  and  neighboring  squads,  offer  many  advantages.  The 
squad  leader  can  make  his  influence  felt  on  his  men  from 
the  time  fire  is  opened.  Gaps  between  squads  permits  ma- 
chine guns  to  fire  through  them,  disruption  of  squads  in 
joining  the  line  is  avoided,  and  the  squad  leader  fights  with 
the  men  whom  he  has  trained  for  battle.  Small,  irregular 
targets  permit  the  infantry  to  get  forward  without  material 
loss. 

We  should  not  demand  regular  formations  within  the 
platoon :  One  portion  is  more  favored,  the  other  less.  The 
formation  must  be  such  that  it  will  not  unnecessarily  in- 
crease the  losses  if  hostile  fire  is  suddenly  encountered.  To 
take  up  the  desired  formation  only  at  that  moment  is  en- 
tirely too  late  and  will  lead  to  annihilation.  In  terrain 
where  a  good  view  cannot  be  had,  scouts  must  be  sent  ahead, 
and  even  in  open  terrain  it  will  often  be  advantageous  for 
the  platoon  commander  to  go  far  to  the  front  with  a  few 
acouts.  The  advance  is  made  at  the  walk  as  long  as  prac- 
ticable, with  the  firm  will  to  open  fire  as  late  as  possible.  If 
broad  stretches,  without  cover,  have  to  be  crossed  the  hos- 
tile fire  effect  may  compel  formation  into  the  smallest  units 
(squads),  which  gain  ground  either  by  thin  skirmish  lines 
following  each  other  in  waves,  or  single  file  formation 
abreast  with  large  intervals.  This  formation  must  how- 
ever not  interfere  with  combined  leadership.  In  addition, 
direction  of  attack  and  guide  must  be  definitely  laid  down 
by  the  platoon  commander  and  strictly  adhered  to  by  all 
units.    Formation  and  method  of  movement  are  left  to  the 


EXAMPLE  OF  THE  FORMATION  OF  ONE  COMPANY  AT 
OPENING  OF  THE  FIRE 


2d  Platoon 

no'  


.-     .•-.._..    ••*! 


.*•••« »'  •••••r««<  »'  *••••{«•• 


e^p 


Musician 


1st  Platoon 
120'  — 


«««*t««*<20'  M*.*.  s  •««••»,  28'  »«at«4 


Oi-p. 


dA^B 


••!•• 


•  •  • 

4 


Musician 


«.*• 

•«•-•  I 


3d  Platoon 


•  •  i  • 


•••4««**  ••• 


•  ••!•« 


♦ 


Company  Commander 

Platoon  commander 

Squad  leader 

Supernumerary  squad  leader 

Musician 

Automatic  machine  gun 


(1)   The  interval  may  be  materially  larger  or  smaller. 


204  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

discretion  of  the  squad  leaders.  Only  effective  hostile  fire 
must  induce  the  individual  soldier  to  work  forward  from 
cover  to  cover.  The  troops  do  not  like  to  crawl  for  longer 
stretches  and  the  expenditure  of  energy  is  not  commensur- 
ate with  the  lessening  of  losses,  as  the  crawling  skirmisher 
offers  a  larger  target  than  the  man  lying  down.  To  cover 
by  crawling  100  meters  in  favorable  terrain  will  take  2^ 
minutes,  and  in  addition,  it  is  difficult  to  preserve  order 
and  cohesion  and  to  keep  to  the  general  march  direction. 
Entirely  different  is  the  occasional  use  of  crawling,  for  in- 
stance, in  entering  a  position.  The  advance  will  be  aided 
if  we  succeed  in  getting  a  portion  of  the  machine  guns  into 
favorable,  inconspicuous  firing  positions,  "attack  nests"  from 
which  they  facilitate  the  advance  at  the  start  and  then  sup- 
port it  by  firing  over  the  heads  of  the  troops.  The  infantry 
should  never  lack  the  support  of  machine  guns,  and  nothing 
must  be  allowed  to  interfere  with  bringing  the  machine  guns 
forward.  It  is  therefore  advisable  to  let  a  portion  of  the 
machine  guns  at  the  very  start  follow  the  infantry  for  fire 
support  at  short  range  and  to  move  the  other  part  up  from 
position  to  position.  Closely  hugging  the  ground,  appear- 
ing suddenly,  skillfully  evading  the  hostile  artillery  fire,  they 
follow  the  fighting  line  in  echelon.  They  also  keep  in  mind 
the  task  of  facilitating  the  advance  of  the  skirmishers  and 
automatic  rifles.  We  must  avoid,  as  long  as  possible,  plac- 
ing machine  guns  in  the  skirmish  line.  They  crowd  that 
line  badly,  and  increase  the  losses  and  in  addition,  it  is  a 
great  disadvantage  to  have  to  take  much  time  to  get  ready 
for  a  rush.  Guns  must  be  unloaded  first,  and  as  the  carriers 
cannot  rush  forward  like  the  skirmishers ;  they  remain  be- 
hind and  as  a  result  draw  the  hostile  fire  on  this  most  im- 
portant fighting  arm. 

The  fire  fight  is  conducted  by  the  skirmish  line  accord- 
ing to  well  known  rules.  The  opening  of  fire  will  be  ordered 
by  the  platoon  commander  only  when  there  is  no  other  way 
to  get  forward.  Target  and  sight  elevation  will  be  desig- 
nated by  the  platoon  commander  as  long  as  possible,  but 
under  heavy  fire  the  control  will  slip  from  his  hands  and 
then  the  squad  leader  takes  his  place  and  finally  the  indi- 
vidual soldier.     Loss  of  fire  control  does  not  matter  very 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  205 

much  at  short  range  if  through  training  the  skirmisher  care- 
fully observes  his  fire  effect,  husbands  his  ammunition,  in- 
creases his  rate  of  fire,  when  the  target  is  favorable,  de- 
creases it  when  the  target  becomes  unfavorable  or  entirely 
stops  firing  when  the  target  disappears.  The  command  "fire 
faster,"  or  "fire  slower,"  only  emphasizes  the  inattention  or 
bad  training  of  skirmishers. 

Light  minenwerfers  must  work  their  way  forward  in 
the  same  independent  manner  as  machine  guns.  Positions 
should  be  selected  within  600  meters  of  the  hostile  position, 
so  that  they  can  use  their  short  range  weapons  effectively 
during  the  assault.  Prematurely  taking  up  a  position  is 
correct  only  in  a  reverse ;  support  had  best  be  left  to  the  ar- 
tillery. Their  mission  is  annihilation  of  observed  machine 
guns  or  guns  placed  in  readiness  to  defeat  the  assault.  It 
will  almost  always  be  advisable  to  attach  them  by  pairs  to 
the  leading  companies.  When  going  into  position  and  when 
ammunition  is  being  brought  up  for  them  they  offer  large 
targets;  therefore  cover  for  them  gains  in  importance. 

Co-operation  between  infantry  and  artillery  previously 
arranged  for  is  put  to  the  test  on  the  demand  of  the  infan- 
try when  entering  battle.  Machine  guns  seen  by  the  infan- 
try are  best  and  more  quickly  annihilated  by  artillery,  but 
it  will  not  be  easy  to  designate  the  target  to  the  artillery  in 
rear.  If  the  advance  of  the  infantry  is  delayed  or  prevented 
by  hostile  fire,  it  can  be  resumed  best  by  waves.  The  infan- 
try must  be  trained  to  immediately  utilize  fire  support  of 
the  sister  arm,  which  means  infantry  must  immediately  ad- 
vance when  it  sees  our  shells  bursting  on  the  enemy.  The 
advance  is  not  to  be  made  in  rushes  but  at  a  walk,  when 
the  enemy  is  blinded  by  dust,  smoke  or  iron.  The  infantry 
has  often  been  able  to  push  on  when  single  guns  or  artil- 
lery platoons  came  up  close  and  supported  its  advance,  pay- 
ing no  attention  to  losses.  There  is  no  reason  to  expect  espe- 
cial danger  to  these  accompanying  guns,  as  the  opponent  in 
defeating  an  assault  has  more  important  things  to  attend 
to  than  to  bother  about  them.  Accompanying  guns  should 
always  be  under  the  orders  of  the  infantry  commander.  Ar- 
tillery follows  up  the  infantry  after  the  capture  of  the  posi- 
tion, and  secure  its  possession.    A  well  planned,  energetic 


206  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

counter-attack  made  after  the  capture  of  the  position  will 
hardly  go  to  pieces  under  artillery  fire  which  comes  from 
far  in  rear,  and  the  observation  of  which  by  the  advance 
troops  is  very  difficult,  especially  in  close  country.  The  ar- 
tillery at  long  range,  limbering  up  at  that  very  moment 
leaves  to  the  infantry  the  entire  difficulties  of  meeting  the 
counter-attack.  Retreating  infantry  finds  stability  onljy 
at  its  first  guns  and  is  enabled  to  make  a  stand  there.  We 
must  not  underestimate  the  moral  effect  which  is  made  on 
the  infantry  by  guns  following  up  close  on  its  heels. 

The  infantry  guns  either  by  piece  or  by  platoon,  sup- 
port the  troops  directly  at  an  effective  range  of  1200  to 
1800  meters.  These  guns  fire  point  blank  which  demands 
that  every  shot  be  observed;  the  difficulty  of  observation 
requires  employment  of  single  guns.  The  battery  is  merely 
the  unit  for  supply,  discipline,  etc. 

During  the  entire  war  the  question  of  employing  the 
spade  in  the  attack  was  hotly  discussed.  During  the  Russo- 
Japanese  War,  the  Japanese  as  a  general  rule  fortified  their 
first  fire  position,  and  resorted  to  the  spade  again  in  the 
subsequent  advance.  The  cause  is  probably  to  be  found  in 
the  fact  that  the  Russian  fire  was  of  little  account  of  itself, 
that  the  Japanese  probably  could  have  advanced  further, 
but  their  disinclination  to  suffer  loss  caused  them  to  ad- 
vance slower.  The  Russians  did  not  follow  the  Japanese  ex- 
ample. In  the  first  regulations,  based  on  the  experiences 
of  the  war,  the  Russians  demanded  intrenching  in  every 
firing  position,  even  in  the  assault  position,  while  the  Jap- 
anese army  was  warned  against  the  too  frequent  use  of  the 
spade.  The  German  infantry  never  relished  the  use  of  the 
spade,  realizing  that  gaining  time  is  more  advantageous  to 
the  defender  than  to  the  attacker.  The  difficulty  of  bring- 
ing a  skirmish  line  that  has  just  dug  itself  in  under  effective 
fire  by  hard  labor,  to  again  resume  the  advance  is  very  diffi- 
cult, hence  caution  is  necessary  in  the  use  of  the  spade. 
Never  must  construction  of  cover  weaken  the  will  to  attack. 
Troops  that  entrench  during  an  attack  must  lay  aside  one- 
half  of  their  rifles;  even  fire  superiority,  difficult  to  attain, 
cannot  offset  this  loss.  The  man  at  work  entrenching  offers 
a  larger  target,  the  freshly  turned  ground  is  an  easy  aim- 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  207 

ing  mark,  and  the  cover  obtained  is  insufficient.  If  the 
cover  is  such  as  to  provide  actual  protection,  much  time  is 
required,  which  the  opponent  will  use  to  good  advantage. 
Thus  a  fire  superiority  that  has  been  gained  with  difficulty, 
can  easily  be  lost.  We  must  not  forget  that  the  steel  hel- 
met offers  protection  at  long  range  against  rifle  fire  and 
thus  lessens  losses  better  than  earthwork.  If  the  hostile 
fire  is  actually  so  powerful  that  there  can  be  no  thought  of 
a  further  advance,  it  is,  in  any  case,  better  for  the  troops  to 
defend  themselves  at  all  hazards  with  their  rifles,  than  to 
endeavor  to  intrench.  On  the  other  hand  if  the  enemy  is  so 
shaken  that  the  loss  of  half  the  rifles  is  of  no  moment,  we  do 
not  need  to  remain  lying,  but  can,  in  most  cases,  close  with 
him.  Filled  sandbags  will,  in  most  instances,  give  better 
protection  than  hastily  constructed  trenches.  Carrying 
along  filled  sandbags,  which  retard  all  movements  may  be 
justifiable  in  position  warfare,  when  the  ground  is  rocky,  or 
when  it  is  frozen  hard. 

The  spade  is  used  in  attack  only  when  the  question  is 
to  hold  captured  terrain,  when  diminishing  hostile  fire  per- 
mits labor  and  when  the  situation  or  the  available  fighting 
means  do  not  permit  an  immediate  continuation  of  the  ad- 
vance. Thus  in  former  times  as  now,  the  use  of  the  spade 
in  an  attack  was  a  makeshift,  which  delayed  the  course  of 
the  battle  in  order  to  offset  the  lack  of  sufficient  fire  sup- 
port. Troops  that  have  fought  successfully  will  decline  the 
use  of  the  spade,  while  troops,  insufficiently  supported  by 
artillery,  which  have  worked  themselves  up  to  the  enemy, 
will  employ  the  spade  in  situations  in  which  it  does  not  ap- 
pear at  all  necessary.  We  must  absolutely  discountenance 
a  general  use  of  the  spade  in  every  attack,  as  the  best  pro- 
tection against  the  hostile  fire  lies  always  in  our  own  fire. 

THE  ASSAULT 

The  World  War  has  shown  clearly  that  the  assault  is 
by  no  means  the  spectacular  performance  of  times  gone  by. 
Now  as  ever  "the  assault  with  cold  steel  seals  the  defeat  of 
the  opponent."  The  skirmish  line  is  made  denser,  the  fire 
of  rifles  and  machine  guns  increased.  Of  the  greatest  im- 
portance is  fire  protection,  in  advancing  to  the  charge,  few 


208  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

orders  can  be  issued  then ;  much  must  be  left  to  the  initia- 
tive of  the  subordinate  commanders,  who  must  be  thor- 
oughly imbued  with  the  importance  of  fire  protection. 

Charging  distance  cannot  be  laid  down  by  regulations ; 
in  peace  time  we  calculated  it  to  be  100  meters.  In  any  case 
we  must,  with  one  breath  and  one  rush,  enter  the  hostile 
position.  In  the  last  Russian  Regulations  before  the  World 
War  it  was  recommended  that  the  start  of  the  assault  was 
the  length  of  a  bayonet — this  of  course  was  figurative  only. 
In  war  it  has  been  shown  only  too  often  that  assaults  started 
at  long  range  broke  down  under  the  hostile  fire.  The  shorter 
our  charging  distance,  the  surer  the  success.  On  the  other 
hand,  however,  infantry  desirous  of  attacking  will  start  the 
charge  at  long  distances  when  there  are  clear  indications 
that  the  enemy  will  completely  abandon  resistance. 

The  decision  for  the  assault  either  originates  in  the 
firing  line  with  the  subordinate  commanders,  or  the  com- 
mander of  the  attack  gives  the  impetus  by  engaging  his  re- 
serves. The  latter  without  doubt  is  the  better  way.  "If 
the  decision  to  assault  has  its  origin  with  the  leader  in 
rear,  the  signal  'fix  bayonet'  is  hoisted  as  a  sign  for  the 
assault,  which  must  be  obeyed  by  all  troops  concerned.  At 
this  signal  all  skirmishers  increase  their  fire  to  the  utmost 
limit;  the  portions  of  the  firing  line  farther  back  work  up 
as  rapidly  as  possible  to  close  distance;  all  reinforcements 
in  rear  hasten  straight  to  the  front.  As  soon  as  the  lead- 
ing line  is  to  start  the  charge,  all  trumpeters  sound  'charge,* 
all  drummers  beat  the  general,  and  all  portions  of  the  line 
throw  themselves  with  the  utmost  decision  upon  the  enemy. 
It  is  a  matter  of  honor  on  the  part  of  the  skirmishers  never 
to  let  the  supports  overtake  them  before  they  have  reached 
the  hostile  position.  Immediately  in  front  of  the  enemy 
pieces  are  brought  to  the  'charge  bayonet'  and  the  position 
entered  under  loud  shouts  of  'hurrah !' "  Thus  it  read  in 
the  old  Regulations.  In  the  future  also  we  shall  not  be  able 
to  do  without  "fix  bayonets." 

It  is  very  difficult  for  the  commander  of  the  attack  to 
determine  the  correct  time  for  starting  the  assault  as  he 
is  forced,  especially  in  the  case  of  larger  units,  to  remain 
far  from  the  attacking  line,  so  that  he  can  follow  the  course 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  209 

of  the  attack  only  along  general  lines.  Whether  the  fire 
power  of  the  enemy  is  entirely  broken  or  not  he  can  deter- 
mine only  by  the  progress  made  in  the  advance  of  his  own 
lines.  Still  more  seldom  can  he  correctly  perceive  when 
the  resistance  of  the  enemy  breaks  at  some  one  point,  and 
he  may  be  entirely  unable  to  issue  orders  in  time  to  take 
prompt  advantage  of  such  an  event. 

For  these  reasons  the  firing  line  will  have  to  give  the 
impetus  for  the  assault,  probably  in  every  instance.  It  is 
especially  necessary,  when  the  enemy  vacates  his  position, 
that  the  firing  line,  quickly  taking  advantage  of  that  oppor- 
tunity, proceeds  to  the  charge.  If  it  were  to  wait,  in  this 
event,  until  the  reserves  come  up,  much  valuable  time  would 
be  lost,  the  opponent  might  recover  from  his  temporary  un- 
favorable situation  and  again  face  about,  and  even  receive 
reinforcements.  If  the  impetus  for  the  charge  originates 
with  the  firing  line,  there  is  danger  that  instead  of  a  gen- 
eral attack  only  a  partial  attack  will  take  place.  It  is  im- 
possible for  the  entire  skirmish  line  to  judge  simultane- 
ously that  the  proper  time  for  the  assault  has  arrived,  only 
a  portion  can  do  this.  Such  partial  attacks  are  dangerous 
and  have  a  chance  of  success  only  in  covered  terrain.  In 
most  cases  such  an  attack,  made  by  a  single  battalion  or 
even  by  one  company,  will  draw  upon  itself  the  fire  of  a 
large  portion  of  the  hostile  line  and  naturally  go  to  pieces 
under  it.  Even  if  a  bold  charging  detachment  is  fortunate 
enough  to  enter  the  hostile  position  at  some  one  point,  it  will 
be  at  once  attacked  by  the  defender  with  superior  forces 
and  forced  to  flee  under  heavy  loss.  Usually  the  defeat  is 
not  confined  to  a  single  detachment  for  the  troops  on  the 
right  and  left  will  as  soon  as  they  see  the  others  charging 
start  forward  on  the  run  without  having  gotten  close  enough 
to  the  enemy  in  their  front  to  have  sufficiently  shaken  him. 
Thus,  in  most  cases  the  decision  for  the  charge,  arrived  at 
in  the  skirmish  line,  will  turn  into  a  series  of  defeats  but, 
will,  nevertheless,  bring  fresh  troops  closer  and  closer  to  the 
enemy  until  finally  the  great  moment  of  the  preponderance 
of  men  and  fire  is  attained. 

The  execution  of  the  assault  portrayed  above  demands 
still  another  special  preparation,  namely  advancing  the  ar- 


210  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tillery  and  minenwerfer  fire.  As  long  as  that  stays  in  one 
position,  any  assault  is  impossible.  If  telephone  or  flash 
light  connection  still  exists  between  the  artillery  liaison 
officer  and  the  batteries,  it  is  possible  of  execution,  other- 
wise it  will  be  necessary  to  come  to  an  agreement  prior  to 
starting  the  assault,  to  the  effect  that  when  the  "artillery 
signal  flags"  are  waved  from  side  to  side,  or  when  light 
pistols  are  fired  with  certain  colored  lights,  that  signal  is  to 
be  understood  by  the  artillery  to  indicate  the  commence- 
ment of  the  charge.  But  if  this  decision  is  confined  to  but 
a  portion  of  the  line,  errors  are  unavoidable,  which  will 
probably  be  paid  for  in  blood.  A  more  favorable  way  is  the 
execution  of  the  forward  advance  of  the  fire  of  the  artillery, 
when  the  commander  decides  to  assault.  The  signal  "fix 
bayonet"  acts  like  a  m^paratory  warning,  and  then,  by 
a  previously  agreed-on^^nal,  the  fire  can  be  advanced. 

In  many  instances  our  enemies  met  us  with  a  counter- 
attack in  our  assault.  In  such  an  emergency  the  assaulting 
troops  must  throw  themselves  down  and  defeat  the  counter- 
attack by  fire,  and  resume  the  forward  movement  as  soon  as 
possible.  The  guiding  thought  in  an  assault  must  always 
be :  to  reach  the  designated  objective,  regardless  of  whether 
that  consists  in  breaking  the  resistance  or  irresistible  pur- 
suit. 

In  preparing  the  assault  we  generally  favored  the  em- 
ployment of  hand  grenades  in  such  manner  that  shortly  be- 
fore the  closing  3  hand  grenades  were  thrown  by  the  men 
lying  down,  who  then  charged  with  loud  shouts.  The  rule, 
that  in  a  charge  in  daytime  rifles  must  be  loaded  appears 
not  to  be  superfluous  as  the  bullet  is  the  most  effective  at- 
tacking means  at  close  range,  although  our  infantry,  as  well 
as  our  enemies,  overestimated  the  effect  of  the  hand  gren- 
ade as  compared  with  the  rifle.  The  charge  requires  special 
training,  in  which  the  hand  to  hand  struggle  with  pickax, 
sharpened  spades,  rifle  with  bayonet  fixed,  or  even  with 
bare  hands  must  be  practiced.  Shouting  hurrahs  shortly 
before  closing  in,  and  shouted  with  full  lung  power,  hurts 
the  morale  of  the  enemy,  however  premature  shouting  pre- 
vents surprise.  In  exceptional  cases  it  may  be  well  to  charge 
without  shouting  so  as  not  to  attract  the  attention  of  neigh- 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  211 

boring  forces  of  the  enemy.  "As  soon  as  the  shout  is  taken 
up,  all  trumpeters  sound  the  'charge'."  The  platoon  com- 
mander charges  ahead  of  his  men;  his  example  is  of  decis- 
sive  importance;  a  charge  once  started  must  lead  into  the 
midst  of  the  enemy.  Every  hesitancy  spells  annihilation. 
The  charge  must  find  the  commanders  of  the  machine  guns 
in  the  front  line.  The  minenwerfer  fire  can  be  of  great  use 
at  short  ranges.  The  main  point  is  that  the  machine  gun 
squad  leader  gives  to  the  best  of  his  abilities  such  fire  sup- 
port that  the  skirmish  squads  reach  the  enemy  with  as  little 
loss  as  possible.  If  the  entrance  succeeds  only  at  a  few 
I)oints,  those  points  are  to  be  immediately  changed  into  ma- 
chine gun  nests  from  which  the  hostile  machine  gun  fire  is 
held  down,  and  from  which  the  enemy  can  be  enfiladed. 

If  the  intention  is  to  penetrate  the  position,  we  must 
avoid  stopping  within  the  position.  The  charging  troops 
must  not  pay  any  attention  to  either  taking  prisoners  or 
materiel  and  attempts  by  the  hostile  supports  in  the  matter 
of  counter-attacks  are  to  be  smothered  in  their  inception 
by  relentless  pushing  forward.  The  retreating  enemy  must 
be  kept  on  the  run,  thus  preventing  his  lines  in  rear  from 
firing  and  causing  them  to  vacillate.  When  the  attack  ob- 
jective has  been  reached,  a  moment  of  weakness  sets  in, 
which  must  be  quickly  overcome  to  avoid  reverses.  The  con- 
trol, lost  by  pushing  into  the  position,  must  be  at  once  rees- 
tablished with  severity.  Detachments  no  matter  how  small, 
are  to  be  cut  out  as  reserves.  These  troops  in  "readiness" 
with  their  machine  guns  must  at  all  times  be  able  to  defeat 
counter  or  flank  attacks.  Machine  guns  and  light  minenwer- 
f ers  held  in  rear  must  come  up  quickly,  but  the  highest  com- 
mander must  at  once  prevent  excessive  crowding  in  the  posi- 
tion, on  which  the  hostile  artillery  fire  will  soon  be  directed. 
The  importance  of  the  quick  arrival  of  all  commanders,  from 
the  regiment  up,  cannot  be  emphasized  enough. 

The  inclination  to  pursue  the  enemy  along  the  entire 
line  with  the  bayonet  instead  of  halting  and  utilizing  the 
fire  power  of  the  rifle  has  shown  itself  in  all  battles.  The 
measures  the  attacker  has  to  take  after  a  successful  attack 
are,  to  use  the  victorious  infantry  for  pursuing  fire  as  soon 
as  a  field  of  fire  presents  itself,  under  protection  of  which 


212  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

fire,  fresh  detachments  start  from  the  wings  in  pursuit.  In 
selecting  the  points  from  which  the  pursuing  fire  is  to  be 
delivered  due  attention  must  be  paid  to  the  observers  who 
have  gone  ahead  and  the  batteries  that  are  to  arrive  shortly. 
Reconnaissance  on  the  wings  is  necessary  during  the  pur- 
suing fire,  as  is  also  locating  our  position  for  the  artillery 
by  means  of  flags  and  to  the  airplanes  by  spreading  out 
panels,  as  well  as  bringing  up  hand  to  hand  fighting  material. 

If  the  enemy  has  fled  beyond  point  blank  or  short  range, 
all  subordinate  commanders  will  independently  follow  with- 
out waiting  for  orders  from  above.  Assembly  of  the  troops 
in  close  order,  leading  off  prisoners,  occupying  the  position, 
replenishment  of  ammunition  must  come  after  the  more 
important  mission  of  starting  the  pursuit.  Only  later  when 
the  enemy  permits,  are  units  correctly  reorganized. 

Means  for  defeating  a  counter-attack  are  especially 
important,  and  we  have  to  count  on  counter-attacks  in  all 
cases.  Our  main  support  lies  in  the  machine  guns  and  light 
minenwerfers  that  have  been  brought  quickly  into  position. 
If  possible  the  first  minenwerf  er  men  must  arrive  with  the 
charging  infantry.  These  men  select  and  mark  the  posi- 
tions, while  the  regiments  send  forward  ammunition.  Or- 
ders for  this  must  have  been  issued  even  before  the  decision 
for  the  assault  is  arrived  at.  The  artillery  will  endeavor  to 
regulate  its  stationary  barrage  for  defeat  of  counter-attacks 
in  case  our  infantry  does  not  go  beyond  the  position,  and  if 
possible,  verify  its  correctness  by  airplane  observation; 
however  if  the  attack  is  to  be  carried  further  a  change  of 
position  of  our  artillery  will  generally  be  necessary  for  pro- 
per fire  support. 

H  the  attack  miscarries,  it  is  the  duty  of  all  comman- 
ders to  bring  the  men,  retreating  under  the  hostile  fire,  to 
a  halt.  As  a  general  rule  the  halt  is  made  at  our  artillery. 
But  a  halt  probably  cannot  be  thought  of  if  the  hostile  fire 
is  very  effective.  Only  at  the  nearest  cover,  or  where  there 
is  no  cover,  only  at  long  range,  when  fatigue  brings  the 
retreat  to  an  end  or  when  the  hostile  fire  is  no  longer  effec- 
tive, can  a  halt  be  made.  This  distance  is  the  greater,  the 
longer  the  enemy,  not  being  interfered  with  by  our  fire,  can 
make  full  use  of  the  ballistic  qualities  of  his  arms,  unless 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  213 

the  attacker's  artillery  prevents  him  from  doing  so.  The 
general  rule  must  be  to  give  up  as  little  as  possible  of  the 
terrain  that  has  been  once  captured.  Wherever  the  troops 
come  to  a  halt  they  again  form,  and  intrench  if  the  hostile 
lire  effect  permits.  They  must  then  try  their  very  best  to 
attain,  under  protection  of  darkness,  what  could  not  be  at- 
tained during  daylight.  An  attack  in  the  late  evening,  after 
the  decisive  fight  has  not  been  quite  completed,  has  always 
had  success. 

INFLUENCE  OF  FOG 

Examination  of  a  large  number  of  operations  shows 
that  bad  weather,  fog,  snow  storms,  heavy  rains  accom- 
panied by  thunder,  beating  into  the  enemy's  face  has  never 
under  various  excuses  been  fully  utilized  by  troops  in  war, 
to  carry  out  an  attack.  An  exception  is  the  dust  storm  on 
March  9,  1905,  at  Mukden  which  facilitated  the  attacks  of 
the  Japanese  wherever  they  were  attempted.  Fog  is  never 
cited  as  a  motive  for  attack,  but  almost  without  exception  as 
an  excuse  for  inactivity  or  failure. 

The  difficulties  connected  with  executing  attacks  in 
fog  and  carrying  them  to  completion  are  well  known;  the 
direction  is  easily  lost,  and  frequently  detachments  will  fire 
on  each  other.  The  fear  of  running  into  an  ambush  creates 
a  feeling  of  insecurity.  On  September  9,  1917,  we  started 
a  well  prepared  attack  against  Hill  344  at  Samogneux  (Ver- 
dun). The  attack  went  to  pieces  in  the  fog,  though  the 
troops  were  excellently  trained  in  executing  night  attacks. 
The  assaulting  troops  lost  the  direction  and  the  connection 
with  a  successful  column  could  not  be  kept  up  as  no  signals 
or  signs  could  pierce  the  fog.  We  must  calculate  in  an  ad- 
vance in  fog  or  on  the  fog  rising  or  dispersing  suddenly. 
While  close  order  formations  are  preferred  in  an  advance  un- 
der fog  and  all  distances  are  to  be  shortened  and  special 
measures  taken  for  keeping  up  connection,  all  subordinate 
commanders  must,  upon  the  dispersion  of  the  fog,  indepen- 
dently take  all  measures  that  are  necessary,  as  in  an  advance 
without  cover,  viz.,  formations  with  more  intervals  and  dis- 
tance.   Fog  is  a  valuable  ally  for  well  trained  troops. 


214  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

FIGHTING  IN  WOODS 

Woods  have  different  influence  on  the  attack  as  well 
as  on  the  defense  depending  upon  their  extent,  density,  con- 
formation of  the  ground,  and  season.  In  all  cases  they  per- 
mit placing  troops  in  readiness  and  shifting  them,  unob- 
served by  the  enemy's  terrestrial  and  aerial  observation. 
Possibilities  for  surprise  always  exist,  as  reconnaissance  is 
difficult.  During  protracted  bombardment  the  trees  grad- 
ually disappear  and  the  view  is  facilitated.  In  case  of  large 
woods  the  artillery  has  at  the  start  little  possibility  of  pro- 
ducing much  effect,  but  this  effect  will  be  materially  in- 
creased by  application  of  all  technical  means — especially 
if  the  battle  is  protracted. 

If  woods  prevent  the  enemy's  gaining  a  view,  they  will 
prove  very  valuable  in  the  matter  of  supporting  points  and 
flanking  works,  and  in  many  cases  will  become  the  critical 
points  of  the  battle.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  they  can  be 
seen  from  afar,  they  easily  attract  hostile  artillery  fire  and 
soon  become  useless  as  cover  against  observation.  Woods 
facilitate  the  defense  by  an  inferior  numerical  force,  favor 
the  delaying  battle  by  permitting  troops  to  be  disengaged, 
and  deceit  as  to  strength.  They  generally  compel  the  at- 
tacker to  employ  relatively  large  forces,  and  therefore  he 
will  generally  seek  to  avoid  them. 

Experiences  in  war  have  taught  us  that  only  minor 
importance  is  to  be  attached  to  infantry  fire  in  woods,  that 
the  flight  of  the  bullet  is  easily  deflected  by  striking  twigs, 
etc.,  and  that  not  the  bullet  but  cold  steel  is  the  decisive 
weapon  in  forest  fighting.  Anyone  engaging  in  protracted 
fire  fighting  in  woods  will  only  lose  time.  The  defender  seeks 
to  gain  time,  while  the  attacker  must  seek  to  bring  the  for- 
est fight  to  an  end  as  soon  as  possible.  Hand  grenades  in 
forests  are  generally  more  dangerous  to  the  thrower  than 
to  the  enemy. 

From  the  above  we  find: 

1.  Close  order  is  discontinued  only  if  the  condition  of  the 
woods  demand  it;  the  denser  the  woods,  the  closer  the  troops; 
only  thus  can  the  officer  retain  control  over  his  men. 

2.  Dense  woods  must  not  be  circumvented;  the  troops  must 
work  their  way  through  them,  unless  they  want  to  run  the  risk 
of  losing  march-direction. 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  215 

3.  The  less  noise  troops  make  passing  through  woods,  the 
better;  all  shouting,  and  signaling  must  cease.  Only  in  clearings 
and  at  spots  where  the  woods  are  very  clear  and  devoid  of  brush 
can  firearms  be  resorted  to,  otherwise  the  decision  is  sought  by 
sharp  attack  with  the  bayonet. 

4.  Experiences  have  taught  that  a  decision  may  be  gained 
in  forest  battles  by  exhaustion  of  the  enemy,  but  that  the  decision 
can  be  more  quickly  reached  by  making  attacks  with  fresh  de- 
tachments against  the  hostile  flanks. 

5.  There  is  special  danger  in  the  infantry  attack  of  units 
becoming  dispersed  and  the  consequent  loss  of  control  by  officers, 
thus  frittering  away  the  attacking  power. 

The  French,  having  wired  the  edges  of  the  woods,  pre- 
ferred the  system  of  posting  small  posts  and  machine  guns 
there,  and  arranging  a  disconnected  defensive  position,  with 
low  blockhouses  connected  with  wire,  in  the  interior.  Ob- 
stacles were  placed  from  the  edge  into  the  interior  so  as  to 
lead  the  attacker  into  blind  alleys  dominated  by  machine 
guns.  Sharpshooters  and  machine  guns  lodged  in  trees  kept 
paths  and  roads  under  fire.  Much  use  was  made  of  sound 
detectors  which  gave  notice  of  the  approach  of  the  enemy. 
In  the  Vosges  the  Alpine  Chasseurs,  lodged  in  trees,  gave 
the  alarm  by  imitating  the  cries  of  birds.  The  defense  was 
made  offensively  (ambush),  the  principal  intention  being 
to  fall  on  the  flank  of  the  careless  pursuer.  The  artillery 
fire  at  the  start  was  barrage  fire,  with  ravines,  crossroads, 
paths,  and  roads  through  the  woods  systematically  kept  un- 
der fire. 

If  woods  are  of  small  extent  we  will  push  through  them 
rapidly,  but  such  procedure  has  its  danger  if  the  woods  are 
large.  In  the  latter  case  it  was  found  better  to  push  into 
the  woods  some  50  meters,  then  halt  and  establish  order. 
Pursuing  patrols  advance  along  all  roads,  combat  patrols 
are  stationed  at  the  edge  and  outside  the  woods  with  orders 
to  keep  up  connection  with  the  troops  on  the  roads  leading 
into  the  forest.  After  fixing  the  march  direction  and  prop- 
erly securing  the  service  of  information,  the  advance  is 
made  slowly  under  protection  of  patrols.  Clearings  and 
roads,  where  hostile  fire  may  be  met,  are  avoided,  shock 
troops  with  flame  throwers  are  held  back  by  battalion  and 
company  commanders,  machine  guns  are  posted  at  roads 
and  clearings  to  be  ready  to  fire  along  them.  Hand  grenades 
and  light  minenwerfers  are  but  seldom  suitable  in  forest 
fighting. 


216  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

It  depends  on  the  kind  of  forest  in  what  formation  the 
troops  must  traverse  it.  Forests  with  no  underbrush  per- 
mit advance  in  skirmish  formation,  but  in  dense  woods,  skir- 
mish lines  are  not  easy  to  control  and  have  little  power  of 
resistance,  so  that  a  detachment  advancing,  in  close  order, 
can  overrun  them. 

In  forests,  detachments  will  encounter  each  other  at 
ranges  hardly  more  than  100  meters,  so  that  rapid  fire,  and 
energetic  attack  with  cold  steel  will  secure  to  the  troops 
all  the  advantages  resulting  from  surprise,  and  consequently 
success.  The  reason  for  this  may  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
the  opponent,  unable  to  see,  allows  himself  to  be  frightened 
by  the  attack,  overestimates  the  hostile  strength,  and,  hear- 
ing loud  shouts  from  all  sides  and  confused  by  the  rever- 
berating sound  of  rifle  fire,  turns  to  hasty  flight,  believing 
his  line  of  retreat  cut  off.  He  has  not  been  given  a  chance 
to  think  of  offering  any  serious  resistance. 

Attack  with  cold  steel  must  become  second  nature  to 
the  troops;  it  requires  a  formation  that  allows  rapid  fire 
and  a  rush  in  close  formation;  such  a  formation  might  be 
the  company  in  line,  but  as  line  formations  on  the  move  are 
difficult  in  woods,  and  as  men  in  skirmish  line  can  easily 
evade  the  supervision  of  their  officers,  and  furthermore,  as 
the  skirmish  line  has  no  power  of  resistance  against  troops 
in  close  order  neither  line  nor  skirmish  formations  seems 
suitable  for  the  purpose. 

For  traversing  dense  woods  platoons  of  the  company  in 
line  abreast  of  each  other,  or  echeloned,  each  platoon  formed 
in  double  column  of  squads  is  recommended.  It  is  not  so 
good  to  advance  in  double  column  by  platoon  or  half-pla- 
toons abreast  of  each  other,  as  the  columns  are  too  long, 
deployment  too  difficult,  and  intervals  hard  to  maintain. 
Squad  columns  on  the  other  hand  will  be  near  enough  to 
keep  in  sight  of  each  other,  and  they  can  more  easily  work 
through  the  forest  than  can  detachments  in  close  order.  De- 
ployment for  purpose  of  delivering  fire  and  for  the  assault 
can  be  easily  accomplished.  A  disadvantage  is  their  lack 
of  resistance  against  a  flank  attack  or  against  an  attack  com- 
ing obliquely ;  in  that  event  we  need  support  of  flank  echel- 
ons.   Columns  of  greater  depth  which  require  a  longer  time 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  217 

for  deployment,  have  the  disadvantage  that  intervals  may 
be  lost  in  the  endeavor  to  keep  proper  direction.  Front  and 
flanks  will  have  to  be  protected  by  patrols  and  by  detach- 
ments in  echelon,  so  that  any  hostile  flank  attack  is  itself 
flanked  by  detachments  moving  to  the  front.  In  rear  of 
this  first  line  follows  a  second  line  in  close  order,  where  prac- 
ticable along  roads.  The  patrols  must  not  be  so  far  away 
that  they  cannot  see  the  troops  they  are  protecting.  A 
stop  is  made  at  all  crossroads,  when  direction  and  order  is 
reestablished.  Of  course,  this  formation,  halting  and  re- 
establishing order,  takes  time,  which  however  is  offset  by 
the  increase  in  order  and  security.  To  prevent  connection 
with  the  retreating  enemy  from  being  lost  at  the  edge  of  the 
woods,  strong  pursuit  patrols  must  be  started  along  roads 
after  the  enemy. 

It  is  advantageous  to  signal  the  progress  of  the  infan- 
try to  the  artillery  and  to  the  commander  by  flares,  which, 
by  the  way,  easily  remain  hanging  on  the  tops  of  trees. 

In  an  attack  upon  a  forest  we  do  without  the  stationary 
barrage.  At  the  start  we  throw  shells  on  the  edge  of  the 
forest  for  a  depth  of  some  200  meters,  then,  at  the  moment 
of  the  charge,  the  fire  is  lifted  to  400  meters  and  the  infan- 
try advanced  to  the  edge  of  that  fire,  then  the  fire  again 
lifted  some  400  meters,  and  so  on.  All  available  means  of 
communication  must  be  utilized  for  connection  with  the  ar- 
tillery. For  communication  within  the  battalion,  we  will 
have  to  be  satisfied  with  runners. 

It  has  always  been  of  advantage  to  mark  the  lines 
along  which  battalion  and  regimental  headquarters  moved 
forward,  when  entering  woods,  by  posting  runners. 

Woods  are  of  advantage  to  the  defense  in  that  they 
conceal  to  a  large  extent  the  works,  prevent  aerial  observa- 
tion and  increase  the  difficulty  of  the  enemy's  artillery  locat- 
ing them.  Surprise  works,  such  as  blockhouses,  offer  in 
woods  good  opportunities  for  the  counter-attack  against 
an  enemy  that  has  entered  the  position,  as  the  defender 
knows  the  ground  well.  Obstacles  from  branches  of  trees 
are  poor,  they  soon  dry  out  and  can  be  easily  set  on  fire  by 
hostile  patrols  or  artillery  fire.  They  suffer  much  in  a 
bombardment.    Men  familiar  with  woodcraft,  such  as  for- 


218  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

esters  and  wood  cutters,  should  be  employed  on  listening 
posts.  By  observing  many  indications,  such  for  instance, 
as  the  conduct  of  birds  they  can  ascertain  the  location  of 
observation  posts  in  trees  or  the  approach  of  hostile  patrols. 
In  the  retreat  woods  facilitate  disengaging  troops  from 
the  enemy.  Even  sharply  pursuing  detachments  can  be  held 
up  by  weak  but  skillfully  handled  rear  guards  until  the 
main  body  is  marching  in  the  desired  direction  undisturbed, 
or  has  made  its  preparations  for  a  counter-attack.  Rear 
guards  generally  have  no  trouble  in  drawing  the  enemy  into 
a  direction  favorable  for  the  counter-attack. 

VILLAGE  FIGHTING 

Localities  such  as  villages  at  all  times  during  the  war 
exerted  a  fatal  magnetic  power  on  all  troops.  In  vain  were 
all  precepts  and  regulations  of  all  armies  to  occupy  vil- 
lages, for  the  defense,  only  with  weak  forces  and  to  defend 
villages  only  when  their  occupation  offered  tactical  advan- 
tages ;  to  avoid  in  any  attack  village  fighting,  but  to  seek  the 
decision  beyond  their  limits,  in  the  open  terrain.  Aspern, 
Ligny,  Bazeilles,  and  Le  Bourget  are  merely  examples  of 
how  little  the  teachings  helped.  Beaune  la  Rolande  with 
1510  meters  extension  was  held  by  2300  men  with  a  loss 
of  only  5.6%.  Frequently  the  defender  gave  way  to  the 
conflagration  rather  than  the  attacker.  The  hope  enter- 
tained prior  to  the  World  War  that  the  increased  artillery 
effect  would  make  village  fighting  superfluous,  was  incor- 
rect. 

The  World  War  can  cite  many  instances  of  tenacious 
village  fights  carried  on  around  complete  ruins  that  once 
were  villages,  but  which  still  were  capable  of  being  defended. 
I  shall  mention  only  Combles  and  Sailly  in  the  Somme  battle, 
and  Mondidier  in  the  Summer  of  1918.  On  the  Eastern 
theaters  of  war  a  number  of  tenacious  village  fights  could 
be  cited.  In  the  Masurian  battle  a  bitter  house  to  house 
fight  took  place  in  Johannisburg  held  by  two  Russian  regi- 
ments; the  place  fell  into  the  hands  of  troops  of  the  2d  In- 
fantry Division  brought  up  from  three  sides. 

Par.  435, 1.  D.  R.  pointed  out  that  tenaciously  defended, 
massive  villages  might  become  the  key  point  of  the  battle, 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  219 

and  occupation  and  arrangement  of  the  edge  of  the  village 
occasionally  facilitated  the  rapid  creation  of  a  defensive 
position  and  an  increase  in  the  enemy's  difficulties  in  per- 
ceiving the  strength  of  the  garrison.  The  disadvantage  of 
the  ease  with  which  the  hostile  artillery  could  find  the  range 
should  be  well  considered  also,  so  that  it  would  often  be  bet- 
ter to  place  the  defensive  line  outside  the  village.  Fortifi- 
cation of  the  flanks  of  villages  is  not  to  be  neglected  and 
the  rear  edge  should  be  opened  so  far  that  the  counter-at- 
tack by  reserves  would  not  be  made  more  difficult. 

Riflemen's  positions  when  the  village  is  within  the  range 
of  effective  hostile  artillery  fire,  should  be  in  massive  build- 
ings or  in  houses  that  are  covered  by  a  rise  in  front,  or  by 
other  portions  of  the  village.  For  this  reason  the  French 
recommended  that  the  defensive  line  be  withdrawn  into  the 
interior  of  the  village,  using  the  portions  lying  between  the 
village  and  the  enemy's  position  as  a  protective  cover  against 
the  hostile  artillery  fire.  As  early  as  the  Campaign  of  1870 
it  appears  that,  the  defense  of  Bazeilles  was  planned  with 
this  intention.  "Defensive  arrangements  in  the  interior  of 
the  village  must  be  made  so  that  each  sector,  and  each  en- 
closure can  be  defended.  Broad  streets,  open  places,  or 
brooks,  running  through  the  village  parallel  to  the  defen- 
sive line  favor  defense  by  sectors."  (Pioneer  D.R.,  par. 
344.) 

In  the  World  War  the  difficulties  of  village  defense 
were  increased  by  aerial  reconnaissance,  by  the  increased 
size  of  projectiles  of  the  attacking  artillery,  and  by  the  em- 
ployment of  flame  throwers.  On  the  other  hand  the  defense 
of  a  village  was  increased  by  the  introduction  of  machine 
guns  which  permitted  the  replacing  of  numerous  men  by 
machines.  Utilization  of  minenwerfers  favors  the  attacker 
as  well  as  defender.  In  the  fights  for  the  fortress-like  Ar- 
mentiers  on  April  9,  1918,  the  German  infantry  declined  to 
make  a  charge  against  the  strongly  occupied  village,  which 
had  been  covered  by  a  hail  of  shells  and  gas  bombs.  The  vil- 
lage finally  fell  (the  British  falsely  state  that  they  voluntar- 
ily evacuated  it)  when  taken  in  flank  and  rear.  The  spoils 
were  50  officers  and  3000  men  as  well  as  45  guns,  and  a  cloth- 
ing and  ammunition  depot.  The  place  had  cover,  toward  the 


220  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

side  of  the  enemy,  so  that  the  artillery,  which  was  given  the 
mission  of  throwing  flanking  fire  came  from  neighboring  sec- 
tors. In  many  cases  the  British  understood  how  to  post  ma- 
chine guns  in  buildings  in  the  vicinity  of  and  visible  to  our 
artillery  positions.  These  were  so  hidden  they  could  be 
located  by  our  airplanes  only  with  difficulty,  and  by  frequent 
change  of  position  they  were  able  to  even  escape  our  flash 
and  sound  ranging  squads. 

A  peculiar  village  fight  happened  on  April  24,  1918, 
around  Villers-Bretonneux,  east  of  Amiens,  which  was  held 
by  the  British.  After  an  artillery  preparation  lasting  two 
hours  and  a  half  the  German  infantry  supported  by  tanks 
attacked  the  village.  The  first  attacking  wave  of  infantry 
stopped  in  front  of  the  village,  which  was  still  under  fire, 
while  infantry,  and  tanks,  gained  ground  in  the  open  terrain 
to  one  side  of  the  village.  Tanks  cleared  a  supporting  point 
at  the  southeast  corner  of  the  village  for  the  assault  and 
then  opened  fire  on  the  village  street,  later  they  turned  off 
to  the  north  edge  of  the  village  and  from  that  point  produced 
good  effect  against  its  interior.  Still  later  the  tanks  ad- 
vanced towards  the  railroad  station  and  church  of  Villers- 
Bretonneux,  where  the  British  in  vain  endeavored  to  hold 
out. 

These  examples  sketched  in  mere  outline,  show  that 
a  tenacious  defender  cannot  be  driven  out  by  artillery  fire 
from  a  well  prepared  village,  if  it  has  been  supplied  with 
deep  shelters  and  that  an  artillery  bombardment  does  not 
assure  the  possibility  of  avoiding  a  bitter  fight  in  the  in- 
terior. Fights  in  streets  and  houses  consume  forces  and 
time.  We  will  cite  the  capture  of  Messines  on  October  31st, 
of  Wytschaete  the  same  day  and  on  November  1st  and  2d, 
1914.  A  later  study  will  have  to  show,  if  with  all  the  heroic 
valor  of  the  troops  it  would  not  have  been  possible  to  shorten 
these  fights.  If  that  is  impossible,  nothing  remains  except 
to  give  troops  flame  throwers  and  accompanying  artillery. 

The  surest  means  for  the  attacker  to  take  a  village,  is 
in  locking  the  place  in  by  fire  and  troops.  Villages  com- 
pletely surrounded  by  troops  are  almost  always  taken 
quickly,  with  rich  spoils  in  prisoners  and  with  little  loss  on 
the  part  of  the  attacker.    Rapid  penetration  of  the  village. 


INFANTRY  ATTACK  IN  OPEN  WARFARE  221 

immediately  in  rear  of  a  rolling  barrage  frequently  breaks 
resistance  without  losses.  If  a  house  to  house  fight  results, 
the  attacker  must  gain  a  foothold  just  as  the  defender,  in 
houses  and  ruins.  He  must  avoid  the  streets,  work  his  way 
through  gardens  and  yards,  and  thus  slowly  but  surely 
break  the  enemy's  resistance. 

Defensive  arrangements  of  a  village  take  much  time 
and  troops.  Works  that  can  be  fired  on  by  artillery  will  be 
destroyed  in  a  short  time  and  do  not  pay  for  the  trouble  of 
constructing  them.  But  the  ruins  still  offer,  to  the  stub- 
bom  defender,  a  possibility  of  continuing  the  battle.  Battle 
positions,  in  front  of  the  village,  are  hard  to  hide  from  the 
view  and  camera  of  the  airplane,  they  require  special  works 
for  bomb-proof  shelter,  while  connecting  roads  with  the  vil- 
lage take  much  labor,  and  invariably  will  betray  the  posi- 
tion. Thus  it  is  an  open  question  if  the  defense  of  the  edge 
of  the  village  would  not  be  better.  Cellars  are  numerous, 
and  even  if  they  require  reinforcement,  the  labor  connected 
therewith  is  slight  in  comparison  with  constructing  bomb- 
proofs  and  connecting  trenches.  Only  works  that  are  hid- 
den from  view  of  artillery  and  airplanes  are  a  reinforce- 
ment to  the  defense.  Thus  it  may  well  be  accounted  for 
how  the  tenacious  resistance  happened  on  November  11, 
1914,  by  the  left  wing  of  the  Guard  Division  in  the  Chateau 
Veldhoek  in  the  forest  of  Herenthage.  Positions,  hidden 
from  hostile  fire  and  aerial  reconnaissance,  from  which  a 
fight  can  be  advantageously  conducted,  require  especially 
strong  garrisons  and  materiel.  They  turn  into  critical  points 
of  the  battle,  on  which  the  entire  defensive  system  may  be 
constructed.  Obstacles  and  bomb-proofs  have  precedence 
over  earthworks,  which  in  a  bombardment,  are  generally 
annihilated  beyond  recognition  in  a  very  short  time.  Sup- 
porting points  are  for  the  purpose  of  holding  out,  even  if 
the  surrounding  country  has  already  fallen  into  the  enemy's 
hands,  but  whether  or  not  completely  surrounding  them  with 
obstacles  is  correct,  requires  special  consideration  in  each 
instance.    Probably  it  will  always  be  well  to  do  it! 


X.     Cavalry 

CAVALRY  PRIOR  TO  THE  WORLD  WAR 

After  all  wars  of  modern  times — from  Bliicher's  sharp 
condemnation  of  the  activity  of  the  Prussian  cavalry  during 
the  Wars  of  Liberation  down  to  the  reproach  for  the  break- 
ing down  of  the  Russian  cavalry  in  Eastern  Asia — the  same 
complaints  were  heard  concerning  the  small  achievements 
of  the  cavalry  in  the  face  of  the  enemy.  Besides  the  increase 
in  fire  power,  we  must  seek  for  the  cause  in  the  continually 
increasing  discrepancy  in  the  strength  of  cavalry  and  infan- 
try. The  only  exception  of  this  is  shown  in  the  American 
War  of  Secession ;  unfortunately  we  delayed  making  use  of 
the  experiences  of  Stuart,  Sheridan,  and  Forrest ;  in  any  case 
we  could  have  arranged  for  similar  achievements  as  early 
as  the  Franco-Prussian  War  by  timely  change  in  armament 
and  training.  We  were  quite  justified  in  concluding  from 
the  Russo-Japanese  War  that  only  first-class  cavalry  pays, 
that  cavalry  has  to  be  trained  for  mounted  and  dismounted 
fighting,  that  it  must  by  no  means  be  allowed  to  sink  to  the 
level  of  mounted  infantry,  which  means  poorly  riding  rifle- 
men like  the  British  in  South  Africa.  Cavalry  has  to  be 
able  to  fire  especially  well.  The  Russian  cavalry  in  Eastern 
Asia,  except  a  very  small  fraction  thereof,  did  not  come  up 
to  the  standard  in  training,  equipment  and  armament  of 
modern  cavalry ;  it  did  not  seek  dismounted  fighting ;  it  fell 
into  inactivity.  Cavalry  that  can  be  employed  in  war  can- 
not be  improvised,  it  must  be  systematically  trained  during 
long  peace  years.  Then,  however,  the  army  leadership  must 
set  cavalry  clearly  defined  tasks  and  pitilessly  demand  defin- 
ite results.  Field  Marshal  Oyama  stated  after  the  Battle  of 
Mukden :  "If  I  had  had  but  two  or  three  cavalry  divisions, 
the  Russians  would  never  have  gotten  northward  after  the 
defeat  of  Mukden,  or  at  least  their  right  wing  would  have 
fallen  victim  to  the  pursuit  of  the  army  cavalry."  In  Ger- 
many and  France  we  considered  the  dismounted  action  only 
a  makeshift  and  sought  employment  on  the  battlefield  by 
the  charge  against  all  arms.    Little  attention  was  paid  that 

222 


CAVALRY  223 

the  Turkish  cavalry,  trained  according  to  German  principles, 
had  sought  in  the  Balkan  War  of  1912-13  the  attack,  but 
had  to  be  satisfied  with  very  successful  participation  with 
fire  arms  in  the  actions  of  the  other  arms. 

Our  conception  was  confirmed  by  the  fact  that  the 
British  cavalry,  after  some  hesitation,  then  the  Russian 
cavalry  after  the  Russo-Japanese  War,  adopted  the  belief 
that  the  days  of  the  cavalry  charge  were  by  no  means  past ; 
that  cavalry  rather,  was  clearly  destined  for  mounted  fight- 
ing; that  the  attached  arms  in  many  instances  relieved  the 
cavalry  from  the  necessity  of  fighting  on  foot.  The  German 
cavalry  drill  regulations  with  the  same  maxims  were  adopted 
by  Japan  in  1895. 

If  the  cavalry  has  not  sufficiently  achieved  success  in 
the  face  of  the  enemy  there  are  two  good  reasons.  First,  a 
lack  of  individual  commanders  capable  of  requiring  the 
higher  efforts  of  cavalry  under  favorable  conditions  without 
regard  to  probable  losses,  and  second,  the  supply  of  horses 
on  the  battlefield,  by  no  means  fulfilled  the  requirements 
clearly  foreseen  in  time  of  peace. 

The  extension  of  the  battlefield  increased  the  difficulties 
of  reaching  the  flanks  and  rear  of  the  enemy.  But  if  cav- 
alry desires,  through  its  charges,  to  accomplish  a  decisive 
influence  on  the  course  of  the  battle,  nothing  remains,  in 
consideration  of  the  growth  of  modern  armies,  but  to  attack 
in  mass.  However,  the  increased  fire  power  of  rifle  and  gun 
increased  the  difficulties  of  placing  cavalry  in  readiness  and 
bringing  up  larger  units.  It  is  very  probable  that  charges 
in  regimental  and  brigade  formation  in  favorable  terrain 
are  still  possible,  but  attacks  in  division  formation  are  out 
of  the  question.  In  the  machine  gun  the  infantry  has  re- 
ceived an  arm  which  is  absolutely  annihilating  against  tall 
and  broad  targets.  In  addition,  increasing  cultivation,  and 
covering  the  terrain  with  industrial  works,  fencing  the 
fields  with  barbed  wire,  are  increasing  the  obstacles  to  the 
mounted  use  of  cavalry. 

VIEWS  ON  CAVALRY  ATTACKS 

Regulations  of  all  armies  lay  stress  on  the  necessity  in 
time  of  peace  of  cavalry  employing  the  arme  blanche  in  ac- 


224  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tion  to  drive  off  the  hostile  cavalry  and  to  open  a  road  for 
our  participation.  Thus,  in  the  World  War  we  ought  to  have 
seen  numerous  cavalry  charges,  but  the  very  opposite  hap- 
pened. The  Russian  cavalry — without  success — several 
times  attacked  the  German  infantry;  but  in  the  West  the 
cavalry  declined  to  attack.  Equipment  with  the  lance,  and 
our  well  trained  horses,  undoubtedly  gave  our  cavalry  a 
superiority  and  our  opponents  well  knew  the  capability  of 
our  well  trained  cavalry  in  movements  and  maneuvering 
in  larger  units.  Minor  contacts  showed  the  difficulties,  due 
to  the  increased  fire  power,  of  keeping  the  cavalry  close 
enough  to  the  firing  line,  to  be  able  to  fully  and  quickly 
utilize  rapidly  passing  opportunities  for  participation.  The 
rapid  wearing  out  of  the  trained  horses,  hard  to  replace, 
worked  against  a  probable  costly  employment  on  the  battle- 
field. Replacement  of  trained  horses  will  probably  be  diffi- 
cult in  the  future,  but  by  no  means  impossible.  As  long  as 
wars  are  conducted  with  impressionable  humans,  so  long 
will  a  suddenly  appearing  cavalry  mass  have  its  effect  on 
infantry  that  has  suffered  physically  and  in  morale,  and 
where  training  has  not  given  it  the  proper  stability.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  organization  of  infantry  favors  success 
of  a  charge.  Arms  become  effective  only  in  the  hands  of 
men;  but  these  men  appear  more  than  ever  susceptible  to 
moral  influences  on  account  of  the  increase  of  urban  popu- 
lation. Because  favorable  opportunities  were  not  grasped, 
or  because  cavalry  was  not  just  at  the  right  place,  or  be- 
cause the  commander  had  been  deceived  by  the  "parade" 
aspect  of  the  enemy,  or  because  the  commander  was  unable 
to  see  that  the  infantry  opposed  to  him  was  ripe  for  a 
charge,  we  have  no  justification  for  concluding  that  the  at- 
tack was  impossible.  Uncertainty,  which  leads  to  inactivity, 
taken  in  conjunction  with  the  difficulties  in  reaching  the 
decisive  place  at  the  correct  time,  has  frequently  saved 
broken  and  demoralized  infantry  from  the  charge. 

Charges  against  marching  batteries,  surprise  attacks 
against  flank  and  rear  of  artillery  in  action,  or  even  against 
the  front  of  artillery  firing  from  under  cover,  against  artil- 
lery that  is  not  fighting  in  connection  with  infantry,  can  fre- 
quently have  great  success.  Frequently  it  is  advantageous 
to  silence  batteries  if  only  for  a  short  time.     Successes 


CAVALRY  226 

against  ammunition  columns  are  also  to  be  valued.  Pres- 
ent day  cavalry  must  therefore  be  able  to  fight  mounted  as 
well  as  dismounted;  it  is  entirely  too  costly  to  sink  to  the 
level  of  rapidly  moving  infantry. 

The  moral  impression  produced  by  charging  cavalry 
remains  undisputed  (Custozza,  Mars  la  Tour),  and  even  its 
mere  presence  has  a  weakening  effect  on  the  enemy. 

The  leader  will  have  to  consider  that  the  losses  in  a 
charge  of  cavalry  against  cavalry  will  probably  be  very 
small,  and  against  other  arms  extraordinarily  high,  while 
the  losses  inflicted  on  the  enemy  are  generally  relatively 
small.  The  leader  must  consider  this  in  arriving  at  a  deci- 
sion whether  to  resort  to  the  charge  or  to  dismounted  fight- 
ing, especially  when,  by  fighting  on  foot  there  is  a  possi- 
bility of  causing  the  enemy  great  loss.  But  in  no  case  must 
the  fact  that  a  dismounted  action  can  quickly  and  easily  be 
broken  off,  be  permitted  to  affect  the  decision  to  make  a 
mounted  charge,  when  it  would  cause  a  quick  and  decisive 
result.  Prerequisite  for  a  favorable  attack  lies  in  sudden 
appearance.  In  any  case  we  will  probably  have  to  prepare 
the  success  of  a  mounted  attack  by  the  firefight  of  carbines 
and  machine  guns.  Tanks  also  can  perform  valuable  service 
here.  Frequently  battle  airplane  echelons  and  escadrilles 
will  have  the  same  effect  as  a  mounted  attack.  The  mounted 
attack,  which  utilizes  celerity  and  shock  power  to  ride  down 
the  enemy,  has  lost  in  importance  in  modem  war,  though 
plenty  of  opportunities  will  offer  for  successful  charges. 
The  larger  the  cavalry  unit,  the  greater  the  difficulties  of 
coordinated  action  and  the  more  will  cavalry  have  to  seek 
opportunity  to  participate  by  fighting  dismounted  in  the 
battle,  to  which  the  cavalry  must  be  trained,  and  without 
paying  any  attention  to  the  neighboring  troops  to  solve  in- 
dependently its  task  in  any  terrain  and  at  any  hour  of  the 
day.  Due  to  increased  attachment  of  fire  arms  of  all  kinds, 
in  conjunction  with  its  mobility  cavalry  will  more  than  ever 
be  assigned  to  operate  against  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear, 
in  which  hostile  cavalry  must  be  quickly  swept  aside,  if  pos- 
sible by  mounted  attack,  and  not  by  the  slower  method  of 
fighting  on  foot. 

As  the  hostile  cavalry  will  have  the  same  tasks,  both 
parties  will  naturally  endeavor  to  bring  about  a  rapid  deci- 


226  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

sion,  to  uninterruptedly  continue  their  tasks.  Thus  cavalry 
engagements  will  result;  and  only  the  inferior  cavalry  will 
resort  to  dismounted  fire  fight  to  accomplish  its  task.  This 
resistance  has  to  be  overcome  by  dismounted  offensive  at- 
tack. The  cavalry  has  to  be  ready  day  and  night  for  the 
"offensive  fire  fight,"  to  be  able,  after  the  victory  over  the 
hostile  cavalry,  to  move  against  the  flank  of  the  enemy, 
against  the  line  of  communication,  or  against  cavalry. 

The  cavalry  must  never  wait  for  opportunities  to  at- 
tack, it  must  not  delay  its  activity  until  it  is  let  loose  for 
the  pursuit,  but  must  participate  with  all  means  at  hand  in 
gaining  the  victory  and  carry  its  strong  fire  power  rapidly 
to  the  weak  points  of  the  enemy's  line.  This  advantage  of 
being  able  to  rapidly  cover  short  distances  to  occupy  impor- 
tant points,  was  not  properly  valued  prior  to  the  war.  Ef- 
ficient cavalry  can  always  mislead  the  enemy  and  can  also 
thereby  make  him  afraid.  The  long  continued  battles  and 
the  dependence  of  the  armies  on  uninterrupted  supplies  of 
ammunition  and  provisions,  mostly  brought  up  by  rail,  make 
operations  against  communications  to  the  rear  of  decisive 
importance.  Without  rail  connection  modern  armies  rapidly 
lose  their  fighting  power  and  freedom  of  movements.  The 
raids,  condemned  before  the  war  by  C.  D.  R.  527,  gain  there- 
by special  value. 

It  is  probably  to  the  point  to  here  point  out  the  raid, 
undertaken  with  strong  cavalry  in  September,  1919,  by  Gen- 
eral Mamontoff.  The  end  of  August  he  pierced  the  Bolshe- 
vist line  south  of  Moscow,  was  enabled  to  live,  without  sup- 
plies from  home,  in  rear  of  the  8th  Bolshevist  Army,  off 
the  country,  and  supported  the  advance  from  Moscow  against 
Orel. 

EMPLOYMENT  OF  CAVALRY  IN  WAR 

Let  us  try  and  sketch  the  tasks  of  cavalry  in  war.  The 
army  cavalry  performs  all  the  duties  that  an  army  demands ; 
the  generally  weaker  divisional  cavalry,  frequently  rein- 
forced or  totally  replaced  by  cyclists,  performs  the  duties 
required  by  smaller  troop  units.  In  conjunction  with  the 
aerial  observation  forces  the  cavalry  carries  on  reconnais- 
sance, screens  movements  of  the  army,  and  secures  the  con- 
nection between  separated  portions  of  the  army.    After  the 


CAVALRY  227 

contact  of  the  armies  the  cavalry  seeks  employment  in  flank 
or  rear  of  the  enemy,  against  important  railroad  junctions, 
prevents  the  enemy  from  bringing  up  supplies  and  attempts 
to  keep  approaching  reinforcements  from  the  battlefield. 
The  development  of  wireless  and  of  the  airships  make  it 
possible  to  supply  distant  cavalry  with  orders  and  facili- 
tates co-operation  with  the  armies  in  retreat  and  in  pursuit. 
The  cavalry  participates  with  all  arms  in  battle  and  finds 
special  employment  in  retreat  and  in  pursuit. 

Reconnaissance 

Aerial  reconnaissance,  in  so  far  as  it  is  not  influenced 
by  weather,  supplements  the  cavalry  reconnaissance  and 
indicates  the  directions  to  the  cavalry  in  which  it  is  to  re- 
connoiter.  Cavalry  reconnaissance  always  has  the  advan- 
tage of  gaining  by  personal  contact  (prisoners)  important 
points  for  the  leader's  decisions.  The  cavalry  reconnoiters 
with  weaker  detachments  (olficers'  patrols)  which  are  fol- 
lowed in  support  by  reconnoitering  squadrons;  reconnais- 
sance with  stronger  forces  ("patrol  rides  by  cavalry  divi- 
sions") leads  to  frittering  away  the  forces. 

The  general  rules  laid  down  in  peace  time  for  the  ser- 
vice of  reconnaissance,  for  far,  near,  and  battle  reconnais- 
sance, have  stood  the  test.  We  reckoned  only  too  little  with 
the  fact  that  the  Russians  as  a  general  rule  appeared  with 
stronger  cavalry  patrols  and  made  more  use  of  deceptions 
than  we  foresaw.  The  strength  of  a  patrol  is  governed  by 
its  task  and  the  probable  number  of  messages  to  be  sent 
back.  The  weaker  the  patrol,  the  easier  can  its  road  be 
blocked  and  the  quicker  will  it  use  up  its  forces.  It  was 
proven  wise  to  attack  hostile  patrols  and  reconnoitering  de- 
tachments whenever  the  situation  permitted.  Armament 
with  the  lance  gave  the  troops  superiority  and  all  reports 
prove  that  the  intrepid  attack  of  our  reconnoitering  de- 
tachments always  had  good  success.  Of  course,  heavy  losses 
resulted  sometimes  by  overhasty  action.  The  leader  will 
solve  his  task  mounted  if  practicable,  otherwise  dismounted. 
This  requires  a  certain  strength  of  the  patrol.  It  is  advis- 
able in  close  reconnaissance — to  save  the  horses — to  move 
the  patrols  forward  in  waves  from  sector  to  sector.  The 
relieved  patrols  assemble  first  as  message  centers  along  the 


228  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

route  of  march  and  finally  join  the  advance  guard  cavalry. 
In  this  manner  the  sending  back  of  messages  is  best  assured. 
Good  reconnaissance  is  the  first  requirement  of  security. 

For  the  purpose  of  furnishing  rallying  points  and  sup- 
ports for  distant  patrols,  reconnoitering  squadrons  were 
of  advantage  in  10  to  20  kilometers  broad  reconnaissance 
strips.  Light  radio  stations  performed  the  service  of  com- 
munication ;  we  cannot  caution  too  strongly  against  sending 
messages  uncoded.  We  found  in  Maubeuge  and  Namur 
copies  of  our  own  wireless  messages  which  the  enemy  had 
picked  up  with  his  wireless.  In  order  to  overcome  hostile 
resistance  the  reconnoitering  squadron  requires  a  certain 
fighting  power,  and  that  is  increased  by  the  assignment  of 
cyclists,  machine  guns,  and  even  single  field  pieces. 

Screening  the  Movements  of  the  Army 

At  the  opening  of  the  World  War  screening  the  move- 
ments of  the  army  was  so  successfully  performed  by  both 
cavalry  corps  that  the  advance  of  the  1st  and  2d  Armies  had 
a  completely  surprising  effect  on  the  allied  leadership,  in 
spite  of  the  fact  that  participation  in  war  in  Belgium  by  the 
population  increased  the  tasks  of  the  cavalry. 

Similarly  in  October,  1914,  the  Cavalry  Corps  Frommel 
(5th,  8th  and  Austrian  4th  Cavalry  Divisions)  succeeded  in 
screening  the  march  to  the  left  of  the  Army  under  Hinden- 
burg  to  the  vicinity  of  Thorn. 

Employment  Against  Flank  and  Rear 

In  July,  1915,  the  5th  Army  Cavalry  Corps  accompanied, 
with  its  2d,  6th  and  8th  Cavalry  Divisions,  the  attack  of 
the  North  Corps  of  the  Niemen  Army  against  the  right 
flank  of  the  Russian  Army  in  position  on  the  Dubissa  and 
upper  Windau  as  far  as  the  vicinity  of  Popeljany.  The  ad- 
vance of  the  German  cavalry  against  the  Russian  flank  was 
decisive.  In  no  case  could  infantry  have  operated  at  such 
a  distance  from  its  main  force.  The  greater  the  distance, 
the  greater  the  effect. 

In  September,  1914,  during  the  "race  to  the  coast"  there 
were  concentrated  on  the  German  north  wing — on  a  nar- 
row space:  the  2d  Cavalry  Corps,  v.d.  Marwitz,  consisting 


CAVALRY  229 

of  the  7th  and  9th  Cavalry  Divisions ;  the  1st  Cavalry  Corps, 
V.  Richthofen,  consisting  of  the  Guard  and  4th  Cavalry 
Division,  and  the  4th  Cavalry  Corps,  v.  Hollen,  consisting  of 
the  3d,  6th  and  Bavarian  Cavalry  Division. 

At  the  present  writing  it  cannot  be  stated  whether  the 
cavalry  could  have  caused  more  delay  to  the  march  of  the 
British  or  could  have  pushed  into  the  hostile  communica- 
tions zone.  Lack  of  infantry  compelled  the  army  leadership 
to  employ  this  brilliant  cavalry  in  position  warfare. 

What  will  ever  remain  as  a  brilliant  cavalry  achieve- 
ment, was  the  employment  of  the  Cavalry  Corps  Garnier 
(the  1st,  3d,  4th,  6th  and  9th  Cavalry  Divisions  took  part) 
after  the  fall  of  Kovno  against  the  rear  of  the  Russian  army 
at  Wilna  in  September,  1915,  Smorgon  September  15th,  Solg 
16th,  and  Wilecki  16th),  all  of  which  were  taken  in  dis- 
mounted fighting  in  the  face  of  continually  reinforced  Rus- 
sian infantry,  which  was  being  brought  up  by  rail.  In  the 
face  of  this  infantry  the  cavalry  could  not  take  Molodeczno, 
so  that  finally  the  Russians  were  able  to  also  break  the  resis- 
tance of  the  rapidly  brought  up  75th  and  115th  Reserve  Divi- 
sions. In  a  captured  Russian  order  appeared  the  following 
praise:  "The  cavalry  must  take  example  by  the  energetic, 
brave  and  rapid  action  of  the  Grerman  cavalry ;  I  consider  it 
sufficient  to  call  back  to  mind  to  the  cavalry,  especially  to  the 
Cossacks  and  their  commanders,  the  former  valor  of  their 
predecessors — definite,  bold  reconnaissance  under  the  nose  of 
the  enemy,  especially  in  his  rear,  full  freedom  to  raise  havoc 
among  his  batteries  and  columns,  to  fall  on  his  tired  infan- 
try— which  is  history  with  which  each  commander  must  be 
familiar  in  order  to  cite  examples  of  the  Russian  cavalry, 
which  the  German  cavalry  now  so  eagerly  emulates." 

If  cavalry  has  once  reached  the  rear  of  the  hostile 
army,  then  only  relentless  action  without  any  regard  to 
losses  can  attain  large  success. 

Connection  Between  Separated  Parts  of  the 
Army  in  Retreat 

After  the  first  battle  of  the  Marne  the  gap  between  the 
1st  and  the  2d  Army  was  closed  by  German  cavalry. 


230         development  of  tactics— world  war 

Mounted  Participation  in  Battle  and  as 
Mobile  Foot  Troops 

Cavalry,  by  surprise,  can  bring  its  strong  fire  power 

into  effect. 

CAVALRY  DIVISIONS 

The  cavalry  division  is  the  fighting  unit  of  the  army 
cavalry ;  its  organization  and  composition  must  be  in  accor- 
dance with  the  new  tasks.  It  is  true  that  the  formation  of 
3  brigades  of  2  regiments,  taken  over  from  the  Franco-Prus- 
sian War — principally  designed  for  mounted  action  and  for 
reconnaissance — has  proven  itself  excellent,  but  the  regi- 
ment nevertheless  requires  another  machine  gun  troop  of  6 
guns  besides  the  8  to  12  autom.atic  rifles  assigned  each  troop. 
If  cavalry  desires  to  solve  its  problem,  it  requires  an  abso- 
lutely strong  equipment  with  automatic  arms,  as  the  horses 
rapidly  decrease — as  we  have  learned.  In  present  day  employ- 
ment of  cavalry  after  deducting  reconnoitering  troops  and 
far  patrols,  1  regiment  will  not  be  able  to  insert  more  than 
200  carbines,  1  cavalry  division  no  more  than  6  troops.  Each 
trooper  must  be  an  excellent  marksman ;  the  small  number 
of  carbines  must  be  increased  by  automatic  arms.  For  this 
employment  we  have  too  many  headquarters  (staffs)  and 
it  should  be  considered  if  the  demands  of  dismounted  action 
cannot  be  better  met  by  organizing  brigades  of  3  regiments 
and  to  increase  the  number  of  troops  in  the  regiment  to  6. 
Attaching  good  marching  infantry  to  the  division  and  not 
to  the  cavalry  corps,  say  about  1  battalion  to  the  brigade 
with  necessary  autos  to  carry  the  knapsacks,  is  recom- 
mended ;  in  addition  too,  infantry  cyclists  are  indispensable 
even  on  an  Eastern  theater  of  war. 

All  men  that  cannot  be  mounted  temporarily  because  of 
loss  of  horses,  are  to  be  formed  within  each  brigade  into 
bicycle  detachments.  As  has  been  learned,  bicycles  are  al- 
ways available.  In  Italy  every  cavalry  regiment  had  1  cycle 
platoon.  The  cyclist  companies  can  occasionally  also  be  or- 
ganized into  battalions. 

In  the  attachment  of  artillery,  the  lack  of  light  field 
howitzers  was  sorely  felt,  and  also  the  lack  of  long  range 
guns.  Attachment  of  heavy  field  howitzers  and  10-cm.  can- 
nons, frequently  demanded,  may  occasionally  be  of  advan- 


CAVALRY  231 

tage,  but  would  seriously  affect  the  mobility  of  the  troops. 
It  is  also  wrong  to  carry  along  more  than  two  calibers.  At- 
tachment of  anti-aircraft  guns  was  demanded  with  justifi- 
cation. 

In  the  matter  of  mounted  pioneers  (supplied  with  ex- 
plosives carried  on  pack  animals),  1  company  with  cavalry 
bridge  equipment  was  found  sufficient  for  the  division.  It 
was  found  best  to  mount  the  pioneers,  in  place  of  equipping 
them  with  bicycles,  on  account  of  the  explosives  they  had  to 
carry  along.  Information  detachments  should  be  equipped 
with  light  radio  stations  for  the  reconnoitering  troops,  heavy 
radio  stations  for  the  brigade  and  division ;  this  is  absolutely 
necessary.  The  service  of  information  in  a  regiment  had 
best  be  performed  by  one  platoon.  Subsistence  and  ammu- 
nition columns  should  be  changed  from  horse-drawn  to  mo- 
tor-drawn. 

CYCLISTS 

In  organizing  cyclist  companies  (collapsible  wheels) 
with  the  Jager  battalions  on  October  1,  1913,  the  dislike  to 
the  employment  of  cyclists  in  Germany  had  been  overcome. 
At  the  opening  of  the  World  War  Great  Britain  had  cyclist 
battalions  (coast  guard),  Austria  (with  single  Jager  bat- 
talions), Switzerland  (to  reinforce  the  weak  cavalry).  Italy 
and  France  also  had  cyclist  detachments.  Preparations  had 
been  made  in  Russia  to  supply  the  cavalry  divisions  with 
cyclist  detachments.  At  the  close  of  the  World  War  each 
Italian  cavalry  division  had  1  cyclist  battalion  of  3  com- 
panies and  in  addition  each  cavalry  regiment  had  a  cyclist 
platoon  of  30  men.  Each  British  army  corps  had  1  cyclist 
battalion  (230  men)  of  3  companies  with  6  automatic  rifles 
carried  on  cycles.  In  mobile  warfare  each  division  was  to 
receive  1  bicycle  company,  as  there  was  no  longer  any  divi- 
sional cavalry  toward  the  close  of  the  campaign — only  corps 
cavalry  still  existed  (3  troops).  The  French  cavalry  divi- 
sion had  a  groupe  cycliste  of  3  peletons  of  3  officers,  15  non- 
commissioned officers,  and  90  men  each. 

In  Germany  the  cyclist  companies  were  doubled  shortly 
after  the  commencement  of  the  war,  and  then  ersatz  com- 
panies were  organized  in  addition,  which  were  brought  into 
the  field  as  mobile  troops.    Cyclist  companies  were  enabled 


232  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

to  utilize  their  rapidity  to  good  advantage  during  the  quick 
advance  through  Belgium  and  Northern  France,  and  because 
the  road  net  was  excellent,  they  could  perform  tasks  inde- 
pendently, and  did  excellent  service  in  the  holding  of  impor- 
tant sectors,  especially  in  the  retreat  from  the  Marne,  and 
offered  a  rallying  point  to  the  cavalry  far  in  front.  The  fear 
that  through  the  permanent  assignment  to  cavalry  corps 
and  cavalry  divisions  their  movements  would  be  retarded, 
did  not  prove  correct  as  long  as  the  roads  were  good  and  the 
road  net  favorable.  In  the  East  cyclist  detachments  also 
performed  excellent  service.  During  the  course  of  the  cam- 
paign additional  cyclist  companies  were  organized  based  on 
the  good  results  so  far  shown.  The  cyclist  companies  not 
attached  to  the  cavalry  corps  and  cavalry  divisions  were 
employed  for  duty  at  army  headquarters,  army  corps  and 
single  divisions,  and  in  part  also  formed  into  cyclist  bat- 
talions of  from  5  to  7  companies  and  1  machine  gun  company 
of  6  guns,  model  '08,  on  auto  trucks.  6  of  such  battalions 
(4  Prussian,  1  Bavarian,  1  Saxon)  later  on  formed  the  2d 
Infantry  (cyclist)  Brigade,  which  performed  most  excel- 
lent services  at  different  times,  the  last  time  in  the  Autumn 
of  1918,  on  the  retreat  in  the  West. 

While  in  time  of  peace  a  cyclist  company  consisted  of 
only  3  officers  and  about  110  noncommissioned  officers  and 
men,  its  strength  in  war — corresponding  to  the  demand — 
was  increased  to  3  officers  and  150  noncommissioned  officers 
and  men  and  each  company  was  assigned  1  passenger  and  2 
supply  autos  as  well  as  3  wagons.  Such  a  strength  was  nec- 
essary as  the  company  in  mobile  war  in  encountering  the 
enemy  was  left  to  itself  and  because  we  had  to  count  on  de- 
tachments for  patrols  and  messengers  and  personnel  for 
the  trains,  as  well  as  on  losses  in  battle. 

In  cyclist  troops  the  desire  was  expressed  to  have  ma- 
chine guns  to  increase  their  fighting  power,  and  in  the  sum- 
mer of  1918  a  portion  of  the  cyclist  companies  were  sup- 
plied with  3  automatic  rifles,  which  with  spare  parts  and 
ammunition  were  carried  along  on  cycles. 

The  strength  of  a  cycle  detachment  is  dependent  on 
the  march  depth  and  on  the  fact  that  in  mobile  warfare 
half  of  the  men  are  designated  to  bring  along  the  wheels 


CAVALRY  233 

of  the  skirmishers.  The  folding  wheel  did  not  show  up  well 
with  us.  If  we  calculate,  in  addition,  on  detachments  for 
supply  trains,  subsistence  and  headquarters  service,  wheels 
getting  out  of  order,  etc.,  it  will  be  seen  that  it  is  not  cor- 
rect to  attach  to  a  cavalry  unit  less  than  1  company  of  cy- 
clists of  2  platoons,  of  a  strength  of  at  least  2  officers,  22 
noncommissioned  officers  and  160  men.  The  baggage  neces- 
sary for  daily  use  is  carried  on  the  wheel,  the  remainder  on 
wagons.  If  the  cavalry  division  wants  to  make  effective 
use  of  its  cyclists,  at  least  1  battalion  of  from  3  to  4  cyclist 
companies  and  1  machine  gun  company  should  be  attached. 
Units  of  this  strength  proved  themselves  to  be  effective. 
Marching  in  the  West  usually  was  in  column  of  threes,  in 
the  East  generally  in  column  of  files.  Method  of  move- 
ment and  rate  of  speed  require  that  the  cyclists  be  taken  out 
of  the  march  column  and  moved  from  sector  to  sector.  In 
the  battle  cyclists  are  to  reinforce  the  fire  power  of  the 
cavalry  and  to  relieve  the  cavalry  as  much  as  possible  from 
the  fire  fight. 

FRENCH  VIEWS  CONCERNING  EMPLOYMENT 
OF  CAVALRY 

At  the  opening  of  the  World  War  French  cavalry  divi- 
sions were  not  equal  to  the  German  cavalry  divisions  be- 
cause of  the  latter's  superiority  in  machine  guns  and  at- 
tached Jager  battalions.  Men's  equipment,  horse  equip- 
ment, and  means  of  communication,  were  in  favor  of  the 
German  troopers.  In  the  Autumn  of  1914  the  French  cav- 
alry officers'  corps  was  rejuvenated,  infantry  was  attached 
to  the  divisions,  and  in  November  portable  intrenching  equip- 
ment and  bayonets  were  supplied.  In  the  Spring  of  1916-17 
Cuirassier  regiments  were  changed  into  "Cuirassiers  dis- 
mounted" organization  and  strength  of  foot  troops,  and  in 
addition  dismounted  groupes  legeres  were  formed  from 
other  regiments.  Grenade  rifles  ( Vivien  Bessieres)  were  in- 
troduced, the  number  of  cartridges  carried  by  individuals 
was  increased,  and  the  number  of  automatic  rifles  increased 
first  to  3  and  later  to  6  per  troop.  Automatic  rifles  were 
given  to  combat  patrols  as  a  general  rule.  Their  employ- 
ment in  attack  and  in  reconnaissance  was  specially  empha- 


234  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

sized.  To  each  regiment  was  attached  one  37-mm.  cannon 
with  tripod  mount  (range  1500  to  2000  meters).  Attached 
were  also  motor  guns  and  motor  machine  guns ;  and  in  the 
Spring  of  1918,  also  light  tanks.  The  auto  guns  were  not 
to  be  considered  as  fire  reserve,  but  were  to  be  energetically- 
inserted  with  utilization  of  their  mobility  and  their  protec- 
tion against  infantry  and  shrapnel  fire,  to  precede  the  de- 
tachments, to  cut  off  the  enemy's  retreat,  and  to  be  employed 
in  attack  and  in  defense  for  sudden  fire  from  flank  posi- 
tions. In  effective  fire  zones  they  were  to  keep  up  connec- 
tion between  commander  and  advanced  detachments.  At 
night,  motor  guns  and  machine  guns  were  not  to  be  used. 
Employment  of  long  range  heavy  cannon  had  also  been  con- 
sidered. The  object  was  to  create  quickly  moving  fire 
groups  which  were  to  make  use  of  the  success  attained  by 
the  other  arms  in  trenchless  terrain.  While  for  mounted 
employment  the  requirements  of  C.D.R.  of  1912  were  fully 
to  be  adhered  to,  three  regulations  were  published  consecu- 
tively in  1916,  which  looked  on  the  dismounted  fight  as  the 
normal  employment  of  cavalry.  The  final  precept  was  the 
regulations  dated  May  26,  1918:  "Celerity,  mobility  and 
ability  to  maneuver  are  the  inherent  qualities  of  cavalry, 
as  long  as  it  is  a  question  of  marching  and  maneuvering. 
But  to  reach  objectives,  which  are  assigned  the  cavalry,  to 
solve  its  tasks,  the  cavalry  will  have  to  fight.  In  most  in- 
stances these  fights  will  have  to  be  carried  on  dismounted, 
for  there  is  no  longer  any  German  cavalry  on  the  Western 
theater  of  war Cavalry  tactics  will  have  to  corres- 
pond to  the  fire  power  of  modern  battle,  and  its  organiza- 
tion and  armament  give  it  the  possibility  to  fully  use  the 
fire  power.  Therefore  cavalry,  supported  by  artillery,  must 
be  able  to  fight  on  foot.  But  nevertheless  the  mounted  fight 
also  has  to  be  considered  and  prepared  for.  For  that  oppor- 
tunity is  offered  against  cavalry  which  seeks  to  attack  or 
accept  attack,  against  infantry  surprised  or  disheartened  in 
terrain  devoid  of  trenches  or  ditches,  against  artillery  on  the 
move,  or  when  it  can  be  attacked  in  position  from  the  flank 
or  rear.  The  cavalry  is  a  fragile  arm,  its  reconstruction  is 
slow  and  far  from  easy.  It  therefore  must  not  be  sacri- 
ficed to  the  impatience  of  a  leader  under  conditions  in  which 
its  inherent  qualities  cannot  be  utilized." 


CAVALRY  235 

After  December,  1916,  the  cavalry  troop  consisted  of  3 
platoons  of  3  squads  each ;  the  dismounted  platoon,  like  in- 
fantry platoons,  suitable  for  a  protracted  fire  fight  accord- 
ing to  armament  and  organization.  In  the  Regulations  of 
1918  it  is  stated:  "Under  present  day  requirements  for 
battle  the  dismounted  fight  is  the  normal  procedure  for  cav- 
alry. It  is  important  that,  if  the  cavalry  dismounts  to 
fight  on  foot,  it  forms  each  time  when  possible  units  cor- 
responding to  infantry  formations,  as  those  possess  all 
means  for  the  fire  fight,  for  movements  and  for  connection 
in  consonance  with  well  known  experiences."  Thus,  the 
cavalry  platoon  dismounted  was  to  correspond  to  the  infan- 
try section,  the  dismounted  troop  to  the  infantry  platoon  or 
half-company,  the  dismounted  regiment  to  2  infantry  com- 
panies. The  men  trained  for  special  purposes  (rifle  gren- 
ade throwers,  automatic  riflemen)  were  distributed  equally 
to  the  platoons.  1  platoon  inserted  14  skirmishers,  the  re- 
mainder serving  as  horseholders  and  for  reconnaissance.  1 
brigade  formed  a  foot  battalion  with  1  machine  gun  com- 
pany. The  led  horses  of  a  troop  were  under  charge  of  1 
officer;  he  has  2  noncommissioned  officers  and  32  troopers, 
including  6  litter  bearers.  The  led  horses  of  a  half-regi- 
ment with  the  combat  train  of  the  machine  gun  platoon  were 
conducted  by  the  captain  second  in  rank,  and  the  led  horses 
of  the  troop  were  generally  posted  separately.  The  follow- 
ing points  were  laid  down  for  the  tactical  insertion:  "In 
the  dismounted  fight  the  celerity  and  mobility  of  the  cav- 
alry must  come  to  the  top,  to  fully  utilize  the  surprise  and 
the  possibility  of  turning  against  flank  and  rear  of  the 
enemy.  Where  the  enemy  makes  a  stand,  he  will  be  held 
in  front  by  fire,  and  mounted  portions  of  the  command  press 
forward  in  the  direction  our  task  lies.  The  troops  are 
formed  into  dismounted  detachments,  led  horses  with  com- 
bat train,  mounted  reserve  (up  to  one-fourth  of  the  total). 
The  mounted  reserve  secures  the  flanks  and  maintains  con- 
nection with  neighboring  detachments,  gathers  the  fruits 
of  success  by  rapidly  throwing  forward  detachments  for 
the  fire  fight  against  flank  and  rear  of  the  enemy  or  pursues, 
mounted,  the  enemy,  covers  the  now  mounting  detachment 
that  has  fought  on  foot,  and  informs  it  of  everything  im- 
portant for  the  continuation  of  its  task." 


236  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

The  corps  cavalry  and  the  divisional  cavalry  secure  in 
the  offensive  battle  the  attainment  of  success,  and  the  army 
cavalry  secures  the  fruits  of  success.  In  the  defensive  bat- 
tle cavalry  is  enabled  to  materially  lessen  the  effect  of  a 
penetration.  Corps  and  divisional  cavalry  participate  in 
gaining  success  in  battle;  if  that  is  attained,  they  keep 
touch  with  the  enemy,  reconnoiter  and  cover  the  exit  of  the 
troops  units  into  the  terrain  that  is  free  from  trenches. 
The  following  tasks  are  set  the  cavalry :  To  attack  retreat- 
ing infantry  and  artillery ;  to  increase  the  point  of  entry  by 
rapidly  bringing  up  fire  echelons  with  automatic  arms 
against  the  flanks  of  detachments  that  still  make  a  stand. 
"It  will  be  the  general  rule  to  bring  the  frontal  fight  of 
dismounted  detachments  into  consonance  with  the  appear- 
ance of  detachments,  that  are  especially  strong  in  machine 
arms,  against  the  flank  and  rear.  In  the  defense  these  cav- 
alry detachments  will  secure  the  approach  of  reserves  and 
occupy  important  points  in  advance.  The  army  cavalry  will 
overtake  the  gathering  of  the  fruits  of  victory,  will  increase 
the  effect  of  a  tactical  and  operative  surprise,  and  will 
secure  the  movement  of  armies.  Celerity,  mobility  and  its 
fire  power  give  the  army  cavalry  an  opportunity  to  solve 
tasks  which  infantry  divisions  cannot  solve  with  the  same 
rapidity,  and  which  corps  and  divisional  cavalry  cannot 
solve  with  the  same  power.  Such  tasks  are  after  a  penetra- 
tion: Threatening  the  rear  of  the  hostile  troops,  rear  at- 
tacks, against  parts  that  still  make  a  stand,  reconnaissance 
and  attack  on  approaching  reinforcements  and  rear  guard 
positions,  to  prevent  the  enemy  to  again  make  front  in  a 
position  in  rear,  to  hold  positions  until  the  arrival  of  the  in- 
fantry, to  execute  important  demolitions,  to  take  possession 
of  provision  and  ammunition  depots.  Assignment  of  air- 
planes, means  of  communication,  light  tanks,  artillery,  in- 
fantry units  and  labor  troops  will  frequently  be  necessary. 
Again  and  again  emphasis  is  laid  on  the  necessity  to  not 
allow  itself  to  become  entangled  into  serious  frontal  fights, 
but  to  turn  with  fire  arms  against  flank  and  rear  of  the 
enemy,  but  still  adhering  to  the  general  march  direction 
and  then  to  inform  the  commander  of  the  situation  by  using 
all  observation  and  communication  means.  The  cavalry  divi- 
sion will  divide  itself  into  reconnaissance  detachments,  into 


CAVALRY  287 

a  detachment  d' exploitation  for  pursuit,  into  the  portions 
designated  to  utilize  its  mobility,  and  into  infantry  sup- 
port. In  the  defense  the  larger  units  are  mainly  designated 
in  accordance  with  a  kind  of  mobile  reserve,  to  close  up  a 
gap  should  the  enemy  have  succeeded  in  entering  the  posi- 
tion. The  cavalry  divisions  have  the  advantage  of  being 
composed  only  of  rapidly  moving  portions,  so  that  on  their 
arrival  on  the  battle  field  they  can  participate  in  full  num- 
erical strength  with  their  guns,  their  automatic  arms,  and 
their  ammunition.  In  that  lies  the  value  and  the  justifica- 
tion of  existence  of  cavalry  divisions."  In  this  rapid  inser- 
tion as  a  unit  lies  the  advantage  of  cavalry  divisions  as  con- 
trary to  infantry  divisions,  the  hasty  insertion  of  which  is 
possibly  only  gradually,  foot  troops  and  vehicles  separated. 
The  French  cavalry,  without  entirely  doing  away  with 
the  mounted  attack,  turned  into  mounted  infantry,  which 
sought  to  solve  its  main  task  on  the  battlefield  in  participa- 
tion in  the  battle.  The  corps  cavalry  and  the  divisional  cav- 
alry was  to  fight  also  as  a  general  rule.  Generally  frontal 
fire  fight  was  to  be  connected  with  an  advance  against  the 
enemy's  flank  and  rear,  so  that  artillery  and  automatic  arms 
could  be  inserted  against  the  most  sensitive  points  of  the 
enemy. 


XI.     The  Artillery 


ORGANIZATION  AND  COMBAT  PRINCIPLES 

Infantry  and  artillery  tactics,  in  so  far  as  concerns  the 
employment  of  light  and  heavy  artillery  cannot  be  separated ; 
but  as  has  been  already  pointed  out,  we  can  here  only  treat 
of  them  together  along  general  lines  and  we  cannot  discuss 
special  questions. 

Before  the  World  War,  when  only  open  warfare  had  to 
be  considered,  the  quantity  of  artillery  for  one  army  corps 
operating  as  a  part  of  a  larger  unit,  was  determined  by  the 
number  of  guns  that  could  be  placed  into  position  in  the 
corps  zone  of  action,  which  amounted  to  24  batteries  to  each 
5000  meters  front.  The  deployment  of  the  artillery,  ex- 
cept the  light  howitzer  batteries,  was  to  be  in  a  single  line. 
As  a  result  of  experience  it  was  believed  in  marches  that, 
in  relation  with  the  infantry,  the  proportion  of  artillery 
could  not  be  too  great.  The  march  length  of  the  artillery 
columns,  with  the  light  munition  trains  included,  was  at  the 
beginning  of  the  World  War,  5600  meters  for  a  division,  as 
against  a  march  depth  of  the  infantry  at  normal  strength, 
of  4800  meters.  Before  the  campaigns  started  there  were 
for  each  12  battalions  of  infantry  12  batteries,  that  is  for 
full  war  strength  there  was  for  each  1000  men  one  6-gun 
battery,  as  against  2  guns  to  1000  men,  the  amount  provided 
in  1870.  As  campaigns  proceeded  this  proportion  had 
changed;  for  example,  the  10th  Army  Corps  had  at  Vion- 
ville  4.16  guns  per  1000  men ;  at  the  time  of  the  capture  of 
Metz  this  proportion  was  5.8;  at  Beaune-la-Roland  6.4;  on 
December  3d  (1870),  8.8  and  on  the  9th  of  December,  11.4. 

The  Second  Army  at  the  beginning  of  the  World  War 
in  1914  had  3  active  corps ;  3  reserve  corps ;  an  army  cavalry 
corps  of  2  divisions ;  2  Landwehr  brigades  for  lines  of  com- 
munication duty;  4  battalions  of  mortars;  1  battalion  4.2 
guns ;  2  heavy  coast  mortar  battalions,  and  2  pioneer  regi- 
ments. Each  active  army  corps,  24  battalions  strong,  had 
at  the  beginning  of  the  World  War  in  each  division  12  in- 
fantry battalions,  12  light  batteries,  of  which  3  were  how- 

238 


ARTILLERY  239 

itzers,  besides  4  heavy  howitzer  battalions  belonging  to  the 
corps  artillery.  The  assigning  of  only  4  heavy  batteries  to 
the  army  corps  was  entirely  too  small  in  view  of  the  super- 
iority of  the  French  light  artillery  gun ;  each  division  should 
really  have  had  heavy  artillery,  in  order  to  itself  solve  its 
own  battle  missions,  especially  when  the  question  to  be  solved 
was  to  deploy  the  guns  under  the  protection  of  the  heavy 
artillery.  The  necessity  for  employing  heavy  artillery  in 
the  attack  soon  became  apparent,  although  the  regulations 
had  assigned  them  only  a  mission  in  the  defense.  In  for- 
mer wars,  the  fact  that  inferior  infantry  required  stronger 
artillery  was  not  given  consideration.  We  can  never  foresee 
that  during  the  development  of  war  the  inferior  troops,  such 
as  the  Landwehr  and  Landstrum  organizations  may  not  ob- 
tain the  more  difficult  missions.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
war  the  reserve  corps,  for  example  had  no  heavy  howitzers 
and  only  12  gun  batteries.  This  was  an  entirely  too  weak 
artillery  strength  for  any  task.  For  lines  of  communication 
purposes  the  Landwehr  brigades  had  a  strength  of  6  to  8 
battalions  with  1  or  2  batteries  mostly  of  an  old  type,  but 
they  were  often  called  upon  to  fight  alongside  active  corps 
equipped  with  entirely  different  material.  In  any  case,  re- 
serve and  provisional  organizations  should  have  rather  a 
stronger  than  a  weaker  proportion  of  artillery.  The  re- 
serve corps  in  October  brought  into  the  field,  divisions  with 
9  batteries,  of  which  3  were  light  howitzers. 

In  the  rapid  and  noteworthy  increase  of  the  army  it 
soon  became  necessary  to  adopt  the  4  gun  battery,  without 
any  disadvantages  appearing,  such  as  had  been  feared  in 
time  of  peace,  and  then  also  to  adopt  the  3  unit  organiza- 
tions for  the  division  infantry  and  to  assign  to  each  infan- 
try 6  light  gun,  and  3  light  howitzer  batteries.  Finally, 
when  position  warfare  commenced,  it  became  necessary  to 
assign  high  angle  fire  artillery  to  the  divisions,  and  each 
division  therefore  received  1  heavy  battalion  of  2  heavy 
howitzer  batteries,  and  1  10-cm.  battery. 

These  formed  the  basic  strength  of  the  division  and 
allowed  exhausted  divisions  to  be  replaced  by  fresh  troops. 
But  it  was  desirable  that  the  heavy  batteries  while  under 
division  control  be  assigned  to  the  sector  and  left  there 


240  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

until  relieved  by  the  army  artillery.  In  the  development  of 
our  tactics  the  experiences  on  the  west  battlefields  had  a 
major  influence.  In  mobile  warfare  the  battle  was  fought 
from  concealed  positions,  exposed  positions  being  excep- 
tional. An  artillery  fighting  principally  from  defiladed  po- 
sitions could  not  be  neutralized,  and  only  partially  damaged. 
At  the  beginning  shrapnel  was  the  principal  projectile.  Its 
effect  against  vertical  targets  was  annihilating,  especially 
when  these  were  in  unsuitable  formations,  while  the  effect 
against  skirmish  lines  taking  skillful  advantage  of  cover  was 
remarkably  low.  The  French  artillery  distinguished  itself 
by  close  co-operation  between  the  artillery  and  the  infantry 
and  by  employing  their  guns  up  to  the  limits  of  their  range. 
The  German  principles  concerning  combat  proved  to  be  cor- 
rect; but  we  soon  felt  the  superiority  of  the  hostile  artil- 
lery, which  could  not  be  offset  by  the  use  of  our  high  angle 
guns. 

Soon  the  strength  of  the  hostile  artillery  forced  us  to 
organize  an  advanced  guard  artillery  with  the  usual  dis- 
advantage of  meeting  the  enemy  suddenly  and  having  to 
take  unfavorable  positions.  For  security  on  the  march  and 
during  an  advance  against  an  enemy  in  position,  single 
guns  with  the  advance  guard  were  sufficient,  but  not  when 
a  meeting  engagement  took  place.  It  was  necessary  to  co- 
ordinate the  action  of  the  infantry  and  the  artillery.  In 
reconnaissance  it  was  first  necessary  to  select  observation 
posts,  the  gun  positions  being  regulated  on  these.  Often 
the  caution  had  to  be  given  that  reconnaissance  must  not 
be  so  made  as  to  draw  fire  upon  our  troops.  In  general  the 
artillery  had  to  fire  over  the  heads  of  the  infantry.  It 
could  not  always  be  avoided  that,  at  increased  ranges,  our 
troops  were  fired  on  by  our  own  artillery,  because  of  inat- 
tention or  inability  to  determine  the  location  of  the  dispersed 
formations.  This  bad  feature  could  never  be  overcome  in 
spite  of  all  efforts.  Our  enemy  also  complained  of  the  same 
trouble. 

In  the  attack  the  principal  factor  was  to  neutralize 
the  enemy's  artillery,  and  to  place  our  fire  with  full  strength 
on  the  hostile  infantry,  in  order  to  permit  our  individual 
skirmishers  to  arrive  within  short  range  of  the  enemy's 
position  without  firing.     Artillery  fire  to  accompany  the 


ARTILLERY  241 

infantry  attack  was  indispensable ;  caution  had  to  be  given 
as  to  carelessly  taking  exposed  positions,  as  this,  in  the 
West  often  caused  us  heavy  losses.  In  the  defense  it  was 
advisable  to  decrease  the  effectiveness  of  the  hostile  fire 
and  the  possibility  of  being  seen  from  the  air  by  closely  hug- 
ging the  ground.  The  deployment  of  the  artillery  in  a  sin- 
gle line,  to  which  we  had  become  accustomed  during  peace 
time,  quickly  disappeared.  The  employment  of  single  en- 
trenched platoons  or  sections  in  flanking  positions,  was  soon 
adopted. 

The  further  development  of  the  German  artillery  took 
place  under  the  requirements  of  position  warfare,  shrapnel 
was  replaced  by  shell  and  also  the  range  of  the  guns  was  in- 
creased with  employment  of  high-angle  fire  artillery;  also 
the  effect  of  the  shells  was  increased  by  the  use  of  gas  pro- 
jectiles. Germany  paid  especial  attention  to  the  develop- 
ment of  high-angle  fire  artillery,  whereas  the  Allies  laid 
preponderance  upon  heavy,  flat-trajectory  guns.  In  addi- 
tion both  sides  took  up  the  emplojnnent  of  railroad  artillery 
on  special  railroad  mounts,  either  for  standard  gauge  or 
narrow  gauge  railroads,  to  be  fired  from  specially  con- 
structed sidings,  for  very  long  ranges. 

The  effects  of  artillery  fire  was  constantly  increased 
by  co-operation  with  the  air  service  on  observation  of  fire, 
reconnaissance  and  report  of  shots  and  by  reducing  and 
finally  suppressing  the  employment  of  trial  shots,  which 
were  replaced  by  theoretical  calculations  based  upon  daily 
atmospheric  conditions.  This  method  was  fully  employed 
only  in  the  last  year  of  the  war,  and  our  enemy  had  a  start 
over  us  in  this  respect.  A  prime  requirement  was  an  ac- 
curate map  of  the  targets  and  the  batteries.  By  the  intro- 
duction of  artillery  position  finding  troops  (flash  and  sound 
registry),  who  plotted  observations  of  hostile  batteries  on 
a  plane  table  (captive  balloons  could  also  be  used  to  give 
data)  results  of  observations  free  from  all  daily  factors 
could  be  rapidly  obtained. 

The  trigonometrical  determination  of  positions  of  bat- 
teries and  infantry  positions  was  the  foundation  for  this 
work.  Sound  registering  troops,  who  were  independent  of 
the  terrain,  could  distinguish  between  actual  and  false  posi- 
tions, although  both  sides  sought  to  mislead  such  observa- 


242  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tions.  Also  in  open  warfare,  the  observation  of  reports  of 
single  shots  by  sound  registering  and  flash  observation  troops 
of  the  light  position  finding  troops,  could  be  counted  upon 
within  three  to  six  hours.  It  was  necessary  for  these  troops 
to  have  a  reliable  information  service  and  the  trigonometri- 
cal position  of  hostile  batteries  and  observation  posts, 
promptly  transmitted  to  the  proper  headquarters. 

In  the  defense  timely  steps  could  be  taken  to  trigonome- 
trically  determine  suitable  points  along  lines  in  the  battle 
zone  leading  towards  the  rear,  from  which  points  measure- 
ments could  later  be  made. 

CO-OPERATION  OF  INFANTRY  AND  ARTILLERY 

It  was  found  that  co-operation  between  infantry  and 
artillery  was  very  important.  During  the  Franco-Prussian 
War,  it  was  a  matter  of  honor  for  our  artillery  to  have  a 
proper  understanding  with  the  infantry  based  on  visual  ob- 
servations. Such  support  was  possible  as  the  battles  took 
place  at  short  ranges  and  as  both  sides  could  readily  be  dis- 
tinguished by  their  uniforms,  which,  in  spite  of  the  clouds 
of  smoke  that  lay  over  the  firing  lines,  were  clearly  visible 
to  the  batteries  fighting  in  the  open.  All  our  pre-war  regu- 
lations required  co-operation  between  the  arms  but  it  did 
not  explain  the  means  or  methods  by  which  this  was  to  be 
accomplished;  the  infantry  relied  on  the  artillery,  and  the 
latter  believed  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  infantry  to  call 
upon  its  sister  arm  at  the  proper  time  for  assistance  against 
a  designated  objective.  This  question  had  received  special 
consideration  by  our  enemies  and  a  correct  system  had  been 
arranged  to  secure  co-operation  between  the  two  arms  in 
which  nothing  was  to  be  left  to  chance.  In  supporting  the 
infantry  the  artillery  must  keep  down  the  fire  of  all  hostile 
troops,  both  infantry  and  artillery,  directed  on  its  own  in- 
fantry. To  be  practicable  such  support  had  to  be  given  at 
particular  moments,  which  only  the  attacker  could  deter- 
mine, and  also  on  particular  points,  which  could  be  partly 
designated  by  the  attacker  but  which,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  partly  dependent  upon  the  movements  of  the  enemy. 
On  the  defensive,  the  infantry  must  dsignate  exactly  the 
targets  on  which  its  artillery  is  to  fire.    A  good  system  of 


ARTILLERY  243 

liaison  is  therefore  required.  The  foundation  for  such  a 
system  is  obtained  through  orders  and  battle  plans  which 
designates  the  task  and  place  for  co-operation  between 
designated  infantry  and  its  supporting  artillery.  In  gen- 
eral the  method  of  issuing  orders  remains  unchanged,  but 
exceptionally  designated  artillery  units  may  be  placed,  in 
close  terrain,  under  the  infantry,  and  always  so  for  accom- 
panying artillery  on  special  tasks  such  as  village  fights  and 
suppression  of  machine  gun  nests.  In  the  absence  of  a 
battle  plan,  co-operation  between  infantry  and  artillery  is 
seldom  possible  even  if  both  parties  do  their  best  to  obtain 
it.  In  such  cases,  in  vigorous  rivalry,  each  arm  looks  after 
itself,  leading  to  a  lack  of  co-operation. 

The  basis  for  combined  tactics  is  the  battle  plan;  co- 
operation between  the  two  arms  proceeds  by  mutual  agree- 
ment between  subordinate  commanders  through  which  the 
nature  and  location  of  targets  is  designated,  and  by  direct 
requests  from  the  battle  line  to  obtain  artillery  fire  at  a 
designated  point  at  a  definite  moment.  If  artillery  fire  con- 
trol is  not  to  be  completely  dropped,  then  only  previously 
designated  batteries  should  receive  such  requests,  not  from 
each  infantry  platoon  commander  but  from  the  higher  in- 
fantry commanders.  These  agreements  must  be  made  be- 
tween the  two  headquarters.  In  no  case  must  the  infantry 
allow  itself  to  be  misled,  by  not  taking  advantage  of  favora- 
ble situations  when  there  is  no  artillery  support  available. 
But  the  artillery  must  depend  on  its  own  observations,  even 
when  the  infantry  does  not  request  special  support.  Thus 
battle  plans  and  observations  supplement  and  support  one 
another.  The  battle  plans  operate  only  for  prearranged 
tasks.  Even  with  the  assistance  of  the  best  means  of  com- 
munication, co-operation  between  the  two  arms  can  be  at- 
tained only  when  the  commanders  have  thoroughly  studied 
the  method  thereof,  and  have  determined  the  best  method 
through  combined  exercises.  Without  special  preparations, 
co-operation  of  the  arms  depends  entirely  on  the  good  will 
of  participants,  and  this  always  leads  to  disillusionments 
and  losses  of  time. 

The  infantry  can  only  be  properly  supported  when  it 
can  make  its  actual  battle  lines  known  to  the  artillery  be- 


244  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

yond  any  doubt.  As  to  location  of  the  front  line  by  the  Air 
Service,  a  burning  of  colored  lights  and  the  exhibiting  of  in- 
fantry panels  upon  demand  of  the  infantry  airplane,  as  well 
as  at  pre-determined  hours,  has  proven  valuable;  photo- 
graphs can  be  utilized  only  after  a  longer  time.  Good  re- 
sults in  marking  front  lines  has  been  given  by  flags  about 
60  cm.  square,  white,  black,  red,  red-yellow  or  yellow-red, 
but  the  side  of  the  flag  facing  the  enemy  must  be  of  some 
neutral  protective  color.  The  English  prescribed  that  these 
flags  were  to  be  paid  attention  to  only  when  they  were 
moved  back  and  forth,  or  when  shown  at  pre-determined 
times;  it  was  feared,  not  without  good  reason,  that  flags 
left  standing  by  the  enemy  might  lead  to  errors.  As  a  mat- 
ter of  course,  the  front  battle  line  only  was  to  be  so  marked. 
It  was  found  advisable  upon  occasions  to  burn  bengal  flares 
when  the  line  designated  in  orders  had  been  reached. 

In  the  autumn  offensive  in  Champagne  in  1915,  the 
French  infantry  wore  linen  cloths  on  their  backs,  to  prevent 
their  own  artillery  from  firing  on  them.  This  method  was 
not  successful,  as  in  spite  of  it,  the  infantry  were  heavily 
fired  on  by  their  own  artillery  during  the  advance.  Mistakes 
can  never  altogether  be  avoided;  we  can  only  attempt  to 
reduce  them  to  a  minimum  and  for  this,  information  as  to 
the  plan  of  attack  and  good  observation  of  the  battlefield  is 
necessary.  Often  enough,  in  close  terrain,  single  detach- 
ments coming  to  the  rear  will  be  taken  for  enemy  detach- 
ments advancing.  Besides  signals  for  "fire  in  front  of  us," 
which  should  be  different  for  different  units  of  the  army, 
there  should  be  the  signal  "We  are  fired  on  by  our  own  ar- 
tillery !"  Often  will  the  infantry  mistake  hostile  shell  frag- 
ments flying  to  their  rear,  or  shells  coming  from  a  flank, 
for  bad  markmanship  of  their  own  artillery.  To  avoid  such 
errors  during  position  warfare,  artillery  trench  patrols 
were  sent  forward,  and  even  better  was  the  sending  of  bat- 
tery commanders  or  battery  officers  to  the  infantry  trenches. 
They  here  had  opportunity  to  verify  their  own  observations, 
to  discuss  matters  personally  with  the  infantry;  to  hear 
their  requests  and  complaints,  and  to  exchange  information 
with  them.  Thus  it  was  easy  to  secure  co-operation  of  the 
arms,  the  infantry  learned  to  meet  the  artillery  half  way 
in  providing  liaison,  to  take  care  to  have  good  observation 


ARTILLERY  245 

positions,  and  to  assist  observers  materially  by  giving  them 
their  own  observations.  In  any  case  an  artillery  observer, 
posted  with  general  and  superficial  instructions,  and  to 
whom  no  one  thereafter  pays  much  attention  cannot  accom- 
plish much  in  supporting  the  infantry.  When  a  critical  sit- 
uation arises,  where  the  infantry  does  not  find  the  expected 
support,  the  infantry  should  not  blame  the  artillery,  but 
should  seek  the  reason  for  the  failure  in  their  own  conduct. 
In  this  manner  artillery  liaison  officers  sent  to  the  front 
can  perform  good  reconnaissance  service. 

Co-operation  between  the  artillery  and  the  infantry 
rests  on  artillery  liaison  officers  who  should  be  liberally  sup- 
plied with  maps  and  means  of  communication.  The  prelimin- 
ary instructions  given  them  should  refer  mainly  to  the  battle 
missions  of  all  batteries  which  are  the  barrage  batteries 
for  the  sector,  what  batteries  are  available  for  fire  within 
the  sector,  and  finally  how  these  batteries  can  be  reached. 
Knowledge  of  the  capability  of  the  various  guns  is  naturally 
necessary.  As  these  officers  have  knowledge  of  the  orders 
and  information  received  by  the  infantry,  they  are  in  a  posi- 
tion to  recommend  proper  artillery  support,  inform  their 
own  commands  as  to  the  general  situation,  so  that  they  may 
quickly  prepare  for  coming  missions.  Their  duty  is  espe- 
cially to  orient  both  arms  in  mutually  informing  them  as 
to  the  whole  situation.  Frequently,  it  is  desirable  to  com- 
municate directly  with  the  forward  artillery  observers,  es- 
pecially when  targets  are  to  be  fired  upon  on  request  of  the 
infantry. 

The  duties  of  observation  and  liaison  officers  are  sharply 
separated,  even  when  observation  officers  are  in  a  position 
to  transmit  requests  from  infantry  for  artillery  support. 
It  is  well  to  attach  to  each  infantry  battalion  headquarters 
an  artillery  liaison  officer,  and  supply  him  with  necessary 
information.  Never  can  the  artillery  count  on  using  the 
infantry  lines  of  communication  which  are  always  over- 
worked. In  position  warfare  the  liaison  officer  is  detailed 
permanently  to  a  battalion,  and  lives  permanently  with  the 
battalion  staff ;  in  quiet  sectors  he  will  often  be  charged  with 
the  service  of  observation  also  within  the  battalion  sector. 
The  heavy  artillery  will  have  one  artillery  liaison  officer  de- 
tailed to  each  regiment;  it  is  very  desirable  that  artillery 


246  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

groups  should  conform  to  infantry  subsectors,  the  co-opera- 
tion of  arms  is  much  enhanced  thereby.  If  the  respective 
artillery  commanders  are  in  the  vicinity  of  the  headquarters 
to  which  they  are  attached,  this  will  facilitate  personal  con- 
sultation of  staffs  and  co-operation  between  the  arms.  Even 
when  it  is  expected  to  have  to  meet  an  attack,  timely  consul- 
tation between  the  respective  infantry  regiments  and  the 
corresponding  artillery  units  is  thereby  facilitated. 

CO-OPERATION  BETWEEN  ARTILLERY  AND 
AIR  SERVICE 

Close  co-operation  between  the  air  service  and  artillery 
in  order  to  locate  targets,  and  in  order  to  observe  fire,  is 
always  a  prime  requirement  for  success.  It  is  always  very 
desirable  to  attach  air  service  officers  to  the  staffs  of  artil- 
lery commanders.  Artillery  airplanes  supplement  the  ser- 
vice of  the  flash  observation  and  sound  registering  troops ; 
air  photographs  make  it  possible  to  definitely  determine  the 
effect  of  fire,  by  proving  in  a  short  flight  the  accuracy  of 
the  artillery  adjustments  and  the  results  of  the  fire.  Of 
the  greatest  importance  is  information  of  those  hostile  bat- 
teries which  have  been  firing  most  or  have  been  silenced,  as 
well  as  good  or  poor  fire  by  our  artillery.  Only  those  air- 
planes which  are  equipped  with  radio  sets  can  remain  in  un- 
interrupted communication  with  the  artillery  without  stop- 
ping their  flight.  Firing  for  effect  with  aerial  observation 
requires  a  previous  understanding  and  good  communication 
between  the  observer  and  the  battery  commander.  Previous 
discussions  cannot  cover  long  engagements  and  in  such 
cases  each  observation  airplane  must,  through  its  radio, 
call  on  batteries  for  fire.  Artillery  equipped  with  radio  for 
receiving  information,  and  the  air  service  must  have  a  firm 
determination  to  co-operate ;  in  such  cases  all  difficulties  will 
be  overcome.  On  the  defensive  it  is  necessary  to  designate 
certain  batteries  to  receive  information  from  the  observa- 
tion airplanes,  which  batteries  should  have  particularly  good 
communication.  The  positions  of  these  batteries  must  be 
such  that  it  will  be  possible  for  them  to  cover  as  much  as 
possible  of  the  battlefield,  their  range  should  be  such  that 
they  will  be  independent  of  the  movement  of  the  infantry 


ARTILLERY  247 

in  order  to  avoid  frequent  changes  of  position  and  arrange- 
ments must  be  made  with  the  air  service  at  each  station  un- 
der all  kinds  of  weather,  so  that  quick  decoding  of  radio 
messages  may  be  made  and  transmitted  to  the  proper  head- 
quarters or  directly  to  designated  batteries.  Should  no  in- 
telligence messages  be  received  for  his  own  command  the 
radio  officer  must  listen  in  on  messages  from  airplanes  to 
neighboring  units  for  his  own  orientation. 

THE  DECISIVE  BATTLE  IN  POSITION  WARFARE 

In  the  first  months  of  the  war,  an  insufficient  supply  of 
ammunition  made  difficult  the  systematic  employment  of  the 
artillery  in  the  attack.  The  artillery  on  the  defensive  was 
divided  into  two  classes;  guns  in  concealed  battle  positions 
and  forward  guns ;  the  latter  were  often  in  the  first  line  in 
masked  or  covered  positions  and  were  to  fire  only  when  the 
hostile  assault  took  place.  These  guns  were  generally  de- 
stroyed early  and  a  belief  arose  in  an  automatic  defensive 
barrage,  which  was  to  be  brought  down  by  means  of  bengal 
light  signals.  The  front  of  a  defensive  barrage  for  1  bat- 
tery was  not  to  exceed  200  meters;  but  such  a  width  was 
generally  exceptional.  This  proceeding  misled  the  infantry 
into  relying  too  greatly  on  the  artillery  support,  and  to  call 
too  frequently  for  this  support.  Through  the  loss  of  guns 
during  the  enemy's  artillery  preparation,  the  defensive  bar- 
rage was  never  as  strong  as  intended,  often  came  too  late, 
and  without  endangering  the  defender  could  not  be  brought 
close  to  the  front  line  trenches.  Even  when  defensive  bar- 
rages lasted  only  2  to  3  minutes,  it  increased  the  expenditure 
of  ammunition.  In  the  same  way  reprisal  fire  did  not  serve 
any  good  purpose.  "It  was  designed  to  square  the  account 
with  the  hostile  artillery  by  annihilating  fire  on  the  re- 
spective sectors  of  the  opposing  hostile  lines  and  so  to  pre- 
vent him  from  deploying  and  advancing  to  his  attack  posi- 
tion." This  was  the  method  we  still  adhered  to  in  the 
battle  of  the  Somme.  This  procedure  was  of  no  value.  We 
found  out  that  air  superiority  and  the  efficiency  of  the  posi- 
tion finding  troops  was  essential  in  the  artillery  duel.  New 
regulations  prevented  reprisal  fire,  substituted  annihilating 
fire  for  defensive  barrages,  and  prescribed  for  each  kilo- 


248  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

meter  front  an  artillery  strength  of  5  to  7  barrage  batteries, 
4  to  6  high  angle  batteries,  and  1  to  3  heavy  gun  batteries. 
The  strength  of  the  artillery  defense  does  not  lie  in 
making  the  barrage  and  annihilating  fire  denser,  but  in  at- 
tempting to  foresee  the  enemy's  movements.  In  a  new  edi- 
tion of  the  Regulations  dated  September  1,  1917,  this  idea 
was  further  discussed,  and  no  mention  was  made  of  a  sys- 
tematic calculation  of  the  artillery  strength.  It  was  re- 
quired that  timely  preparations  be  made,  when  the  artillery 
deployment  is  undertaken,  as  to  the  artillery  battle,  without 
regard  to  the  damaging  of  guns  during  the  artillery  battle, 
because  such  a  battle  would  at  least  delay  and  weaken,  possi- 
bly decisively,  the  enemy.  The  difficulties  lay  in  the  nature 
of  the  targets;  well  concealed  batteries  can  withstand  a 
heavy  bombardment ;  in  the  greater  number  of  and  mobility 
of  targets,  the  enemy  made  more  frequent  changes  of  his 
battery  position  and  of  his  artillery  reserves  than  we  did; 
finally  there  was  the  difficulty  of  observation.  As  terres- 
trial observation  is  in  most  cases  impracticable,  artillery 
superiority  is  closely  connected  with  air  superiority.  Very 
naturally  two  groups  arose,  one  for  long  range  fire  into  the 
enemy's  back  areas  and  the  other  a  close  defense  group, 
just  close  enough  to  take  under  fire  the  enemy's  battle 
trenches.  These  designations  were  not  well  named,  the 
close  defense  group  was  as  a  matter  of  fact  the  furthest  to 
the  rear.  Grouping  of  the  artillery  in  several  lines  was 
recommended,  the  reinforcing  batteries,  which  arrived  gen- 
erally only  during  the  progress  of  the  battle,  being  placed 
in  the  second  line.  Orders  must,  from  time  to  time,  be  given 
as  to  how  long  the  artillery  battle  is  to  continue  against  a 
threatened  attack,  and  where  and  when  the  annihilating 
fire  is  to  be  laid  down.  In  any  case  the  general  principle  is 
that  the  artillery  fire  should  be  laid  down  as  late  as  possible. 
It  was  much  to  be  desired  that  our  artillery  should  be  strong 
enough  to  lay  down  annihilating  fire  against  the  hostile  in- 
fantry and  at  the  same  time,  with  a  part  of  it  continue  the 
artillery  duel.  For  such  a  purpose  there  was  needed  heavy 
gun  batteries,  from  18-cm.  cahber  upwards,  which  deployed 
in  depth,  could  with  assistance  of  special  balloons  and  air- 
planes, undertake  to  neutralize  distant  hostile  batteries.  By 
separating  the  artillery  into  a  distant  and  close  defense 


ARTILLERY  249 

group  there  was  a  natural  depth  formation.  Against  a  pene- 
tration this  greatly  decreased  the  effect  of  surprise,  as  well 
as  furnishing  flank  support  for  adjacent  sectors.  The  great 
difficulty  in  the  transmission  of  orders  and  information  soon 
became  very  clear. 

Fire  against  the  hostile  infantry  is  the  second  mission 
of  the  artillery  in  the  defensive  battle.  In  this  we  must  be 
free  from  the  thought  that  it  is  possible,  or  necessary,  to 
destroy  all  of  the  hostile  infantry  positions.  The  question 
is,  during  the  development  of  the  hostile  attack,  to  select 
the  tactically  most  important  targets  such  as  infantry,  mor- 
tars, command  and  observation  posts,  support  trenches, 
bomb-proof  dugouts ;  to  fire  either  in  order  to  destroy  them 
or  else  prevent  their  occupation.  Daily  bombardment  of 
unoccupied  trenches  is  useless. 

The  artillery  defense  against  assault  is  by  pre-arranged 
mass  fire,  in  more  or  less  rigid  form,  annihilating  fire,  or 
barrage  fire.  Annihilating  fire  is  directed  against  the  rear 
echelons  of  the  attack,  if  possible  against  supports  of  the 
assault  troops ;  the  barrage  is  laid  down  on  the  enemy's  ap- 
proach lines  to  strike  down  the  advancing  infantry.  With- 
drawing barrage  fire  to  our  own  front  line  should  be  avoided 
due  to  the  fact  that  our  infantry,  at  the  moment  of  the  hos- 
tile assault,  must  be  saved  from  the  demoralizing  effect  of 
short  shots  coming  from  their  own  artillery.  Where  the 
hostile  trenches  are  only  a  short  distance  away  and  when 
artillery  cannot  cover  dead  angles  in  front  of  our  trenches, 
the  artillery  fire  is  replaced  by  trench  mortars  and  rifle  or 
hand  grenades.  In  these  cases,  the  artillery  directs  the  mass 
of  its  fire  in  rear  of  the  foremost  hostile  lines.  Trench  mor- 
tars are  under  the  command  of  the  artillery  to  insure  pro- 
per regulation  of  the  barrage.  When  the  opposing  trenches 
are  far  apart,  the  higher  commanders  prescribe  the  line  in 
No  Man's  Land  on  which  the  barrage  fire  is  laid ;  it  is  best 
to  have  this  line  where  natural  obstacles  will  delay  the 
enemy.  It  must  be  possible  to  lay  down  the  barrage  on  all 
parts  of  our  front  and  in  front  of  adjacent  sectors.  Should 
the  enemy  penetrate  into  our  position,  supporting  the  in- 
fantry fight,  is  difficult.  It  will  often  only  be  possible  to 
limit  the  amount  of  penetration  and  by  firing  gas  shells  at 


250  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  hostile  artillery  prevent  them  from  assisting  the  at- 
tack. A  mobile  artillery  reserve  is  of  great  advantage;  it 
is  brought  up  and  employed  as  prescribed  for  open  warfare. 

For  calculating  the  strength  of  the  artillery  we  have 
but  few  rules  to  go  by.  The  number  of  guns  required  is 
naturally  dependent  on  the  enemy's  artillery  strength,  but 
this  can  only  be  determined  by  its  effects.  It  is  then  usually 
too  late  to  provide  reinforcements.  In  such  cases,  we  would 
have  to  renounce  the  superiority  in  the  artillery  fight.  The 
strength  of  the  field  fortifications  also  has  a  material  effect 
as  to  the  strength  of  the  artillery.  The  weaker  our  position 
may  be  the  greater  should  be  the  proportion  of  guns.  The 
commander  must  start  from  a  definite  basis ;  it  is  never  pos- 
sible to  be  too  strong  in  artillery.  As  a  guide  it  was  pre- 
scribed that  for  each  400  meters  of  hostile  trench,  1  high 
angle  fire  battery  for  annihilating  fire  was  to  be  provided, 
and  that  the  barrage  fire  was  to  be  laid  down  by  machine 
guns,  light  trench  mortars  and  the  infantry.  For  destroy- 
ing 1  battery,  according  to  Par.  254  Battle  Regulations  for 
Artillery,  300  rounds  from  heavy  howitzers  or  200  rounds 
from  mortars  were  required ;  and  by  Par.  268,  same  Regula- 
tions, for  each  division  sector  at  the  commencement  of  the 
attack,  1  to  2  mortar  batteries;  2  to  3  heavy  howitzer  bat- 
teries and  1  to  2  heavy  gun  batteries  were  required  for  the 
artillery  battle.  Light  artillery  was  used  against  casual 
targets.  The  difficult  situation  of  our  troops  compelled  us 
to  operate  generally  with  materially  smaller  forces  than 
our  enemy.  Usually  in  quiet  sectors  for  each  kilometer  of 
front,  each  division  besides  its  9  light  batteries  had  2  to  4 
heavy  howitzer  batteries,  1  mortar  battery  and  2  heavy 
gun  batteries.  This  was  not  enough.  It  did  not  suffice  at 
all  and  besides,  the  division  sectors  were  generally  notice- 
ably wider  than  given  above. 

No  steps  had  been  taken  in  Germany  to  prescribe  a 
rule  for  the  occupation  of  a  battle  front  by  the  artillery. 
This  was  determined  by  the  strength  of  the  hostile  artillery 
and  the  method  of  conducting  the  battle.  In  active  sectors, 
when  an  attack  was  foreseen,  there  was  provided  for  about 
each  4  kilometers  front  (when  a  counter-attack  division  was 
provided  for  each  2  division  sectors  whose  artillery  was 


ARTILLERY  251 

available)  the  following  artillery  was  provided  for  each  kilo- 
meter of  front : 

3.5  to  5  light  gun  and  1  light  howitzer  batteries, 
1.5  to  2.5  heavy  howitzer  batteries, 
1  to  1.5  10-cm.  gun  batteries. 

This  made  a  total  for  a  4  kilometer  sector  of  14  to  20 
light  batteries,  6  to  10  heavy  howitzer  batteries,  and  4  to  6 
heavy  gun  batteries.  In  addition,  it  is  desirable  to  have  an 
artillery  reserve,  and  a  mobile  artillery  repair  shop  in  rear 
of  the  front. 

THE  OFFENSIVE 

The  first  attacks  were,  to  be  true,  erroneously  based  on 
destroying  the  hostile  artillery  in  preparation  lasting  many 
hours,  surprise  being  unobtainable.  Until  we  came  to  the 
point  of  neutralizing  the  hostile  artillery  at  the  moment  of 
the  assault,  when  we  decided  to  do  without  bomb-proof  cover 
for  the  battery  positions,  and  when  we  were  able  to  avoid 
range  finding  and  trial  shots  by  substituting  therefor  theo- 
retical calculations  based  on  daily  weather  conditions  and 
accurate  measurement  of  distances  between  battery  and  tar- 
get, then  only  could  the  high  command  count  on  the  possi- 
bility of  obtaining  surprise  for  the  decisive  action.  This  was 
made  the  easier  by  the  number  of  battery  positions  that 
had  been  constructed  along  the  entire  front  during  the 
years  of  war,  and  subsequently  by  the  introduction  of 
tanks. 

Batteries  designated  for  counter  battery  work  can  be 
kept  back;  the  artillery  employed  to  support  the  infantry 
assault  has,  however,  to  be  held  close  in  hand,  and  these 
should,  as  long  as  possible,  utilize  the  full  possibilities  of 
range  and  not  make  a  change  of  position,  especially  when 
a  counter-attack  may  require  artillery  support  for  the  in- 
fantry. Only  effective  support  will  keep  the  assault  going; 
as  a  matter  of  experience  the  infantry  only  gets  as  far  as 
its  artillery  fire  reaches.  As  a  general  rule  it  must  be  held 
that  the  artillery  preparation  should  be  as  short  as  possi- 
ble ;  with  one  blow  the  resistance  of  the  enemy  must  be  over- 
come. Almost  always  will  there  be  the  accessory  mission  of 
destroying  the  hostile  liaison  and  intelligence  communica- 
tions. 


252  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

Gas  shells,  which  at  the  close  of  the  war  were  loaded 
with  stronger  bursting  charges,  were  the  more  effective  as 
they  were  the  less  perceived  by  the  senses  (being  odorless 
and  colorless).  After  a  "green  cross"  bombardment  the 
terrain  can  again  be  entered  within  two  hours.  The  effect 
of  "yellow  cross"  gas  shell  is  noted  gradually  for  hours  and 
days,  the  effectiveness  continues  a  long  time  in  good  weather, 
especially  in  villages  and  woods. 

In  a  large  attack  for  penetration,  the  following  missions 
fall  to  the  artillery: 

1.  Destruction  and  neutralization  of  hostile  artillery  and 
trench  mortars. 

2.  Neutralization  of  the  hostile  trench  and  supporting  posi- 
tions. 

3.  Firing  on  reserves  and  rear  communications,  on  observa- 
tion and  command  posts,  parks,  balloons,  transportation  and 
munition  centers  in  rear  beyond  the  objective  of  the  attack. 

4.  Supporting  the  assai^t  by  a  rolling  barrage. 

5.  Accompanying  the  infantry  assault  with  infantry  guna 
and  light  artillery  to  break  up  local  centers  of  resistance  by 
direct  and  close  shell  fire. 

6.  Protecting  the  infantry  after  reaching  the  objectives  by  a 
•landing  barrage. 

7.  Repulsing  hostile  counter-attacks,  and  distant  approach 
of  reserves. 

For  counter  battery  work  at  the  beginning  of  the  at- 
tacks there  should  be  provided  for  each  division  sector  for 
observed  destructive  fire,  1  to  2  mortar  batteries,  2  to  3  heavy 
howitzer  batteries,  and  1  to  2  heavy  gun  batteries;  this 
number  must  be  reinforced  for  neutralization  of  the  hos- 
tile artillery  in  order  to  obtain  a  quicker  success.  Only  sel- 
dom will  the  general  situation  justify  a  delay.  It  is  better 
to  employ  over  the  entire  terrain  gas  shell  and  high  ex- 
plosive shells  to  neutralize  the  enemy's  activities.  In  gass- 
ing areas  the  quick  fire  guns  of  the  light  artillery  are  more 
suitable  than  the  heavier  projectile  from  the  bigger  guns. 
In  order  to  neutralize  1  hectare,  by  gas,  the  following  ammu- 
nition is  required : 

100  rounds  light  artillery,  or  60  rounds  light  howitzer,  or 
10-cm.  guns, 
25  rounds  heavy  howitzers, 
10  rounds  mortars. 

In  order  to  neutralize  by  gas  1  square  kilometer  from 
1  to  2  hours,  there  is  required  10  light  batteries,  17  10-cm. 
batteries,  12  heavy  howitzer  batteries  and  10  mortar  bat- 
teries.   If  the  enemy's  artillery  is  contained  in  a  zone  2000 


ARTILLERY  258 

meters  wide  and  800  meters  deep,  or  in  area  of  1.6  square 
kilometers  there  would  be  required  for  neutralizing  by  use 
of  gas: 

12  light  batteries  (of  which  6  batteries  have  not  previously 
fired) , 
3  light  howitzer  batteries, 

2  10-cm.  guns  batteries  (neither  having  previously  fired), 
5  heavy  howitzer  batteries  (1  to  open  fire  for  surprise  effect 
later). 

At  the  moment  of  the  assault  these  batteries  neutralize 
hostile  artillery  with  gas  and  high  explosive  shells.  In  this 
mission  attack  airplanes  can  greatly  assist  by  attacking  hos- 
tile batteries  with  machine  gun  fire,  and  by  bombing.  Single 
batteries  remain  available  for  the  second  period  as  surprise 
batteries,  waiting  for  the  attack  to  develop  in  order  not  to 
be  previously  known  to  hostile  barrage  batteries.  The  En- 
glish Regulations  for  the  defensive  against  a  strong  attack 
provided  for  special  "silent"  batteries ;  the  French  similarly 
provided  "dumb"  batteries. 

To  prepare  a  position  for  assault  for  each  100  meters 
of  front  penetration,  1  high-angle  fire  battery  is  needed. 
Places  which  are  not  to  be  assaulted  are  neutralized  by  the 
smaller  caliber  gun.  A  part  of  the  preparation  is  taken  over 
by  the  trench  mortars  with  1  heavy  or  1  medium  trench 
mortar  for  each  40  meters  front.  For  3  division  trench 
mortar  companies,  containing  all  kinds  and  including  12 
heavy  and  24  medium  trench  mortars,  with  10%  of  spare 
mortars,  a  front  for  penetration  of  1600  meters  can  be  as- 
signed, and  in  1  hour  they  can  fire  280  heavy  and  900  medium 
trench  mortar  bombs.  As  for  the  artillery,  where  the  second 
line  must  cover  neighboring  sectors,  they  must  cover  with 
their  fire  1200  to  1500  meters  of  the  front  to  be  penetrated. 
Details  cannot  be  given  here  without  considering  a  definite 
case  of  attack.  Par.  267,  Battle  Regulations  for  Artillery, 
prescribes  the  following  ammunition  as  required  for  the 
artillery  preparation  preparatory  to  an  assault: 

"In  about  3  hours  a  position  can  be  prepared : 

One  battery  One  line  of  trenches  Number  of 

width  in  meters  rounds 

Light  Howitzer 100  800 

Heavy  Howitzer,  Model  13 150  600 

Heavy  Howitzer,  Model  02 100  400 

Heavy  Howitzer,  Model  96 __ _     75  300 

Mortar  (3  guns  battery) 100  226 


254  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

"The  above  ammunition  includes  that  required  for  the 
destruction  of  bomb-proofs ;  also  for  the  destruction  of  ob- 
stacles which  are  not  more  than  30  meters  from  the  line 
of  trenches  fired  at.  Against  more  distant  obstacles,  special 
ammunition  and  time  must  be  allowed.  In  a  contrary- 
case  their  destruction  will  be  accomplished  through  the 
dispersion  of  shells  directed  at  the  trenches.  By  use  of 
flank  fire,  which  also  always  gives  a  moral  effect,  the 
amount  of  ammunition  prescribed  above  may  be  reduced  one- 
third.  Whether  all  the  lines  of  defense  of  a  position  are  neu- 
tralized simultaneously  or  successively  will  depend  upon  the 
number  of  available  batteries." 

There  will  be  required  for  example : 

3  light  batteries  each  covering  100  meters  front  firing  800 

rounds  each,  giving  a  total  of  300  meters  front  with  2400 
rounds. 
7  heavy  howitzer  batteries  each  covering  100  meters  front 
firing  700  rounds  each,  giving  a  total  of  700  meters  front 
and  4000  rounds. 

4  mortar  batteries  each  covering  100  meters  front  firing  400 

rounds  each,  giving  a  total  of  400  meters  front  and  900 
rounds. 

However,  this  number  of  batteries  alone  is  not  sufficient 
to  prepare  one  position  for  assault.  Adjacent  sectors  must 
also  as  far  as  possible  be  neutralized  by  use  of  gas  or  smoke 
in  order  to  prevent  them  from  using  enfilade  fire  or  making 
counter-attacks.  A  secondary  mission  is  the  firing  on  the 
positions  in  readiness  of  the  reserves,  lines  of  approach, 
command  and  observation  posts,  munition  dumps,  balloon 
ground  stations. 

As  the  main  point  of  defense  rests  not  in  the  less  easily 
found  intermediate  lines  but  in  the  less  conspicuous  built 
machine  gun  nests  between  lines.  General  Nivelle  in  1916 
introduced  the  rolling  barrage.  This  after  the  first  jump 
was  to  permanently  precede  the  infantry  at  the  rate  of  100 
meters  in  about  4  minutes  and  was  to  halt  for  a  time  be- 
yond designated  attack  objectives  as  a  standing  barrage. 
In  this  manner,  all  defensive  positions  in  the  entire  terrain, 
such  as  machine  gun  nests  are  effectively  neutralized  until 
the  infantry  with  their  own  weapons  can  attack  them  them- 
selves. Frontal  counter-attacks  should  be  broken  up  by  the 
barrage  fire.    But  it  is  necessary  that  the  infantry  should 


ARTILLERY  255 

closely  follow  the  rolling  barrage,  that  the  infantry  should 
not  stop  its  advance,  which  would  result  in  the  rear  lines 
over-running  the  front  lines,  nor  that  the  advance  should 
proceed  too  rapidly.  The  latter  case  is  the  most  unfavora- 
ble, as  then  the  positions  being  attacked  would  be  free  from 
fire  too  soon,  and  machine  guns  and  reserves  could  then 
undertake  a  counter-attack.  The  limit  for  the  rolling  bar- 
rage is  the  effective  fire  of  the  guns  which  is  about  4000 
meters.  This  requires  the  artillery  to  be  posted  immediately 
in  rear  of  the  line  of  departure,  and  then  that  the  batteries 
advance  rapidly  to  the  position  penetrated.  If  the  rolling 
barrage  is  to  provide  effective  protection  for  advancing  in- 
fantry, the  latter  must  adhere  exactly  to  the  prescribed 
program  and  closely  follow  the  points  of  burst  of  the  shells. 
Consequently,  it  follows  that  in  the  first  line,  gun  batteries 
are  most  suitable,  that  howitzer  shells  may  be  employed  as 
a  pace  marker  but  cannot  be  used  in  the  barrage  on  account 
of  the  backward  flight  of  the  splinters  of  their  shells.  In- 
fantry can  be  taught  to  overcome  the  fear  of  closely  follow- 
ing the  barrage  by  thorough  training,  in  which  at  the  start 
they  follow  the  barrage  to  one  side.  The  closer  the  infantry 
follows  the  better.  The  best  formation  to  follow  is  small 
narrow  columns,  so  as  to  reduce  losses  from  back  flying 
shell  splinters.  Attempt  to  regulate  the  advance  of  the 
rolling  barrage  by  the  advance  of  the  infantry  has  not  been 
successful. 

It  was  found  that  often  in  variable  terrain  the  rolling 
barrage  had  been  set  at  too  fast  a  speed,  so  that  it  got  away 
from  the  infantry  and  could  not  be  stopped.  It  therefore 
was  determined  that  ttie  barrage  would  advance  slowly  from 
one  line  to  another.  In  general  1  light  battery  is  needed 
for  100  meters  front. 

The  infantry  must  never  rely  on  rolling  barrage  alone, 
but  must  advance  through  the  strength  of  their  own  weap- 
ons. Especially  must  they  depend  on  the  infantry  accom- 
panying guns.  Each  regiment  of  infantry  has  at  least  1 
accompanying  battery  assigned  to  it,  which  is  entirely  de- 
tached from  the  artillery  command,  and  which  is  distributed 
among  battalions  by  sections  or  platoons,  each  gun  having 
2  caissons  filled  with  shells.    It  is  to  be  noted  that  the  guns 


256  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

of  reserve  battalions  are  given  2  extra  caissons  per  ^n  for 
replenishing  ammunition.  These  form  an  ammunition  sec- 
tion. Considering  the  great  demands,  selected  teams  must 
be  provided,  and  for  each  gun  and  each  caisson  at  least  6 
extra  horses  are  necessary. 

The  possibility  of  watering  the  horses  during  the  ad- 
vance must  not  be  lost  sight  of.  The  quickest  method  for 
crossing  trenches  is  to  fill  them  in.  The  battery  comman- 
der remains  with  the  infantry  regimental  staff,  but  may 
temporarily  join  his  guns.  Sending  junior  officers  to  in- 
fantry regimental  staffs  is  never  advisable,  as  they  may  not 
receive  the  same  respect,  and  may  have  less  tactical  train- 
ing and  experience.  The  battery  commander  will  recom- 
mend to  the  regiment  to  have  necessary  roads  marked  by 
streamers,  by  signs  or  by  paper  markers.  The  attacking 
infantry  cannot,  by  any  means,  be  called  on  to  furnish  labor 
detachments,  but  the  division  should  attach  at  least  1  pio- 
neer squad  to  each  gun  and  to  each  caisson.  For  each  man 
1  long  handled  shovel  or  1  pick  axe  is  required.  The  in- 
trenching tools  on  wagons  serve  as  a  reserve.  In  addition 
materiel  is  carried  along  for  camouflage  against  airplanes 
(wire  netting  is  too  heavy  and  too  rigid  to  shape) .  By  us- 
ing natural  cover  (as  for  example  shell-holes  for  the  teams) , 
and  guns  protected  by  camouflage  nets  against  airplanes, 
they  are  ready  to  have  teams  quickly  hitched  and  accom- 
pany the  attacking  infantry.  Occupying  a  position  in  readi- 
ness can  ordinarily  be  done  at  night  only  after  the  roads 
have  been  carefully  reconnoitered,  so  as  to  avoid  unnecessary 
fatigue  for  the  teams.  About  15  minutes  before  the  concen- 
tration or  assault  the  teams  are  hitched  up,  otherwise  the 
guns  will  only  be  left  behind.  Crossings  over  our  own 
trenches  (in  this  case  it  is  best  to  utilize  bridges  provided 
in  advance)  are  to  be  made  during  the  artillery  prepara- 
tion. Crossing  places  must  be  watched  by  details  and  kept 
in  proper  repair.  The  difficult  movement  across  shell  torn 
terrain  while  at  the  same  time  keeping  up  with  the  infantry 
behind  the  barrage,  is  hard  for  the  artillery. 

The  gun  commander  (to  be  generally  an  officer  when 
single  guns  are  detached  to  battalions)  remains  with  his 
vehicles,  and  sends  a  noncommissioned  oflicer  forward  to 


ARTILLERY  257 

the  battalion  to  prepare  timely  information  through  patrols 
of  machine  gun  nests  to  be  fired  at,  as  these  are  the  princi- 
pal targets.  Whether  it  is  practicable  to  fire  over  the  heads 
of  the  infantry  in  front  depends  on  the  situation ;  often  the 
infantry  on  pre-arranged  signals  will  have  to  clear  the  field 
of  fire  of  the  guns.  Fire  is  opened  only  when  the  infantry 
can  no  longer  advance  or  when  hostile  counter-attack  is 
noted,  or  when  tanks  start  to  attack.  Generally  the  fire  will 
be  at  short  ranges  and  from  open  or  partly  covered  posi- 
tions. Positions  from  an  elevation  above  that  of  the  in- 
fantry which  allow  of  direct  fire  without  danger  to  the  in- 
fantry are  especially  valuable.  A  caisson  is  unlimbered 
near  each  gun,  but  the  ammunition  is  not  removed  there- 
from so  that  no  loss  of  time  occurs  when  the  advance  is  re- 
sumed. The  following  dispositions  of  the  battery  are  gen- 
erally suitable : 

1.  The  battery  commander  with  his  special  detail  remains 
with  the  infantry  regimental  commander. 

2.  1  officer  and  1  nonconmiissioned  officer  is  with  each  gun, 
and  2  caissons  and  18  extra  horses  with  each  battalion  acting  as 
accompanying  artillery  in  the  front  line.  Battle  missions  are:  to 
support  the  infantry  in  the  first  line  against  machine  guns  and 
tanks. 

3.  With  the  reserve  infantry  battalion:  2  guns  and  6  cais- 
sons. Battle  missions:  advance  from  one  covered  position  to 
another  prepared  to  defend  against  coimter-attacks. 

The  light  ammunition  column  must  plainly  mark  its 
position;  agents  sent  to  the  rear  by  batteries  to  obtain 
ammunition  are  to  be  directed  to  guide  caissons  to  their 
batteries. 

The  losses  in  personnel  of  accompanying  batteries  have 
been  relatively  small,  while  the  loss  in  animals  has  been 
often  very  great,  without,  however  (thanks  to  providing 
suflicient  reserve  horses),  interfering  with  the  mobility  of 
the  artillery  vehicles. 

The  inconvenience  during  the  advance  of  the  infantry 
in  the  rolling  barrage  becoming  gradually  thinner,  can  only 
be  overcome  by  the  timely  advance  of  the  artillery.  This 
then  gives  a  second  artillery  approach  march  having  the 
following  features:  early  special  reconnaissance  and  air 
observation,  bringing  forward  and  installing  the  artillery 
position  finding  troops  and  providing  artillery  orientation, 
observation  service,  firing  positions  and  the  quick  construe- 


268  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tion  of  lines  of  communication,  the  re-establishment  of  the 
battery  stations,  orienting  battery  positions  and  aiming 
points,  selecting  targets,  and  determining  ranges  and  organ- 
izing the  meteorological  service  for  the  artillery.  So  far  as 
concerns  a  new  prepared  attack:  drawing  up  the  orders 
for  the  development  and  advance  of  the  batteries,  the  am- 
munition supply  and  location,  the  battle  missions  for  single 
guns,  barrage  tables,  etc. 

All  the  foregoing  tasks  are  supervised  by  the  division 
in  accordance  with  instructions  from  higher  authority  and 
the  preparations  are  to  be  completed  before  the  first  pene- 
tration. The  carrying  out  of  the  order  must  proceed  as 
soon  as  the  first  line  stops,  without  waiting  for  information 
and  decisions  as  to  further  intentions.  If  reconnaissance, 
range  finding,  etc.,  proves  to  be  premature,  or  unnecessary 
on  account  of  the  attack  continuing  forward  or  because  the 
attack  has  been  discontinued,  the  fact  that  the  artillery  for- 
mation has  been  changed,  etc.,  is  of  no  importance;  it  is 
better  to  start  these  preparations  early  rather  than  too 
late.  The  systematic  carrying  out  of  missions  must  not  be 
interfered  with  by  unnecessary  rapidity  of  movements. 

Altogether  the  artillery  for  an  attack  on  a  division 
sector  whose  zone  of  action  was  2  kilometers  wide  is  as  fol- 
lows: 

I 
I     I  I 

3  ^  S           :;           a:  :? 
Neutralizing  hostile  artil- 
lery with  gas 6  3                                        8  0 

Surprise  batteries  (may 
also  be  used  for  firing 

gas)    6  0  2            0            10 

Standing  barrage  fire 0  0  4            2            0  0 

Artillery  for  preparatory  fire  0  5  0            0            7  4 

Accompanying  artillery 3  1  0            0            0  0 

Total     15  9  6  2  16  4 

We  thus  have  for  each  division  sector  24  light  bat- 
teries, 8  heavy  howitzers,  and  2  mortar  battalions  with  26 
batteries.    Altogether  52  batteries.    Before  the  World  War 


ARTILLERY  259 

no  one  of  us  thought  of  the  amount  of  ammunition.  Orders 
for  the  deployment  of  artillery,  for  its  occupation  of  posi- 
tions, and  for  furnishing  ammunition  could  be  developed 
only  gradually.  In  1917  the  English  for  1  division  sector, 
with  a  zone  of  action,  2  kilometers  wide,  had  artillery  of  3 
divisions,  24  light  batteries  and  33  heavy  batteries.  Luden- 
dorff  provided  for  each  kilometer  front  of  attack  20  to  30 
batteries,  that  is  for  a  division  zone  of  action  40  to  60  bat- 
teries. Generally  in  most  battles  3  divisions  were  posted, 
one  in  rear  of  the  other,  each  provided  with  13  to  20  bat- 
teries. The  question  as  to  the  proportion  of  the  artillery 
is  no  longer:  "How  many  guns  for  each  thousand  men 
should  be  provided  ?"  but  far  rather :  "How  much  infantry 
will  be  required  to  utilize  the  success  of  the  fire  of  the  ar- 
tillery?" But  is  not  the  infantry  still  the  principal  arm  as 
heretofore?  It  is  no  use  to  argue  this  matter.  General 
Ludendorff  writes  in  his  memoirs:  "The  artillery  suffered 
as  much  as  the  infantry.  The  longer  the  war  lasted,  the 
greater  were  its  losses  in  the  defense  as  well  as  in  the  at- 
tack ;  it  became  more  and  more  the  bearer  of  the  burdens  of 

the  battlefield  and  the  hold-fast  of  the  front It 

is  right  not  to  dispute  the  question  that  the  infantry  is  the 
main  arm.  There  are  no  longer  principal  arms.  Each  arm 
has  its  use,  all  are  necessary." 


XII.     The  Year  1918 

TRANSITION  FROM  POSITION  TO 
MOBILE  WARFARE 

The  year  1917  finally  brought  the  campaign  in  Russia 
to  an  end.  The  troops  relieved  there  furnished  the  means 
for  an  offensive  in  the  West,  in  which  the  experiences  gath- 
ered concerning  the  penetration  battles  in  Eastern  Galicia, 
on  the  Diina,  in  Roumania  and  in  Upper  Italy  found  excel- 
lent use.  The  general  situation  demanded  the  offensive, 
which  the  troops  also  greatly  desired.  "In  the  same  meas- 
ure in  which  the  defense  depressed  the  troops,  the  offensive 
raised  their  morale.  In  defense  the  army  had  finally  to  suc- 
cumb to  the  hostile  superiority  in  men  and  munitions  of 
war,  while  the  offensive  had  always  been  the  strongest  role 
of  the  army."  The  attack  is  the  most  powerful  form  of  war, 
and  brings  the  decision;  and  a  modern  defensive  battle  is 
far  more  costly  than  the  attack.  With  a  superiority  of 
from  25  to  30  divisions  over  the  enemy,  the  offensive  could 
be  started. 

When  thus  the  situation  of  the  German  armies  de- 
manded the  offensive,  the  principal  question  could,  however, 
be  only  that  of  a  penetration,  considering  the  extensive  of 
the  hostile  front,  from  which  action  there  could  follow  later 
on,  in  case  of  a  favorable  decision,  an  enveloping  attack  of 
the  separated  hostile  wing. 

The  penetrating  attack  had  been  about  rejected  in  Ger- 
many prior  to  the  war  as,  of  course,  it  was  harder  to  start 
and  harder  to  execute,  and  certainly  furnished  smaller  re- 
sults than  an  enveloping  battle  as  Count  Schlieffen  had  de- 
scribed it  in  his  "Cannae"  procedure.  From  the  ill-fated  pene- 
tration at  Liaoyan  it  was  concluded :  "The  ill-success  only 
furnishes  proof  that  with  modem  fire  effect  and  modern  field 
fortifications  tactical  penetration  has  little  hope  of  success." 

The  question  as  to  whether  in  the  selection  of  the  point 
of  attack  strategic  demands  should  be  placed  above  tactical 
requirements, — the  affirmative   being   demanded    by    the 

260 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  261 

"Criticism  of  the  World  War"  but  denied  by  Ludendorff — 
cannot  be  discussed  here.  I  agree  with  Ludendorff  in  his 
statement:  "Tactics  should  have  been  placed  above  mere 
strategy.  Without  tactical  success  strategy  could  not  be 
accomplished.  Strategy  which  does  not  think  of  tactical 
success,  is  condemned  in  the  very  start  to  failure.  Numer- 
ous examples  for  this  were  furnished  by  the  attacks  of  the 
Entente  in  the  first  three  years  of  the  war." 

In  the  penetration  we  could  attempt  to  break  in  at  a 
favorable  point  for  maneuver,  to  annihilate  the  reserves 
streaming  together  here,  and  to  bring  to  an  end  through  this 
victory  the  operation  in  the  quickest  possible  way;  or,  we 
could,  through  operations  intended  to  deceive,  draw  the  re- 
serves away  from  the  decisive  point,  and  utilize  our  super- 
iority in  numbers  to  enlarge  the  tactical  entry  and  to  con- 
duct the  final  battle  against  the  gradually  appearing  re- 
serves. Brussilow  adopted  this  procedure  in  Eastern  Asia, 
his  false  operations  extending  to  the  lower  Diina,  his  pene- 
tration starting  on  the  right  wing  of  the  attack  zone  and 
then  continuing  south.  A  German  counter-attack  broke 
the  Russian  offensive. 

The  German  leadership  selected  the  first,  and  shorter 
road,  as  it  hoped ;  it  had  learned  by  experience  how  very  diffi- 
cult it  is,  in  view  of  the  great  development  of  aerial  fighting 
forces  to  deceive  the  hostile  leadership  by  trying  to  execute 
double  attacks  separated  in  time  and  space.  Preparations 
for  further  attacks  took  place  along  the  entire  front,  as  well 
as  feints  on  a  smaller  scale.  The  German  leadership  had 
made  its  decision ;  all  it  had  to  do  now  was  to  see  that  the 
attacks  would  not  come  to  a  standstill  at  strong  hostile  posi- 
tions. Did  the  forces  suffice  to  have  a  second  attack  imme- 
diately follow  the  first  ?  "It  will  be  a  giant  struggle,"  writes 
Ludendorff,  "commencing  at  one  point,  continuing  at  another 
and  which  will  take  a  long  time." 

However,  the  infantry  had  a  far  different  value  than 
had  the  infantry  with  which  we  executed  the  offensive  at 
the  opening  of  the  World  War.  Battalions  and  companies 
were  commanded  by  young,  for  the  greater  part  by  very 
young,  officers  who  probably  had  had  by  then  experiences 
in  the  field,  but  who  still  lacked  those  qualities  which  had 


262  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

formed  the  strength  of  our  officers  in  peace.  Thoroughly- 
trained  to  meet  all  situations,  indefatigable  in  their  care  for 
the  subordinates,  an  example  in  danger  as  well  as  in  endur- 
ing fatigue  and  hardships,  our  old  oflEicers'  corps  was  the 
best  proof  of  the  correctness  of  our  peace  training.  The 
difficulties  of  filling  up  the  gaps  in  our  officers  forced  us  to 
husband  our  trained  officers  and  to  cut  out  a  "leader  reserve" 
prior  to  each  battle.  But,  nevertheless,  there  still  was  ex- 
cellent spirit  in  the  ranks,  and  the  men  followed  their  lead- 
ers in  full  confidence.  Of  course,  the  training  was  no  longer 
the  same,  as  we  could  not  accomplish  in  six  months  what  had 
taken  two  years  in  time  of  peace,  which  was  especially  true 
of  the  use  of  the  rifle  as  a  firearm  and  as  a  shock  arm.  The 
troops  were  younger,  and  added  to  the  lack  of  training  was 
the  fact  that  the  youthful  recruits  were  neither  fully  de- 
veloped physically  nor  trained.  The  youthful  recruits,  who 
had  grown  up  without  the  parental  influence  because  their 
fathers  were  in  the  field,  were  spoiled  by  high  wages  and 
manner  of  living,  and  were  lacking  in  morale  as  well. 

METHODS  OF  HOSTILE  DEFENSE  AND 
GERMAN  OFFENSIVE 

On  the  Allied  side  an  attack  on  a  grand  scale  was  ex- 
pected— but  by  no  means  before  April.  Just  as  was  the 
case  with  us,  the  decrease  in  moral  value  of  the  troops  was 
felt  by  the  Allies.  In  Regulations  for  the  Defense  the  En- 
tente sought  development  of  the  then  accepted  German 
views  in  adopting  the  mobile  defense.  The  leader  was  to 
designate : 

1.  Whether  the  attack  was  to  be  accepted  in  the  first  or  the 
second  position,  or, 

2.  Whether  the  attack  was  to  be  avoided,  in  order  to  launch 
a  well-prepared  powerful  counter-attack  during  the  enemy's  ad- 
vance, and,  at  the  time  that  he  would  not  have  the  support  of  his 
artillery,  or, 

3.  Whether  voluntary  retreat  should  take  place  to  a  position 
in  rear,  to  profit,  at  some  other  jwint,  by  the  delay  the  enemy's 
attack  would  encounter  in  such  a  movement. 

The  condition  of  all  works,  badly  shot  to  pieces,  was 
accepted  as  a  fact  that  could  not  be  helped,  and  thus  we 
declined  to  keep  up  a  defense  of  "trunk"  lines,  which  the 
troops  up  to  this  time  regarded  as  a  prerequisite  for  a  sue- 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  263 

cessful  defense.  After  a  protracted  drum  fire  the  only 
question  could  be  of  tenaciously  holding  a  few  critical  points ; 
these  the  commanders  attempted  to  establish  inconspicu- 
ously under  mutual  fire  support;  the  trenches  situated  be- 
tween them,  with  strong  obstacles,  were  to  divert  the  atten- 
tion of  the  enemy  from  the  combat  groups,  which,  grouped 
behind  or  beside  each  other,  were  consolidated  into  strong 
points  in  company  sectors,  and  these  latter  again  into  bat- 
talion centers  of  resistance.  The  trenches  were  only  for 
the  purpose  of  facilitating  communication  in  quieter  times. 
A  battle  group,  usually  of  the  strength  of  half  a  platoon, 
consisted  of  1  machine  gun  with  some  artillery  observers, 
riflemen,  and  hand  and  rifle  grenade  throwers.  In  this 
manner  formation  in  depth  and  an  intermediate  terrain 
defense  had  been  prepared,  the  importance  of  which  we, 
as  attackers,  found  out  to  our  cost.  Special  weight  was 
laid  on  the  counter-attack  and  flanking  fire  was  specially 
recommended  for  the  reason  that  it  would  in  this  manner 
be  possible  to  save  rifles.  Only  one  general  difference  from 
the  German  Regulations  was  adopted,  in  this  case  the  me- 
dium and  heavy  flat- trajectory  guns  with  the  corps  artil- 
lery and  a  few  high-angle  fire  batteries  remained  under  the 
orders  of  corps  headquarters,  which  latter  thus  retained 
control  of  fighting  the  hostile  artillery.  The  divisions  kept 
only  their  field  artillery,  the  stationary  tank  defense  guns 
and  a  few  high-angle  fire  batteries.  We  will  point  out  here, 
that,  on  the  part  of  the  enemy,  the  flat-trajectory  artillery — 
different  with  us  since  we  had  a  preference  for  batteries — 
was  preferred  for  tactical  and  technical  reasons  (minor 
weight  of  gun,  less  powder  charge). 

The  divisions  occupied  sectors  of  from  2  to  4  kilome- 
ters breadth;  first  and  second  positions  were  separated  by 
a  distance  of  from  6  to  8  kilometers,  so  that  in  any  case  the 
attacker  would  be  compelled  to  again  deploy  his  artillery. 
The  main  fighting  trench  is  the  most  important  work  of  any 
defensive  position ;  security  detachments  are  placed  in  front 
of  it,  and  in  rear  lies  the  parallele  de  soutien  at  a  distance 
of  about  200  meters  as  an  exit  for  counter-attacks.  Within 
the  trench  were  bombproof  shelters  capable  of  defense,  while 
in  the  main  fighting  trench  there  were  small  shelters.    The 


264  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

construction  of  deeper  and  stronger  bombproof  s  in  the  main 
fighting  trench  was  prohibited.  Besides  the  connecting 
trenches,  inter-locking  trenches  and  intermediate  lines  were 
constructed,  as  well  as  numerous  rallying  points  indepen- 
dent of  the  trenches.  In  front  of  the  batteries  was  an  artil- 
lery protective  position  consisting  of  strong  points  connected 
by  trenches.  False  positions  and  protection  against  aerial 
reconnaissance  were  specially  valued. 

The  fire  activity  had  almost  completely  discarded  the 
retaliation  fire ;  the  stationary  barrage  fire  was  left  mainly 
to  the  infantry  auxiliary  arms;  greater  importance  was 
assigned  to  the  daily  destruction  and  annihilation  fire  (coun- 
ter preparation)  in  which  the  minenwerfers  participated. 
High  angle  fire  was  directed  against  fortifications,  fighting 
positions,  observation  positions,  bombproofs  and  crossings 
of  trenches ;  batteries  were  attacked  by  flat- trajectory  guns ; 
routes  of  approach  stopped  by  machine  guns.  The  defen- 
sive method  demanded  tenacious  resistance  on  the  part  of 
all  detachments  and  also  of  the  ones  that  had  been  dispersed, 
so  that  points  of  resistance  sprang  up  which  could  cause  the 
attack  confusion  and  thereby  prepare  the  success  of  counter- 
attacks. Reserves  that  were  not  designed  for  counter-at- 
tacks, according  to  the  defensive  plan,  prepared  themselves 
for  defense  just  where  they  happened  to  be.  "It  is  impor- 
tant that  the  reserves  remain  in  readiness  for  emplojnnent 
at  the  places  originally  designated." 

The  German  commanders  distinguished  between  at- 
tacks with  a  limited  objective  (for  purpose  of  bettering  the 
position,  relieving  the  main  attack  through  deceiving  the 
enemy),  and  the  penetrating  battle  which  could  develop  af- 
ter entry  into  the  hostile  position  into  the  battle  of  maneu- 
ver. In  spite  of  extensive  preparations  the  penetrating  at- 
tempts on  the  part  of  the  enemy  had  come  to  a  standstill 
after  the  relatively  easy  beginnings ;  the  German  penetra- 
tion was  based  on  the  maxim  that  the  hostile  artillery  had 
to  be  taken  the  first  day.  This  required  an  entry  of  at 
least  10  kilometers.  Emphasis  was  laid  on  the  great  value 
of  surprise.  The  extensive  preparations  for  attack  could, 
however,  hardly  be  hidden  from  the  hostile  aerial  observers 
and  this  information  was  augmented  by  statements  of  de- 
serters and  prisoners  (and  for  that  reason,  we,  as  well  as 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  265 

our  enemies,  stopped  all  minor  attack  operations  prior  to  the 
battle).  Though  we  received  in  this  manner  timely  know- 
ledge of  each  hostile  attack,  we  had  to  assume  that  the 
enemy  received  the  same  in  regard  to  our  intentions.  To 
keep  the  operation  secret  as  well  as  strict  control  of  the 
troops  in  shelter,  on  the  march,  in  deploying  and  in  the  ser- 
vice of  communication,  remained  one  of  the  most  important 
tasks  of  leadership. 

The  Battle  of  the  Somme  had  furnished  an  illustration 
of  the  slow  "eating  through"  process  of  a  stabilized  situa- 
tion ;  the  longer  this  took  the  more  time  the  defender  gained 
for  his  counter-measures.  That  had  to  be  avoided  at  all 
cost.  After  the  first  entry,  quick  attack  was  essential  so  as 
not  to  allow  the  enemy  to  come  to  his  senses.  The  hostile 
attacks  never  were  able  to  progress  beyond  the  fire  zone 
of  their  own  artillery  fire ;  thus  the  attack  fell  through.  A 
deeper  entry  could  have  been  accomplished  only  by  rapidly 
advancing  the  artillery,  inserting  reserves,  relieving  the 
shock  troops  from  the  care  for  the  flanks  and  rear,  and  then 
the  utilization  of  tanks. 

While  the  regulations  of  the  Allies  laid  emphasis  on 
the  necessity  of  depth  formation  and  narrow  fronts  in  at- 
tack, we  sought  to  find  the  proper  mean  between  the  de- 
mand for  the  pressure  of  fresh  forces  from  the  rear  (nar- 
row front)  and  the  possibility  of  advantageously  posting 
the  artillery,  as  well  as  the  necessity  for  assigning  to  each 
division  in  the  first  line  a  good  road  for  bringing  UP  supplies 
(broad  battle  fronts).  From  this  it  resulted  that  it  was 
not  considered  correct  in  a  deep  attack  to  obtain  less  than 

2  kilometers'  breadth  of  a  battle  front  for  the  division,  while 
in  an  attack  with  a  limited  objective  the  breadth  could  be 

3  kilometers.  Even  with  a  decrease  of  numerical  force  a 
battle  breadth  of  2  kilometers  was  found  not  to  be  to  large, 
as  the  power  of  fire  arms  had  been  materially  increased  and 
as  the  gun  carriers  in  the  first  line  were  designated  to  util- 
ize fire  effect.  But  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  number  of 
rifles  decreased  too  much  we  had  to  limit  ourselves  to  hold- 
ing the  enemy  and  first  gaining  terrain  supported  by  the 
progress  of  a  stronger  neighbor.  The  necessity  was  per- 
ceived furthermore  of  disregarding  some  single  well  forti- 
fied supporting  points,  around  which,  we  had  learned,  pro- 


266  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

tracted  fighting  would  ensue  and  holding  them  down  for 
the  present  and  taking  them  later  on  by  an  attack  from 
flank  or  rear.  As  was  the  practice  in  Eastern  Galicia  and 
on  the  Isonzo,  it  was  believed  to  be  advantageous  to  conduct 
the  attack  so  that  preparations  were  made  on  a  large  scale 
in  the  earliest  assignment  of  the  troops  for  an  envelop- 
ing attack  against  single  supporting  points.  In  the  further 
development  of  this  thought,  not  all  parts  of  the  hostile 
position  were  to  be  attacked  equally,  but  the  center  of 
gravity  was  to  be  laid  on  such  points  the  possession  of  which 
had  to  be  decisive  in  the  further  conduct  of  the  battle. 

Two  to  three  division  sectors  were  placed  under  one 
corps  headquarters;  in  the  second  and  third  line  followed 
divisions  for  relief,  to  be  inserted  after  the  leading  troops 
had  expended  their  force.  The  thought  of  placing  them 
under  the  orders  of  the  leading  division  was  rejected,  as 
that  method  would  merely  have  hastened  their  premature 
use.  They  were  to  remain  as  a  reserve  in  the  hands  of  the 
highest  commander.  Their  insertion  in  any  case  was  pro- 
per only  where  the  attack  made  good  progress.  As  we  had 
learned,  taking  full  advantage  of  a  success  best  helped  the 
troops  that  had  remained  behind  or  even  had  suffered  re- 
verses. In  any  case  they  had  to  be  kept  close  at  hand,  but 
did  not  need  to  reach  the  assault  terrain  until  the  very  day 
of  the  assault. 

Based  on  our  experiences  it  was  deemed  correct  to  have 
a  strong  artillery  preparation  lasting  for  about  two  hours, 
with  a  full  utilization  of  gas.  A  shock-like  fire  preparation 
might  well  be  suited  for  minor  or  medium  operations,  but 
attack  without  fire  preparation  could  be  successful  only 
under  specially  favorable  conditions.  Carefully  thought 
out  distribution  of  tasks  for  the  artillery  and  minenwerfers 
as  well  as  separation  of  targets  was  required.  Minenwerfers 
were  placed  under  the  orders  of  the  artillery  and,  on  account 
of  their  limited  range,  directed  their  fire  only  on  the  near- 
est trenches,  especially  on  obstacles. 

The  longer  the  artillery  fight  lasts,  the  harder  will  it 
be  to  accomplish  surprise;  the  more  difficult  will  it  be  to 
protect  the  assaulting  troops  in  their  places  of  readiness. 
The  artillery  fight  commences  at  dark,  so  that  the  infantry 
can  start  the  assault  in  the  early  morning  hours  after  a 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  267 

powerful  bombardment  of  the  hostile  position.  We  must 
prove  in  every  case  how  few  guns  we  require  for  the  artil- 
lery action  and  how  many  can  be  employed  to  prepare  the 
hostile  positions  for  the  assault.  We  must  avoid  creating 
spaces  near  the  trenches  which  suffer  nothing  from  the 
bombardment  and  into  which  the  enemy  may  withdraw.  The 
major  battles  have  shown  that  the  defensive  power  is  by 
no  means  broken  by  changing  the  trenches  into  a  field  of 
shell-holes ;  but  the  hostile  morale  is  most  surely  destroyed 
by  creating  fire  pauses,  then  advancing  the  fire  and  finally 
bringing  a  burst  of  fire  back  upon  the  point  to  be  entered. 
It  is  entirely  wrong  (as  the  French  and  British  did)  to  cre- 
ate the  conviction  in  the  infantry  that  through  this  fire  it 
would  be  saved  from  close  range  fighting;  this  kind  of 
fighting  can  only  be  shortened  and  made  easier. 

After  the  position  has  been  entered,  the  infantry  de- 
mands : 

1.  Artillery  support  in  the  position  when  overcoming  the 
hostile  resistance  (machine  gun  nests  and  rall3nng  points)  by  at- 
taching about  1  accompanying  battery  per  regiment. 

2.  Fire  protection  during  the  advance, — "Creeping  barrage." 
A  further  success  lies  only  in  the  rapid  advance — commencing 
with  the  entry — of  an  artillery  wave,  with  teams  hitched,  that 
has  been  kept  back  for  that  purpose,  and  the  entire  force  of 
teamed  minenwerfers.  The  difficulties  of  the  ground  have  to  be 
overcome  and  proper  steps  taken  to  prevent  the  roads  from  get- 
ting blocked  up.  It  is  also  necessary  to  bring  forward,  besides 
the  artillery,  mortars  and  long  range  10-cm.  guns. 

3.  If  the  infantry  has  reached  the  objective  of  the  attack,  the 
creeping  barrage  changes  into  a  stationary  barrage  (which  gra- 
dually decreases  and  is  again  called  for  at  places  of  counter-at- 
tack). 

4.  Until  the  forward  movement  is  resumed,  the  fire  activity 
of  the  artillery  is  to  be  regulated  according  to  the  points  of  view 
of  defense;  advancing  reserves  are  to  be  kept  off  and  counter- 
attacks, as  soon  as  perceived,  are  to  be  annihilated  by  timely 
action. 

The  artillery  receives  a  very  material  support  by  the 
attack  squadrons  and  the  observation  airplanes  of  the  aerial 
fighting  forces. 

The  deeper  the  entry  is  to  be  made,  the  earlier  must 
the  time  for  the  assault  be  fixed.  It  depends  on  the  time 
required  for  artillery  preparation  whether  the  infantry 
leaves  the  assault  position  prior  to  the  artiUery  fire  during 
the  night  or,  in  case  a  longer  artillery  preparation  is  planned, 
during  the  artillery  fire.    Losses  by  hostile  artillery  fire  have 


268  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

to  be  reckoned  with  in  the  latter  case.  It  is  unfavorable  if 
the  preparations  extend  over  several  days;  for,  in  spite  of 
all  destructive  artillery  fire,  the  enemy  can  recuperate  dur- 
ing the  night  and  shift  his  forces.  The  longer  the  artillery 
preparation,  the  more  favorable  for  the  attack.  "Placing 
the  assault  infantry  in  readiness  is  the  first  crisis  of  the 
attack."  Danger  lies  in  a  too  extensive  crowding  together 
of  men,  which  increases  the  difficulties  of  hiding  all  noises 
in  movements  and  which  increases  the  losses  in  sudden  fire. 
Complete  clearness  must  obtain  concerning  the  procedure 
in  case  the  enemy  has  perceived  the  position  in  readiness 
and  attempts  to  destroy  it.  The  commander  must  regulate 
exactly  what  equipment  the  troops  are  to  carry.  The 
troops  are  placed  in  readiness  in  very  compact  formation 
to  rapidly  run  under  the  barrage  fire,  and  assumes  depth 
formation  only  during  the  advance.  If  infantry  is  placed 
in  readiness  in  great  depth  formation  the  first  lines  must 
be  made  especially  strong,  as  we  have  to  reckon  with  the 
rear  waves  being  cut  off  by  sudden  barrage  fire,  and  the 
leading  waves  in  that  case  must  be  strong  enough  to  force 
the  decision.  Whether  the  infantry  attack  is  to  be  executed 
in  thin  lines  or  in  lines  of  squads  must  be  carefully  con- 
sidered in  each  instance.  If  the  enemy's  resistance  is  strong, 
each  line  of  trenches  will  as  a  rule  consume  the  attack 
power  of  one  wave,  so  that  the  number  of  attack  waves 
should  be  fixed  by  the  number  of  lines  of  trenches  to  be 
taken;  but,  in  no  case,  must  the  leading  wave  halt  at  the 
first  trench;  what  can  proceed  forward,  must  keep  on  till 
the  attack  objective  is  reached.  As  the  opponent  will  no 
longer  occupy  his  trenches  in  a  dense  battle  line,  we  might 
eliminate  the  entry  in  a  dense  skirmish  line.  In  this  man- 
ner the  entry  in  close  swarms,  in  "shock-squads"  was  de- 
veloped. But  we  cannot  do  at  all  without  a  skirmish  line 
as  a  battle  formation ;  formation  into  shock  squads  is  merely 
a  makeshift.  In  the  skirmish  line,  supervision  is  easier; 
the  skirmish  line  facilitates  the  greatest  deployment  of 
fire  power.  The  skirmish  line  must  be  formed  prior  to  the 
time  that  the  entrenched  terrain  is  reached.  More  impor- 
tant than  the  formation  of  a  definite  attack  procedure  is 
the  celerity  of  the  advance.  Infantry  must  become  accus- 
tomed to  having  machine  guns  fire  over  its  heads  and  also 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  269 

through  gaps  between  detachments.  But  by  this  manner 
of  advance,  the  question  has  also  been  answered  whether 
troops  are  to  advance  in  long  or  short  rushes.  As  long  as 
possible  the  walk  is  continued,  and  only  when  the  enemy's 
fire  becomes  effective,  are  short,  irregular  rushes  taken  by 
squads  and  individuals.  The  farther  off  the  attack  objec- 
tive, the  less  attention  will  be  paid  to  the  trench  garrison; 
they  are  captured  by  the  "mopping-up"  detachments.  It 
would  be  an  error  for  the  leading  line  to  move  toward  a 
flank  to  assist  a  neighboring  detachment ;  that  would  merely 
promote  the  loss  of  the  march  direction.  Only  succeeding 
troops  engage  in  action  towards  the  flank,  and  minor  de- 
tachments may  be  successful  by  a  mere  attempt  to  do  so. 
The  farther  the  attacking  troops  have  gotten  beyond  the 
attack  objective,  the  more  effective  has  been  their  shock, 
and  the  less  chance  of  meeting  a  new  front.  The  number  of 
machine  guns  must  be  brought  into  consonance  with  the 
number  of  rifles ;  to  1  platoon  of  40  men  2  automatic  rifles 
would  generally  be  attached,  and  a  materiel  reserve  should 
be  held  out,  in  addition.  "The  automatic  rifle  was  and  had 
to  be  (considering  its  fire  power  as  against  that  of  a  rifle) , 
the  main  and  increasing  reliance  of  the  infantry  fire  fight, 
especially  as  it  was  improved  in  design.  This  is  not  to  say 
that  the  riflemen  must  not  fire, — to  the  contrary,  the  great- 
est value  was  laid  on  such  action."  (Ludendorff.)  Machine 
guns  are  to  provide  permanent  fire  protection  for  the  in- 
fantry. A  few  machine  gun  companies  are  placed  in  ambush 
prior  to  the  infantry  start,  while  the  others  advance  with 
the  infantry  to  quickly  reach  important  firing  positions, 
which,  in  position  warfare,  can  easily  be  reconnoitered  in 
advance.  Single  machine  guns  serve  for  airplane  defense. 
Light  minenwerfers  which  are  made  mobile  for  the  attack 
and  also  for  direct  fire  during  the  advance  are  attached  to 
the  battalions  for  attacking  strong  objectives. 

Simultaneous  breaking  forth  of  the  assaulting  infantry, 
entry  immediately  behind  the  last  projectiles  fired  into  the 
position — generally  with  time  fuse — then  in  one  rush  pierc- 
ing to  the  attack  objective,  was  always  found  effective.  After 
reaching  the  attack  objective  measures  must  be  immediately 
taken  for  warding  off  a  counter-attack,  and  the  infantry 


270  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

given  stability  by  mobile  minenwerfers  and  artillery.  Rapid 
attack  can  frequently  cause  positions  farther  off  to  fall. 

Regimental  headquarters  must  make  arrangements  for 
bringing  along  the  accompanying  guns,  must  arrange  for 
locating  the  bearer  squads,  regulate  the  police  service,  sup- 
ply of  ammunition  for  machine  guns  (in  belts),  for  rifles, 
grenade  rifles,  light  minenwerfers  and  hand  grenades.  It 
is  the  duty  of  division  headquarters  to  regulate  the  move- 
ments of  the  combat  trains.  Telephone  communication  to 
brigade  and  artillery  headquarters  remains  of  special  im- 
portance, as  well  as  wireless.  Connection  between  regi- 
mental headquarters  and  the  battalions  is  generally  had 
by  runners  and  dogs,  but  an  attempt  to  establish  communi- 
cation by  light  signals  must  not  be  abandoned. 

THE  SPRING  OFFENSIVE 

All  conditions  for  the  success  of  the  planned  offensive 
battle  had  been  met.  Information  of  the  insertion  of  the 
18th  Army  (v.  Hutier)  between  the  2d  (v.  d.  Marwitz)  and 
the  7th  Army  (v.  Bohn),  the  creation  of  numerous  flying 
fields  and  troop  camps  in  the  vicinity  of  Laon  had  of  course 
not  escaped,  since  March  4,  1918,  the  observance  of  the  hos- 
tile aerial  reconnaissance,  but  had  not  been  sufficiently 
evaluated  by  the  hostile  command.  In  reserve,  the  defender 
had  16  British  and  35  French  divisions.  General  Foch  as 
president  of  the  Supreme  War  Council  made  preparations 
for  the  organization  of  a  reserve  army  of  30  to  60  divisions, 
but  declined  to  get  ahead  of  the  German  attack  by  an  offen- 
sive on  his  part.  There  were  probably  6  divisions  of  Ameri- 
cans present,  but  still  under  training.  During  the  night  of 
March  18-19th  two  Lorraine  deserters  went  over  to  the 
French  and,  as  was  ascertained  later,  betrayed  the  German 
intentions.  The  evening  of  March  20th  the  concentration 
was  completed.  Though  the  fine  spring  weather  in  the  sec- 
ond and  third  week  of  March  had  favored  reconnaissance, 
the  screening  had  not  yet  been  successful.  Great  thanks 
is  due  the  aerial  fighting  forces;  they  increased  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  hostile  aerial  reconnaissance  while  they  them- 
selves took  many  photographs  of  positions  in  rear;  and, 
continually  watching  over  the  traffic  in  the  terrain  in  rear, 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  271 

could  report  their  impression  that  the  enemy  did  not  expect 
an  attack.  The  infantry  could  be  instructed  by  means  of 
the  aerial  photos  of  all  details  of  the  position  to  be  assaulted, 
of  each  machine  gun  and  of  each  minenwerf er  location.  In 
the  second  half  of  the  month  rainy  weather  softened  the 
fields  and  the  roads,  and  with  sorrow  did  the  assaulting 
troops  watch  the  fog  roll  down  during  the  night  of  March 
21st.  But  the  high  command  insisted  on  the  execution  of 
the  attack. 

The  attack  along  the  70-kilometer  front  by  the  17th 
Army  (Otto  v.  Below),  the  2d  Army  (v.  d.  Marwitz)  and 
the  18th  Army  (v.  Hutier) ,  started  principally  north  of  the 
junction  between  the  French  and  the  British,  was,  at  that 
time  and  at  that  place  a  complete  surprise,  as  an  attack  was 
not  thought  of  before  April  in  the  terrain  of  the  Somme  bat- 
tle which  offered  such  unfavorable  conditions  after  the  re- 
treat into  the  Siegfried  position.  The  British  commander- 
in-chief  was  home  in  England.  It  was  the  task  of  the 
shock  troops  to  pierce  through  the  three  main  lines  of  the 
British  position  system  to  a  depth  of  from  12  to  15  kilome- 
ters. As  the  17th  and  2d  Armies  advanced  from  the  bend 
of  the  Cambrai  arc  in  southwesterly  direction,  and  the  18th 
Army,  on  the  other  hand,  advanced  westward,  a  concentric 
attack  resulted,  which  was  brought  into  a  straight  line  dur- 
ing the  course  of  the  first  movements  by  the  18th  Army 
pushing  sharply  ahead  and  by  the  stubborn  resistance  of- 
fered by  the  British  Army  in  the  north. 

At  4:40  A.M.  March  21st, — that  is  when  it  was  still 
completely  dark — ^the  artillery  battle  opened  along  the 
entire  front  between  Croisilles  and  La  Fere  with  gas  and 
high  explosive  shells.  At  and  after  6 :40  A.M.,  the  concen- 
trated fire  of  the  short  range  battle  groups  swept  the  3 
British  positions.  The  failure  to  find  a  gradual  weakening 
of  the  positions  through  days  of  effective  fire  had  to  be  off- 
set by  a  doubled  energy  of  the  fire  wave  lasting  for  3  hours. 
The  incomparable  shock-power  of  the  infantry  (which  broke 
forth  at  9  A.M.)  was  so  instrumental  in  securing  success 
that,  in  spite  of  fog  and  mud,  the  second  hostile  position  was 
reached  the  evening  of  the  first  day  of  battle  and  partly  cap- 
tured and  partly  over-run.  The  foremost  trenches  were 
taken  comparatively  easily  by  the  deep-formed  phalanx 


272  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

under  cover  of  the  fog ;  at  the  most  difficult  points,  such  as 
the  south  exits  of  the  city  of  St.  Quentin,  flocks  of  tanks 
reinforced  the  momentum  of  the  shock.  Thereafter,  how- 
ever, a  net  work  of  numerous  supporting  points  had  to  be 
overcome  with  the  help  of  machine  guns,  minenwerfers  and 
batteries.  The  fog,  though  it  had  materially  favored  sur- 
prise, now  increased  the  difficulties  of  orientation,  and  slack- 
ened the  rate  of  the  attack.  At  many  points  in  the  after- 
noon, when  the  weather  had  cleared,  and  when  our  pursuit 
and  battle  squadrons  threw  themselves  on  the  enemy,  we 
had  to  wait  for  the  arrival  of  the  field  artillery  working  its 
way  under  unbelievable  difficulties  through  the  bottomless 
mud  of  the  terrain  (which  was  merely  a  mass  of  shell-cra- 
ters) ,  in  order  to  overcome  stronger  bulwarks. 

Most  of  the  airplane  detachments  moved  their  flying 
fields  to  correspond  with  the  progress  of  the  action  forward, 
some  of  them  even  to  places  heretofore  used  by  the  enemy's 
airplanes.  The  captive  balloons,  without  being  drawn  down, 
followed  the  infantry  at  4  to  5  kilometers  distance  and  con- 
stantly reported  to  higher  headquarters  the  course  of  the 
action.  Anti-aircraft  guns  were  brought  close  in  rear  of  the 
foremost  infantry  line  to  fire  on  low  flying  battle  airplanes, 
and  there  found  opportunity  to  accomplish  good  results 
against  the  fleeing  infantry  and  other  ground  targets  at 
short  range.  In  the  first  days  the  hostile  battle  airplanes 
found  little  opportunity  for  counter-attack. 

The  shock  between  the  Scarpe  and  the  Oise  struck  the 
British  9th  Division  on  the  front  line  with  the  8th  Infantry 
Division  and  the  3d  Cavalry  Division  behind  it.  At  the 
time  the  British  3d  Army  in  the  north  (Byng)  made  a  stand 
in  the  face  of  the  attack  by  the  17th  Army,  the  resistance 
of  the  5th  Army  (Gough)  broke  quickly  and  entirely  un- 
expectedly. An  unsuccessful  counter-attack  was  started 
on  the  22d  by  foot  troops  without  artillery  support,  who  were 
brought  up  by  autos  from  the  vicinity  of  Senlis  and  Com- 
piegne  and  who  belonged  to  the  French  9th  and  10th  In- 
fantry Divisions  and  1st  dismounted  Cuirassier  Division, 
supported  by  the  25th  Infantry  Division  from  the  vicinity 
of  Chauny.  During  the  evening  of  the  22d,  the  Army  of 
Hutier  had  broken  through  the  third  hostile  position,  while 
the  17th  Army  (Otto  v.  Below)  rested  in  front  of  the  Brit- 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  273 

ish  3d  position.  The  evening  report  of  the  23d  read :  "We 
are  fighting  in  a  line  about  north  of  Bapaume,  Peronne  and 
Ham."  The  penetration  had  been  successful  as  well  as  the 
pursuit  connected  with  it;  and  thus  the  dead  point  of  all 
previous  penetrating  battles  had  been  overcome.  During 
the  night  of  the  24th  Bapaume  fell;  the  day  after,  Noyon; 
in  vain  did  the  55th  Infantry  Division,  hurriedly  brought 
from  Paris,  attempt  to  ward  off  fate  there.  Farther  north, 
around  Cambrai,  the  British  troops  also  gave  way.  The 
French  forced  to  insert  their  divisions  as  they  came  up,  were 
thrown  into  the  general  retreat.  "The  support  of  our  bat- 
tle airplanes  was  specially  effective  during  the  infantry  at- 
tacks on  Bapaume  and  in  the  charge  against  Ferme  la  Mai- 
sonnette at  Peronne  which  had  been  attacked  before.  At 
Albert  they  attacked  fleeing  columns  with  bombs  and  fired 
more  than  80,000  rounds  from  machine  guns.  Our  bomb- 
ing squadrons  continued  night  after  night  the  fight  against 
the  lines  of  communications,  the  troop  shelters,  and  the 
flying  fields  of  the  enemy.  In  the  attack  against  railroad 
stations  behind  the  front  they  frequently  flew  at  altitudes 
of  less  than  100  meters.  Hits  in  the  midst  of  railroad  works 
and  on  trains  and  heavy  explosions  and  conflagrations  were 
the  result  of  their  audacity.  In  the  three  nights  after 
March  25th  a  total  of  100,000  kg.  of  explosives  was  thrown 
down." 

The  most  important  event  of  the  day  was  the  final  ap- 
pointment of  Foch  as  commander-in-chief  of  the  Allies. 
Countershocks  by  British  divisions  brought  from  Flanders 
made  themselves  felt.  A  counter-attack  on  a  large  scale 
started  by  Foch  encountered  a  rapidly  formed  new  German 
front  Mondidier — Lassigny — Noyon.  The  French  reserves 
had  been  held  back  to  the  fullest  extent,  since  the  German 
progress  was  naturally  not  so  clearly  defined  as  in  the  first 
days.  The  German  front  had  approached  within  15  kilome- 
ters of  Amiens.  The  gap  between  Ancre  and  Oise  was  closed 
by  British  reserves  and  by  the  army  under  Fayolles  brought 
from  Flanders.  A  continuation  of  the  attack  which  had 
been  expected  by  the  Allies  did  not  take  place,  so  that  the 
Allies  on  April  4th  advanced  from  Amiens  to  an  attack, 
which,  however,  had  no  success. 


274  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

In  the  very  first  days  of  the  attack  the  Army  Group 
commanded  by  the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia  which  had  been 
designated  to  carry  forward  the  attack  of  the  2d  and  17th 
Armies  in  the  direction  of  Albert  and  Abbeville  had  15  divi- 
sions, which  were  quite  fresh  yet,  but  of  the  second  and 
third  line.  But  the  High  Command  held  the  view  that  to 
succeed  quickest  was  to  attack  where  the  enemy  had  given 
way  easiest.  It  was  indisputably  confirmed  that  the  hostile 
resistance  was  stronger  than  our  power.  A  battle  of  attri- 
tion ought  not  to  have  been  fought.  This  was  precluded  by 
our  strategical  as  well  as  tactical  situation.  The  High  Com- 
mand had  to  come  to  the  exceedingly  grave  decision — in  con- 
junction with  all  headquarters  concerned — to  definitely  stop 
the  attack  on  Amiens.  At  the  same  time,  while  the  atten- 
tion of  the  Entente  was  completely  engaged  at  Amiens,  on 
the  opposite  wing,  on  April  6th,  the  7th  Army  started  the 
offensive  and  was  enabled  to  bring  its  right  wing  to  the 
Ailette  and  to  the  Aisne — Oise  canal  by  the  battles  at  Au- 
rigny  and  Coucy-le-Chateau. 

The  indicated  shifting  of  the  British  Flanders  reserves 
and  the  expectation  of  finding  along  the  Flanders  front  less 
efficient  units  (Portuguese)  or  even  tired  out  divisions,  was 
(in  addition,  the  possibility  of  exerting  a  pressure  on  the 
British  communications  leading  from  the  canal  ports) ,  the 
inducement  for  a  new  attack  in  Flanders.  Unfortunately, 
we  lacked  fresh  forces  to  execute  the  shock  with  full  vigor. 
April  9th  the  6th  Army  (v.  Quast)  attacked  on  the  line 
Festubert — Armentieres,  not  bothering  with  the  latter  place 
in  the  start,  which  later  on,  on  the  12th,  fell  into  our  hands. 
This  time  there  was  a  short  preparatory  fire  from  4:15  to 
8 :45  A.M.,  then  excellent  artillery  support  for  the  infantry, 
so  that  most  of  the  enemy's  machine  guns  were  unable  to 
get  into  action.  As  early  as  10:00  A.M.,  the  third  position 
of  the  enemy  was  taken.  The  difficulties  encountered  in 
the  completely  sodden,  shell-cratered  terrain,  appeared  al- 
most insurmountable,  but  we  succeeded  on  the  first  day  in 
bringing  up  several  heavy  guns,  though  after  unbelievable 
labor.  Early  on  the  10th,  the  4th  Army  (Sixt  v.  Armin) 
commenced  the  attack  under  the  same  difliiculties  farther 
north  between  Armentieres  and  HoUebeke,  while  in  the 
next  few  days  the  6th  Army  gained  more  ground  in  the 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  275 

direction  of  Hazebrouck  and  Hollebeke,  so  that  between  the 
16th  and  18th  our  successes  in  the  Ypres  arc  made  them- 
selves felt  also  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Yser.  On  April  21st 
the  number  of  prisoners  taken  was  117,000,  1550  guns  had 
been  captured  and  more  than  200  tanks.  The  amount  of 
ammunition,  subsistence,  supplies,  and  equipment  captured 
could  not  even  be  calculated.  In  the  course  of  4  weeks  the 
British  not  only  lost  what  they  had  gained  in  the  half-year 
battles  on  the  Somme  and  the  rest  of  their  success  at  Cam- 
brai,  but  also  about  two-thirds  of  the  terrain  they  had 
bought  so  dearly  in  16  battles  in  Flanders.  On  April  25th 
the  battles  ceased  by  the  well  planned  and  brilliantly  exe- 
cuted capture  of  Kemmel.  Had  headquarters  arrived  in  time 
on  the  hill,  continuation  of  the  attack  would  have  been  pos- 
sible before  the  hostile  reserves  could  come  up.  German  pa- 
trols had  reached  without  danger  the  Scherpenberg,  while 
the  troops  occupied  a  very  unfavorable  line  which  they  had 
been  ordered  to  hold.  Thus  we  contented  ourself  with  the 
mere  capture  of  a  comer  pillar  of  the  important  Flanders 
position.  "The  attack  fulfills  its  purpose  as  long  as  it  causes 
the  enemy  more  damage  and  loss  than  it  does  ourselves. 
That  is  always  the  case  in  the  first  stages  of  a  successful 
surprise  attack.  Here  the  main  point  is  to  engage  the  enemy 
without  fear  of  losses,  but  not  neglecting  fire  support  and 
fire  preparation.  The  commander  must  determine  whether 
the  effect  of  the  hostile  reserves  is  becoming  stronger.  If 
that  is  the  case,  the  attacks  must  gradually  become  more 
systematic ;  strong  artillery  preparation  with  plenty  of  am- 
munition develops  more  and  more  until  the  transition  to 
defense  on  the  part  of  the  victor  becomes  realized.  By  his 
insufficiently  prepared  'counter-shocks'  and  counter-at- 
tacks the  opponent  will  suffer  material  losses  in  the  face  of 
a  skillful  defense,  while  we  save  our  forces.  With  us  the 
question  hardly  ever  is  to  gain  terrain  at  any  price.  We 
must  strike  down  the  enemy ;  we  must  save  ourselves.  Our 
military  feeling  must  in  this  regard  become  even  firmer; 
we  are  inclined  to  attack  in  the  later  days  of  an  attack  with 
entirely  too  insufficient  means  and  are  inclined  to  fight  for 
the  purpose  of  gaining  ground,  which  is  entirely  immaterial 
to  the  whole  situation."     (Reference — High  Command  on 


276  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

June  9,  1918.)  In  these  expressions  lies  the  entire  system 
of  our  battles  in  1918. 

Our  new  method  of  attack  had  been  still  farther  de- 
veloped. It  consisted  in  surprise,  by  short,  powerful  artil- 
lery preparation  directed  on  single  points  and  in  rapid  ad- 
vance of  the  infantry  with  co-operations  of  its  auxiliary 
arms. 

On  March  21st  the  principal  question  was  of  an  attack 
that  had  been  planned  by  Great  General  Headquarters  in 
quietness  and  with  the  utmost  care;  in  its  fortunate  exe- 
cution the  German  troops  struck  newly  organized  fronts,  or 
fronts  that  were  still  under  construction.  Every  delay  in 
time  might  bring  the  success  of  the  undertaking  into  ques- 
tion; the  subordinate  commanders  had  to  act  quickly  and 
independently,  and  General  Headquarters  had  to  bring  the 
different  operations  into  consonance  with  the  whole.  3  to  5 
divisions  had  been  placed  under  the  orders  of  Corps  Head- 
quarters; 2  to  3  of  these  divisions  were  to  execute  the  at- 
tack in  the  first  line,  under  proper  artillery  support,  as  long 
as  possible.  The  attack  frontage  of  2  kilometers  proved  too 
narrow  in  most  cases  for  properly  leading  the  division  and 
therefore  an  extension  to  3  kilometers  was  recommended. 
Strong  resistance  was  to  be  overcome  by  inserting  more  ar- 
tillery but  not  by  increasing  the  density  of  the  infantry, 
which  would  only  increase  the  losses.  20  to  30  batteries 
were  inserted  per  kilometer.  Their  effect  was  supplemented 
by  medium  and  heavy  minenwerf  ers.  The  artillery  attached 
to  the  divisions  by  the  war  organization  tables  was  rein- 
forced in  most  cases  by  a  second  field  artillery  regiment, 
one  or  more  heavy  field  howitzer  battalions  and  1  mortar 
battery.  If  the  reinforcing  artillery  was  taken  away  from 
some  one  division,  then  arrangements  had  to  be  made  to  have 
that  artillery  return  at  the  proper  time  to  its  own  division. 
The  Group  (army  corps)  had  the  disposition  of  a  number  of 
field  batteries  of  the  army  artillery,  heavy  field  howitzer 
battalions,  mortars,  and  heavy  flat-trajectory  batteries, 
which  were  attached  to  the  division  in  the  front  line  ac- 
cording to  requirements.  Assigning  such  artillery  was  to 
be  kept  within  limits,  so  as  not  to  create  specially  difficult 
conditions  by  the  insertion  of  an  unweildy  mass.  The  num- 
ber of  guns  had  to  be  brought  into  proper  consonance  with 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  277 

the  increase  of  the  ammunition  supply.  "Too  many  guns 
in  relation  to  the  amount  of  ammunition  is  very  bad.  The 
fighting  power  of  troops  is  lessened,  not  increased,  since 
the  difficulties  of  leadership  are  increased  by  the  volum- 
inous carriages  and  vehicles  of  the  numerous  guns,  which 
cannot  be  properly  used.  And  probably  what  the  troops 
need  more  is  denied  for  that  very  reason." 

Success  of  the  attack  does  not  lie  in  the  number  of  in- 
fantry units  inserted,  but  in  the  manner  of  artillery  pre- 
paration and  the  immediate  utilization  of  the  moral  impres- 
sion created  by  our  fire  effect  and  in  the  use  of  the  auxil- 
iary arms  (machine  guns,  light  minenwerfers,  flame  throw- 
ers and  accompanying  guns)  that  accompany  the  infantry. 
We  had  but  very  few  tanks,  and  could  do  without  their  as- 
sistance. The  German  industries  could  have  constructed 
a  sufficient  number  of  tanks  by  neglecting  other  means  of 
fighting.  We  adopted  a  tank  gun  (13-mm.)  which  unfor- 
tunately was  very  heavy  and  required  two  men  to  handle. 
Important  services  were  performed  by  battle  airplanes. 
Technique  now  also  had  the  same  importance  as  tactics  and 
psychology. 

The  machine  gun  had  become  the  main  arm  of  infan- 
try and  formed  the  skeleton  of  each  battle  formation.  A 
fifth  machine  gun  was  now  furnished  the  companies.  The 
skirmish  line  takes  a  back  seat  now  in  the  fire  fight ;  we  had 
absolutely  broken  with  the  meaning  of  a  "powerful  skirmish 
line"  with  which  we  entered  war  under  other  conditions.  In 
the  start  great  objection  was  put  forth  against  this  inova- 
tion ;  for  in  the  first  battles  the  skirmish  lines  were  still  too 
dense.  "Overcoming  machine  gun  nests  had  caused  diffi- 
culties beyond  expectation  at  many  points  and  delayed  our 
attack.  The  independence  of  our  infantry  squad  had  been 
found  wanting  frequently,  as  well  as  its  co-operation  with 
the  auxiliary  arms.  It  had  become  especially  difficult  for 
the  troops  to  form  again  for  defense  after  the  completion 
of  an  attack  and  especially  to  perceive  that  a  continuation 
of  the  attack  could  have  no  further  success."  But,  in  the 
end,  the  number  of  men  carrying  rifles  will  determine  the 
result.  It  is  questionable  if  that  number  might  not  decrease 
too  much ;  "the  danger  is  the  greater  because  a  weaker  unit 
requires  the  same  administrative  staff,  same  number  of  in- 


278  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

formation  troops,  and  same  train  as  that  of  a  stronger  unit, 
but  has  only  a  smaller  number  of  rifles.  It  was  necessary  to 
consider  whether  it  would  not  be  best  to  overcome  this 
difficulty  by  consolidating  two  divisions."  Another  diffi- 
culty was  the  new  attack  method.  Heretofore  the  entire 
attacking  space  was  filled  with  dense  skirmish  lines.  Battle 
leadership,  which  had  to  pay  attention  only  to  the  hostile 
skirmishers,  or  at  most  to  a  few  machine  guns,  was  rela- 
tively simple.  Everybody  went  straight  for  the  objective. 
At  the  present  day,  however,  there  can  be  no  thought  of 
an  equal  distribution  of  the  infantry  in  the  terrain.  The 
troops  divide  according  to  the  breadth  and  depth  into  sub- 
detachments  and  lose  themselves  in  the  terrain — ^but  all 
must  work  toward  one  objective.  The  auxiliary  arms  also 
demand  depth  formation;  if  they  are  once  let  out  of  hand, 
the  infantry  will  soon  be  unable  to  get  forward.  The  new 
method  of  attack  puts  especially  high  demands  on  the  sub- 
ordinate leaders.  If  these  give  out,  the  attack  stops ;  here- 
tofore we  could  carry  it  forward  again  by  inserting  strong 
skirmish  lines  led  as  units.  But  this — and  therein  lies  the 
danger — no  longer  is  possible  in  the  new  method,  which 
expresses  itself  in  a  slow  forward  movement  in  overcom- 
ing hostile  centers  of  resistance.  It  will  be  the  main  task 
of  battle  training  from  now  on  to  assure  rapid,  decisive 
co-operation  between  the  separated  portions  within  the 
whole  of  the  battle  action. 

Infantry  advances  in  files,  in  swarms,  as  "shock  squads" 
or  in  skirmish  line ;  its  fire  power  lies  in  the  machine  guns 
and  light  minenwerfers,  the  protection  of  which  it  assumes. 
Overcoming  hostile  machine  gun  nests  takes  much  time. 
Frontal  attack  leads  to  nothing.  In  view  of  the  checker- 
board like  distribution  of  the  nests  and  in  consideration  of 
the  strength  of  the  supporting  points,  attacks  from  flank 
and  rear  were  but  seldom  possible;  the  use  of  gas  proved 
useful;  the  troops  also  soon  learned  to  estimate  the  value 
of  the  rifle  grenades  adopted  from  the  French  system.  Diffi- 
cult situations  arose  when  machine  gun  nests  were  discov- 
ered too  late,  so  that  their  attack  could  not  be  prepared  un- 
der cover,  and  when  the  accompanying  guns  had  heavy  losses 
before  they  could  fire  even  a  single  shot.  The  accompany- 
ing guns  were  able — even  if  only  slowly — to  follow  up  the 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  279 

infantry  by  the  help  of  pioneers  and  laborers,  being  partially 
protected  by  gas  masks.  Proper  attention  also  has  to  be 
paid  to  watering  the  animals  during  the  advance. 

Finally  the  infantry  storms  the  terrain  stUl  held  by 
the  enemy,  but  adheres  to  its  depth  formation  until  entry 
of  the  enemy's  position  and  then  seeks  to  re-establish  that 
depth  formation  immediately  after  reaching  the  attack  ob- 
jective— generally  toward  the  front.  It  has  not  always 
been  easy  for  infantry  to  regain  this  depth  formation.  De- 
tachments in  rear  take  over  the  fire  protection  against  coun- 
ter-attacks and  secure  the  flanks  or  turn  to  the  side  to 
help  the  neighbor. 

The  commander  endeavors  to  achieve  surprise  with  all 
means  at  hand.  Though  success  is  accomplished  in  hiding 
the  attack  preparations  from  the  enemy  by  well  thought 
out  orders,  strict  discipline  and  development  of  oral  exam- 
inations and  instructions  of  all  concerned,  it  is  by  no  means 
assured  that  the  enemy  will  not  receive  a  warning  of  the 
storm  about  to  break  through  statements  of  deserters.  But 
the  statements  of  single  prisoners  can  hardly  ever  give  a 
complete  picture ;  they  are  usually  received  so  late,  that  the 
leader  can  utilize  them  but  seldom,  even  disregarding  the 
fact  that  false  statements  are  mixed  up  with  true  state- 
ments, and  that  probably  no  credence  will  be  given  to  the 
true  ones.  It  was  impossible  to  stop  communication  between 
the  army  and  home,  "the  mania  for  talking  and  boasting, 
so  inherent  to  the  Germans,  brought  the  most  important 
and  most  secret  things  to  the  knowledge  of  the  press  and 
consequently  also  to  the  knowledge  of  the  enemy." 

If  we  must  count  absolutely  on  the  defense  of  a  "fore- 
ground," it  may  be  of  advantage  to  take  possession  of  that 
foreground  even  before  the  assault  and  to  gas  more  effec- 
tively those  hostile  batteries  that  fire  standing  barrages  dur- 
ing the  advance. 

The  infantry  attacks  under  protection  of  the  creeping 
barrage  which  advances  in  lifts  of  about  200  meters  each, 
at  the  rate  of  40  to  50  minutes  per  kilometer.  In  spite  of 
the  slow  progress  of  the  creeping  barrage  it  has  in  many 
cases  outstripped  the  infantry;  it  also  proved  to  be  too 
rigid,  to  correspond  to  the  progress  of  the  infantry.  The 
danger  was  very  great  that  in  disruption  of  the  barrage, 


280  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

some  batteries  would  fire  on  our  own  infantry.  It  was  of 
course  entirely  out  of  the  question  to  bring  a  creeping  bar- 
rage back,  as  the  location  of  the  infantry  could  not  be  defin- 
itely shown  to  the  artillery.  If  the  infantry  was  able  to 
follow  close  at  the  heels  of  the  barrage,  it  could  in  most 
cases  over-run  the  hostile  machine  gun  nests  and  support- 
ing points  before  the  latter  could  become  effective.  But  if 
the  barrage  continued  its  way  and  outstripped  the  infantry, 
then  the  latter  was  obliged  to  break  the  stubborn  resistance 
of  the  enemy  with  its  own  means — accompanying  guns  and 
teamed  minenwerfers.  The  infantry  must  never  come  to 
believe  that  its  very  existence  lies  within  the  creeping  bar- 
rage. The  existence  of  infantry  much  rather  rests  in  the 
fighting  value  of  the  troops  and  the  skillful  utilization  of 
its  auxiliary  arms.  The  desire  for  more  accompanying  ar- 
tillery was  heard  everjrwhere ;  in  many  cases  a  96-mm.  gun 
battery  (the  16-cm.  was  too  heavy)  and  1  platoon  of  light 
field  howitzers  were  attached  to  the  regiments,  and  single 
guns  with  several  caissons  to  the  battalions.  Often  heavy 
field  howitzers  were  desired.  It  was  quite  natural  that  the 
regiments  finally  received  in  addition  to  their  accompany- 
ing batteries  an  artillery  group  consisting  of  2  96-mm.  gun 
batteries  and  1  light  and  1  heavy  field  howitzer  battery, 
while  the  rest  of  the  artillery  remained  at  the  disposal  of 
the  divisions.  This  was  correct  as  the  regiments  because 
of  their  gradually  decreasing  effective  strength  (companies 
frequently  had  but  three  men  carrying  rifles)  were  required 
to  cover  materially  greater  spaces  with  the  number  of  rifles 
available.  Due  to  these  broad  attack  sectors,  the  battle 
generally  resolved  itself  into  partial  fights  which  were  con- 
ducted by  "mixed"  regiments  in  the  front  line.  The  divi- 
sion commander  was  able  to  bring  his  influence  to  bear  on 
the  battle  only  through  his  reserve  regiment  and  his  artil- 
lery. This  dissolution  of  the  attack  into  partial  fights  was 
an  unavoidable  and  bad  feature  which  had  to  be  abandoned 
when  the  situation  permitted  systematic  attack  or  defense. 
The  first  step  in  that  direction  was  to  deprive  the  regiments 
of  their  artillery. 

After  the  position  is  entered,  the  divisional  artillery 
is  brought  up ;  and,  to  avoid  congesting  the  roads  all  vehicles 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  281 

that  can  be  spared,  even  the  field  kitchens,  must  be  kept 
back. 

RESUMING  THE  OFFENSIVE 

The  German  offensive  in  Flanders  had  succeeded  in  at 
least  one  object;  it  had  contained  strong  hostile  forces,  it 
had  filled  the  enemy  with  fear  for  his  canal  ports  and  had 
aroused  the  last  remnants  of  the  Belgian  state.  It  is  pro- 
bable that  it  did  have  a  farther  reaching  objective.  Based 
on  the  recommendations  of  the  Army  Group  commanded  by 
the  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  Great  General  Headquarters 
first  sought  a  success  in  the  attack  in  front  of  the  1st  and 
7th  Armies,  and  then  to  again  transfer  the  decisive  attack 
there  as  soon  as  the  first  attack  had  had  its  effect  on  the 
situation  in  Flanders.  Though  prisoners  taken  on  May  25th 
and  26th  had  divulged  everything  they  knew  concerning  the 
time  and  place  of  the  attack,  the  attack  of  the  7th  Army  on 
June  27th  at  the  Chemin  des  Dames  and  farther  east  to 
Brimont  was  very  successful;  in  conjunction  with  the  1st 
Army  (Fritz  v.  Below)  it  was  able  to  accomplish  the  cap- 
ture of  the  heights  of  Reimes  and  Epemay.  The  French 
high  command  had  ordered  early  readiness  for  gassing  and 
had  placed  its  reserves  (13th  Infantry  Division)  on  the 
heights  between  the  Aisne  and  Vesle. 

At  4:40  A.M.,  on  the  27th,  after  a  short  artillery  pre- 
paration, the  German  troops  broke  forth  to  the  attack  from 
their  positions  between  Landricourt  and  Brimont.  The  at- 
tack struck  battle-worn  British  divisions,  which  lost  about 
15,000  prisoners,  and  then  encountered  several  fresh  French 
divisions.  As  early  as  the  first  day  of  the  attack  a  depth 
of  18  kilometers  was  reached  inside  of  the  hostile  position  by 
the  irresistable  center  of  the  attack.  In  the  next  few  days 
the  wings  of  the  attack  could  not  keep  up  with  the  advanc- 
ing center.  On  the  3d  day  of  battle,  Soissons  was  taken,  the 
number  of  prisoners  increased  to  35,000;  on  May  30th  the 
Mame  was  reached  south  of  La  Fere  en  Tardenois,  the 
number  of  prisoners  being  45,000;  and,  on  the  31st  heavy 
battles  took  place  near  Soissons. 

The  French  leadership  saw  the  cause  of  its  defeat  in 
the  error  of  having  deployed  all  its  batteries  in  a  single  line, 
so  that  the  artillery  was  annihilated  in  a  short  time;  in 


282  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

addition,  the  French  did  not  utilize  the  advantage  to  get 
ahead  of  the  recognized  German  artillery  preparation  by 
a  timely  counter-preparation.  It  was  quite  different  in  the 
succeeding  battles  1  The  leaders  abandoned  the  rigid  hold- 
ing of  terrain,  and  evacuated  portions  of  the  position  when 
it  was  impossible  to  lay  a  barrage  to  100  to  150  meters  in 
front  of  its  own  line.  Such  positions  show  themselves  to 
be  untenable.  Untenable  positions  are  defended  only  when 
it  is  absolutely  unavoidable.  It  is  an  advantage  only  if  the 
new  position  is  not  exposed  to  the  destructive  fire  of  the 
light  artillery  and  minenwerfers,  so  that  a  new  deploy- 
ment of  the  artillery  becomes  necessary.  The  troops  should 
fight  in  a  position  of  their  own  selection,  not  in  one  selected 
by  the  enemy. 

From  June  6th  the  two  new  front  line  positions  of  the 
Germans,  Chateau  Thierry — ^Villers  Cotterets — Noyon  and 
Chateau  Thierry — Dormans — Reims  were  under  the  des- 
perate counter-attacks  of  the  enemy  but  the  situation  did 
not  change.  The  Army  Group  commanded  by  the  German 
Crown  Prince  had  taken  up  to  June  6th;  55,000  prisoners 
(of  these,  1500  officers)  650  guns  and  more  than  2000  ma- 
chine guns. 

A  fourth  German  offensive  shock  by  the  18th  Army 
with  four  corps  (9th,  v.  Ottinger,  62d,  v.  Webem;  8th,  v. 
Scholer;  28th  Reserve  Corps,  Hoffman),  led  to  the  Battle 
of  the  Matz  between  Mondidier  and  Noyon,  with  the  deter- 
mined intention  to  take  the  forest  terrain  of  Compiegne 
which  possessed  permanent  danger  for  the  Germans.  It 
was  a  rare  coincidence  that  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
French  3d  Army,  General  Humbert,  claims  to  have  had  in- 
formation as  early  as  June  4th  (the  orders  of  the  attacker 
were  dictated  only  that  day) .  It  is,  of  course  true  that  the 
army  had  expected  an  attack  here  since  the  end  of  May 
and  had  sought  by  all  means  to  prevent  a  surprise.  A  deep 
foreground  had  been  ordered,  defended  by  many  machine 
guns,  from  which  the  guns  were  at  the  proper  time  with- 
drawn. The  first  position,  the  foreground,  was  said  to  be 
strongly  defended  by  8  divisions  disregarding  the  existence 
of  a  second  position.  This  first  position  was  to  be  the  exit 
point  for  counter-attacks  of  the  corps  reserves.    The  10th 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  283 

Division  of  the  army  reserve  was  to  be  brought  with  its 
leading  elements  as  far  as  the  second  position. 

The  German  attack  was  to  be  started  by  gas  shell  fire, 
but  in  1  division  of  1000  throwers  only  150  could  be  placed 
into  position  because  of  strong  destruction  fire,  and,  of 
these,  70  were  destroyed. 

The  attack  preparations  commenced  at  12 :50  A.M.  with 
a  surprise  fire  of  gas  and  bursting  projectiles  lasting  10 
minutes  against  the  main  hostile  batteries,  observation  and 
command  positions  (which  however  had  been  withdrawn 
during  the  night)  and  against  the  shelters  and  routes  of 
approach.  Between  1  and  2:30  A.M.  a  stronger  artillery 
preparation;  between  2:30  and  4:10  A.M.  destructive  fire 
against  the  hostile  positions  in  such  manner  that  each  time 
two  lines  were  taken  under  fire,  while  the  hostile  artillery 
remained  under  fire  of  the  long  range  batteries.  At  4:20 
A.M.  a  powerful  fire  shock  was  to  give  the  signal  for  the 
assault,  which  was  to  be  preceded  by  a  creeping  barrage 
(1st  lift  300  meters,  than  10  minutes  for  each  200  meters) 
up  to  the  line  Ecouvillers-Atteche  Ferme.  The  infantry 
worked  its  way  up  to  within  300  meters  of  the  leading  hos- 
tile trenches,  ran  under  the  barrage  squads,  formed  within 
the  hostile  trenches  for  further  advance  and  also  advanced 
the  artillery  at  once.  The  execution  of  the  attack  had  been 
well  planned;  in  spite  of  superior  forces  the  German  divi- 
sions gained  ground,  and  could  gain  ground  everywhere.  In 
this  battle,  the  infantry  naturally  did  not  have  the  full 
support  of  its  guns,  while  being  exposed  to  the  concentrated 
fire  of  the  hostile  artillery.  Rapid  deployment  of  the  ar- 
tillery against  this  new  line  of  resistance  was  the  principal 
requirement  for  success,  while  the  infantry  had  to  be  halted 
as  soon  as  it  reached  the  artillery  protective  position.  The 
French  counter-attack  executed  on  June  10th,  11th,  and 
12th,  and  supported  by  tanks  and  airplane  squadrons,  had 
no  success  worthy  of  the  name. 

The  German  leadership  would  have  been  able  to  break 
the  resistance  prepared  here  only  with  heavy  losses,  and 
it  therefore  decided  not  to  continue  the  attack  at  this  point. 
It  was  correct  in  any  case  for  both  opponents  to  seek  the 
further  decision  in  the  Champagne  between  Rheims  and 
Chalons.    The  German  attack,  with  15  divisions  in  the  first. 


284  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

and  10  in  the  second  line,  started  on  July  15th  against  a 
fully  prepared  enemy.  The  4th  Army,  Gouraud,  claims  to 
have  made  preparations  as  early  as  July  12th  in  the  Cham- 
pagne, and  to  have  occupied  its  leading  positions  only  with 
detachments,  in  rear  of  which  were  single  strongly  wired 
supporting  points  to  catch  the  shock  in  the  line  Pournoy — 
Prosnes — Perthes,  while  the  decision  was  to  be  sought  by 
a  counter-attack  on  a  large  scale  against  the  front  Chateau 
Thierry — Soissons.  The  day,  place  and  frontage  of  the  at- 
tack had  been  known  to  the  Entente  since  the  13th.  Pris- 
oners taken  on  July  14th  divulged  all  further  details  of 
the  attack.  At  12:10  A.M.  July  15th  the  artillery  fire  was 
to  start  and  the  infantry  was  expected  to  start  for  the  as- 
sault at  4:15  A.M.  The  French  counter  preparation  started 
at  11:00  P.M.  on  the  14th. 

According  to  British  statements,  the  outpost  garrison 
had  materially  delayed  the  German  attack,  and  the  French 
artillery,  in  rear  positions,  brought  heavy  losses  to  the  as- 
saulting troops  and  the  batteries  that  had  gone  forward 
too  soon.  The  5th  Army  (Berthelot),  connecting  on  the 
left,  held  the  advanced  line  between  Rheims  and  the  Mame 
in  the  Montagnes  de  Reims,  but  could  not  prevent  the  Ger- 
man 1st  Army  (Fritz  v.  Below)  from  taking  the  heights 
north  of  Venteuil  and  the  Ardre  valley  to  include  Poury.  On 
the  German  right  wing  the  7th  Army  had  experienced 
greater  successes  and  had  been  able  to  gain  ground.  On 
July  16th  the  German  headquarters  directed  the  cessation 
of  the  attack,  at  5 :30  A.M.  On  the  18th,  between  the  Aisne 
and  the  Mame  a  completely  unexpected  French  counter- 
attack came  from  Belleau  (near  Chateau  Thierry) — Fon- 
tenay  (west  of  Soissons) .  This  counter-attack  was  made  in 
superior  force,  with  great  depth,  and  directed  against  the 
right  flank  of  the  Chateau  Thierry — Reims  front,  and  was 
executed  by  the  Army  Group  of  Fayolle  (6th  and  10th 
Army) .  It  was  preceded  by  a  short  fire  preparation  which 
immediately  continued  in  the  shape  of  a  creeping  barrage 
accompanied  by  numerous  fast  tanks.  The  tanks,  favored 
by  the  tall  standing  crops  in  which  our  machine  guns  could 
produce  no  effect,  plowed  through  our  lines,  unloaded  their 
passengers  with  machine  guns  in  our  rear  to  form  machine 
gun  nests,  and  then  the  tanks  returned  to  bring  up  rein- 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  285 

forcements.  Loss  of  ground  was  unavoidable  as  our  troops 
were  battle  worn,  but,  nevertheless,  the  scheduled  flank  at- 
tack was  frustrated.  Reserves  rapidly  brought  up  with 
auto  trucks  re-established  the  situation  by  a  strong  attack 
(20th  Infantry  Division).  We  will  here  again  point  out 
the  difficulties  encountered  when  the  foot  troops  are  sep- 
arated from  their  guns  and  vehicles  while  using  auto  trucks. 
The  French  did  not  utilize  their  initial  success  and  thus 
saved  us  from  a  heavy  defeat.  The  German  offensive  had 
passed  its  zenith ;  the  enormous  losses  in  leaders  and  trained 
men  were  not  to  be  replaced  as  quickly  as  the  situation  de- 
manded, and  the  value  of  recruits  fell  greatly.  Even  the 
best  army  cannot  be  victorious  if  it  is  not  supported  from 
home. 

The  German  conduct  of  the  offensive  up  to  then  was 
based  on  the  assumption  of  surprising  the  enemy  and  that 
the  enemy  would  remain  in  the  terrain  dominated  by  the 
German  artillery.  Any  attack  method  that  is  correctly 
formed  breaks  the  enemy's  resistance.  Surprise  makes 
this  easier.  The  attack  must  disintegrate  if  the  enemy  de- 
fends an  outpost  zone  of  some  kilometers  with  weak  forces, 
and  takes  a  position  in  readiness  with  strong  forces  out- 
side the  effective  fire  zone  of  our  artillery,  like  Humbert 
did  for  the  first  time  on  the  Matz  and  the  Army  under 
Gouraud  in  the  Champagne.  Now,  could  not  the  preparation 
for  a  change  of  the  battle  plans  have  been  ascertained  by 
aerial  reconnaissance?  Against  such  a  battle  formation  a 
long  artillery  preparation  merely  meant  squandering  am- 
munition and  allowed  the  infantry  without  sufficient  artil- 
lery preparation  to  enter  into  the  unbroken  artillery  fire  of 
the  defender.  From  these  reflections  result  the  fact  that 
the  hostile  outpost  zone  should  have  been  taken  after  a 
short  artillery  preparation  (possibly  only  by  medium  and 
heavy  minenwerfers)  in  the  afternoon  before  the  attack 
on  a  broad  front  (for  instance  3  to  4  army  fronts)  and 
that  only  at  the  assault  points  should  the  assaulting  troops 
be  placed  immediately  in  front  of  the  main  line  of  resistance 
during  darkness.  Prior  to  the  infantry  attack  the  second 
artillery  deployment  into  the  hostile  outpost  zone  should 
commence.  This  will  not  be  possible  without  resorting  to 
the  mechanical  truck  trains  (caterpillar  trucks).     Only  a 


286  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

portion  of  the  artillery  with  the  required  amount  of  ammu- 
nition should  be  placed  in  readiness  in  our  outpost  zone. 
Simultaneously  with  the  infantry  attack  the  gassing  of  the 
hostile  artillery  commences ;  almost  the  entire  artillery  par- 
ticipates in  this ;  the  infantry  has  to  break  the  hostile  re- 
sistance with  its  own  accompanying  arms;  this  becomes 
more  necessary  since  it  will  hardly  be  possible  to  start  an 
effective  creeping  barrage.  Obstacles  in  the  positions  in 
rear  have  to  be  flattened  and  torn  down  by  tanks.  The  at- 
tack has  become  more  difficult  through  this  battle  method. 
The  defender  can  materially  delay  the  second  deployment  of 
our  artillery  through  harassing  fire  and  gas  attacks ;  he  can 
bring  to  naught  the  preparations  for  the  attack  by  nightly 
sorties  on  a  large  scale,  and  can  himself  take  the  offensive 
at  other  points. 

We  are  obliged  to  admit  that  the  French  Army  has 
shown  a  greatly  increased  offensive  power  in  these  battles 
through  mass  insertion  of  airplanes,  ammunition  and  tanks. 
As  large  forces  of  American  troops  had  already  arrived,  the 
supreme  command  decided  to  evacuate  the  Mame  to  hold 
for  the  present  the  Aisne — ^Vesle  line. 

THE  LAST  DEFENSIVE  BATTLE 

After  the  defeat  of  the  German  July  offensive,  Marshal 
Foch  had  given  the  task  to  the  British  Army  which  on  July 
28th  the  1st  French  army  (Debeney)  was  subordinated; 
i.e.,  to  press  in  the  projecting  arc  east  of  Amiens.  For 
this  attack  Marshal  Haig  designated  the  4th  Army  (Raw- 
linson)  which,  with  7  divisions  in  the  first  line  and  4  divi- 
sions in  the  second  line  (starting  on  a  17-kilometer  front 
from  the  line  Hangard — Morlancourt) ,  waa  to  reach  Le 
Quesnil  (9  km.) — Mericourt  sur  Somme  (6  km.)  as  its  first 
objective.  1  cavalry  corps  (3d  Cavalry  Division)  brought 
up  by  night  marches,  reinforced  by  1  cyclist  battalion  and 
2  motor  machine  gun  battalions,  was  to  push  forward  along 
the  Amiens — Roye  road.  The  French  1st  Army,  connect- 
ing on  the  south,  was  to  attack  about  one  hour  after  the 
effect  of  the  British  attack  made  itself  felt.  Marshal  Foch 
retained  at  his  disposition  the  French  3d  Army  farther  to 
the  south.    By  means  of  well  planned  false  movements  and 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  287 

wireless  messages  sent  out  to  mislead  the  enemy,  it  was 
the  plan  to  create  the  belief  that  the  attack  would  take  place 
in  Flanders.  It  appeared  that  an  operation  of  the  German 
27th  Infantry  Division  on  August  6th  south  of  Morlancourt 
did  not  clear  up  the  situation  for  us.  Favored  by  a  heavy 
fog  that  had,  in  addition,  been  artificially  thickened,  the 
artillery  fire  suddenly  opened  on  August  8th ;  this  fire  soon 
changed  into  a  creeping  barrage,  immediately  followed  by 
tanks  and  infantry.  Surprise  against  the  leading  division 
of  the  2d  Army  had  succeeded.  The  entry  nearly  reached 
the  objective,  that  is,  between  Albert  and  Pierre-pont  on 
the  Avre,  a  depth  of  penetration  of  14  kilometers  had  been 
reached,  though,  with  the  exception  of  organizing  the  posi- 
tion, everything  that  could  be  done  for  defense  was  done, 
including  narrow  division  sectors  with  excellent  depth  for- 
mation and  plenty  of  ammunition.  The  hostile  tanks  anni- 
hilated our  machine  gun  nests,  and,  followed  by  cavalry, 
entered  deep  into  our  position  system  spreading  disorder 
and  confusion — even  headquarters  were  surprised  in  their 
quarters.  Valuable  documents  were  lost.  7  German  divi- 
sions, considered  absolutely  fit  for  fighting,  were  annihil- 
ated ;  the  enemy  had  but  little  loss ;  but  the  increasing  bad 
morale  of  our  poorly  trained  recruits  became  a  decisive 
fact.  Under  such  conditions,  there  could  be  no  longer  any 
mention  of  tactics.  "The  8th  of  August  is  the  black  day 
of  the  German  Army  in  the  History  of  this  War."  It  was 
very  fortunate  that  the  attack  of  the  Allies  was  not  con- 
tinued on  the  9th  in  the  same  strength. 

Further  attacks  between  Ancre  and  Avre  pushed  back 
our  lines  without  disrupting  them.  Gassing  in  conjunction 
with  fog,  mass  insertion  of  tanks,  and  insertion  of  strong 
airplane  battle  squadrons  were  the  causes  of  British  suc- 
cess. Based  on  the  estimate  of  the  situation  General  Lu- 
dendorff  perceived  that  in  the  face  of  the  relative  strength 
of  both  sides  no  victory  could  possibly  be  gained  by  the  Cen- 
tral Powers.  The  Government  of  the  Empire  was  obliged 
to  start  negotiations  for  peace,  the  army  high  command  was 
forced  to  try  and  prevent  a  penetration  of  the  German  lines, 
in  order  to  gain  time,  and  to  avoid  unnecessary  losses,  and 
to  save  the  living  power  of  the  army  for  subsequent  tasks, 
which  could  be  solved  farther  in  rear  on  a  shorter  line.  Thus 


288  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

the  troops  were  forced  to  hold  the  enemy,  to  cover  the  bring- 
ing away  of  the  materiel,  and  to  gain  the  time  required  for 
preparing  a  new  position.  Tenacious  defense  of  the  exten- 
sive foreground  delayed  the  enemy's  advance.  These  fore- 
ground battles  gave  the  defender  time  for  his  preparations 
and  furnished  important  viewpoints  for  estimating  the  of- 
fensive intentions  of  the  enemy.  In  many  cases  it  could 
not  be  prevented,  having  the  fights  extremely  stubborn  in 
the  foreground  zone.  Foreground  and  mobile  defense  with 
countershock  proved  excellent  in  the  defense.  A  British 
attack  undertaken  on  August  21st  at  6 :00  A.M.,  with  a  16- 
kilometer  front  between  Croisilles  and  the  Ancre,  against 
the  17th  Army,  according  to  the  arrangements  of  August 
8th,  was  driven  off.  104  tanks  alone  had  been  inserted  on 
the  Bucquoy — Achiet  le  Petit  road.  On  the  22d  an  attack 
on  a  larger  scale  succeeded,  and  then  the  British  continued 
their  attacks  the  next  few  days.  "The  characteristics  of 
the  attacks  were  narrow,  but  deep,  entries  by  tanks  after 
a  short  but  exceedingly  heavy  artillery  preparation,  in  con- 
junction with  artificial  fog.  Mass  insertion  of  tanks  and 
artificial  fog  remained  our  most  dangerous  enemies  in  the 
future.  They  became  more  and  more  dangerous  the  more 
morale  became  lowered  and  the  more  tired  and  weaker  our 
divisions  became.  The  depth  of  the  entry,  but  not  its  en- 
tire extent,  were  soon  seen.  Correctly  inserted  counter- 
attacks by  the  reserves  generally  offset  these  entries.  But 
there  was  danger  that  the  local  command  employed  its 
troops  in  an  overhasty  manner  and  not  in  close  order." 

The  decisive  battle  was  from  now  on  carried  on  in  the 
mobile  attack  method  only  where  success  was  assured.  If 
deep  indentures  occurred  in  a  position,  then  the  entire  por- 
tion of  the  front  was  taken  back  rather  than  exposing  the 
troops  to  heavy  loss  by  flanking  or  envelopment. 

Frequently,  the  enemy  was  deceived  concerning  the 
evacuation  of  a  position,  which  fact  led  him  to  attack  the 
void  left  by  the  abandoned  position.  The  differences  be- 
tween empty  positions  and  positions  only  temporarily  de- 
fended by  rear  guards  offering  serious  resistance,  frequently 
misled  the  attacker  into  rash  attacks,  so  that  he  subse- 
quently suddenly  attacked  fully  occupied  fire  fronts.     In 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  289 

Army  Reports  of  July  21,  1918,  it  is  stated:  "On  the  south 
bank  of  the  Marne  the  enemy  conducted  attacks  against  the 
positions  evacuated  by  us  during  the  preceding  night  (19th- 
20th) ;  these  attacks  were  made  yesterday  (20th)  in  the 
forenoon  after  an  artillery  preparation  lasting  four  hours, 
and  were  executed  under  heavy  fire  protection  and  accom- 
panied by  numerous  tanks;  the  latter  attacked  but  smoke 
in  the  empty  positions.  Our  fire  from  the  north  bank,  in 
part  flanking,  caused  the  enemy  heavy  losses."  "Our  task" 
said  General  Ludendorff  after  the  army  high  command 
had  ordered  the  retreat  to  the  Siegfried  position  in  July, 
1918,  "is  not  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  terrain  nor  to  hold 
it  at  any  cost,  but  to  reduce  the  fighting  power  of  the 
enemy."  Possession  of  the  terrain  is  in  itself  a  visible  sign 
of  success,  of  course,  but  was  greatly  overestimated  at  home. 
But  possession  of  the  ten-ain  can  never  justify  remaining  in 
a  tactically  unfavorable  situation ;  however,  timely  evacua- 
tion of  unfavorable  portions  of  terrain  may  well  offset  the 
gain  of  time  if  it  compels  the  enemy  to  undertake  a  new 
deployment  or  to  an  advance  across  difficult  terrain  under 
our  uninterrupted  fire.  However,  we  must  not  fail  to  re- 
cognize the  moral  gain  to  the  enemy  when  he  attributes  the 
voluntary  retreat  to  the  effect  of  his  own  measures.  But, 
if  we  could  hold  or  abandon  terrain  without  material  disad- 
vantage, conditions  were  different  for  the  enemy.  The  re- 
captured terrain  was  to  him  native  soil,  the  reoccupied  lo- 
calities gave  some  measure  of  the  extension  of  his  power. 
The  German  defensive  method  was  something  of  an  inno- 
vation which  was  demanded  by  considerations  of  expediency. 
The  "mobile  defense"  makes  enormous  demands  on  the 
troops.  A  retreat  never  raises  the  self-confidence  of  troops, 
for  whatever  remains  behind  in  men,  materiel  and  arms, 
falls  into  the  enemy's  hands. 

On  September  18th  attacks  by  large  units  on  the  part 
of  the  British  were  begun;  the  weak  German  troops  still 
proved  their  tenacity  and  desire  to  attack;  heavy  fighting 
took  place  around  the  debris  and  ruins  of  Gauzeaucourt  and 
Epehy.  In  spite  of  the  use  of  all  available  means,  no  deep 
entry  was  made  on  September  21st.  But  the  German  losses 
had  been  very  heavy.  The  troops  had  executed  a  task  that 
was  superhuman.    The  hostile  attacks  were  based  upon  the 


290  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

employment  of  tanks,  followed  by  infantry  with  great  depth, 
in  many  cases  with  hesitation.  The  artillery  prepara- 
tion consisted  principally  of  a  short  powerful  fire  shock, 
which  changed  at  the  appearance  of  the  infantry  into  a 
creeping  barrage.  The  appearance  of  tanks  in  large  masses 
demanded  a  formation  for  tank  defense  arms  in  great 
depth,  as  we  could  not  expect  that  all  tanks  could  be  de- 
feated by  a  single  line,  especially  when  their  advance  was 
also  screened  by  fog.  Thus,  a  certain  "tank  defense  zone" 
was  created  between  the  main  line  of  resistance  and  the 
artillery  protective  position  in  such  manner  that,  in  front, 
machine  guns  and  "tank  guns"  were  formed  in  groups,  far- 
ther in  rear  light  minenwerfers  and  field  guns  which  pos- 
sibly gave  opportunity  for  effect  towards  both  flanks. 

Directions  from  Great  General  Headquarters  of  August 
8th  pointed  out  the  probability  of  surprise  attacks.  Pro- 
tection against  those  was  not  to  be  sought  by  making  the 
defense  more  dense  but  by  holding  forces,  in  rear,  in  readi- 
ness. "Their  location  must  be  determined  with  a  view  to 
meeting  hostile  surprise  attacks.  The  activity  of  the  units 
placed  in  the  front  line  together  with  their  decisive  conduct 
in  the  battle  zone,  must  facilitate  timely  readiness  for  ac- 
tion on  the  part  of  the  forces  held  in  rear;  these  latter 
forces  must  attack  the  enemy  with  a  countershock  during 
his  sudden  entry  and  in  conjunction  with  the  divisions  in 
the  front  Hne,  drive  him  back  beyond  the  battle  zone."  The 
question  of  the  foreground  also  was  made  clearer:  "In 
open  terrain,  when  the  view  is  good,  the  position  can  be  rela- 
tively open.  In  close  terrain  and  when  there  is  a  bad  view 
(night  fog)  the  garrison  must  move  closer  together  within 
the  foreground ;  whether  the  movement  is  forward,  toward 
the  center,  or  toward  the  main  line  of  resistance  depending 
on  the  terrain.  In  all  other  portions  of  the  foreground,  pa- 
trols must  suffice  in  such  situations.  The  strength  runs 
all  the  way  from  a  simple  chain  of  sentries  to  the  deep,  or- 
ganized outpost  position,  with  artillery  and  minenwerfers. 
In  battle  the  foreground  garrison  conducts  itself  like  out- 
posts. It  will  drive  off  hostile  patrols  or  capture  them. 
The  foreground  garrison  does  not  conduct  this  fighting  rig- 
idly, but  with  mobility  and  by  using  every  opportunity  for 
favorable  movements.    In  hostile  attacks  (to  this  also  belong 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  291 

patrol  operations  on  a  larger  scale  prepared  by  artillery 
fire)  the  foreground  garrison,  as  a  general  rule,  falls  back 
fighting — and  in  pursuance  with  a  prearranged  plan  and 
according  to  instructions  from  the  commander — on  the  main 
line  of  resistance — also  laterally,  towards  the  wings.  If  the 
hostile  attack  is  driven  off,  the  foreground  will  again  be 
occupied  as  before  unless  the  commander  directs  otherwise. 
The  recapture  of  the  foreground  is  conducted  independently 
by  the  fighting  troops,  in  so  far  as  possible;  but  that  de- 
mands (if  the  enemy  has  gained  a  strong  foothold  there), 
a  systematic  counter-attack  which  must  be  ordered  by  the 
higher  commander  and  which  requires  stronger  forces  than 
the  foreground  garrison." 

It  was  quite  correct  to  point  out  that,  as  soon  as  the 
morale  of  the  troops  will  be  endangered  thereby,  defense  of 
the  foreground  should  be  abandoned  as  a  general  rule. 

The  artillery  was  to  conduct  its  fight  in  a  formation 
with  depth  and  as  a  mobile  force ;  it  was  cautioned  against 
"gun  fanaticism;"  was  informed  that  ammunition  was  of 
more  importance  than  number  of  guns,  and  that  concentra- 
ted fire  against  the  important  targets  was  of  great  impor- 
tance. Systematic  defense  by  stationary  barrage  was  dis- 
countenanced absolutely.  "Barrage  fire  is  without  any  ef- 
fect, seldom  is  correct  in  its  adjustment,  is  too  thin,  starts 
usually  too  late,  requires  a  great  deal  of  ammunition  and 
materially  endangers  the  infantry  in  a  mobile  battle.  Sta- 
tionary barrages  should  in  all  cases  be  strictly  forbidden 
in  ordinary  position  warfare.  Their  place  should  be  taken 
by  a  concentrated  fire  of  annihilation." 

Again  Great  General  Headquarters  pointed  out  that 
losses  could  be  materially  lessened  without  endangering 
the  battle  objective  by  the  creation  of  an  extensive  fore- 
ground, 1  to  3  kilometers  deep,  and  by  systematic,  well 
planned  depth  formation.  The  designations  "foreground 
zone"  and  "main  battle  zone"  are  primarily  designations 
of  command.  It  can  only  confuse  troops  if  they  have  to 
differentiate  between  these  designations.  In  speaking  to 
troops  the  expression  "foreground  zone"  and  "main  battle 
zone"  should  not  be  mentioned,  but  the  troops  should  re- 
ceive directions  in  each  case  as  to  what  zone  they  must  hold. 


292  DEVELOPMENT  OF  TACTICS— WORLD  WAR 

That  is  their  "battle  zone."  Positions  in  rear  thereof,  are, 
for  the  troops,  merely  "positions  in  rear."  In  the  sense  of 
an  "elastic  defense"  the  troops  must  free  themselves  from 
an  overestimation  of  the  possession  of  terrain.  In  any 
case  it  must  be  made  clear  to  the  troops  in  orders,  whether 
they  must  give  up  ground  and  how  much,  and  what  terrain 
must  be  in  their  hands  absolutely  at  the  conclusion  of  a 
battle.  Keeping  up  the  fighting  power  and  the  offensive 
spirit  are  more  important  than  possession  of  a  few  villages 
all  shot  to  ruins,  and  of  a  few  trenches ;  for  that  reason,  the 
higher  and  the  subordinate  commanders  must  very  quickly 
decide  clearly  whether  a  counter  fire  shock  or  a  counter- 
attack is  required,  and  if  the  losses  suffered  in  any  attack 
are  commensurate  with  what  we  hope  to  attain  by  gaining 
ground.  We  never  succeeded  at  all  points  in  organizing 
positions  in  rear  in  sufficient  extension.  The  fighting  troops 
required  rest,  and  in  addition  they  were  required  to  fight, 
march  and  then  intrench.  It  was  quite  comprehensible 
that  the  troops  were  only  too  willing  to  do  without  trenches, 
especially  as  the  hostile  aerial  reconnaissance  could  not 
then  ascertain  without  considerable  trouble  where  the  main 
resistance  was  to  be  made.  Obstacles  and  bomb-proofs 
were  of  greater  value  than  trenches.  It  was  the  old  fight 
between  shell  crater  positions  and  rifle  trenches.  The  ad- 
vantages of  a  well  constructed  trench  system  however  show 
themselves  immediately  as  soon  as  the  troops  are  forced  to 
remain  for  a  considerable  time  at  one  place.  Again  and 
again  the  high  command  was  obliged  to  point  out  the  im- 
portance of  thoroughly  constructed  positions.  Time  for  re- 
cuperation could  not  be  granted  to  the  tired  troops  during 
this  fatal  period ;  the  strength  of  the  companies  in  many  in- 
stances sank  to  about  40  men,  and  supplies  failed  to  suffice 
for  the  demands  either  in  numbers  or  value. 

I  quote  the  following  excerpts  from  a  letter  written  in 
the  field : 

"The  man  is  supposed  to  work  and  fight.  That,  which 
he  has  created  today,  is  lost  the  very  next  day.  Supply 
from  the  rear  is  going  to  pieces,  there  is  a  shortage  of  ra- 
tions. Actual  rest  the  troops  enjoy  but  seldom.  For  three 
weeks  training  has  been  very  fatiguing  for  the  officers.  The 


THE  BATTLES  IN  1918  293 

men  on  furlough  do  not  return  at  the  proper  time;  they 
loaf  around  railroad  stations  and  around  the  cities  and 
appear  probably  seven  days  after  the  expiration  of  their 
furlough.  If  they  are  punished  therefor,  we  lose  their 
work;  if  we  let  them  off  without  punishment,  discipline 
suffers.  And  then  the  traffic  and  theft !  The  young  officer 
is  undoubtedly  brave,  but  training  is  lacking  in  the  officers' 
corps.  He  cannot  treat  his  older  men  properly.  The  older 
gentlemen  (officers)  are  for  the  greater  part  no  longer  equal 
to  their  tasks ;  they  break  down,  and  the  battalions  and  regi- 
ments pass  from  one  hand  to  the  other." 

And  again  from  another  letter  prior  to  the  revolution : 
"The  army  has  been  fighting  for  six  weeks  continually 
on  the  retreat,  partly  in  dissolution,  thrown  out  of  one  posi- 
tion into  the  other,  the  troops  without  relief,  played  out, 
airplane  attacks  by  day  and  by  night,  firing  on  the  quarters, 
lack  of  ammunition  in  consequence  of  the  railroads  going 
to  pieces, — that  was  the  picture  offering  itself  to  the  eyes 
of  the  man  behind  the  scenes.  The  men  lived  only  in  the 
thought:  why  should  I  let  myself  be  shot  to  death,  peace 
will  soon  come,  and  so  they  gave  themselves  up  as  prisoners. 
Our  enemies  of  course  soon  perceived  this  state  of  affairs. 
Therefore  their  continual  desire  is  to  gain  time,  so  as  to  com- 
pletely annihilate  us.  Would  we  have  acted  differently? 
But  the  answer  of  the  enemy  to  our  offer  for  an  armistice 
has  had  a  very  different  effect  on  the  entire  front  than  the 
enemies  thought.  The  men  perceived  the  hostile  desire  to 
annihilate  us  and  had  come  to  their  senses.  For  the  past 
eight  days  I  believe  that  an  entirely  different  sentiment  has 
taken  possession  of  the  men.  We  have  learned  to  organize 
the  retreat,  there  are  again  troops  present,  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  everything  runs  smoothly  along  tranquil  roads. 
The  front  holds  out.  Our  positions  are  adapted  to  the  at- 
tack methods  of  the  enemy.  The  enemy  will  find  that  out. 
Our  men  again  have  confidence,  and  then  we  will  be  superior 
to  every  opponent." 

The  much  abused  "militarism"  misunderstood  by  its 
opponents  at  home  but  well  known  and  feared  by  the 
enemy,  has  stood  the  test  splendidly  in  these  dark  days  and 
proved  its  justification. 


Conclusion 

The  World  War  found  a  premature  end  through  politi- 
cal events  in  Germany,  without  additional  battles  having 
been  able  to  prove  the  correctness  of  our  new  defensive 
method.  Great  General  Headquarters  had  the  fullest  con- 
fidence in  these  general  rules,  though  it  did  not  underesti- 
mate the  value  of  the  hostile  procedure  of  the  offensive,  the 
influence  of  superiority  of  numbers,  and  the  importance  of 
the  hostile  fighting  means.  The  high  command  reckoned  on 
success,  or  at  least  on  gaining  time,  in  the  defense  of  the 
expected  Antwerp — Meuse  position  and  also  in  further  bat- 
tles. But  things  happened  differently !  The  army  at  home 
knifed  the  undefeated  field  army  in  the  back,  like  Hagen  of 
old  did  to  the  unconquerable  valiant  hero,  Siegfried.  The 
lessons  of  history  were  not  written  for  us,  our  peoples 
trusted  to  the  "goodheartedness"  of  unforgiving  enemies, 
who  concealed  their  hatred  under  the  banner  of  the  League 
of  Nations.  Our  peoples  were  to  find  out  for  themselves 
"Vae  victis!" 

Supported  by  weak  allies,  the  German  army  had  op- 
posed for  almost  four  and  one-half  years  a  world  of  enemies, 
who  had  at  their  disposition  all  means  of  industry  and  tech- 
nique, of  foodstuffs  and  raw  materials.  If  we  seek  for  the 
criminal  responsible  for  our  fall,  he  should  be  sought,  not 
in  the  army,  but  he  should  be  sought  in  the  ranks  of  the 
leaders  of  our  political  parties,  in  the  ranks  of  the  men  who 
placed  pursuit  of  their  own  ends  above  the  weal  and  woe  of 
Germany.  In  the  territory  of  the  enemy,  the  army  has  se- 
cured its  greatest  achievements,  and  was  very  near  in  reach- 
ing an  advantageous  peace.  In  the  foregoing  pages  no  one 
should  seek  for  errors ;  they  are  only  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
formation of  what  we  have  done,  so  that  the  reader  may 
proudly  look  back  on  the  achievements  of  our  people  under 
arms.  The  ignominious  peace  of  Versailles  is  for  the  sole 
purpose  of  making  us  helpless  and  consequently  no  longer 
dangerous.  Can  the  annihilation  of  our  peoples  be  God's 
will?    We  do  not  believe  so.    Our  peoples  have  given  too 

294 


CONCLUSION  295 

many  proofs  of  their  efficiency  to  permit  a  stroke  of  the 
pen  of  the  Entente  to  annihilate  them.  In  spite  of  all  diffi- 
culties piling  up  in  front  of  us,  I  firmly  believe  in  the  future 
of  our  peoples.  German  power  may  be  lamed  for  years, 
but  the  German  spirit  cannot  be  killed.  The  German  Spirit 
will  continue  to  live ! 

When  later  on  a  new  aurora  of  history  embellishes  our 
days,  then  may  our  peoples  remember  also  our  heroes  of 
the  World  War.  Work,  suffer,  and  fight  like  they  did,  and 
thus  Germany's  future  will  be  secure.  And  then,  also,  the 
blood  of  our  heroes  who  fell  in  the  belief  of  Germany's  vic- 
tory will  not  have  been  spilled  in  vain ! 


^ 


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